PSC Session on Protection of Children in Conflict Situations in Africa
Amani Africa
Date | 11 May, 2021
Tomorrow (11 May) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 995th session virtually, to discuss on the theme ‘protection of children in conflict situations in Africa’. The session is to be convened in the context of Council’s decision at its 420th meeting to hold annual sessions dedicated to children affected by armed conflicts (CAAC), as well as its decision at its 956th meeting to dedicate two sessions per year, to receive briefings on the situation of children affected by conflict situations, from the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACERWC) and related partners. As indicated in its information note, the main objective of the session is for Council to receive updates on the state of children’s rights in conflict situations and to reflect on how well protection of such children is integrated in AU conflict prevention, management and resolution architecture.
The session is set to start with the opening remark of the PSC Chairperson of the month and Permanent Representative of People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria, Salah Francis Elhamdi. Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, Bankole Adeoye and Commissioner of Health, Humanitarian Affairs and Social Development, Amira El Fadil will also make key remarks. Presentations are also expected from invited participants including ACERWC Special Rapporteur on CAAC, Save the Children, and United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF).
Tomorrow’s session is expected to highlight recent trends about how ongoing conflicts are affecting children in conflict affected areas. Various reports indicate that in the various conflict settings civilians bear much of the brunt of conflicts and crises. Children are among those most affected. This is the case whether in situations of armed conflict such as those in the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes regions or in situations of terrorist violence in the Sahel, Lake Chad Basin, Somalia and Cabo Delgado province of Mozambique.
Children are affected by violence both as indirect victims and direct targets of the violence. They end up sustaining physical violence, forced into displacement and fleeing into neighbouring countries as refugees as recent events in Cabo Delgado province of Mozambique and Tigray region of Ethiopia have highlighted. They also suffer the most, as the situation in South Sudan attest, from conflict induced hunger and malnutrition in conflict situations. Children are among the main victims of recruitment, use, sexual abuse and exploitation in conflict situations. The recurrent incidents of abduction of school girls and boys by Boko Haram has put spotlight on children as direct targets of terrorist attacks and abductions. Similar incidents of attacks on school have also been reported in conflict affected parts of Cameroon.
Even when children survive the physical effects of conflicts and terrorist violence, they are not spared from being deprived of access to basic necessities such as health care and lose opportunities due to disruption of their access to education. For instance, UN reports show that in Central Sahel alone, 4,000 schools were forced to cease function in early 2020 due to direct attacks and insecurity, leaving about 650,000 students out of education.
The rate of displacement of children has also been most concerning in recent months. By end of April this year, the UN has reported that 168,000 children were forced to flee their homes due to the widespread violence which broke out in Central African Republic (CAR) in the run- up to the elections of December 2020. In addition to the spike in displacement of children, the Covid-19 pandemic has further compounded the situation. Particularly, internally displaced (IDP) and refugee children continue to be excessively affected as a result of the outbreak of the pandemic. With that in mind, Council has emphasised at its 921st session, that part of the AU Covid-19 Response Fund should be directed towards provision of humanitarian assistance to refugees and IDPs among other vulnerable parts of society. Having regard to the accelerating rate of the pandemic in some parts of the continent and the potential impact on IDP and refugee children there, Council may reiterate this point and call on Member States to mobilise more support to those countries that have high numbers of IDP and refugee populations.
The first issue that these various issues affecting children in armed conflict raise is how to ensure protection of children during conflicts. This is not about the deployment of security measures only. In this respect, it is of significance that measures are taken to ensure that conflict actors observe human rights and international humanitarian law (IHL) standards. This necessitates not only urging the actors to abide by these standards and reminding them of the responsibility they bear for violations of those standards but also putting in place mechanisms for monitoring, investigating and reporting incidents of violations. Additionally, it is incumbent on governments to facilitate humanitarian access and initiatives for protecting and supporting civilians and children affected by violence. The situation of displaced and refugee children not only in recent conflict situations but also those from frozen conflicts also deserves particular attention. Recurring incidents of attacks on schools also underscore the importance of and the need for upholding such frameworks as the ‘Safe School Declaration’, aimed at ensuring children in conflict situations continue to enjoy their right to education.
The second issue relates to the settlement of the conditions of conflict and terrorist violence, including the resolution of the underlying causes. In this respect, the issues requiring attention include absence of good governance and democratic inclusion, weak presence of state institutions and public services in areas far from urban centres, depleting resources on which communities depend for their livelihoods, marginalization and inequality and lack of respect for and protection of fundamental rights of affected people. Given the consequences of violence, there is also a need for initiating measures for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of conflict affected regions.
Tomorrow’s session also presents the chance for the PSC to follow up on its request at previous sessions, for the AU Commission to implement Assembly/AU/Dec.718 (XXXII), adopted at the 32nd Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly, convened on 10-11 February 2019. Assembly/AU/Dec.718 (XXXII) underscores four strategic resolutions essential to child protection, which are: the establishment of an accountability, monitoring and reporting mechanism; the development of a child protection architecture for the AU; the establishment of child focal points in all AU missions; and the establishment of an office of Special Envoy on children in situations of conflict. In this respect, the address from the two Commissioners’ remarks is expected to provide update on these four areas relating to AU’s role.
It is also to be recalled that at its previous session, Council was presented with the final ‘Policy on Integration of Child Protection into the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)’, developed by the AU Peace and Security Department (PSD). Tomorrow’s session presents the opportunity to examine the level of implementation of decisions related to child protection, within the framework of APSA, including relevant organs of Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs).
The form that the expected outcome of the session takes remains unknown. It is expected that the PSC will express its concern about the plight of children in conflict affected countries in Africa. The PSC may call on all parties to armed conflicts to comply with international, regional and national instruments applicable to the protection of children in conflict situations, including international human rights law and IHL. It may also call on the AU Commission to ensure the full operationalization and implementation of the AU mechanisms for protection of children in conflict situations. To ensure that children in armed conflicts continue to enjoy their basic rights, Council may urge all relevant actors to strive for ensuring that access to humanitarian assistance is guaranteed to enable children to get access to life saving services including food, health care and education. Council may also underscore the importance for Member States, the AU Commission, RECs/RMs and the international community to enhance their child protection capacity in conflict situations at the national, regional and continental levels. In this regard, the PSC may urge the international community to enhance its support for humanitarian assistance particularly for displaced and refugee children.
Briefing on the situation in Somalia and the renewal of the mandate of AMISOM
Amani Africa
Date | 11 May, 2021
Tomorrow (11 May), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to consider the situation in Somalia and the implementation of AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) mandate based on the report of the Chairperson of the Commission. Although the focus of the discussion is supposed to be on AMISOM, the meeting will likely pay closer attention to the political crisis in Somalia. The country finds itself at crossroads following serious disagreement over the organization of elections. This latest development will also have enormous implications on the future of AMISOM.
Opening remarks are expected to be delivered by the PSC Chairperson of the month and Permanent Representative of People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria, Salah Francis Elhamdi. Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, Bankole Adeoye, is also expected to address the PSC. The Council is expecting to receive a briefing on the recent developments from Francisco Madeira, the Special Representative of the AU Commission Chairperson (SRCC) and Head of AMISOM. Representatives of troop contributing countries, the UN and the EU may also make statements in the partially open segment of the session.
It is to be recalled that the AUPSC met on 22nd April to discuss the political and security situation in Somalia following the decision by the lower house of the Somali Parliament, the House of the People, to extend the mandate of the President and the Parliament. The Council condemned this unilateral decision and reaffirmed its support to the 17 September agreement as the only viable way forward to ensure the holding of timely, transparent, and credible elections in Somalia. In this regard, it underscored the need for Somali parties and other stakeholders to return to dialogue and reach a political compromise. Reaffirming the AU’s readiness to support such a process, the Council requested the Chairperson of the Commission to appoint a Special Envoy who will work with the parties and assist them in reaching a mutually acceptable political compromise. Accordingly, Former President of Ghana, John Dramani Mahama, has been appointed as the AU Special Envoy and he is expected to visit Somalia over the coming days to discuss with the country’s political stakeholders on how to resolve the prevailing impasse and pave the way for the holding of elections in the shortest possible time. The Somali Opposition Alliance, Somali National Salvation Forum, in its letter addressed to the Chairperson of the Commission welcomed this decision, while expressing reservation on the inclusion of the Head of AMISOM’s Political Affairs Division as part of the Special Envoy’s team.
Based on the decision of the AUPSC, the 32nd Meeting of the Coordination Committee (MOCC) of the Troop and Police Contributing Countries (T/PCCs) of AMISOM was held on 28 April 2021 at the level of Ambassadors, and Chiefs of Defense Staff and Chiefs/Commissioners of Police. The meeting reflected on the political crisis in Somalia and its serious ramifications for the country’s security situation. Particularly, the MOCC looked at the implications in terms of the implementation of both the Somali Transition Plan (STP) and UN Security Council Resolution 2568 (2021). This resolution, in its paragraph 39, requested the AU to report to the Security Council through the UN Secretary-General on a number of specific issues, including progress on joint operations in support of the STP including the use and effectiveness of coordination mechanisms; progress against revised objectives and functions set out in paragraphs 11 and 12; accountability measures taken to address underperformance, including command and control, and conduct and discipline; measures taken to protect civilians; equipment review outcomes and use of force assets; and staffing of the civilian component.
The Report of the Chairperson provides specific updates on progress made in these areas over the past three months. The report acknowledges, however, the slow progress made in the implementation of the resolution 2568 (2021). In this regard, it emphasized the serious ramifications of the current political impasse in the effective implementation of the milestones set out in the resolution against the specified timeframes. Particularly, it put into question the viability of the STP in the face of the prevailing factionalism and divisions within the Somali Security forces, which was manifest during the recent incident in Mogadishu. This, the report says, is a matter of serious concern for AMISOM, making it difficult for the mission to facilitate joint operations in a divided and factionalized Somali Security Forces (SSF). Most importantly, the report argues that this situation is likely to undermine the ability of the SSF not only to assume security responsibilities from AMISOM but also plan, agree, and conduct joint operations with AMISOM in line with the operational timelines, objectives and functions identified in the STP and UNSCR 2568 (2021). The AU is doing its own independent assessment and it is expected to highlight the AU perspective on the future of AMISOM in view of this serious challenge.
One of the things underlined during the MOCC meeting was, in fact, the need for AMISOM to prepare contingency plans in light of the latest developments in Somalia and take the necessary steps to ensure the capabilities for its implementation. There was also indication of the possible T/PCC Summit, which could likely provide the necessary strategic guidance to AMISOM. In this connection, the Chairperson’s report emphasized that sustained progress in the implementation of the AU’s objectives and mandate in Somalia is largely dependent on the availability of appropriate logistical and financial support to AMISOM. Therefore, it once again underscored the need for continued mobilization of support for AMISOM, including through predictable, sustainable, and flexible financing mechanisms to ensure successful implementation of the AMISOM’s mandate.
In the meantime, things have moved in a positive direction in Somalia since the last meeting of the AUPSC. President Farmaajo, who came under increased pressure both from within and outside, addressed the nation in a televised speech on 26 April 2021, following which the House of the People reversed its April 12 decision and reinstated the 17 September Agreement as a basis for the organization of the upcoming elections. The Prime Minister has also been given the lead role to prepare for peaceful, credible, and transparent elections and ensure its security. This decision, which rescued the country from the brink, was welcomed by IGAD, the AU, and indeed the rest of the international community. Prime Minister Roble met with members of the international community in Mogadishu and assured them of his commitment to hold inclusive & transparent Federal elections. He expressed his intention to invite the Federal Member States to attend the National Consultative Forum to finalize the electoral process in line with the Sept 17 and Feb 16 Agreements. Following his meeting with the opposition, soldiers who rebelled against the term extension are said to have started withdrawing from the capital, Mogadishu. The Prime Minister also inspected the reopening of streets and the removal of barricades to restore normalcy and calm in the city.
The other major development is the announcement made by the Federal Government of Somalia to restore diplomatic relations with Kenya. The relations between the two countries had been strained over the past six months in relation to their maritime dispute and accusations by Somalia against Kenya of meddling in its internal affairs. Qatar is said to have provided good offices in facilitating the restoration of diplomatic ties between the two countries. The Spokesperson of President Formajo announced that “In [the] interest of good neighborliness, the Federal Government of Somalia resumes diplomatic ties with Kenya based on mutual benefit and respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-external interference, peaceful co- existence and equality”. The Kenyan Foreign Ministry in its statement noted this announcement and looked forward to further normalization of relations by the Somali authorities including with regard to trade, communication, transportation, people to people relations and cultural exchanges.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to welcome the reversal of the April 12 decision by the House of the People and the reinstatement of the 17 September agreement as a basis for the holding of elections. It may wish to reiterate the need for inclusive dialogue among Somali stakeholders leading to broad political consensus and compromise on the electoral processes within this framework. In this regard, it may welcome the appointment of Former President John Dramani Mahama as the AU Special Envoy and call upon Somali stakeholders to work with him in the search for finding a solution to the political impasse and pave the way for the holding of elections within the shortest time possible. The PSC may also welcome the restoration of diplomatic relations between Somalia and Kenya. With respect to AMISOM, the PSC may express concern over the serious implications of the political crisis in the country for the implementation and timelines of both the STP and UN Security Council Resolution 2568 (2021). It may also echo the call by the MOCC on AMISOM to avoid being drawn into partisan politics in Somala. The PSC may underscore the need for coordinated efforts with other international partners, including IGAD, UN and EU to address the current situation. It may look forward to the outcome of the ongoing AU independent assessment of AMISOM and once again reiterate the need for continued mobilization of support for the mission to ensure the successful implementation of its mandate. The PSC is expected to renew the mandate of AMISOM with its current troop levels until 31 December 2021.
Consideration of the Fact Finding Mission on Chad
Amani Africa
Date | 10 May, 2021
Tomorrow (10 May) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 994th session to consider the findings of the Fact- finding Mission on Chad.
This first session of the month is set to begin with the opening remark of the PSC Chairperson for May, Algeria’s Permanent Representative to the AU, Salah Francis Elhamdi. The AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, who co-led the delegation of the Fact-finding Mission, is expected to present on the findings of the Mission. Similarly, Djibouti’s Permanent Representative to the AU, Mohammed Idriss Farah, Chairperson of the PSC for April who co-led the mission is also scheduled to present on the mission. It is also envisaged that the representative of Chad, as the country concerned, will make a statement.
Tomorrow’s session is a follow up to the emergency session on Chad the PSC had at its 993rd meeting held on 22 April 2021. In that meeting, the Council requested the AU Commission to send a ‘high- powered Fact-Finding Mission to Chad’. It is to be recalled that the emergency session was convened after the military announced seizure of power after the death of the late President Idriss Deby Itno on 20 April, reportedly from the wounds sustained while battling rebel groups. A Transitional Military Council, established under the leadership of Deby’s son, Mahamat Idriss Deby, suspended the Constitution and dissolved the national Assembly. The military takeover took place in clear contravention to the terms of Chad’s Constitution which provides that in the event of vacation of power, the president of the National Assembly should be appointed as interim president and lead the country to elections within 90 days.
As highlighted in our previous ‘Insight on the PSC’ for the emergency session on Chad at its 993rd session, practice of the PSC takes two approaches during unconstitutional change of government. The first is the automatic application of the Lomé Declaration and article 7(1) (g) of the PSC Protocol, resulting in the immediate suspension of the country from AU activities. Since coming into operation in March 2004 and until its 993rd session on Chad, the PSC invoked its Article 7(1)(g) power in fifteen (15) instances.1 In all the 15 instances except that of Cote d’Ivoire in December 2010, the PSC designated each instance as constituting ‘coup d’état’ or ‘unconstitutional change of government’. The PSC also condemned or rejected the ‘coup d’état’ or ‘unconstitutional change ofgovernment’ in each instance. Additionally, with the exception of three cases,2 in all other twelve (12) cases the PSC applied the Lomé Declaration’s stipulation for automatic suspension of the country concerned, with the PSC, in some cases, such as its 384th session, stating that AU instruments ‘provide for automatic implementation of specific measures whenever unconstitutional change of government occurs.’
The forcible seizure of power by the military in Chad is the first case in which the PSC failed to name the act as a coup d’état and condemn or reject it. This is in stark departure from both the clear terms of AU normative instruments including the Lomé Declaration of 2000 and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (2007) and the practice it has set over the years, at least in two major ways. On one hand, the Council stopped short of characterizing the military takeover in Chad as ‘unconstitutional change of government’ or a ‘coup d’état’. On the other hand, the Council neither suspended Chad from AU activities pursuant to its Protocol and the Lomé Declaration nor did it follow the Burkina Faso and Sudan approach that gave 15 days ultimatum for the military to transfer power to a civilian authority.
The PSC decided to task the AU Commission to dispatch ‘a high-powered Fact-Finding Mission’, with the participation of the PSC, to engage with the Chadian authorities on all issues relating to the situation there, particularly to support the investigation into the killing of the late President and ascertain the efforts to restore constitutionalism, and report back to the Council within two weeks. In pursuit of this, the Fact-finding Mission, led by the AU Commissioner for PAPS, along with the PSC Chairperson for the month of April (Permanent Representative of Djibouti), was deployed to Chad from 29 April to 06 May 2021. The delegation involved the participation of the representatives of five PSC member states from the five regions of the continent (Cameroon from Central, Djibouti from East, Egypt from the North, Ghana from West and Lesotho from Southern). The DRC in its capacity as Chairperson of the Union, and an officer of the AU Legal Counsel were also part of the delegation.
According to a statement released by AU Commission on 29 April, the Fact-Finding Mission would engage with Chadian authorities and stakeholders mainly to ‘get first-hand information’ on the unfolding political and security situation as well as explore ways to facilitate ‘a swift return to constitutional order’, while at the same time preserving security and territorial integrity of that country. The mission held meetings with a wide range of actors including the President of the Military Council, Head of the Lake Chad Basin Commission, religious leaders of Chad, President of the Supreme Court of Chad and President of the Assembly of Chad. The delegation of the mission also received a briefing from the AU Commission Chairperson in N’Djamena.
One consideration that seems to carry tremendous weight within the PSC as reflected in its communique of the 993rd session is the security context in Chad and its neighbourhood. Some of the developments that merit attention during tomorrow’s session include the intense political climate after a deadly protest broke out in the two largest cities (N’Djamena and Moundou), demanding a return to constitutional order. According to media reports, military crackdown left six people dead and some 700 people arrested. Also of concern is the fight with rebel group, the Front for Change and Concord in Chad, otherwise known by its French acronym as FACT, in northern part of the country, some 300Kms north of the capital. This is despite the rebel’s overtures for a ceasefire and dialogue. The military council ruled out any possibility to sit down with the rebels for negotiation nor mediation, but vowed to bring them to justice. Another consideration for PSC members is the fact that Chad is a key player as a major military actor in the efforts to combat terrorism and violent extremism in both the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin regions.
Of course, these concerns about security and stability are not completely unique to Chad. These are threats that Chad shares with its two neighboring countries, Sudan and Mali, that also experienced military seizure of power in similar context. Indeed, experience shows that overemphasizing the security dimension leads to risk of the military considering it as a license to justify seizure of power in complete disregard of the constitutional process of the country concerned. While security represents a significant consideration, the experience of Mali and Sudan also shows that it cannot dispense with the need for upholding constitutional order and the application of the AU norm on unconstitutional changes of government.
In terms of the task of the Fact-finding Mission for ‘ascertaining’ and ‘facilitating’ swift return to constitutional order, the shape that the transitional process has taken shows no indication of a handing over of power to civilian authority. Instead, indications are that the Military Council is going to stay around. The Military Council, without any meaningful engagement with other stakeholders, adopted a Transitional Charter, indicating the continuation of the suspension of the Constitution of the country. This Charter invests supreme authority in the Military Council, with the Chairman of the Military Council holding enormous power including the appointment of both the Transitional Government headed by the Prime Minister and the members of National Transitional Council. It is to be recalled that the PSC has already expressed its ‘grave concern’ over the military takeover and urged the handing over of political power to civilian authorities in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Constitution of Chad, at its 993rd session.
The Military Council named a government comprising 40 ministers and deputy ministers where oppositions are given some portfolios. For instance, the former Prime Minister turned an opposition and a presidential runner-up in the latest election, Albert Pahimi Padacke, has been appointed to head the transitional government as an interim Prime Minister. The newly created Ministry of Reconciliation and Dialogue as well as the Justice Ministry are also portfolios handed to the opposition. While some of this move received positive response from some oppositions including the longtime opposition figure Saleh Kebzabo, the fact remains that under the Transitional Charter, ultimate power is held by the Military Council. Thus, these measures that the Military Council took represent no progress towards return to civilian rule within the framework of Chadian Constitution as stipulated in the communiqué of PSC’s 993rd meeting.
The other issue on which the Fact-finding Mission is expected to update the PSC is the investigations around the circumstances of the death of the late President Deby.
The expected outcome is a communique. On the issue of the transfer of power to civilian authorities as per the terms of PSC’s 993rd meeting, the PSC may follow one of the two options. The first is to endorse the Military Council’s plan for the transition. This would be a direct violation of the AU instruments including the PSC’s Protocol and bring to an end AU’s policy of zero tolerance to military coups. The other option is to apply, as it did for Mali in August 2020, the AU instruments, declare the military council’s action a military coup, suspend Chad from participation in the AU activities and set out clear terms for Military Council’s handover of power to civilian transitional authority with the participation of various Chadian stakeholders for lifting suspension. The Council is expected to reiterate its deep concern about the increasing spate of violence and rebellion and the attendant heightened insecurity and the increasing operational tempo of rebels, foreign terrorist fighters and mercenaries, as well as the proliferation of illicit weapons, as consequences of, among others, the conflict in Libya. The PSC is also expected to express concern about the challenges facing Chad’s security and stability and the necessity of forestalling the transitional process from leading to the destabilization of the country, and the weakening of its role in the fight against terrorism in the region. In this respect, the PSC, as it did in previous instances relating to Chad, may also express its rejection of the attempt of the rebel groups for taking power by force and call for peaceful means for resolving the fighting with rebel groups. The Council is also likely to express its regrets over the incidents of violence on protesters and call on all parties to show utmost restraint and the de facto authorities to respect human rights as enshrined in different regional and international human rights instruments.
1Togo (2005), Mauritania (2005), Mauritania (2008), Guinea (2008), Madagascar (2009), Niger (2010), Cote d’Ivoire (2010), Mali (2012), Guinea Bissau (2012), Central African Republic (2013), Egypt (2013), Burkina Faso (2014), Burkina Faso (2015), Sudan (2019) and Mali (2020).
2The first instance in which the PSC did not activate automatic suspension after declaring the occurrence of a coup d’état or unconstitutional change of government was at its 164th session held on 24 December 2008 relating to Guinea. But this lasted only for five days. Thus, at its 165th session held on 29 December 2008, after the visit of the AU Commission Chairperson to the country on 26 December, the PSC suspended Guinea from participation in AU activities. The other instances are the cases of Burkina Faso in November 2014 and Sudan in April 2019 where the PSC set a 15-day deadline for transfer of power after declaring the seizure of power by the military a coup d’état and condemning it.
