State of foreign military presence in Africa
Amani Africa
Date | 14 August, 2019
Tomorrow (14 August) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will hold a session to assess the state of foreign military presence in Africa and its implications on the implementation of African Common Defense and Security Policy.
The AU Peace and Security Department is expected to brief the Council. The Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA) is also best placed to provide further inputs.
In recent years increasing concerns have been expressed over the surge in the establishment of foreign military presence in various parts of the continent. In its communique of its 776th session held in May 2018, the PSC expressed deep concern ‘over the potential negative effects of the presence of foreign military bases in some volatile parts of the continent to the future security and stability of Africa’.
The 19th meeting of the Panel of the Wise in November 2018 went further. It not only reiterated the concern about the ‘increasing militarization of parts of the continent, in particular the Sahel and the Horn of Africa regions’ but importantly ‘the increase in uncoordinated external interventions which undermines the efficacy of African‐led solutions to violent conflicts on the continent.’ In this respect, the Panel underscored that considerable attention should be devoted to understanding the dynamics of external involvement on the continent’s security landscape.
The trend in the militarization of parts of the continent is backed by data. Over the past three decades, the continent has witnessed the heavy military presence of multiple regional and international security actors. Particularly in the Horn of Africa region, the number of actors with military presence from Europe, the United States, the Middle East, the Gulf, and Asia has increased exponentially. Moreover, the increased volatility and complex security challenges in the Sahel and West Africa regions have also led to the expanded role of foreign security actors.
France has had a military presence in Djibouti since the late 1800. After Djibouti achieved independence in 1977, France retained several military facilities. In recent decades, in the Horn region, foreign military presence was first established for purposes of countering violent extremism and terrorism following the terrorist attacks in the United States in 11 September 2001. Since 2001, the Government of Djibouti leased Camp Lemonnier to the USA and ever since the US has made continuous investment to transform it into a permanent facility. Similarly, the US has also established presence in other countries in the Horn for its operation against al‐Shabab. Surveillance sites in South Sudan, Uganda and Democratic Republic of Congo have also been established aiming, among others, at capturing Joseph Kony.
China’s first major security step in relation to military presence in Africa came in 2008 when it launched an anti‐piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden. China has since maintained a permanent naval anti‐piracy presence in the Horn of Africa region and recently it launched its 32nd convoy fleet to the Gulf of Aden and Somali waters. In a landmark development, China established a People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) base in Djibouti in August 2017. While presented as a logistics support base and aiming at supporting China’s peacekeeping operations in Africa and its participation in the fight of international piracy off the coast of Horn of Africa and Gulf of Aden, the facility has been instrumental in the protection of China’s growing overseas assets and represents China’s plan to project power.
The UK similarly has deployed a number of military personnel at Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, for a closer cooperation with the US forces in the region.
Increased presence from emerging actors particularly the Gulf States has witnessed sharp increase starting from 2015‐2016. Saudi Arabia has significantly increased its presence in the region, particularly following the civil war in Yemen and has maintained a significant naval presence in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. After strained relationship with Djibouti, the UAE has directed its ties to Eritrea, Somalia and Somaliland.
The UAE has also targeted Somaliland by working on the military base in Berbera to strengthen its military capacity in the conflict in Yemen while also providing security for Somaliland’s coastal waters and coastline. Turkey has also opened a military training centre in Mogadishu in 2017 to train recruits for the Somali National Army.
Russia has become the latest power to emerge on the African security scene. In 2018, it has established presence in the Central African Republic (CAR) to equip and advise the CAR military. In apparent indication of long‐term presence, Bangui and Moscow signed a military cooperation pact.
The rivalry and competition among foreign powers has worsened already volatile security situation in the continent. In addition to the GCC crisis, the perceived rivalry between the US and China has further intensified the military presence. The US Africa Strategy has openly stated its intention of countering China and Russia’s influence in the continent.
These competing military engagements particularly among global powers will have a number of implications for the implementation of the African Common Defense and Security Policy.
One of the principal objectives of the policy is ‘to ensure collective responses to both internal and external threats to Africa… in conformity with the principles enshrined in the Constitutive Act’. The current security landscape and involvement of foreign power complicate the establishment of any collective security response by African states.
While there is recognition that individual member states have the sovereign prerogative for allowing their territories to be used by foreign militaries, there remain concerns about the extent to which such military presence is channeled for enhancing the collective security of the continent. Some of the bilateral engagements of member states are seen as being not fully coherent with existing continental commitments and mechanisms established by the AU. Rather there is seems to be fragmentation and ad‐hoc engagement with foreign powers, leading to fragmentation of the engagement of AU member states. Moreover, there is also a tendency of building closer ties with foreign power than with neighboring states in the security front. It is feared that this tends to fuel tension among neighboring countries.
IGAD during its 46th ministerial meeting cognizant of the changing geopolitics in the region, adopted ‘a collective approach to challenges in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden by strengthening regional cooperation, and establish a regional platform for IGAD Member States with a view to promote dialogue’ and agreed ‘to harmonize and develop a common position to protect the security and economic interests of the region’.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may take note of the increased level of unregulated presence of foreign militaries in Africa and destabilizing effects of antagonism and rivalry among powers on the peace and security of the continent. The PSC may urge member state for their immediate action in considering the continental and regional standards, particularly the Common African Defense and Security Policy, when engaging foreign security actors. The PSC may call on member states to work towards common security and intensify regional cooperation to effectively respond to any threat emanating from foreign power competition. As part of the effort to limit the pitfalls of foreign military presence, the PSC may task the AU Commission to present to it a report on the scope of foreign military presence, its adverse impacts and ways and means by which member states may coordinate with the AU on the role of foreign militaries in their territories.
Review of Partnerships between the AU Commission, non-African States and Organisations
Amani Africa
Date | 13 August, 2019
Tomorrow (13 August) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to review the institutional relationships and partnerships between the AU Commission, non-African states and/or organizations and their impact on the implementation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and the African Governance Architecture (AGA).
The Departments of Peace and Security and Political affairs are expected to brief the PSC on partnerships on the APSA and the AGA respectively.
The AU PSC, being the principal decision-making body with respect to both APSA and AGA, plays a key role in reviewing and providing guidance on the modalities of partnership. Critical to the role of the PSC is the review of how partnerships on the APSA and AGA are initiated, negotiated, designed and implemented.
The session is expected to offer an opportunity for PSC member states to be informed of the nature and diversity of partnerships established on the APSA and the AGA currently in place. Indications are that PSC members do not have full information on the various partnerships established on the APSA and the AGA. Apart from the information gap, PSC member states are also keen about accountability around the planning and implementation of partnership programs.
Other issues expected to feature during the session include the focus areas of the various partnerships, how the partnerships inform or shape the focus and orientation of the APSA and the AGA including their alignment with Agenda 2063, the extent to which partnerships may impact on the ownership and leadership of the AU in the planning and implementation of APSA and AGA projects and challenges of coordination and the burden of multiple reporting formats. Also, of interest would be the availability of mechanisms for engaging the PSC and reporting to it on the establishment and implementation of APSA and AGA partnerships programs.
Within the context of multilateralism, the session may identify and categorize the various forms of partnerships including with non-African member states, inter-governmental and international organizations as well international non-governmental organizations towards the operationalization of AGA and APSA. It may also look into the establishment of standardized partnership framework that can also streamline a harmonized support to the two complementary and mutually reinforcing architectures, APSA and AGA.
Moreover, given the existence of numerous state and non-state partners that engage the AUC the review may provide a clearer direction on coordination among partners and more organized AU engagement to prevent duplication of efforts and resources. Also given the overlap between the two architectures, the review of partnerships may explore the possibility of having a comprehensive common strategy for both the APSA and the AGA.
In terms of the multilateral partnerships on APSA and AGA, the most notable ones include those with the UN and the EU. APSA is anchored on the recognition of its complementarity to the multilateralist global collective security system articulated in the Charter of the United Nations (UN). Hence AU’s primary and well-established partner in the area of promoting peace and security has been the UN. The partnership in this specific area was strengthened when the AUC and the Secretary-General of the UN signed the Joint UN–AU Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security in April 2017 at the first UN–AU Annual Conference. The Framework outlines priority areas for cooperation including early warning, prevention, mediation, conflict management, and working together to sustain peace and address climate change. The Decision Assembly/AU/Dec.644(XXIX) adopted by the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government at its 29th Ordinary Session held in July 2017 which welcomed the signing of the framework, it also requested the Chair of the AU Commission to accelerate the process of accessing the UN assessed contributions to finance AU peace support operations.
The implementation of the key areas of the framework have also been spearheaded through the UN Office to the African Union (UNOAU), established in July 2010 to support the UN Secretariat’s presence in Addis Ababa on peace and security matters.
The EU has been AU’s longstanding partner on peace and security dating back to 2003, the early years of the APSA. The EU APSA-support program of the African Peace Facility was established in 2004 at the request of African leaders at the 2003 AU summit in Maputo, Mozambique. Tomorrow’s session is also taking place as two major multi-year and strategic engagements are being developed between the AUC and the European Union (EU), which directly target APSA and AGA: the support program for APSA IV (2020 – 2024) and support to (AGA) 2020-2023. These engagements build on the key common priorities on strengthening resilience, peace, security and governance identified at the most recent AU-EU Summit held in Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire in November 2017.
The second category of partnership is the AUC engagement with non-African member states. In this context, engagement with members of the UNSC may be particularly relevant for the promotion of the continental peace and security agenda including the preventive mechanisms identified in the AGA. Tomorrow’s session is timely particularly in light of recent developments where a number of cooperative platforms have been launched in 2019 with various non-African states. For example, the first China-Africa peace and security forum was launched in July 2019. The first session of the strategic dialogue between France and the AUC was held following the meeting between President Macron and the Chairperson of the Commission on 13 March 2019. A MoU was signed between the UK government and AUC in early 2019.
The PSC may need to identify a coherent policy direction in managing these multiple engagements, which over the years have deepened. It will also be essential for the Council to strategize ways in which the Commission can leverage from longstanding and emerging partnerships and advance the set objective in its normative and policy frameworks. This may require the close cooperation between the Council and Commission to jointly strategize in addressing partnership issues.
The third form of partnerships that the PSC may also review is with international non-governmental organizations and their role in the implementation of APSA and AGA. The review may look into the contribution of partners such as most notably the GiZ, which has provided long term support to both APSA and AGA.
The other key issue that may feature in tomorrow’s session is also the reform process and its effects on AGA and APSA operationalization. The proposed restructuring of the AUC in 2021 and the merger of the Departments of Political Affairs and Peace and Security will have direct implication on the harmonization between AGA and APSA. The main area that may require attention in this regard is on how establishing common objectives between the two architectures in order to generate coherent partnership policy. The changes associated with the reform will also affect the implementation of the activities of the two architectures and the long-term partnership built around them.
One of the ways in which the merger of the two departments and its implications on synergy between the two architecture can be accommodated is through the development of a common APSA-AGA roadmap. The opportunity for elaborating such common roadmap is present with the end of the current APSA roadmap in 2020.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may call for an enhanced coordination and a standardized partnership framework that governs AUC engagement with various actors on the implementation of APSA and AGA. It may urge the Commission to strengthen its efforts in providing regular update and analysis on partnership. It may particularly highlight the need for harmonization between the two architectures to also enhance coordinated partners engagement.
Consultative meeting between the PSC and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights
Amani Africa
Date | 8 August, 2019
Tomorrow (8 August) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will held its 866th session. This session involves a consultative meeting between the PSC and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African (Banjul) Commission). With its Secretariat based in Banjul the Gambia for which it is also known as the Banjul Commission, the Commission is the oldest and premier human rights body of the AU.
It is expected that a member of the African (Banjul) Commission will deliver a briefing on the theme of the session. As the department of the AU Commission responsible for human rights and governance, a representative of the Department of Political Affairs is also expected to brief the PSC.
There are at least three legal bases for the convening of this session. The first of this relates to the mandate that the PSC has been explicitly assigned under the PSC Protocol for upholding human and peoples’ rights as part of its conflict prevention, management, resolution and post-conflict reconstruction mandate. It is envisaged that this is to be done in accordance with the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the founding treaty of the African human rights system that has near universal ratification by AU member states.
The second foundation for the convening of this session is the overlap in the mandate of the PSC and that of the African (Banjul) Commission. Given that the African (Banjul) Commission is the body with the expertise for the interpretation and application of the human and peoples’ rights of the African Charter, it is best placed to provide the requisite technical advice to enable the PSC in the implementation of the human rights dimension of its mandate including its role relating to Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act. It is worth noting in this regard that the African (Banjul) Commission has also established a thematic focus on human rights in conflict situations under its Resolution 332.
Finally, and crucially, tomorrow’s session is convened within the framework of Article 19 of the PSC Protocol. This article provides for the establishment of close working relationship between the PSC and the African (Banjul) Commission.
While Article 19 of the PSC Protocol provided for the establishment of close working relationship between the PSC and the African (Banjul) Commission and the Conclusions of the 2007 Dakar retreat of the PSC on its working methods stipulated annual consultative meeting between the two as one avenue for operationalizing Article 19, no meeting has been held between the PSC and the African (Banjul) Commission neither prior to the 2007 Dakar retreat of the PSC since the latter’s establishment in 2004 nor since that retreat. Tomorrow’s session thus presents a good opportunity not only to activate the consultative meeting envisaged in the Dakar retreat conclusions but also take stock of the nature of the relationship between the two bodies thus far.
Despite the fact that there was no institutionalized interaction and the PSC, the African (Banjul) Commission have had working interactions on various occasions. There have been various instances in which the PSC requested the African (Banjul) Commission. From recent experiences, one good example is the African (Banjul) Commission in early December 2015 undertook an investigation mission into human rights violations in Burundi in the context of the 2015 crisis in Burundi on the request of the PSC. Most recently, the PSC made reference to the role of the African (Banjul) Commission with respect to the investigation missions it called for in relation to the situation in Sudan and that of Libya. Admittedly, the working relationship is characterized by ad hocism. As such even when a request is made by the PSC for the Commission to undertake such investigation, there are no established modalities for follow up in terms of both enabling the African (Banjul) Commission execute such task in pursuit of the mandate of the PSC and inscribing a session for the receipt and processing of the findings of the Commission after the African (Banjul) Commission undertook the investigation mission.
In the briefing, the representative of the African (Banjul) Commission is expected to inform the PSC both on the relevant work of the Commission that are of material interest to the mandate of the PSC and on the various modalities (in addition to the annual consultative meeting as per the Dakar retreat conclusions) for the full operationalization of Article 19 of the PSC Protocol. In this respect, the work of the African (Banjul) Commission that would deserve particular mention for being of interest to the PSC include the work in relation to women rights under the Maputo Protocol, its Guideline on protecting human rights while countering terrorism, transitional justice under its Resolution 235 and human rights in conflict situations under its Resolution 332.
In terms of the modalities for the operationalization of Article 19, some of the approaches that may feature in the briefing include: informal consultations; institutionalizing PSC requested investigation missions by the African (Banjul) Commission through a more clear arrangement for follow up on the conduct and outcome of such mission; information sharing including through an established arrangement for incorporating relevant work of the African (Banjul) Commission into the Continental Early Warning system (CEWS); provision of briefings to the PSC in between the annual sessions on the human rights dimension of conflict situations on the agenda of the PSC or on themes of interest for the PSC such as protection of human rights in countering terrorism or transitional justice in post-conflict countries; establishment of a standing thematic agenda of the PSC on human rights and peace and security in Africa; and joint filed missions.
The intervention from the Department of Political affairs (DPA) is expected to highlight existing practices and work undertaken with the active role of the Department that are of direct relevance to the theme of the session. One such area of work of the Department which commonly feature on the agenda of the PSC concerns elections. Another one relates to the work of the DPA on the African Governance Architecture (AGA) including that relating to unconstitutional changes of government. And in this respect the institutionalization of the annual consultative meeting under Article 19 offers an opportunity for enhancing the synergy between the AGA and the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Also, of interest for highlighting in the intervention by the DPA include the work done on transitional justice – particularly the adoption during the February 2019 summit of the AU of the AU Transitional Justice Policy – a key instrument for implementing the accountability dimension of the mandate of the AU broadly and the PSC specifically. From the perspective of PSC’s mandate, also worth mentioning is the emerging practice of deployment of human rights experts (monitors) as part of an AU mission and in collaboration with the African (Banjul) Commission has been done in Mali and Central African Republic or as a standalone deployment as has been the case since 2015 in Burundi.
The expected outcome of the session is a communique. It is expected that the PSC would welcome the work of the Commission and the opportunity for full operationalization of Article 19 of the PSC Protocol. In this respect, one major expected outcome is the establishment of the annual consultative meeting as standing agenda of the PSC to be inscribed into the annual indicative plan of work of the PSC. The PSC may also decide to establish a thematic agenda on human rights and peace and security as an avenue for receiving briefing by the African (Banjul) Commission both on the human rights dimension of situations on the agenda of the PSC and on other ways of full implementation of the human rights related mandate of the PSC. The outcome document may also stipulate arrangements for sharing of information of early warning value, for effective implementation of PSC requests for human rights investigation mission by the African (Banjul) Commission and for undertaking joint field visits.
Open session on Natural and Other Disasters and Peace and Security in Africa
Amani Africa
Date | 5 August, 2019
Tomorrow (6 August) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will hold the first open session of the month on ‘Natural and Other Disasters and Peace and Security in Africa: Beyond the Normative Frameworks’. An expert from the Meteorological Services Department of Zimbabwe is expected to deliver a presentation. The AUC is also expected to make a statement, which among others, seeks to update the PSC on the operationalization of the AU Humanitarian Agency.
The session is being held in the aftermath of two major cyclone events that wreaked havoc in the east and South eastern coast of Africa, the worst cyclone events to hit the Southern hemisphere last March and May. Zimbabwe, the PSC Chair for this month, was among the countries affected by the first of the cyclones, Cyclone Idai that hit the South-eastern coast of Africa in March.
While Cyclone Idai affected Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Malawi, Cyclone Keneth that hit the east and South-eastern coast of Africa causing death of many people and destruction in Mozambique, Tanzania, Comoros, Madagascar, Seychelles, Malawi and Mayotte Island. The cyclones resulted in the death of over 1000 people, in the destruction of farmlands, houses and public infrastructure such as schools and public health centres.
As these events show, Africa, while being the continent that contributed the least to the causes of climate change, is one of the parts of the world most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. It has been pointed out in a study by USAID that globally 57 per cent of the countries facing the highest double burden of climate exposure and political fragility risks are located in sub-Saharan Africa. The UN led Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has shown strong links between the impacts of climate change in Africa with some of the most intractable conflict on the continent. These conflicts are caused and exacerbated by existing structural environmental, socio-economic, political and technological weaknesses including environmental pressure over scarce resources, unemployment and poverty.
The agenda for tomorrow’s session indicates that the objectives of the session include ‘integrate climate information into infrastructure ecosystem and settlement plans’ and identify ‘innovative financing for reconstruction and climate sensitive infrastructure planning’. Indeed, the scale of the impact of the two cyclones reflects the weak state of the institutions and infrastructure of affected societies. The poor capacity of institutions and the state of the physical infrastructure and social services also contribute to poor mitigation, and response capacities.
The AU has policy frameworks to support member states in preparedness, prevention and mitigation of natural disasters including through the adoption of the program of action for the implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 in Africa. According to the 2018 UN Secretary General report on the implementation of the Sendai Framework, only 13 African member states have national disaster risk reduction strategies that are aligned with the Sendai Framework. In terms of the role of the PSC, one of the roles assigned to the PSC under Article 6(4) pf the PSC Protocol relates to humanitarian action and disaster management. The African Peace and Security Architecture Roadmap 2016–20 and the AU Master Roadmap for Silencing the Guns by 2020 also recognize climate change as a cross cutting issue.
The AU Humanitarian Policy Framework and its annex the policy guideline on the role of the African Standby Force in Humanitarian Action and Natural Disaster Support (HANDS) articulate practical steps in facilitating response and humanitarian action in complex crisis or emergencies. The role of ASF in HANDS is also anchored in the PSC Protocol. Article 13(f) of the Protocol highlights one of the key functions of the ASF as being the facilitation of “humanitarian assistance to alleviate the suffering of civilian population in conflict areas and support efforts to address major natural disasters”.
While these policy frameworks and institutional awareness are important, these have not as yet translated into a coherent and sustained operational action. Accordingly, it is of major interest for tomorrow’s PSC meeting to look into the systematic inclusion of environment and the effects of climate change in the continent’s peace and security architecture and the development and security agenda of the AU, its member states and Regional Economic Communities (RECs).
The role of AU organs is also of interest. In this respect, it is worth noting that At its last ordinary session held in Sharm el Sheikh, Egypt the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights adopted Resolution 417 on Resolution on the human rights impacts of extreme weather in Eastern and Southern Africa due to climate change outlining specific measures for addressing the human rights dimension of extreme weather events such as the two cyclones that hit east and south-eastern Africa.
In terms of inclusion of issues of climate change into the peace and security architecture, an important avenue is the establishment, as part of the continental conflict early warning system, a dedicated framework of whether and climate forecasting not only for detecting and alerting vulnerable countries of emerging whether disasters but also for mobilizing responses for mitigating impacts of such events and rehabilitating affected communities. As noted in the concept note for tomorrow’s session, this can be done by tapping into the expertise of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), which can play the role of supporting early warning and preparedness work. The contribution that the WMO can make has also been recognized at the global level when the organization has addressed the UNSC for the first time during the January 2019 open debate.
As noted above, tomorrow’s session will discuss the operationalization of the African Humanitarian Agency and its role in responding to natural and other form of disasters. The council has highlighted its expectation to see the full operationalization of the agency by January 2019 and has frequently called for the swift completion of the process.
Tomorrow’s session is expected to provide an opportunity to review the progress that has been made so far and outstanding issues for the full operationalization of the Agency.
Also of interest for tomorrow’s session is the integration into the strategies and action plans of the AU Humanitarian Agency dedicated tools and capacity for mobilizing intervention and resources for climate resilient infrastructure planning and for the anticipation, management and mitigation of climate induced disasters in Africa.
The PSC has thus far held five sessions on the impact of climate change induced crises in Africa. This session presents an opportunity for reviewing the evolution of PSC’s consideration of the impact of climate change in Africa and gaps in the PSC’s approach and AU’s responsiveness to climate change related disasters on the continent.
The expected outcome of the session is a press statement. The PSC may reiterate the importance of comprehensive, climate related security risk information, including credible data and analyses with a view to enabling Member States to predict with more precision the frequency of climate change related risks, including natural disasters, and to enhance resilience of vulnerable communities. It may also urge for increased allocation of national budgets for disaster risk preparedness and reduction and for integration into development finance of support for climate resilient infrastructural planning and community development interventions. The PSC may endorse the call of Resolution 417 of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights for the AU to declare the year 2021 the AU Year for Climate Change preparedness and response. It may also call on the AUC to expedite the operationalization of the AU Humanitarian Agency and the inclusion, as part of the finalization of the outcomes of the study on the nexus between climate change and peace and security (mandated through its 774th session), of assessment on Africa’s vulnerability to climate induced disaster and the measures required for mitigation and response.
PSC provisional program of work for August 2019
Amani Africa
Date | August 2019
For the month of August 2019, Zimbabwe will assume the role of chairing the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC). Prepared under the leadership of Zimbabwe’s Permanent Representative to the AU Albert Chimbindi, the provisional program of work of the PSC for the month envisages some six sessions. The sessions have thematic focus including one open session planned for the month.
On 6 August, the monthly PSC program of work starts with the open session of the month on ‘Natural and Other Disasters and Peace and Security in Africa: Beyond the Normative Frameworks’. This puts spotlight on the role of the PSC with respect to humanitarian action and its operationalization. On the same day, the PSC is expected to consider and adopt the draft provisional program of work for the month of September 2019.
On 8 August the PSC is scheduled to hold the annual consultative meeting with the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR). This is in line with the protocol establishing the PSC, which under Article 19 requests the PSC to establish close working relationship with the ACHPR.
The third session of the month taking place on 13 August is expected to review the institutional relationships and partnerships between the AU Commission, non-African states and/or organizations and their impact on the implementation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and the African Governance Architecture (AGA).
The following day on 14 August the PSC is expected to consider the state of foreign military presence in Africa particularly the implications on the implementation African Common Defense and Security Policy. There have been instances in which concerns have been expressed in the AU on the militarization of some parts of the continent with the presence of foreign military bases, particularly the Horn of Africa and the Sahel.
On 20 August the PSC is scheduled to have three agenda items. First it will deliberate on the cooperation, coordination and collaboration of the AU PSC and Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) on Peace and Security Related Matters on the Continent. It may be recalled that the PSC had its inaugural meeting with the peace and security decision-making organs of RECs/RMs in May. Since then, at the Niamey summit the AU has adopted detailed framework for division of labour between the AU, RECs and member states.
The second agenda item is the monthly update on the harmonization of ACIRC into the ASF Framework. Finally, the PSC will receive a briefing from SADC on the Construction of SADC Standby Force (SADC SF) Regional Logistic Depot (RLD).
The last session of the month is expected to be held on 22 August which will be a brainstorming session on the concept of popular uprisings and how it impacts peace and security on the continent. In addition to these agenda items, the provisional program of the month also envisions in footnotes a briefing on the situation in Sudan that may be added in the course of the month.
Situation in Mali and the Sahel
Amani Africa
Date | 25 July, 2019
Tomorrow (25 July) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council is expected to hold a session on the situation in Mali and the Sahel. AU High Representative for Mali and the Sahel, Pierre Buyoya, as well as the representatives of the G5 Sahel Secretariat and member states of the regional mechanism are expected to make statements.
Since the last PSC briefing on the situation in Mali and the Sahel in April, the security situation has remained highly volatile, with the insecurity in many parts of the Sahel notably Mali and Burkina Faso, further deteriorating. Violence by various non-State actors, including terrorist groups, criminal networks and community-based and tribal militias, perpetrated against civilians and security and defence forces show rise. There are also concerns about incidents of violations involving security forces of Sahel countries further exacerbating already fragile conditions.
In Mali, following the violent attack that claimed the lives of 160 Fulani civilians in March 2019, at least 95 people were killed in an attack that targeted an ethnic Dogon village in central Mali. The massacre is believed to be a retaliation given ethnic Dogon militia were suspected of committing the atrocities in the ethnic Fulani village in March. For members of the PSC, it is of major interest to hear about risks of expansion of the increase in inter-communal violence and the spike in insecurity in central Mali and the political, developmental and security measures required for containing cycle of inter-communal violence and stabilize central Mali. The UN documented that as at March 2019, 100,000 people were internally displaced, representing almost a threefold increase in one year.
The briefing may also assess the political developments particularly in relation to the implementation of the 2015 peace agreement in Mali. The killing of ethnic Fulani villagers in March has resulted in the resignation of Prime Minister Soumeylou Boubèye Maïga and his entire government. This has slowed down the progress and implementation of the Agreement. The continued violent incidents targeting civilians, killings of signatory and non-signatory armed groups to the peace agreement and attacks on Malian defence and security forces and UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) have also further complicated the implementation of the Agreement.
For the PSC, the deepening insecurity in Burkina Faso reflecting widening security in the Sahel is very worrisome. The UN reported that from January to March, 86 security incidents were
registered in Burkina Faso, resulting in 376 deaths and injuries to 187 persons. In June last month, 19 people were killed following attacks by unidentified assailants. It is to be recalled that in December 2018 state of emergency has been declared in several northern provinces and has since been extended for additional six months.
According to the UN, the insecurity precipitated the displacement from their homes of more than 170,000 people, most of them since the start of 2019. Although much of the spike in insecurity affect Mali and Burkina Faso, a number of attacks leading to multiple deaths and kidnappings have also been reported in Niger.
Beyond the Sahel and West Africa region the PSC may also consider the impact of the deteriorating security situation in Libya and its effects on the Sahel region due to the proliferation of armed groups and the operation by terrorist groups. While the security responses tend to loom large, it is of interest for the PSC to look into how to prioritize the political and development responses including improving the relationship between states institutions and communities and strengthening state institutions and the delivery of services. This would draw attention to the multifaceted root causes of the crisis in the region including the adverse effects of climate change. The G5 and AU representative to Mali and the Sahel briefings may also provide an update on the on going initiatives including the 1 May G5 Sahel extraordinary summit of Heads of State in Ouagadougou on the fight against terrorism and organized crime and the overall security challenges in the region. During the summit Germany has pledged $51 million to support efforts by Burkina Faso in combating violent extremism.
The other issue expected to attract particular attention during tomorrow’s session is the role of the G5 force. The latest Secretary General report on the G5 Sahel force noted that the force has resumed operations in January 2019, after a sixmonth interruption following the complex attack
on its headquarters in Sévaré, Mali, in June 2018 and has conducted four operations. While the report noted that the force has attained 75 operational capacity, it continues to suffer from numerous challenges including training and equipment shortages, unclear sustainability of financing, the absence of fortified and secure operational bases, information sharing and coordination, and non-existent logistical supply chains to transport fuel and rations from the MINUSMA.
Apart from addressing these operational, logistics and resource issues facing the G5 Sahel force, also of interest for PSC members during tomorrow’s session is clarifying the strategic direction of the force, including anchoring it on a political strategy to be implemented nationally. Related to this is the need to clarify and develop the force’s strategic concept of operations, highlighted in the Secretarygeneral’s report.
The resource challenges facing G5 Sahel is expected to draw the attention of PSC members. The European Union reportedly announced in early July to give €138 million ($155 million) more to support the G5 Sahel Joint Force, including its police component. PSC members would in particular be keen to see provision of predictable support by the UN.
The report of the Secretary-General of the UN has underlined that the full operationalization of the G5 will depend on the predictable support it receives. Hence, he urged for a UN support office, funded through assessed contributions and independent of MINUSMA, to provide predictable and sustainable financing of support for the G5. Also proposed in the report is the extension of the support that MINUSMA provides to forces operating outside of Mali. PSC while renewing the mandate of the G5 Sahel Joint Force for a period of twelve (12) months, from 12 April 2019 to 12 April 2020, it also urged for ‘the need for the UNSC to extend the support of MINUSMA beyond the limits of the Malian territory to all other components of the G5 Sahel Joint Task Force’. However, the UNSC has extended the mandate of MINUSMA until 30 June 2020 with the primary strategic priority of supporting the implementation of the political Agreement in Mali.
Given the level of insecurity in the region and the difficulties confronted by the forces, the PSC during tomorrow’s session may recall its previous decision at its 838th session on the ‘need for Council to also undertake a field mission to the G-5 Sahel region, as soon as possible, in order to have first-hand appreciation of the realities on the ground, as well as efforts being deployed by the G5 Sahel’. It may identify the next steps in undertaking the mission. Similarly, this week the UNSC is expected to hold its mid year briefing on the Sahel. Mohammad Ibn Chambas, Special Representative and head of the UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS), is expected to present the Secretary- General report on West Africa and the Sahel.
Key political and security developments in the region are expected to feature in the briefing. The expected outcome is a communiqué. The PSC may express its deep concern over the deteriorating security situation in the region. It may reiterate the importance of the Nouakchott Process for the Enhancement of the Security Cooperation to collectively address the security challenges in the Sahel. It may follow up and provide concrete measures and timeline for the field mission to the region. It may call on the international community to continue and strengthen efforts and support to the G5 force and the countries in the region in order to mitigate the security challenges and reiterate its earlier call for the support from MINUSMA to be expanded to all G5 forces. It may urge member states in the region to maximize efforts particularly in terms of implementing political, socio-economic and environmental measures for addressing the underlying causes of insecurity in the region.