Briefing on the situation in Libya
Amani Africa
Date | 17 October, 2018
Tomorrow (17 October) the Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to convene a briefing session on the situation in Libya. The AU Commission through the Peace and Security Department and Chairperson’s Special Representative for Libya, Mrs. Wahida Ayari are expected to brief the PSC. Congo as Chair of the AU High Representative Committee and the other members of the Committee are expected to make statement. The UN, as the body that is leading the international effort for finding a political solution to the crisis in Libya, is also expected to provide updates to the PSC. Libya will also make statements.
Although this was not on the agenda of the initial program of the PSC, the Chair of the Month, Congo, being the Chair of the AU High Level Committee on Libya, it was no surprise that Libya was put on the agenda of the PSC. The session is expected to assess the prevailing security situation in the country, developments in the political process, including the plan for holding of national elections, and the situation of migrants in Libya.
In terms of the security situation, it would be of interest for the PSC to be informed of the state of the security situation in Libya in all its dimensions. Overall, the security situation in Libya remains dire. The continued existence of rival armed groups fighting over the control over various parts of the country continues to result in major incidents of fighting. Last month, armed groups launched an offensive against Tripoli maintained in bid to oust Tripoli-based militias and pressure Prime Minister Faiez Serraj to step down. At least 115 people, half of whom civilians in residential areas, were killed since fighting erupted late August.
Apart from existing patterns of violent confrontation among rival groups, increasingly, struggle all armed actors in Libya to refrain from any attempt to disrupt oil installations, production and exports’.
Inter-communal violence has also become a major source of insecurity. In recent times, such conflicts have particularly affected Southern Libya. The situation also manifests the proliferation of not only armed groups but also criminal activities affecting in particular Southern Libya. Further compounding the wide presence and circulation of weapons in the country is also continuing trends of supply of weapons into the country. The presence of terrorist groups is another manifestation of the complex and dire security situation in the country.
On the political front, despite the fact that a UN initiative led to a Libyan Political Agreement in December 2015 and a so-called Government of National Accord (GNA), bringing together two warring “governments,” deep divisions remain between the parties in Libya, specifically between the competing Tripoli-based and UN-supported Presidency Council and the eastern Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR).
Attempts have been underway for reaching consensus between the rival bodies on forming a new executive authority to reach an agreement on limited amendments to the Libyan Political Agreement. However, with these two components of the GNA competing for authority and legitimacy, in effect there remain two rival authorities in the country, with no single group commanding preponderance national clout. As the fighting during August and September showed, Tripoli and Tripoli-based UN-backed Govt of National Accord remain contested and even armed under attack.
In the mean time, there remains a plan for the convening of elections in the country. Although progress on technical preparations has been reported particularly in terms of voter registration, the feasibility of the convening of elections within a set timeline in the absence of changes in the prevailing conditions remains uncertain.
Multilateral actors are pushing for a process of inclusive national dialogue. The AU Commission Chairperson in his 1 July press statement called for the organization of an inclusive dialogue to promote reconciliation and address peacefully all issues at hand. Following their meeting on 23 September in New York, participants of the third AU- EU-UN trilateral meeting ‘agreed to work in close cooperation with the Libyan actors on the principle of the organization of a peace and reconciliation conference as a prelude to the conduct of peaceful and transparent legislative and presidential elections.’
With respect to the situation of migrants, it is of interest for PSC members to note that the situation remains dire. According to a report of the UN Secretary-General, despite the effort of Libya to close some detention centers ‘migrants, including children, continued to be vulnerable to unlawful deprivation of liberty and arbitrary detention in official and unofficial places of detention, torture, abduction for ransom, extortion, forced labour and unlawful killing. Perpetrators included State officials, armed groups, smugglers, traffickers and criminal gangs.’
Apart from the large number of migrants present in Libya, the measures being taken by European countries for steaming the flow of migrants seems to worsen the situation of refugees and migrants in Libya. This is due to a greater number of interceptions at sea, the growing closure of the Mediterranean Sea for migrant departures and the refusal of countries to provide rescue support for migrants and refugees crossing the Mediterranean. The grave danger facing migrants became evident when no rescue support was extended to 600 migrants stranded on the sea. In a statement he issued on this incident, AU Commission Chairperson stated ‘European Union Member States must demonstrate their commitment to our shared commitments to address the immediate safety and human rights of all migrants within and across borders, while tackling the underlying causes driving illegal migration’.
During this meeting, the PSC may echo the call of the fifth meeting of the AU High-Level Meeting on Libya held in Addis Ababa, in April 2018 urging all regional and international actors to stop arms supply in line with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions. Equally important is also the need for countries to cease support for and official contact with parallel institutions in Libya. The PSC could also express support for the political process spearheaded by the UN including inter- community reconciliation efforts and restate the emphasis of the AU High-Level meeting on the imperative of engaging in an inclusive AU-UN proposed national reconciliation conference for resolving the Libyan crisis.
With respect to the plight of migrants, the PSC could call on Libyan authorities and European countries to comply with human rights obligations, including in interactions with persons in need of assistance at sea and cooperation with other vessels engaged in rescue operations. It could reiterate the call of the UN Secretary-General that for states to refrain from returning to Libya any third-country nationals intercepted at sea and should ensure that those in need of international protection are able to access fair and effective asylum procedures and from contributing— through their search and rescue coordination efforts, their provision of material support or otherwise — to bringing about a course of events by which individuals are transferred to places where they face risks of torture, ill- treatment or other serious human rights violations or are denied access to international protection if needed.
AU-UN Briefing on joint field visit to South Sudan
Amani Africa
Date | 10 October, 2018
Tomorrow (10 October) the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) will receive a briefing from Smail Chergui, AU Commissioner for Peace and Security and Jean-Pierre Lacroix, UN Under Secretary- General for Peacekeeping Operations. The session will listen to the reports by the two officials on the political and security developments in South Sudan, and on the contribution, gaps and future of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), and its relations with the Regional Protection Force (RPF).
The briefing by Chergui and Lacroix follows their joint visit to South Sudan along with the co-chair of the AU FemWise, Speciosa Wandira Kazibwe and the Executive Director for UN Women, Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka. The visit took place from 07 to 09 October. During the visit, they had talks with members of the South Sudanese government including the President and first vice President, the leadership of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), and women leaders and organizations in Juba and Bentiu, including those at the
UN Protection of Civilians sites.
The joint mission to South Sudan had two objectives. The first concerns the promotion of the peace agreement. The second focuses on enhancing the participation of women in the implementation of the peace agreement. It is to be recalled that the South Sudanese parties signed the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS), on 12 September 2018.
In terms of the first aspect of the joint visit, apart from the opportunity that the visit presented to the delegation for expressing support for the peace agreement, it was also an occasion for first hand exchange on the implementation of the peace agreement and role that UN Mission to South Sudan (UNMISS) and the Rapid Protection Force (RPF) could play and the contribution that the AU could make in supporting the implementation process. The visit also enabled the delegation to have a better understanding of the challenges facing the implementation of the RARCSS. With respect to the second dimension of the visit, the delegation sought to highlight tangible actions on women’s meaningful participation and leadership in the implementation of the peace agreement. Important part of such enhanced role of women is also the representation of women in the committee for the implementation of the peace agreement that the government constituted and in the transitional
government of national unity.
Tomorrow’s session is thus expected to examine the political and security developments in South Sudan and the role and partnership of the UN and the AU in the next phases of the peace and political processes. This would enable the PSC not only to be appraised of where the implementation of the R-ARCSS stands and the steps that the parties to the agreement are taking in this direction.
The 12 September agreement was followed by a positive announcement by President Kiir calling for the immediate release of all opposition fighters and political prisoners. Juba subsequently releases twenty political prisoners. However, serious differences still remain on who should be included in the pardon list. Despite some of these positive developments, there is a legitimate skepticism on the seriousness and commitment of the parties of the conflict to implement the latest rounds of the agreement. The signatories have repeatedly failed to respect the spirit and words of previous deals, and the capacity and power of the two leaders to command and control the proliferated and undisciplined armed groups they lead presents a further challenge. The SPLM-IO also recently reported that there were at least five violations of the ceasefire by the government forces since 12 September. There were also reports of serious clashes between government and opposition forces in Equatoria and Unity states on 24 September.
The insecurity in the country still affects the activities and movement of the UNMISS. Days after the 12 September agreement in Addis, a UNMISS peacekeeper was injured when a government solider fired at a U.N. convoy. Repeated violations of previous attempts to stop the violence and consolidate the peace, and antagonism of some members of the leadership in Juba towards the UN have put the role of the UMMISS in doubt.
The appointment by the South Sudan government of Gen. Malek Reuben Riak as deputy minister of defense has attracted strong international criticisms. Gen Riak has been repeatedly accused of obstructing peace and blocking humanitarian assistance, and is sanctioned by the U.S. and U.N. The divisive general has also been implicated with arming a militia that committed gross violations of human rights, and war crimes by a 2016 U.N. Panel of Experts. The decision isn’t the first of its kind as President Kiir appointed Gabriel Jok Riak, another figure on the UN sanctions list accused of obstructing peace and repeatedly violating the terms of the peace agreements, as army chief of staff.
Tomorrow’s briefing will also be an occasion for PSC members to be appraised of the progress made and challenges faced in the implementation of the peace agreement. It would be of interest for the PSC to be informed of risks of repeat of the violations that hindered the implementation of the August 2015 initial agreement and importantly what role the AU could play for supporting the full implementation of the revitalized peace agreement.
The head of the UN Mission in South Sudan David Shearer recently highlighted the lack of the ‘key ingredient’ in the latest agreement. Shearer said the personalities behind the deal have a complex past and ‘suspicions still remains widespread’, and there is a lack of trust. The briefing offers an opportunity for discussing what the UN-AU partnership can do to enhance trust and the important role that the enhanced participation and representation of women could play for enhancing the legitimacy and effective
implementation of the peace agreement. In terms of the second dimension of the joint visit, how the AU supports the representation and participation of women in the implementation of the peace agreement including the role that the AU FemWise could play in this regard would also be of particular interest for the PSC. It is likely that this dimension of the visit would also feature in the session of the PSC on UN Resolution 1325 expected to take place on 19 October.
While it was not the focus of the joint field mission, one area of the peace agreement that implicates the role of the AU is the operationalization of the Hybrid Court, a major element of the peace agreement and the political process. The details of the operationalization and operations of the court with South Sudanese judges and international war crimes experts is articulated under chapter five of the revitalized peace agreement. The chapter also envisions the establishment of the hybrid court and puts mechanisms for the compensation and reparations of the victims of crimes committed during the conflict. Although the Government of South Sudan signed the MoU on the establishment of the Hybrid Court with the AU, it has not adopted the relevant legislative measure for the domestication of the MoU. Following the announcement of amnesty by the government, concerns were raised on the implication of the amnesty for the mandate of the hybrid court in establishing accountability for atrocities committed against South Sudanese civilians. Despite this mounting pressure against impunity, earlier this month, the Minster for Information of South Sudan Michael Makuei said that his government is opposed to the creation of a war crimes court. The minster which labeled the court ‘a tool of regime change by the troika’ added that peace must be the priority of the involvement of the international community in South Sudan. He accused the hybrid court as ‘an instrument they want to use against the people of South Sudan, especially the leadership of South Sudan. They want to use it in a sense that because the agreement gives the hybrid court the right to indict anybody at any time and once you are indicted, you are apprehended and taken to jail’.
Within the broader discussion on the peace agreement, the session also affords an opportunity for examining developments in the IGAD led Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC) and the state of the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism (CTSAMM) in the framework of
the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS), including the planned deployment of troops from Sudan for securing the oil infrastructure. The briefing by Chergui and Lacroix is also expected to look into the progress made in the deployment of the Regional Protection Force (RPF), its harmonization with the UNAMISS and its role vis-à-vis the revitalized peace agreement. The force which is created with a mission of protection of civilians and mandate to secure Juba will have a capacity of 4,000 at full capacity. So far, 2,400 of these troops have been deployed. There are uncertainties and lack of clarity on how these forces will engage and coordinate with the 8,000 peacekeepers under UNMISS. The expected outcome of the briefing is a communiqué.
PSC Program of Work for the Month of October 2018
Amani Africa
Date | October 2018
Congo assumes the role of the monthly chairpersonship of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) for the month of October when the monthly program of work of the PSC commences on 1 October. The provisional program of work does not include any agenda on specific country situation. It envisages one open session and a retreat of the PSC. Much of the substantive agenda of the provisional program reflect sessions from the AU Commission.
The October PSC program of work starts on 1 October with a briefing on the continental framework for structural conflict prevention in line with the 502nd meeting of the PSC that took place on 29 April 2015. Proposed from the AU Commission, the meeting will look at developments with the Country Structural Vulnerability and Resilience Assessments (CSVRAs) and Country Structural Vulnerability Mitigation Strategies (CSVMS) elements of the framework.
The second agenda item on 1 October is dedicated to the discussion on the preparation for the annual joint consultative meeting between the AU PSC and the EU Committee on Peace and Security (EU CPS) that will take place from 22-24 October in Brussels. On 2 October 2018, the PSC has three agenda item. In the first agenda of the session from the AU Commission, the PSC will hold a briefing session on the establishment of a Mediation Support Unit in the AU Commission. The session will examine the mandate, capacity and structure of the support unit and its working relations with the Panel of the Wise (PoW), the mediation component of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).
Under the second agenda item, the PSC will consider and adopt the draft provisional program of work of the PSC for November 2018. The third item of the session will review the preparation for PSC retreat scheduled from 29-31 October 2018. After a week-long absence, the PSC will convene
again on 10 October to receive a joint briefing from the Smail Chergui, AU Commissioner for Peace and Security and Jean-Pierre Lacroix, UN Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations.
The briefing by Chergui and Lacroix will follow their joint visit to South Sudan planned for 9 October. This joint filed mission builds on the precedent that the joint field visit that the two AU and UN senior leaders had to CAR and Darfur in mid-April in an attempt to enhance collective action.
Following the joint briefing, the session will also consider the reports of the PSC field missions to Guinea Bissau (28-31 July 2018) and Lesotho (26 to 29 of August 2018) to examine the political and security developments in the two member states. On 15 October, the PSC will receive a briefing on the Joint Summit of Heads of States of ECCAS and ECOWAS held in Lomé on 30 July 2018. This is a session that the PSC Chairperson of the month, from the ECCAS region, initiated. The meeting will also evaluate the agenda and the preparation for the annual joint consultative meeting between the AU PSC and the EU CPS (Brussels).
On 17 October, the Council will receive a briefing on the situation in the Great Lakes Region. The session is expected to focus on peace and security dynamics in the region with attention on Burundi and DRC. The only Open Session of the month will take place on 19 October on the Celebration of the Resolution 1325, the landmark resolution on Women, Peace and Security of the United Nations Security Council. Initially proposed in August and