Emergency session on the Situation in Sudan
Amani Africa
Date | 6 June, 2019
Tomorrow (6 June) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will hold an emergency session on the situation in Sudan. As this was not initially planned in the provisional program of work of the PSC for June, the session was agreed on following an informal consultation that the PSC had on Monday morning 3 June 2019.
It is expected that the Moussa Faki Mahamat, Chairperson of the Commission, who has been tasked to follow the situation in Sudan and brief the PSC, will brief the PSC on the most recent developments. Sierra Leone’s Permanente Representative to the AU, Ambassador Brima Patrick Kapuwa, the PSC Chairperson of the month, will also make an opening remark. As per established PSC practice, the representatives of Sudan, and Ethiopia, as Chair of the regional body the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), are also expected to make statements.
Tomorrow’s session follows the latest developments indicating the deterioration of the situation in Sudan. According to various reports, on 3 June a group from the security forces initiated an operation for dispersing the sit-in camp near the military headquarters that has been the epicentre of the protest movement in the days before and since the removal of the country’s long-time President Omer Hassen al Bashir. The accounts of various reports and media footage show that the security forces used live ammunitions and tear gas. While initial reports put the death toll from the violent crackdown at over 30 people, the most recent
reports indicate that it has reached over 60 people. Hundreds of other people have also reportedly been injured.
There were also reports of hospitals and clinics, where the wounded were receiving emergency treatment, being besieged and attacked. Following this incident, the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA), coordinating body of the protest movement, announced its suspension of all communication with the TMC and called for sweeping civil disobedience against the military council. The Forces for Declaration of Freedom and Change (FDFC), which represented the protesters and various opposition forces, also called for the end of military rule. The head of the TMC Abdul Fattah Al-Burhan announced plans for holding elections in a period of nine months. He also declared that the agreements reached with the civilian stakeholders have also been scrapped.
There are concerns that these developments affect the negotiations for the formation of a civilian-led transition in at least two ways. First, the events of 3 June and the subsequent
announcement from both sides has brought the negotiation to a halt. Second, these developments have also reversed the progress made in the negotiations. It is to be recalled that the PSC in its communique of the 852nd session noted the progress made including in particular ‘with regard to the agreement reached on duration of the Transition, the Transitional Institutions and the priorities of the transition’. Another issue for the PSC in the light of these difficult set of situations is whether there is a realistic prospect for an agreement to form a
civilian-led transitional authority after the 3 June tragic events and the rescinding of the agreements reached between the TMC and the FDFC. Central to this question is the implication of the language civilian-led transition vis-à-vis the leadership of the sovereign council.
The AUC Chairperson, Moussa Faki Mahamat, has released a statement on 3 June. In the statement, he expressed his strong condemnation of the violence and called for ‘an immediate and transparent investigation in order to hold those all responsible accountable’. The statement further stated the demand that
the Sudanese stakeholders return to the negotiations urgently in order to arrive at an inclusive accord, which paves the way for a civilian-led Transitional Authority.
On 4 June, the UN Security Council held an emergency meeting called by the United
Kingdom and Germany. While the Council members did not agree on an outcome document, many have expressed concern over the violence against protesters. The UK condemning the violent crackdown killing so many protesters called for agreed transfer of power to civilian-led government. Germany on its part, noting that legitimacy cannot come from the barrel of a gun, stressed ‘the urgent need for a return to the negotiation table to bring about an inclusive, civilian-led transitional government.’ It was reported that Russia during the emergency session of the Council insisted that the Council should await the response of the AU.
For members of the PSC, there are at least two issues that the current situation presents. The first of this is whether under the current circumstances the PSC can continue to wait until the end of the two-month period it set at its 846th session before determining the application of the measures envisaged under the Lome Decalration of 2000 after a military seized power. At the heart of this question is if these are not the kind of situations envisaged in the PSC’s affirmation at its 852nd session that ‘it shall, at any time deemed appropriate in view of the prevailing circumstances in the country, take the necessary measures, including imposition of sanctions, in line with article 7(g) of its Protocol’.
The other issue on which PSC members may wish to get Mahamat’s view is what the
prospects are for the parties to return back to the negotiating table to continue from where the negotiations stopped. While Burhan in his Eid celebrations address expressed regret about the civilian casualties and affirmed readiness for negotiations, it remains uncertain if the SPA and FDFC will accept resumption of talks and if the negotiations will be from scratch or continue from where they stopped.
An IGAD meeting at the level of Ambassadors has been called. It is expected that the meeting will deliberate on how to respond to the latest developments and on a plan to dispatch a delegation to Khartoum. While IGAD has clearly been slow to respond, the outcome of this meeting informs the position that the Chair of IGAD will present during tomorrow’s session. From the deliberations of the meeting IGAD aligns its position with that of the AU. It is noteworthy that IGAD does not have similar rules against military takeover of power and the measures envisaged under the Lome Decalration.
The expected outcome of the session is a communique. Depending on whether the PSC decides to apply the Lome Declaration, there are major implications in terms of AU’s zero tolerance position vis à-vis military takeover of power. Even if the PSC decides to apply the measures envisaged in the Lome Declaration by imposing suspension, it would still require, as envisaged in the Declaration, to institute a process to facilitate negotiations towards transfer of power to a civilian-led authority paving the way for restoration of constitutional order in Sudan. Thus, apart from reiterating the statement of the AUC Chairperson of the Commission condemning the violence against unarmed protesters and demanding independent investigation, the PSC may, in terms of resumption of negotiations, additionally consider to affirm the continued validity of the agreements reached thus far and request the AUC Chair to designate a highrepresentative that will, working with the UN Special Envoy, facilitate the resumption of negotiations for the establishment of a civilianled transitional authority.
PSC provisional program of work for June 2019
Amani Africa
Date | June 2019
For the month of June 2019, Sierra Leone will assume the role of chairing the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC). Prepared under the leadership of Sierra Leone’s Permanente Representative to the AU Brima Patrick Kapuwa, the provisional program of work of the PSC for the month adopted on 7 May envisages some nine sessions. These includeeight closed sessions and one open session.Two of the closed sessions will focus on two country situations. During the month there is also a planned PSC retreat.
On 4 June, the monthly PSC program of work starts with a session deliberating on two agenda items. The first is the preparation for the African Amnesty month within the context of the AU Master Roadmap to Silence the Guns by the Year 2020 and building momentum for the effective implementation of the Agenda 2063 goals. Among others, this is expected to review the state of continental and regional efforts for effectively addressing illicit movement of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), one of the major drivers of conflict in Africa.
The following day on 5 June the committee of experts will meet to engage in preparatory works for two planned PSC activities. The first preparatory meeting is on PSC retreat that is planned to take place in Rabat, Morocco in the last week of June and is expected to work on the agenda and working documents of the retreat. The other is the preparation for the 13th Annual Joint Consultative Meeting with the UN
Security Council.
On 6 June, the PSC is scheduled to have two agenda items. It will have the first country specific session on the situation in Guinea Bissau. As a major country of concern for West Africa it was initially on the agenda when Nigeria was chairing the PSC, however the session could not be held. Guinea Bissau is brought back on the agenda for June under Sierra Leone. The PSC is expected to receive update on the political stalemate in the country following the March 2019 parliamentary election that prevented the formation of a new government, exacerbating the existing precarious political and socio-economic situation.
The second agenda of the day is a briefing on elections in Africa. This is the periodic briefing that the AU Department of Political Affairs regularly presents to the PSC. It is expected to give update on elections held since the last briefing and on the upcoming elections. On 11 June, the PSC will have its second session on a country situation, focusing on South Sudan. This will focus on the steps being taken and challenges faced in the implementation of the revitalized peace agreement, including where the process for the formation of the national unity government stands.
On 13 June, the PSC will deliberate on three agenda items. First, it will consider the renewal of UNAMID mandate which will end on 30 June. The session is expected to provide clarity on the kind of conditions under which the mandate will be renewed in the context of the contested transition under way following the military coup in Sudan. Subsequently, building on the preparatory work of the committee of
experts undertaken earlier in the month, the PSC willconsider two preparatory activities, namely the preparations for the 13th Annual Joint Consultative Meeting with the UNSC and for the PSC retreat expected to take place in Rabat at the end of the Month.
On 14 June, the PSC is expected to receive and consider the report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on the implementation of Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Policy, including the institutional and operational developments.
The one open session of the month is planned to take place on 20 June to commemorate the African Refugee Day. It is expected to be held under the theme ‘Advancing Refugee Protection in Africa in the Context of Human Rights’. The operationalization of the African Humanitarian deliberations.
On 21 June, the PSC will receive an update on the AU peace support operations doctrine and the monthly briefing on the harmonization of the ACIRIC within ASF.
After the retreat from 24-26 June, the last activity of the month will take place on 28 June on the briefing by the Chairperson of the PSC to the PRC on the activities of the PSC during the
month of June. In addition to these agenda items, the provisional program of the month also envisions in footnotes additional items that may be added in the course of the month. These include the three-week update by the Chairperson of the AU Commission on the situation in Sudan. Additionally, meeting of the Military Staff
Committee may also take place.
Inaugural Consultative Meeting of the Peace and Security Council and Regional Economic Communities (RECs)/Regional Mechanisms (RMs)
Amani Africa
Date | 24 May, 2019
Tomorrow (23 October) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to hold its annual informal consultative meeting with the United Nations (UN) Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). The informal consultation is the second agenda item of the 958th PSC session and is expected to take place virtually.
The annual informal consultative meeting takes place in the form of a panel discussion, which will be co-facilitated by the Chairperson of the AUPSC Osama Abdel-Khalek and the Chairperson of the UNPBC Bob Rae. Following opening remarks by the two chairs, Smail Chergui, AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, Hanna Tetteh, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General to the AU and Oscar Fernandez-Taranco UN Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support are expected to deliver a briefing. This will be followed by interventions from the AUPSC and the PBC. A concept note has been circulated to guide the informal consultation.
The Council and the Commission have been holding their consultations over the last couple of years with a view to forging cooperation in support of peacebuilding efforts in Africa. Most of the country specific, regional, and thematic issues under consideration by the PBC are focused on the African continent. Four African countries – Burundi, Central Africa Republic, Guinea-Bissau, and Liberia – will remain on the agenda of the PBC, with the exit of Guinea and eventually Sierra Leone. These and other African countries have over the years benefited from the financial assistance of the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund.
There are several instruments, which have been guiding the cooperation between the AUPSC and the PBC. The concurrent resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly (70/262) and the Security Council (2282) in 2016 following the review of the United Nations Peacebuilding architecture underscored the importance of partnership between the Commission and the African Union and its regional mechanisms in support of peacebuilding in Africa. The African Union has also the Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Peacebuilding Policy Framework adopted in 2006. The AU initiative on Silencing the Guns in Africa is also significant and the Security Council through the adoption of resolution 2457 (2019) expressed strong support for this initiative. Furthermore, the United Nations and the African Union signed a Joint Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security and MoU on peacebuilding in 2018.
It is within this overall framework that the annual meeting takes place on Friday. What makes the meeting particularly important is that it is happening at a time when Africa is facing serious challenges on peacebuilding and sustaining peace in terms of the various post-conflict countries and regions, particularly in west Africa and the Sahel region, the Lake Chad Basin, Central Africa and the Great Lakes. The situation has also been further compounded by the multifaceted impacts of the COVID-19 pandemics. The PBC has been discussing this important issue over the last couple of months and what has come out clearly in these discussions was the need for stronger partnerships, particularly with regional organizations and International Financial Institutions to better respond to the impact of the pandemic.
The annual AUPSC-PBC meeting also takes place at the backdrop of the 2020 review of the United Nations peacebuilding architecture and intergovernmental consultations have already started in New York under the co-facilitation of New Zealand and St. Vincent and the Grenadines to achieve the broadest possible consensus among member States on the review process. The co-facilitators have circulated a zero-draft resolution for member State’s consideration.
The AUPSC has already adopted a Common African Position on the review at its 948th meeting on 22 September 2020, underscoring that the review should consider practical means for enabling the AU to exercise ownership of PCRD efforts and engagements on the Continent; ensuring closer collaboration and information-sharing on operational and programmatic engagements; and enhancing national and continental African capacities for planning and implementation of programmes and projects designed to address context-specific cross border challenges and sub-regional dimensions of peacebuilding. The PSC instructed the Commission to transmit the Report of the Chairperson on the Common African Position on the 2020 Review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture, towards an enhanced global peacebuilding system to the African Group in New York, to guide and advance its engagement in the negotiations on the review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture.
The Common African Position is indeed an important contribution to the 2020 review of the peacebuilding architecture sharing Africa’s views and perspectives on enhancing the global peacebuilding system. It was a result of thorough reflection on the AU’s experience over the past two decades in peacebuilding in Africa underscoring the “indispensability of national ownership and leadership of peacebuilding process; the importance of effective partnership in support of peacebuilding; the imperative for institution building and financing, and a strong emphasis on impact, through implementation at the field level”. It provided specific recommendations on how to strengthen the global peacebuilding architecture in line with Africa’s own priorities.
The hope and expectation is that these priorities will be taken on board during the review process. The role of the African Group in New York is going to be critical in making sure that they are adequately reflected in the intergovernmental consultations, which are currently underway. The African Caucus on Peacebuilding is said to have already made proposals on Financing and Partnerships for Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace and Institution Building and System-Wide Engagement for Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace, to the informal phase of the review. The AU Commission is also said to have submitted inputs on “Financing and Partnerships for Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace”. The annual meeting will provide yet another opportunity for members of the AUPSC to advance Africa’s views and perspectives on the review based on the common position.
According to the draft concept note prepared for the annual meeting, the Council and the Commission are expected to identify ways of further enhancing synergies between the two bodies in support of peacebuilding and sustaining peace in Africa, building on the ongoing UN Peacebuilding Architecture Review and the Common African Position on Peacebuilding. They are also expected to examine ongoing AU and UN efforts to help address the impact of COVID-19 on peacebuilding and sustaining peace efforts in Africa, including under the framework of Silencing the Guns and particularly in regions under the consideration of the PBC (West Africa and the Sahel; Central Africa; Lake Chad Basin; and the Great Lakes), with a focus on the role of women and youth.
This is indeed a landmark year for Women, among others, because of the 25th anniversary of the adoption of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action as well as the 20th anniversary of the landmark resolution 1325 (2000) on the Women, Peace and Security agenda adopted by the United Nations Security Council. Series of activities are being organized to mark these important events. Both the AUPSC and the PBC had also held meetings over the course of this month focusing on women, peace, and security. The meeting between the AUPSC and PBC provides yet another opportunity to highlight this issue in the context of the country specific, regional, and thematic issues under consideration by the PBC.
The expected outcome may be in a form of a joint press statement. The outcome document may call on the need to enhance the strategic partnership to ensure the provision of a comprehensive peacebuilding support to countries emerging from conflict. It may further call on efforts to address the adverse impact of COVID-19 on peacebuilding in Africa and prevent the risks of relapse to conflict. It may underline that sustainable peace requires addressing root causes of conflict through coordinated security and development efforts. The document may reiterate the key components of the Common African Position on peacebuilding and underline the importance of supporting a global peacebuilding architecture that accommodates Africa’s priorities. The joint statement may also highlight the need to further clarify the format of the annual informal consultation between the PSC and PBC.
Report on the challenges faced by AU led Peace Support Operations
Amani Africa
Date | 23 May, 2019
Tomorrow (May 23) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to consider the African Union Commission’s report on the challenges faced by AU led Peace Support Operations (PSOs) and on mechanisms to address them. The military staff committee and the Peace Support Operations Division are expected to brief the Council.
The session is expected to identify challenges faced by mandated, authorized, endorsed and hybrid peace operations in Africa. A wide range of challenges are expected to be addressed including those that are recurring in all forms of operations as well as the ones that are distinct to a specific type of operation. Issues related to leadership, funding, coordination and division of labor, with a particular focus on the relationship between host nations and troop contributing countries are expected to feature in the briefing. The impact of such factors on the sustainability of mandates and their effective operationalization are also expected to be addressed.
The AU has mandated and managed and/or authorized some ten PSOs since its first mission to Burundi. The largest, most deadly and expensive mission of the AU to date is AU Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) since 2007. AU has also authorized and provided political and technical support for the establishment and operationalization of three ad hoc security forces against terrorist groups including the G5 Sahel Joint Force, the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram and the Regional Coordination Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord’s Resistance Army (RCI-LRA) which are all deployed based on the cooperation of affected countries in the respective regions. Moreover, the AU jointly with the United Nations (UN) has managed the AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur for more than a decade (UNAMID).
PSOs in Africa are increasingly tasked with broad and complex mandates including protection of civilians, stabilization, counterterrorism and counterinsurgency and long term post conflict reconstruction operations. The international security system is gradually relying more on the response of the AU and its sub-regional institutions, particularly in the context of high security threats and counter terrorism operations in the continent. This has been largely the case for AMISOM and is central to the mandate of the MNJTF and the G5 Sahel. However, the delivery of these mandates highly depends on the financial and technical partnership of the UN and other multilateral and individual partners. Apart from dependency on such external sources, a major challenge has been the delivery of the logistics and equipment that matches the nature of the activities of the operations and in a timely manner. The protracted nature of the deployment timeline of PSOs is the other factor that is posing challenge in securing sustainable funding. The human and capital cost of such counterterrorism operations is also very high.
Challenges related to resource and funding have mainly contributed to the decision of drawdown and the eventual exit of peacekeeping operations such as UNAMID and AMISOM. Both missions have been in place for more than ten years however the situation on the ground remains volatile and highly insecure. PSC may also address the challenges associated with the exit process particularly in relation to such long standing operations and the kind of vacuum their withdrawal might create. In line with agreed upon timeline UNAMID’s military component will be reduced to 4,050 by 30 June 2019 and AMISOM’s uniformed personnel has already been reduced to 20,626. The unpredictable political and security recent developments in Sudan are likely to have impact on the troop withdrawal. In this regard, a major concern is the serious threat that the security risk that arises from the implementation of the withdrawal of PSOs without the presence of a trained and prepared national force that is able to take effective control. In order to prevent the risks of the reversal of the security gains, there is a need for strengthening national security mechanisms.
In these and other operations, perhaps the most crucial challenge has been the lack of political strategy for addressing the conflict issues. The absence of such strategy means that PSOs are deployed for a prolonged period of time caught up in the protracted task of trying to manage the conflict situation and hence making the planning of their exit difficult.
The other related challenge in various PSOs is the coordination among the various stakeholders involved in the implementation of the missions. There have been disagreements between nations that send troops and those that fund missions. Countries that either contribute troops or whose citizens are directly affected by peacekeeping missions often have limited say in how missions are designed and mandated given that funding and technical support is provided by other countries or partners. The interest and relationship with the host country adds an additional layer of complexity. The same is true of the relationship between the mission leadership and the sector contingents.
The mismatch between the mandate of PSOs and what their capacity and resources also remains a major challenge facing AU mandated and/or authorized missions. The challenge faced particularly by hybrid peacekeeping missions such as UNAMID is related to the asymmetrical relationship between the AU and UN. Although the AU has the political leverage in mobilizing African states for troop contribution and in managing the engagement with the government of Sudan, it however depends entirely on UN budget and resources. Although hybrid missions have deepened UN and regional organization cooperation in peacekeeping operations, in reality however the relationship between the two organizations in managing the mission has not necessarily been even.
The second aspect of tomorrow’s briefing session is expected to focus on providing solutions to the multifaceted challenges faced by the various forms of AU led PSOs. Based on these categorizations and recommendations that will be provided by the MSC and PSOD, the PSC is expected to agree on ways to address challenges faced by the various PSOs. One of the recommendations or area of intervention is expected to address the issues related to prolonged PSOs and on ways to prevent open ended mandates by strategizing on definite exit timeline.
With regards to responding to the financial challenges the launch of the AU Peace Fund in November 2018 which aims at mobilizing 400 million USD by 2021 including for the financing of PSOs is another option that may be explored. So far, around 105 million USD has been mobilized towards the Peace Fund.
The progress that is being made in strengthening Africa’s ownership in PSOs through the reinvigorated Peace Fund may also facilitate the political engagement with UNSC. Particularly in relation to the pending UNSC resolution which establishes that the AU mandated or authorized PSOs should in principle be financed on a case by case basis through UN assessed contributions. In its recent resolution 2457 (2019) the UNSC stated its ‘intention to consider steps that can be taken to enhance practical cooperation with the African Union in the promotion and maintenance of peace and security in Africa in line with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter’. During the briefing Ramtane Lamamra High representative of the AU for Silencing the Guns by 2020 reiterated the importance of UN’s favorable response to the critical and the long-standing calls for the funding of UN assessed contributions to be accessed by AU-led PSOs.
The expected outcome of the session was not known at the time of the production of this Insight. The PSC may however consider to adopt a communiqué that identifies tasks and responsibilities for addressing the challenges that AU PSOs face and assigns the AU Commission to develop action plan for a coordinated and sustained effort for addressing the challenges. In the communiqué, the PSC may request for AU Commission reports on current missions to include analysis of the steps taken both at the strategic and operational levels to address the forgoing challenges as they relate to the specific missions. It is also expected that the outcome of the session will provide key recommendations based on the experiences and lessons learnt from past and ongoing PSOs.
Report on the challenges faced by AU led Peace Support Operations
Amani Africa
Date | 23 May, 2019
Tomorrow (May 23) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to consider the African Union Commission’s report on the challenges faced by AU led Peace Support Operations (PSOs) and on mechanisms to address them. The military staff committee and the Peace Support Operations Division are expected to brief the Council.
The session is expected to identify challenges faced by mandated, authorized, endorsed and hybrid peace operations in Africa. A wide range of challenges are expected to be addressed including those that are recurring in all forms of operations as well as the ones that are distinct to a specific type of operation. Issues related to leadership, funding, coordination and division of labor, with a particular focus on the relationship between host nations and troop contributing countries are expected to feature in the briefing. The impact of such factors on the sustainability of mandates and their effective operationalization are also expected to be addressed.
The AU has mandated and managed and/or authorized some ten PSOs since its first mission to Burundi. The largest, most deadly and expensive mission of the AU to date is AU Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) since 2007. AU has also authorized and provided political and technical support for the establishment and operationalization of three ad hoc security forces against terrorist groups including the G5 Sahel Joint Force, the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram and the Regional Coordination Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord’s Resistance Army (RCI-LRA) which are all deployed based on the cooperation of affected countries in the respective regions. Moreover, the AU jointly with the United Nations (UN) has managed the AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur for more than a decade (UNAMID).
PSOs in Africa are increasingly tasked with broad and complex mandates including protection of civilians, stabilization, counterterrorism and counterinsurgency and long term post conflict reconstruction operations. The international security system is gradually relying more on the response of the AU and its sub-regional institutions, particularly in the context of high security threats and counter terrorism operations in the continent. This has been largely the case for AMISOM and is central to the mandate of the MNJTF and the G5 Sahel. However, the delivery of these mandates highly depends on the financial and technical partnership of the UN and other multilateral and individual partners. Apart from dependency on such external sources, a major challenge has been the delivery of the logistics and equipment that matches the nature of the activities of the operations and in a timely manner. The protracted nature of the deployment timeline of PSOs is the other factor that is posing challenge in securing sustainable funding. The human and capital cost of such counterterrorism operations is also very high.
Challenges related to resource and funding have mainly contributed to the decision of drawdown and the eventual exit of peacekeeping operations such as UNAMID and AMISOM. Both missions have been in place for more than ten years however the situation on the ground remains volatile and highly insecure. PSC may also address the challenges associated with the exit process particularly in relation to such long standing operations and the kind of vacuum their withdrawal might create. In line with agreed upon timeline UNAMID’s military component will be reduced to 4,050 by 30 June 2019 and AMISOM’s uniformed personnel has already been reduced to 20,626. The unpredictable political and security recent developments in Sudan are likely to have impact on the troop withdrawal. In this regard, a major concern is the serious threat that the security risk that arises from the implementation of the withdrawal of PSOs without the presence of a trained and prepared national force that is able to take effective control. In order to prevent the risks of the reversal of the security gains, there is a need for strengthening national security mechanisms.
In these and other operations, perhaps the most crucial challenge has been the lack of political strategy for addressing the conflict issues. The absence of such strategy means that PSOs are deployed for a prolonged period of time caught up in the protracted task of trying to manage the conflict situation and hence making the planning of their exit difficult.
The other related challenge in various PSOs is the coordination among the various stakeholders involved in the implementation of the missions. There have been disagreements between nations that send troops and those that fund missions. Countries that either contribute troops or whose citizens are directly affected by peacekeeping missions often have limited say in how missions are designed and mandated given that funding and technical support is provided by other countries or partners. The interest and relationship with the host country adds an additional layer of complexity. The same is true of the relationship between the mission leadership and the sector contingents.
The mismatch between the mandate of PSOs and what their capacity and resources also remains a major challenge facing AU mandated and/or authorized missions. The challenge faced particularly by hybrid peacekeeping missions such as UNAMID is related to the asymmetrical relationship between the AU and UN. Although the AU has the political leverage in mobilizing African states for troop contribution and in managing the engagement with the government of Sudan, it however depends entirely on UN budget and resources. Although hybrid missions have deepened UN and regional organization cooperation in peacekeeping operations, in reality however the relationship between the two organizations in managing the mission has not necessarily been even.
The second aspect of tomorrow’s briefing session is expected to focus on providing solutions to the multifaceted challenges faced by the various forms of AU led PSOs. Based on these categorizations and recommendations that will be provided by the MSC and PSOD, the PSC is expected to agree on ways to address challenges faced by the various PSOs. One of the recommendations or area of intervention is expected to address the issues related to prolonged PSOs and on ways to prevent open ended mandates by strategizing on definite exit timeline.
With regards to responding to the financial challenges the launch of the AU Peace Fund in November 2018 which aims at mobilizing 400 million USD by 2021 including for the financing of PSOs is another option that may be explored. So far, around 105 million USD has been mobilized towards the Peace Fund.
The progress that is being made in strengthening Africa’s ownership in PSOs through the reinvigorated Peace Fund may also facilitate the political engagement with UNSC. Particularly in relation to the pending UNSC resolution which establishes that the AU mandated or authorized PSOs should in principle be financed on a case by case basis through UN assessed contributions. In its recent resolution 2457 (2019) the UNSC stated its ‘intention to consider steps that can be taken to enhance practical cooperation with the African Union in the promotion and maintenance of peace and security in Africa in line with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter’. During the briefing Ramtane Lamamra High representative of the AU for Silencing the Guns by 2020 reiterated the importance of UN’s favorable response to the critical and the long-standing calls for the funding of UN assessed contributions to be accessed by AU-led PSOs.
The expected outcome of the session was not known at the time of the production of this Insight. The PSC may however consider to adopt a communiqué that identifies tasks and responsibilities for addressing the challenges that AU PSOs face and assigns the AU Commission to develop action plan for a coordinated and sustained effort for addressing the challenges. In the communiqué, the PSC may request for AU Commission reports on current missions to include analysis of the steps taken both at the strategic and operational levels to address the forgoing challenges as they relate to the specific missions. It is also expected that the outcome of the session will provide key recommendations based on the experiences and lessons learnt from past and ongoing PSOs.