Briefing session on the AU Peace Fund
Amani Africa
Date | 17 April, 2019
Today (17 April) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will have a briefing session on ‘Proposals towards Practical Utilization of the AU Peace Fund (in support of Conflict Prevention and Mediation; Capacity Building and AU Peace Support Operations)’. It is expected that Ciru Marwa, the Deputy Head of the AU Institutional Reforms Unit, who also advises Donald Kaberuka, the AU High Representative on the Financing of the African Union (AU) and the Peace Fund, will brief the PSC.
In the briefing, Mrs. Marwa is expected to present to the PSC the current state of the Peace Fund and the next steps including in terms of the criteria and processes for utilizing the funds that have been mobilized from member states as their assessed contributions to the Fund. The briefing also provides an opportunity for providing update on the progress made in the operationalization of the AU Peace Fund.
In terms of the operationalization of the Fund, when the PSC met last time on the Peace Fund, work was still under way in terms of the establishment and operationalization of the structures that ensure transparent and efficient administration of the fund and the running of the day to day operations of the Peace Fund. The first of these structures is the Board of Trustees. This is the body that plays the key role in terms of the financial and administrative oversight of the Fund required to ensure high fiduciary standards and integrity and the provision of strategic coherence. In this respect, perhaps the most notable development has been the appointment of the Board of Trustees of the Fund in November 2018. The Board consists of five individuals representing the five regions of the continent and two institutions. The five individuals are Zainadine Ahmed of Nigeria, Kamel Morjane of Tunisia, Ellen Mekonen of Ethiopia, Tito Mboweni of South Africa and Anicent Dologuele of Central African Republic. The two institutions are the major partner organizations of the AU, namely the United Nations and the European Union.
Following the appointment of the Board members and the first meeting of the Board in the same month, a major milestone was registered with the official launching of the Peace Fund on 17 November 2018 on the sidelines of the 11th Extraordinary Assembly on the AU Reform. With the launch of the Fund, the next steps in the operationalization of the Fund are of paramount importance. In this respect, the first issue to be addressed is the progress in the full institutionalization of the various oversight and management structures of the Fund as well as legal instruments including financial rules governing the fund.
Within the framework of the AU, at strategic level, it is envisaged that the AUC Chairperson assisted by an Executive Management Committee oversees the operations of the Fund. At the operational level for the day to day management of the affairs of the Fund, it is envisaged that the Peace Fund would have its own secretariat. The structural proposal for the establishment of the secretariat is envisaged to be considered as part of the ongoing AU reform process. This is indeed one of the items on which this briefing is expected to shed some light in terms of where the process stands and when the secretariat is expected to be operational.
Political oversight lies with the PSC, with the support of the AU Commission Chairperson. While these structures and their roles are generally known in terms of mandating and decision-making authority, one of the issues of interest for PSC members would be how the PSC interacts with the Peace Fund and the parameters of that interaction. Against this background, an important issue that requires clarification is the decision-making roles of the various structures relating to the Fund.
Another area with respect of which the session is expected to receive update on is the status of contribution to the Fund. In its Decision Assembly/AU/Dec.605(XXVII) on the financing of the Union adopted at its 27th Ordinary Session held in July 2016 in Kigali, the AU Assembly decided to endow the AU Peace Fund with $400m by 2020. Although the expectation has been for the AU to collect at least $120 million as at the end of 2018, the contribution that member states have mobilized as at end of January 2019 is about $90 million. Within this context, one of the issues to be addressed is what the challenges are for making progress to meet the target of endowing the Fund with $400 million by 2020.
It is to be recalled that the PSC at its 30 May 2017 session decided the Peace Fund to have three (3) thematic windows, namely Mediation and Preventive Diplomacy; Institutional Capacity; and Peace Support Operations, as well as the Crisis Reserve facility provided for in Article 21 (4) of the PSC protocol and envisaged to fund rapid response to emergency crisis. Thus far one can only discern some indications of what initiatives would be covered within the framework of each of the windows.
At the time of the launch of the Peace Fund in November, it was noted that the within Window One of the Peace Fund, some of the initiatives that will be expected to draw from the Peace Fund include the Commission and Panel of the Wise peace-making missions, women in conflict prevention and mediation project anchored on FemWise, the Youth for Peace Africa Initiative, African Union Border initiatives, the Continental Conflict Prevention Framework, as well as post conflict reconstruction and development endeavours. While Window three is expected to cover, peace support operations, this will be guided by the AU Common Costs Document. The Document was developed by the Commission as part of its efforts towards efficient and effective utilization of the Peace Fund. This is also envisaged to guide the Commission in facilitating planning, rapid deployment and sustenance of AU Peace Support Operations. The Document was approved by the 10th Meeting of the AU Specialized Technical Committee on Defence, Safety and Security on 9 January 2018.
This session is accordingly expected to highlight progress made in organizing the Peace Fund around these three Windows in particular in terms of determining the scope and eligibility criteria for the windows.
Given that the Peace Fund is meant to operate alongside the funding from the UN, another issue expected to feature in tomorrow’s session is the political engagement with the UN Security Council (UNSC). This in particular concerns the adoption by the UNSC of a substantive resolution that establishes the principle that the AU mandated or authorized PSOs authorized by the UNSC should be financed through UN assessed contributions, with decisions on the financing of specific missions to be taken on a case by case basis’. From the side of the AU, AU Common Costs Document is also envisaged to guide the Commission in discussing options and categories of support that will be required from the UN in the event that the UN Security Council authorizes the use of UN Assessed Contributions for AU led Peace Support Operations.
Finally, this briefing session is expected to clarify the next steps, procedures and timelines for starting using the finances from the Peace Fund for funding AU’s peace and security efforts.
There is no expected outcome for this session.
Briefing session on the AU Peace Fund
Amani Africa
Date | 17 April, 2019
Today (17 April) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will have a briefing session on ‘Proposals towards Practical Utilization of the AU Peace Fund (in support of Conflict Prevention and Mediation; Capacity Building and AU Peace Support Operations)’. It is expected that Ciru Marwa, the Deputy Head of the AU Institutional Reforms Unit, who also advises Donald Kaberuka, the AU High Representative on the Financing of the African Union (AU) and the Peace Fund, will brief the PSC.
In the briefing, Mrs. Marwa is expected to present to the PSC the current state of the Peace Fund and the next steps including in terms of the criteria and processes for utilizing the funds that have been mobilized from member states as their assessed contributions to the Fund. The briefing also provides an opportunity for providing update on the progress made in the operationalization of the AU Peace Fund.
In terms of the operationalization of the Fund, when the PSC met last time on the Peace Fund, work was still under way in terms of the establishment and operationalization of the structures that ensure transparent and efficient administration of the fund and the running of the day to day operations of the Peace Fund. The first of these structures is the Board of Trustees. This is the body that plays the key role in terms of the financial and administrative oversight of the Fund required to ensure high fiduciary standards and integrity and the provision of strategic coherence. In this respect, perhaps the most notable development has been the appointment of the Board of Trustees of the Fund in November 2018. The Board consists of five individuals representing the five regions of the continent and two institutions. The five individuals are Zainadine Ahmed of Nigeria, Kamel Morjane of Tunisia, Ellen Mekonen of Ethiopia, Tito Mboweni of South Africa and Anicent Dologuele of Central African Republic. The two institutions are the major partner organizations of the AU, namely the United Nations and the European Union.
Following the appointment of the Board members and the first meeting of the Board in the same month, a major milestone was registered with the official launching of the Peace Fund on 17 November 2018 on the sidelines of the 11th Extraordinary Assembly on the AU Reform. With the launch of the Fund, the next steps in the operationalization of the Fund are of paramount importance. In this respect, the first issue to be addressed is the progress in the full institutionalization of the various oversight and management structures of the Fund as well as legal instruments including financial rules governing the fund.
Within the framework of the AU, at strategic level, it is envisaged that the AUC Chairperson assisted by an Executive Management Committee oversees the operations of the Fund. At the operational level for the day to day management of the affairs of the Fund, it is envisaged that the Peace Fund would have its own secretariat. The structural proposal for the establishment of the secretariat is envisaged to be considered as part of the ongoing AU reform process. This is indeed one of the items on which this briefing is expected to shed some light in terms of where the process stands and when the secretariat is expected to be operational.
Political oversight lies with the PSC, with the support of the AU Commission Chairperson. While these structures and their roles are generally known in terms of mandating and decision-making authority, one of the issues of interest for PSC members would be how the PSC interacts with the Peace Fund and the parameters of that interaction. Against this background, an important issue that requires clarification is the decision-making roles of the various structures relating to the Fund.
Another area with respect of which the session is expected to receive update on is the status of contribution to the Fund. In its Decision Assembly/AU/Dec.605(XXVII) on the financing of the Union adopted at its 27th Ordinary Session held in July 2016 in Kigali, the AU Assembly decided to endow the AU Peace Fund with $400m by 2020. Although the expectation has been for the AU to collect at least $120 million as at the end of 2018, the contribution that member states have mobilized as at end of January 2019 is about $90 million. Within this context, one of the issues to be addressed is what the challenges are for making progress to meet the target of endowing the Fund with $400 million by 2020.
It is to be recalled that the PSC at its 30 May 2017 session decided the Peace Fund to have three (3) thematic windows, namely Mediation and Preventive Diplomacy; Institutional Capacity; and Peace Support Operations, as well as the Crisis Reserve facility provided for in Article 21 (4) of the PSC protocol and envisaged to fund rapid response to emergency crisis. Thus far one can only discern some indications of what initiatives would be covered within the framework of each of the windows.
At the time of the launch of the Peace Fund in November, it was noted that the within Window One of the Peace Fund, some of the initiatives that will be expected to draw from the Peace Fund include the Commission and Panel of the Wise peace-making missions, women in conflict prevention and mediation project anchored on FemWise, the Youth for Peace Africa Initiative, African Union Border initiatives, the Continental Conflict Prevention Framework, as well as post conflict reconstruction and development endeavours. While Window three is expected to cover, peace support operations, this will be guided by the AU Common Costs Document. The Document was developed by the Commission as part of its efforts towards efficient and effective utilization of the Peace Fund. This is also envisaged to guide the Commission in facilitating planning, rapid deployment and sustenance of AU Peace Support Operations. The Document was approved by the 10th Meeting of the AU Specialized Technical Committee on Defence, Safety and Security on 9 January 2018.
This session is accordingly expected to highlight progress made in organizing the Peace Fund around these three Windows in particular in terms of determining the scope and eligibility criteria for the windows.
Given that the Peace Fund is meant to operate alongside the funding from the UN, another issue expected to feature in tomorrow’s session is the political engagement with the UN Security Council (UNSC). This in particular concerns the adoption by the UNSC of a substantive resolution that establishes the principle that the AU mandated or authorized PSOs authorized by the UNSC should be financed through UN assessed contributions, with decisions on the financing of specific missions to be taken on a case by case basis’. From the side of the AU, AU Common Costs Document is also envisaged to guide the Commission in discussing options and categories of support that will be required from the UN in the event that the UN Security Council authorizes the use of UN Assessed Contributions for AU led Peace Support Operations.
Finally, this briefing session is expected to clarify the next steps, procedures and timelines for starting using the finances from the Peace Fund for funding AU’s peace and security efforts.
There is no expected outcome for this session.
Briefing session on the AU Peace Fund
Amani Africa
Date | 17 April, 2019
Today (17 April) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will have a briefing session on ‘Proposals towards Practical Utilization of the AU Peace Fund (in support of Conflict Prevention and Mediation; Capacity Building and AU Peace Support Operations)’. It is expected that Ciru Marwa, the Deputy Head of the AU Institutional Reforms Unit, who also advises Donald Kaberuka, the AU High Representative on the Financing of the African Union (AU) and the Peace Fund, will brief the PSC.
In the briefing, Mrs. Marwa is expected to present to the PSC the current state of the Peace Fund and the next steps including in terms of the criteria and processes for utilizing the funds that have been mobilized from member states as their assessed contributions to the Fund. The briefing also provides an opportunity for providing update on the progress made in the operationalization of the AU Peace Fund.
In terms of the operationalization of the Fund, when the PSC met last time on the Peace Fund, work was still under way in terms of the establishment and operationalization of the structures that ensure transparent and efficient administration of the fund and the running of the day to day operations of the Peace Fund. The first of these structures is the Board of Trustees. This is the body that plays the key role in terms of the financial and administrative oversight of the Fund required to ensure high fiduciary standards and integrity and the provision of strategic coherence. In this respect, perhaps the most notable development has been the appointment of the Board of Trustees of the Fund in November 2018. The Board consists of five individuals representing the five regions of the continent and two institutions. The five individuals are Zainadine Ahmed of Nigeria, Kamel Morjane of Tunisia, Ellen Mekonen of Ethiopia, Tito Mboweni of South Africa and Anicent Dologuele of Central African Republic. The two institutions are the major partner organizations of the AU, namely the United Nations and the European Union.
Following the appointment of the Board members and the first meeting of the Board in the same month, a major milestone was registered with the official launching of the Peace Fund on 17 November 2018 on the sidelines of the 11th Extraordinary Assembly on the AU Reform. With the launch of the Fund, the next steps in the operationalization of the Fund are of paramount importance. In this respect, the first issue to be addressed is the progress in the full institutionalization of the various oversight and management structures of the Fund as well as legal instruments including financial rules governing the fund.
Within the framework of the AU, at strategic level, it is envisaged that the AUC Chairperson assisted by an Executive Management Committee oversees the operations of the Fund. At the operational level for the day to day management of the affairs of the Fund, it is envisaged that the Peace Fund would have its own secretariat. The structural proposal for the establishment of the secretariat is envisaged to be considered as part of the ongoing AU reform process. This is indeed one of the items on which this briefing is expected to shed some light in terms of where the process stands and when the secretariat is expected to be operational.
Political oversight lies with the PSC, with the support of the AU Commission Chairperson. While these structures and their roles are generally known in terms of mandating and decision-making authority, one of the issues of interest for PSC members would be how the PSC interacts with the Peace Fund and the parameters of that interaction. Against this background, an important issue that requires clarification is the decision-making roles of the various structures relating to the Fund.
Another area with respect of which the session is expected to receive update on is the status of contribution to the Fund. In its Decision Assembly/AU/Dec.605(XXVII) on the financing of the Union adopted at its 27th Ordinary Session held in July 2016 in Kigali, the AU Assembly decided to endow the AU Peace Fund with $400m by 2020. Although the expectation has been for the AU to collect at least $120 million as at the end of 2018, the contribution that member states have mobilized as at end of January 2019 is about $90 million. Within this context, one of the issues to be addressed is what the challenges are for making progress to meet the target of endowing the Fund with $400 million by 2020.
It is to be recalled that the PSC at its 30 May 2017 session decided the Peace Fund to have three (3) thematic windows, namely Mediation and Preventive Diplomacy; Institutional Capacity; and Peace Support Operations, as well as the Crisis Reserve facility provided for in Article 21 (4) of the PSC protocol and envisaged to fund rapid response to emergency crisis. Thus far one can only discern some indications of what initiatives would be covered within the framework of each of the windows.
At the time of the launch of the Peace Fund in November, it was noted that the within Window One of the Peace Fund, some of the initiatives that will be expected to draw from the Peace Fund include the Commission and Panel of the Wise peace-making missions, women in conflict prevention and mediation project anchored on FemWise, the Youth for Peace Africa Initiative, African Union Border initiatives, the Continental Conflict Prevention Framework, as well as post conflict reconstruction and development endeavours.
While Window three is expected to cover, peace support operations, this will be guided by the AU Common Costs Document. The Document was developed by the Commission as part of its efforts towards efficient and effective utilization of the Peace Fund. This is also envisaged to guide the Commission in facilitating planning, rapid deployment and sustenance of AU Peace Support Operations. The Document was approved by the 10th Meeting of the AU Specialized Technical Committee on Defence, Safety and Security on 9 January 2018.
This session is accordingly expected to highlight progress made in organizing the Peace Fund around these three Windows in particular in terms of determining the scope and eligibility criteria for the windows.
Given that the Peace Fund is meant to operate alongside the funding from the UN, another issue expected to feature in tomorrow’s session is the political engagement with the UN Security Council (UNSC). This in particular concerns the adoption by the UNSC of a substantive resolution that establishes the principle that the AU mandatedor authorized PSOs authorized by the UNSC should be financed through UN assessed contributions, with decisions on the financing of specific missions to be taken on a case by case basis’. From the side of the AU, AU Common Costs Document is also envisaged to guide the Commission in discussing options and categories of support that will be required from the UN in the event that the UN Security Council authorizes the use of UN Assessed Contributions for AU led Peace Support Operations.
Finally, this briefing session is expected to clarify the next steps, procedures and timelines for starting using the finances from the Peace Fund for funding AU’s peace and security efforts.
There is no expected outcome for this session.
Briefing session on the situation in Sudan
Amani Africa
Date | 15 April, 2019
Tomorrow (15 April) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene on an emergency meeting on the situation unfolding in Sudan. It is expected that the AU Peace and Security Department, will brief the PSC. Sudan’s Ambassador and representative of IGAD are also expected to make statements. It is anticipated that the session will focus on the conditions of the ouster of long time President of Sudan, Omar Hassan al-Bashir the precious day on 11 April and the nature of the transition that the army leadership announced after removing Bashir.
The move of the Sudanese army ousting Bashir came after months of peaceful popular protests that covered many parts of Sudan. The protests began on 19 December in the northern town of Atbara after a major spike in the price of bread. As the protests spread to many other parts of Sudan including notably the capital Khartoum, the demand of the protesters shifted into broader political change with a particular focus on the departure of Bashir from power.
The army ousted Bashir after the protesters mobilized major demonstrations running for a number of days since April 6 outside of the military headquarters in Khartoum. When announcing the removal of Bashir, the First Vice President and Minister of Defence Awad Ibn Auf declared the suspension of the Constitution, the dissolution of the National Assembly, the formation of a military-led transitional government which will rule for two years, and the arrest of President Omar al Bashir, as well as the imposition of a state of emergency for three months. Since then the military Awad IbnAuf himself resigned and Lt-General Abdel Fattah Burhan assumed the region of power. Despite reconciliatory tone of the new head of the Military Council, protesters continue to demand the establishment of a civilian administration.
These turn of events, particularly the abrogation of transitional government power by the military and the suspension of the Constitution, raised the question of the application of the AU norm on unconstitutional changes of government. Unsurprisingly, the AU Commission Chairperson issued a press
statement on the situation. In the statement the Chairperson expressed ‘the African Union conviction that the military take-over is not the appropriate response to the challenges facing Sudan and the aspirations of its people.’ While appealing to all stakeholders to engage in an inclusive dialogue to create the conditions that will make it possible to meet the aspirations of the Sudanese people to democracy, good governance and well-being and restore constitutional order as soon as possible, the Chairperson reiterated the strong condemnation, under the Lome Declaration of 2000 and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (African Democracy
Charter), ‘of any unconstitutional change of Government and commit member states to the respect of the rule of law, democratic principles and human rights.’
Tomorrow’s session was also anticipated in the Chairperson’s statement. It is expected that the PSC will make a determination on whether the transition in Sudan constitutes a military coup
warranting the application of the measures envisaged under the Lome Declaration and the African Democracy Charter. The military takeover of transitional authority under a Military Council, the suspension of the
constitution and the declaration of state of emergency are all the constituent elements of a military coup. As such, it is expected that the PSC will designate the situation in Sudan as an unconstitutional change of government. What is not clear is whether the PSC will proceed to institute the consequences that flow from the occurrence in a member state of an unconstitutional change of government. While the reading of the Lome Declaration and other relevant instruments of the AU including the AU Constitutive Act and the dominant practice of the AU suggests that the application of suspension of the country in which unconstitutional change happened to be automatic, there have been instances in which the PSC opted for holding back the automatic application of the legal consequences. This is done to use the threat of sanction as leverage for pushing democratic change and deploy an incremental application of sanctions.
It may be recalled that in a similar situation in Burkina Faso in 2014 the PSC opted for the suspension of the automatic application of the consequences of the occurrence of a military
seizure of power. After widespread protests against the change of constitutional term limit he was pushing through Parliament for seeking a third term, Burkina Faso’s then President Blaise Compaore fled out of the country at the end of October 2014. On his departure, the army took over the reign of power. The AU through the statement of the Chairperson of the AU commission announced its rejection of unconstitutional changes. At its meeting on 3 November 2014, the PSC informed the army that the seizure by the army of power was contrary to the AU norm on unconstitutional changes. But as opposed to the usual practice of suspending Burkina Faso immediately, the PSC, on the advise of the then Chairperson of the AU Commission Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, used
the threat of suspension as a leverage for quick transfer of power by the military to a transitional civilian authority. Accordingly, the PSC gave Burkina Faso’s army a period of two weeks for handing over power to such civilian authority.
From the perspective of applying the AU norm banning unconstitutional change of government to support peaceful transition in Sudan, this approach used in Burkina Faso could as well be
the option that the PSC could opt for. The result of this could be the rejection and condemnation of the seizure of power by the army as unconstitutional and the provision of a timeline for the army to negotiate with various stakeholders on the streets protesting for handing over power to an inclusive civilian transitional authority.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. In accordance with Lome Declaration of 2000 and the Addis Ababa Democracy Charter, it is expected to condemn the military seizure of power and urge the transfer of power to a civilian transitional administration, failing which the PSC would take the relevant measures including suspension of Sudan from the AU and targeted sanctions as applicable. As in Burkina Faso, the PSC could request the AU High Level Panel to support the Sudanese actors in handing over power to an inclusive civilian authority and elaborate a road map for addressing outstanding issues of the various peace processes in Sudan and for instituting reforms for achieving democratic change.
Open Session on Children in situations of Armed Conflicts in Africa
Amani Africa
Date | 15 April, 2019
Tomorrow (16 April) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will have an open session on children affected by armed conflict in Africa.
During this session, it is expected that Amira Elfadil Mohammed Elfadil, AUC Commissioner of Social Affairs, Benyam Dawit Mezumr member of the African Committee of Experts on the Right and Welfare of the Child and Special Rapporteur on Children and Armed Conflict, will brief the PSC. Assefa Bequele founder of the African Child Policy Forum, UNICEF and Save the Children representatives are also expected to make a statement. The PSC Chair of the month, Ambassador Bankole Adeoye, of Nigeria, who is the Chair of the PSC for April, will make opening remarks.
The 21st Ordinary Executive Council Session held in Addis Ababa in June 2012, adopted Decision EX.CL/Dec.712 (XXI) in which it requested the PSC to take into consideration the rights of the child in its agenda and cooperate actively with the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACERWC). Following this decision, the first PSC open session exclusively focusing on children affected by armed conflicts was held in May 2014 at the 434th meeting. Since then, efforts were made by the PSC and ACERWC in institutionalizing the session on the topic by convening regular PSC open sessions.
According to the 2016 ACERWC ‘Continental Study on the Impact of Conflict and Crises on Children in Africa’ states that conflict in the continent accounts for a 50 per cent increase in infant deaths and a 15 per cent increase in under nutrition. Children are twenty-four times more exposed to death in armed conflict due to illness and injury than in peacetime.
Tomorrow’s session is taking place within the context of the AU theme for 2019, ‘the Year of Refugees, Internally Displaced Persons and Returnees: Towards Durable Solutions to Forced Displacement in Africa’ and it also makes linkages to the Silencing the Guns by 2020. The session is expected to take stock of previous PSC decisions and AU’s response to protecting children affected by armed conflicts. There have been quite a significant number of PSC outcome documents since 2010 on the impact of armed conflict on children. However there has not been systematic follow up mechanism on items that require implementation and regular review. The session may address the lack or limited implementation of standards and policies and the absence of a robust oversight and coordination capacity through this stock taking exercise on the protection of children in situations of armed conflicts.
One of the major PSC decisions that is yet to be implemented is the appointment of a special envoy on children to draw more attention and action on issues of child rights, education and protection, particularly in the context of conflict. This decision has been a standing item in the PSC outcome documents since 2014 and in the subsequent PSC sessions dedicated to children.
The lack of implementation of this decision and others is not completely surprising. It in part has to do with the lack of clear strategy that guides and informs decisions such as the appointment of a special envoy on children. Additionally, this lack of implementation also reflects the lack of due consideration at the time of making decision to the institutional, legal and resource implications of decisions particularly those involving the establishment of new mechanisms. There is thus a need for the PSC to have a study that addresses these issues including vis-a-vis the mandate of the AU Special Envoy on Women and Peace and Security and the role of the Children’s Committee, which itself has a dedicated rapporteur on the theme of children in armed conflicts.
Indeed, the issue of the impact of conflict on children is also addressed within the framework of the one of the standing themes of the PSC on women peace and security in Africa. The 757th session especially urged for an extraordinary AU summit dedicated to the plight of women and children to mobilize political support and recourses to respond to the needs of women and children. Although this decision did not fully materialize, the 2019 AU theme on humanitarian focus offers an opportunity to highlight the vulnerability of children in conflict and humanitarian situations.
Some of the recent PSC sessions on children have increasingly focused on the impact of conflict on children’s access to education. In this context the 706th and 597th PSC sessions held in May 2016 and July 2017 respectively shed light primarily on attacks on schools and on out-of-school children due to protracted conflicts and violence. The military use of schools and presence of troops and weapons inside schools have been highlighted. The 2016 session has particularly indicated that more than 12 million children are denied of education due to attacks on school and violence. Hence the PSC called on member states to endorse the Guidelines for Protecting Schools and Universities from Military Use During Armed Conflicts, also commonly known as the “Safe Schools Guidelines”. Moreover at its 706th session the PSC has called for the establishment of a comprehensive child protection architecture within the AUC to monitor and track the effective implementation of various instruments adopted at continental and international level.
Beyond its aim to take the issues affecting education of children in situations of armed conflict, this session is expected to reflect broadly on the impact of conflicts on children including killing and maiming, abductions, sexual abuse, recruitment of children as armed combatants, attacks on education and hospitals, and denial of humanitarian access. The launch of the recent ACERWC report on children on the move can further generate momentum in underlining the particular needs of children in armed conflicts. Elfadil in her briefing is expected to highlight key issues raised in the report. The report elaborates on the drivers of forced displacement and states that ‘no other continent has witnessed armed conflicts that have adverse effects on children like the African continent’. The report further asserts that children constitute 53% of the total 5.4 million refugees in the continent.
The PSC is expected to make reference and follow up on commitments made during the previous sessions. Particularly the PSC may reiterate the primary responsibility of governments to ensure that children are protected and that their rights and welfare are respected by particularly ratifying and implementing all the relevant legal instruments. Significant children specific PSC decisions are related to ratification, domestication and enhancing implementation of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child and other international child protection, rights and welfare instruments.
The expected outcome is a press statement.
Briefing session on the situation in Sudan
Amani Africa
Date | 14 April, 2019
Tomorrow (15 April) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene on an emergency meeting on the situation unfolding in Sudan.
It is expected that the AU Peace and Security Department, will brief the PSC. Sudan’s Ambassador and representative of IGAD are also expected to make statements. It is anticipated that the session will focus on the conditions of the ouster of long time President of Sudan, Omar Hassan al-Bashir the precious day on 11 April and the nature of the transition that the army leadership announced after removing Bashir.
The move of the Sudanese army ousting Bashir came after months of peaceful popular protests that covered many parts of Sudan. The protests began on 19 December in the northern town of Atbara after a major spike in the price of bread. As the protests spread to many other parts of Sudan including notably the capital Khartoum, the demand of the protesters shifted into broader political change with a particular focus on the departure of Bashir from power.
The army ousted Bashir after the protesters mobilized major demonstrations running for a number of days since April 6 outside of the military headquarters in Khartoum. When announcing the removal of Bashir, the First Vice President and Minister of Defence Awad Ibn Auf declared the suspension of the Constitution, the dissolution of the National Assembly, the formation of a military-led transitional government which will rule for two years, and the arrest of President Omar al Bashir, as well as the imposition of a state of emergency for three months. Since then the military Awad IbnAuf himself resigned and Lt-General Abdel Fattah Burhan assumed the region of power. Despite reconciliatory tone of the new head of the Military Council, protesters continue to demand the establishment of a civilian administration.
These turn of events, particularly the abrogation of transitional government power by the military and the suspension of the Constitution, raised the question of the application of the AU norm on unconstitutional changes of government. Unsurprisingly, the AU Commission Chairperson issued a press statement on the situation. In the statement the Chairperson expressed ‘the African Union conviction that the military take-over is not the appropriate response to the challenges facing Sudan and the aspirations of its people.’ While appealing to all stakeholders to engage in an inclusive dialogue to create the conditions that will make it possible to meet the aspirations of the Sudanese people to democracy, good governance and well-being and restore constitutional order as soon as possible, the Chairperson reiterated the strong condemnation, under the Lome Declaration of 2000 and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (African Democracy Charter), ‘of any unconstitutional change of Government and commit member states to the respect of the rule of law, democratic principles and human rights.’
Tomorrow’s session was also anticipated in the Chairperson’s statement. It is expected that the PSC will make a determination on whether the transition in Sudan constitutes a military coup warranting the application of the measures envisaged under the Lome Declaration and the African Democracy Charter. The military takeover of transitional authority under a Military Council, the suspension of the constitution and the declaration of state of emergency are all the constituent elements of a military coup. As such, it is expected that the PSC will designate the situation in Sudan as an unconstitutional change of government.
What is not clear is whether the PSC will proceed to institute the consequences that flow from the occurrence in a member state of an unconstitutional change of government. While the reading of the Lome Declaration and other relevant instruments of the AU including the AU Constitutive Act and the dominant practice of the AU suggests that the application of suspension of the country in which unconstitutional change happened to be automatic, there have been instances in which the PSC opted for holding back the automatic application of the legal consequences. This is done to use the threat of sanction as leverage for pushing democratic change and deploy an incremental application of sanctions.
It may be recalled that in a similar situation in Burkina Faso in 2014 the PSC opted for the suspension of the automatic application of the consequences of the occurrence of a military seizure of power. After widespread protests against the change of constitutional term limit he was pushing through Parliament for seeking a third term, Burkina Faso’s then President Blaise Compaore fled out of the country at the end of October 2014. On his departure, the army took over the reign of power. The AU through the statement of the Chairperson of the AU commission announced its rejection of unconstitutional changes. At its meeting on 3 November 2014, the PSC informed the army that the seizure by the army of power was contrary to the AU norm on unconstitutional changes. But as opposed to the usual practice of suspending Burkina Faso immediately, the PSC, on the advise of the then Chairperson of the AU Commission Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, used the threat of suspension as a leverage for quick transfer of power by the military to a transitional civilian authority. Accordingly, the PSC gave Burkina Faso’s army a period of two weeks for handing over power to such civilian authority.
From the perspective of applying the AU norm banning unconstitutional change of government to support peaceful transition in Sudan, this approach used in Burkina Faso could as well be the option that the PSC could opt for. The result of this could be the rejection and condemnation of the seizure of power by the army as unconstitutional and the provision of a timeline for the army to negotiate with various stakeholders on the streets protesting for handing over power to an inclusive civilian transitional authority.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. In accordance with Lome Declaration of 2000 and the Addis Ababa Democracy Charter, it is expected to condemn the military seizure of power and urge the transfer of power to a civilian transitional administration, failing which the PSC would take the relevant measures including suspension of Sudan from the AU and targeted sanctions as applicable. As in Burkina Faso, the PSC could request the AU High Level Panel to support the Sudanese actors in handing over power to an inclusive civilian authority and elaborate a road map for addressing outstanding issues of the various peace processes in Sudan and for instituting reforms for achieving democratic change.