Briefing on the RCI- LRA
Amani Africa
Date | 19 September, 2018
Tomorrow (18 September), the PSC will have a meeting on the status of implementation of the Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord’s Resistance Army (RCI‐LRA) and the future of the mandate of the regional operation. The session will receive a briefing from the Commissioner for Peace and Security, Smail Chergui. The meeting will also listen to member countries of the RCI‐LRA, South Sudan, the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Uganda.
Commissioner Chergui’s briefing is expected to focus on the state of peace and security in the LRA affected areas, the state of the LRA and the future of the counter‐LRA operations. UN figures show that at the peak of its activities around 2013, the LRA caused more than 100,000 deaths, abducted 60,000 and displaced more than 2.5 million people in the DRC, CAR and South Sudan. According to the LRA Crisis Tracker, an NGO that follows the LRA activities, there were more than 40 registered LRA attacks in CAR since Uganda left the regional military operation in April 2017. The attacks killed nine people and kidnapped more than a hundred civilians. In September 2018, the LRA militants killed two police officers, abducted 30 people and looted food, medical supplies Bas‐Uele province. These sporadic and isolated attacks and raids are indeed insignificant compared to the crisis the group caused few years back. However, the LRA still causes havoc.
The RCI‐LRA, which was authorized by the PSC on 22 November 2011 has three components. Chaired by the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, the joint coordination Mechanism (JCM) is the political management body of the RCI‐LRA that leads the strategic coordination and communication between the AU, the LRA affected countries and the international partners. Ministers of Defense of the LRA affected countries are also members of the coordination mechanism that works closely with the AU Chairperson’s Special Envoy for LRA issues. With an authorized force of 5,000 troops from the LRA affected countries, the Regional Task Force (RTF) is the military wing of the regional cooperation. The force has been behind series of operations to eliminate the LRA, limit its movement and capture its leadership.
Though the LRA is still roaming the remote forests of the region, the military operations have significantly degraded its fighting capacity and its size. Based at Yambio, the headquarters of the RTF, the third component of the regional cooperation, coordinates the logistics of the operation.
On 16 May 2018, the PSC renewed the mandate of the AU RCI‐LRA for three months, until 22 August 2018. Although this session was on the agenda of the August program of work of the PSC, that
meeting was postponed. The Council is meeting almost a month after the expiry of the mandate. The last decision for the extension of the mandate of the operation of the regional force was taken in expectation of the outcomes of a ministerial meeting of the Joint Coordination Mechanism of the RCI-LRA With no change in the operational and financial situation of the mission, the JCM meeting did not take place. Tomorrow’s meeting is expected to decide on whether the current conditions warrant continuing with further extension of the mandate of RCI‐LRA. As things stand now and with no prospect of support for the operation, the expectation and the assessment in the AU is that there is no point in continuing with the extension of the mandate.
The biggest international partner and major source of logistical support, the US significantly reduced its role in the fight against the LRA in March 2017 saying the LRA had been ‘reduced to irrelevance.’ The assessment was also shared by the biggest troop contributor to the operations of the Regional Task Force (RTF), Uganda, as it pulled its operations and withdrew its troops the next month noting the LRA no longer posed any significant threat to Uganda’s security. The two decisions significantly reduced the capacity of the force and raised concerns at the PSC which in May 2017 states that the ‘LRA has not yet been eliminated and still maintains the potential to rejuvenate itself’. The regional initiative has been suffering from financial and operational challenges. Indeed, the decision to suspend the military operation was the result of financial and logistical constraints.
Tomorrow’s meeting is expected give recognition to the fact that the RCI‐LRA and affirm de jure the end of the mission in its current form. The decision could close‐down the military operations by the regional force, and leave the rest of the task to fight and eliminate the LRA to the security forces of the LRA affected areas within their national borders. The session will discuss and pass decision on how remaining responsibilities would be handled in moving forward and look at what kind of approach and arrangement of cooperation can be made between the LRA affected countries in their respective campaigns against the LRA.
The exit strategy would also require the stabilization of LRA cleared areas, and ways to avoid resurgence of the LRA. Accordingly, the session expected to discuss the stabilization and rehabilitation of the LRA affected areas within the framework of the AU Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD). The role of the AU in the post military operation phase of the regional cooperation can also be devolved to its liaison offices in the affected countries, including in continuing the monitoring the movement of LRA, and support stabilization efforts. As part of the exist strategy, the PSC could also discuss the possibility of convening a pledging conference for supporting the post‐RCI‐LRA stabilization plan.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué.
PSC Briefing on Burundi
Amani Africa
Date | 19 September, 2018
Tomorrow (19 September) the PSC will have its session on Burundi, postponed from 6 September. In a first meeting of the PSC since October last year, the Council
will receive a briefing from Commissioner for Peace and Security, Smail Chergui on the political, security,
human rights and socioeconomic and humanitarian situation in Burundi. The meeting will also listen to
statements from Burundi, International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) and Uganda, as the mediator of the East African Community (EAC).
The meeting is a follow up to the decision of the PSC from 27 October 2017 to receive a ‘more comprehensive briefing from the Commission and other relevant stakeholders on the evolution of the situation in Burundi’.
The major recent development that is linked with the situation in Burundi is the constitutional referendum that was held on 17 May 2018. Held in the absence of a settlement for the current crisis and in an atmosphere of violations and intimidation, the referendum that endorsed the proposed constitutional amendment with 73 percent of the votes cast is feared to lead to the erosion of the foundations of the peace settlement under the Arusha Accord while also further limiting the already fraught chances of negotiated settlement within the framework of the EAC led talks.
Following the 7 June announcement of the decision by the incumbent President Pierre Nkurunziza that he would not seek re-election in the 2020 election, international and continental efforts to resolve the political standoff are increasingly focusing on the pace and success of the inter-Burundian dialogue, and reaching a political settlement within that framework to prepare the groundwork for the 2020 elections. Though various stakeholders warmly received the declaration of the President that he won’t seek another term at the end of his term, the lack of meaningful progress to break the political impasse in the peace talks has been an issue for concern. While a roadmap for the 2020 elections came out of the workshop of 36 Burundian political parties based in Burundi that took place on 3 August 2018, some key political parties boycotted the event.
Although Burundi did not feature on the agenda of the PSC since October last year, the AU has remained engaged and seized with the Burundi situation. As a guarantor of the Arusha Peace Accord, the AU expressed concern over the slow progress in the peace talks and the implications of the referendum on the constitutional amendment. Ahead of the referendum on 9 May, AU Commission Chairperson, Moussa Faki, sent an open letter to Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, the official mediator of the talks on behalf of the EAC, calling on him to take action. The letter copied to the guarantors of the Arusha Accord—the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, the UN Secretary-General and the EU Commission – expressed concern about the erosion of the gains of the Arusha Accord since 2015 and warning that the constitutional amendments ‘will likely have far-reaching negative consequences for Burundi and the region’.
What is of particular interest for the PSC in this session is to get adequate appreciation of the implications of the May 2018 constitutional referendum on both the EAC led peace talks and the Burundi post-conflict peace settlement anchored on the power-sharing scheme of the Arusha peace agreement reflected in Burundi’s constitution. Although the constitutional amendment did not change the ethnic quotas—a key element of the Arusha Accord—of 60 percent Hutu and 40 percent Tutsi in the executive branch, the parliament and the judicial branch, it opens the possibility of future review following ordinary majority decision-making.
The intervention from the EAC during the PSC session is expected to provide updates to the PSC on latest developments in the peace process. While efforts are
now underway for reconvening the talks in Uganda, the EAC led peace talks have remained stalled for many months, facing boycotts on all sides and government intransigence. Major Burundian diaspora opposition forces were absent from the last round of talks, and the talks ended with no major progress or agreement. The government has expressed its willingness to participate in this next round of talks which is deemed by many
including the facilitation team as the ‘final’ attempt, although it indicated that this will be the last round of talks to take place out side of Burundi. Indeed, the EAC led mediation made very little progress. The major challenge since PSC’s last session has reportedly been the outstanding refusal of the Burundian government to recognize and engage in talks with some of the major opposition forces. Bujumbura rejects the opposition coalition Conseil National pour le respect de l’Accord d’Arusha pour la Paix et de l’État de Droit (CNARED, or National Council for the Respect of the Arusha Agreement and Rule of Law) claiming that they are associated with the May 2015 failed coup. The other challenge is the fact that the EAC is trying to mediate the political standoff with a divided house, and without an agreed roadmap among its member states.
The interconnectedness of the security complex in the region, the issue of migrants, and the sensitive topic of third termism and its implication in the national political contexts of its member states made EAC’s role a complex and difficult one.
What is of significant value for the PSC, apart from the interest to be updated about the current status of the EAC led peace talks and EAC’s efforts for reconvening the talks, is to have proper analysis on the chances of any breakthrough in the talks and the EAC’s plan on the next steps if its current efforts fail to produce progress in the talks.
The human rights situation, and the broader political climate will also be further areas of concern in the session. The PSC would be interested to hear about the political and human rights situation in Burundi, including the challenges facing the AU human rights monitors and policy options available for the PSC to enable the AU office deliver on its roles including with respect to human rights monitoring. Given the lack of breakthrough in the peace talks and the fragile political and security environment, this important presence of the AU in Burundi with human rights observers and military monitors should be maintained.
The signing by Burundi of the MoU on the presence of the mission of the human rights observers would be another issue for critical reflection during this PSC session.
Despite improved security since 2016, the tense and polarized political sphere, lack of a inclusive dialogue, the history of violent conflict, the difficult regional
security and power dynamics and worsening of the socio-economic situation make the marginal security improvement fragile. At the beginning of August 2018, three soldiers of the Burundian army were ambushed and killed and five others were injured in an attack that took place in the town of Gihanga, 15 km from the capital Bujumbura.
Apart from these incidents of sporadic violent attacks from armed groups, there remain concerns about the human rights situation in the country. As pointed out in the 2016 human rights investigation report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights submitted to the PSC, there remain major issues of impunity among the state’s security forces. Militia groups still spread violence.
The human rights and humanitarian situation has faced further set backs due to the major challenges facing Burundi’s economy. In a report released very recently, the International Crisis Group (IGC) stated that ‘[i]n the wake of this political and security crisis, the country’s economy has shrunk at an alarming rate and socioeconomic progress made after the end of the civil war in the 2000s has been derailed’. The report particularly highlighted the worsening food and fuel shortages and the serious foreign currency reserves shortage the Burundian economy faced resulting in ‘new taxes and obligatory public ‘contributions’, forcing civil servants and ordinary Burundians to donate extra money to state coffers’. The report warned that the economic challenge could pull the country back to violence.
Given the gravity of the socio-economic situation, the PSC may also discuss the implications of the EU sanctions on Burundi and recommend for their lifting. This could address not only the immediate challenges facing the population but also it can potentially be used
to leverage the peace process in Burundi.
African members of the UN Security Council including Ethiopia have been expressing their concern on the political impasse and lack of progress in the EAC led mediation. Ethiopia has called for a re-launch of the dialogue under the auspices of the EAC with support of the African Union and United Nations. Tomorrow’s meeting may consider how to scale up PSC’s role in the mediation and the preparation of the 2020 elections.
The expected outcome is a communiqué. With respect to the EAC led peace talks, this communiqué may in particular call on the EAC and the AU Commission to elaborate a roadmap on how the two organizations pursue the peace process jointly. In terms of the role of the AU, the PSC could emphasize the need to keep the operation of the human rights observers and military experts in Burundi until the 2020 elections and set benchmark for reviewing their presence. The communiqué could reiterate the need for finalizing the singing of the MoU and indicate how the PSC plans to continue engaged on the situation in Burundi as well.
PSC Briefing on the Harmonization of the ACIRC within the ASF Framework
Amani Africa
Date | 18 September, 2018
Tomorrow (19 September) the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) will hold a briefing on the harmonization of the African Capacity for Rapid Intervention in Crises (ACRIC) within the African Standby Force (ASF) framework. Convened on the request of Nigeria, the meeting will examine the conceptual, structural and institutional harmonization of the ASF and ACIRC. The session will also evaluate the progress made by the two mechanisms since the last briefing to the PSC. The meeting will receive a briefing from the Peace and Security Department (PSD)’s Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD).
The meeting is held in line with the decision 695 of the AU Assembly meeting in Nouakchott, which requested quarterly progress update on implementation of decision 679 of the 30th ordinary session of the Assembly.
The meeting will also receive updates from the Secretariat of ACRIC in PSOD on the state of the ACIRC, its relations with the ASF mechanism and recent developments in the implementation of the Maputo Strategic Work Plan on the Enhancement of the ASF (2016‐2020). The five‐year work plan for the ASF highlighted the changing security environment and threats on the continent. Its recommendation for dynamism into the design and structure of the ASF to respond to the challenges goes in line with the initiative to harmonize the ASF with the ACIRC. The session will use the indicators, deliverables and timelines defined by the five‐year work plan as a reference to evaluate the move towards harmonization of ACRIC with ASF, particularly its rapid deployment capability (RDC). The training, exercises, airlift and mission support capabilities of the regional forces and their progress in articulating the command structure and control, and logistical capabilities of the ASF and ACIRC will also be discussed by the session.
The discussion and debate of the meeting will focus on the complex relationship between the ASF and ACRIC. Divisions still exist among the member states of the AU and within the AU Commission on the relevance, role, interaction and the need for keeping the two as parallel initiatives. There is an opinion that sees ACIRC as a redundancy, an admission of failure to fully operationalize the ASF, and questions the value addition of the ACIRC. This view sees the 2013 initiative as a project that diverts and distracts the attention, energy, resources and political focus of the continent and partners that should have been spent on realizing the ASF. Those participating in ACRIC consider the mechanism as providing the mechanism for rapid mobilization and more flexibility (compared to the region based and relatively more region approach of the ASF) in cases emergency situations.
Despite its success for standardization, training and mobilization of peace support mission in Africa, security challenges in the continent have revealed the weakness of the ASF in rapidly deploying troops. Harmonizing the ASF and ACIRC will primarily focus on addressing this structural gap. The conversation on the ASF and ACIRC dynamics is taking place while the continent is witnessing a sweeping trend of relying on ad‐hoc regional coalitions and deployment arrangements and alliances as a rapid response mechanism. The meeting is expected to address these trend in the context of the effort for harmonization of the ASF and ACRIC.
While peace support operations serve as a vital tool of crisis response, changing security dynamics and trans‐regional nature of emerging security threats demand a more flexible, agile and effective missions. The possibility of an effective transfer of responsibility to local security forces and institutions, and withdrawal of missions with an extended presence and limited effectiveness still look distant. These conditions and reality significantly affected the reputation and effectiveness of the traditional peace support operations in Africa, and called for a revision of the existing practice and arrangements. The threat posed by transnational terrorist groups and non‐state actors need a ‘fit for purpose’ and tailor made mandated approach, which is currently lacking in the traditional African Union and UN missions in Africa.
Tomorrow’s meeting will examine the ASF‐ACRIC harmonization as a response to the question of effectiveness and sustainability of peace support operations in the continent. Reviewing the design and structure of the ASF in a way that enhances its deployment capabilities and mission effectiveness including the ACIRC as its component is seen by the AU as a way forward. An important aspect of this session is also finding a balance between rapid and flexible regional initiatives and overarching standards and principles developed within the framework of the ASF.
Also important for tomorrow’s session is tailor made interventions with greater emphasis on political initiatives underscoring the imperative of the primacy of political strategy over military or security approaches. These include integrating and enhancing the role of preventive diplomacy and mediation mechanisms, the African Governance Architecture (AGA), Africa’s normative framework to constitutionalism and inclusive governance. Enabling national institutions is critical in the path from conflict to sustained peace, and should be part and parcel of the ASF‐ACIRC harmonization.
The expected outcome of the briefing is a communiqué. The communiqué may stipulate a timeline for finalizing the harmonization of ACRIC within the ASF and for all efforts at the levels of the AU and regions to focus on the full operationalization of the ASF with necessary adjustments for flexible, rapid and effective utilization of ASF in response to emerging crisis.