PSC session to discuss the implementation of AU Assembly Decisions

Amani Africa

Date | 21 April, 2020

Tomorrow (21 April) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will hold a discussion on the implementation of the decisions of the 33rd Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the AU relating to peace and security. Although it was initially envisaged to take place via VTC, it is now expected to be conducted on the basis of email exchanges and the silence procedure.

It is to be recalled that the 33rd AU summit held in February 2020, has made a number of decisions related to peace and security after deliberating on the report of the PSC, the outcome of the 12th Ordinary Meeting of the Specialized Technical Committee on Defense, Safety and Security (STCDSS) and the report on the implementation of AU Master Roadmap on Silencing the Guns. Moreover, the AU Assembly has also adopted specific decisions on Libya and the Sahel following a PSC summit level meeting that was held at the margins of the summit.

It is envisaged that the PSC will be guided for the purposes of this session by the Matrix of the Summit Decisions which summarize the various outcomes that require follow up by the PSC, member states and relevant AU Commission departments. However, given the major changes since the February Summit due to COVID19 and measures taken to mitigate the spread, the discussion is expected to prioritize from the decisions that require follow up during this period and for which alternative options of implementation is feasible.

The Assembly made decisions in relation to crises situations as well as thematic issues. In the context of the African Standby Force (ASF), the Assembly has tasked the PSC to consider the establishment of a Special Unit within the ASF that serves to combat terrorism and to present its conclusions at the Ordinary Session in February 2021. Although Egypt has proposed to host an Extraordinary Summit dedicated to this matter, this may be reconsidered given the current restrictions on physical meeting and to identify an alternative means to follow up on this.

The other thematic issue featured in the Assembly is on efforts towards child protection. The Assembly has requested the AU Commission to integrate child protection into Silencing the Guns campaign and the 2020 theme of the AU, as well as to develop a comprehensive policy on child protection in AU peace support operations. The Assembly further reiterated previous decision, which has also been echoed by the PSC, on the appointment of a special envoy for children in armed conflict.

Issues related to terrorism and violent extremism formed a major peace and security agenda of the 33rd AU summit. In this context, the Assembly decided to organize an Extraordinary Summit focusing on the challenges of terrorism and violent extremism to galvanize support and immediate action to assist countries, which are facing the severe effects of terrorism. To this end the Assembly tasked the AU Commission, in coordination with the Chairperson of the Union, to undertake preparation for the convening of the Summit.

Although this was meant to take place in May 2020, given the current context the PSC may reflect on other mechanisms to pursue the agenda. One possible option is to have a VTC heads of state and government level PSC session on the theme followed by a similar remote summit level meeting of the Bureau of the AU Assembly.

The second set of decisions adopted by the Assembly emanate from the 12th STCDSS which mainly looked at three major issues that may need further follow up by the PSC. The first decision is on the extension of the implementation timeline of the African Union Master Roadmap (AUMR) on Silencing the Guns beyond December 2020 to provide more time for member states and other stakeholders to implement objectives set in the roadmap. More particularly, the Assembly called on for more strengthened implementation and reporting on the economic, social, environmental and legal aspects of the master roadmap. In this respect Kenya as a country that offered to host a meeting on the review of the implementation of the AUMR may provide further input on the matter.

The current situation of COVID19 and the restrictions on physical meetings will have direct impact on the implementation of AUMR, which is ending in December 2020. Many of the activities, which are time bound and planned to take place this year in line with the 2020 theme are expected to be postponed. The PSC may however undertake preparation to produce the comprehensive Report on the Status of the Implementation of the AUMR, which the Assembly has requested the Council to submit at the January/February 2021 Summit.
The second agenda item considered at the STCDSS is on the AU Doctrine on Peace Support Operations (PSO).

The Assembly has requested the AUC to gather further inputs on the doctrine to be presented at the upcoming STCDSS in 2020. Although it remains uncertain whether such meeting would be possible, the PSC may request member states and RECs/RMs to send their input on the doctrine to the AU Commission.
The third decision is around Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW). The Assembly has given the responsibility to the AU Commission to conduct a second phase of the Mapping Study on SALW focusing more on illicit weapons flows more particularly linked to terrorist activities. Furthermore, it has requested the PSC to work closely with the UN Security Council to address the challenges around the proliferation and flow of SALW and violation of arms embargos. As a major driver of conflict in the Sahel and Libya, among others, this deserves a robust and sustained engagement and follow up both at the level of the PSC and the AU Commission.

Another major area, which the PSC may deliberate on in tomorrow’s session, is around early warning and conflict prevention. The Assembly has requested the PSC in collaboration with other AU Organs and Regional Economic Communities (RECs)/Regional Mechanism (RMs) Policy Organs, to establish a format to engage on strengthening efforts on early warning and early response issues. Hence the Assembly has requested the PSC and the RECs/RMs to initiate the process at the upcoming annual Consultative Meeting on Peace and Security in May 2020. In the light of the potential of COVID19 and the response measures to have dire peace and security consequences on the continent, a focus on early warning and response has acquired heightened importance.

The Assembly has also made a reference to a PSC decision on the authorization the immediate deployment of an AU Mission Against Ebola in DRC (MAEC). The PSC may follow up on the fate of this mission taking in consideration and assessing the ongoing developments of COVID19 and the capacity of the AU as well as the recent reports of a resurgence of the Ebola outbreak in the DRC.

Two regions received a particular attention by the PSC during the 33rd ordinary session: the Sahel region and Libya. The most notable aspect of the deliberation on the Sahel is expected to be the initiative for deploying 3000 AU troops to the Sahel region in support of the efforts of the countries in the region. It is to be recalled that the AUC has taken steps towards mobilizing support towards the deployment of these troops however this also requires the prompt direction by the PSC on the nature and scope of the mandate as well as its coordination with existing peace support operations.

On Libya, three major decisions are expected to feature in the Matrix. One is in relation to dispatching a joint AU-UN military and security reconnaissance mission to Libya. Although due to the current freezing of activities this particular process may not be conducted, this period however offers the PSC to review and make the necessary adjustment to this plan. The second point, which was raised in the decision, is around the establishment of Libya contact group. The contact group, which held its first meeting in March under the leadership of the Chair of the AU High Level Ad Hoc Committee on Libya, is a key platform to consolidate AU’s role in the Libyan peace process.

The third concerns the elevation to the level of mission of the current AU Liaison Office in Libya, and to equip it with the necessary political, diplomatic and military capacity, with a view to ensuring greater contribution and participation of the AU in the efforts aimed at finding a lasting solution to the crisis in Libya. The AU has strongly urged for its active role in finding a sustainable peace in Libya. While AU’s push for such role has as yet to win support in the UN Security Council, the elevation of its office together with the contact group could strengthen its influence in the Libya peace process.

The outcome of the session was unknown during the production of this ‘Insight’. Given major changes that have taken place since the 33rd Ordinary Session, particularly in relation to developments of COVID19 the PSC may prioritize decisions and activities that may be implemented within the set limits on meetings and travel. The PSC may task the AU Commission to present proposals on adjustments to and modalities for follow up of the decisions in the context of COVID19. In relation to both the Sahel region and Libya the PSC may express concern over the ongoing fighting in the midst of COVID19. The Council may exert further political pressure on belligerent parties to adhere to the global call on cessation of hostilities. In terms of early warning and response, which has become more pressing in the context of COVID19 and pending the possibility of convening a meeting on this subject with AU organs and RECs/RMs, the PSC may urge the AU Commission working with RECs/RMs to initiate assessment of risks for peace and security with a view to help member states facing major risks of instability and violence due to COVID19 initiate mitigating measures for preventing conflicts. It could also request that AU regional and liaison offices, PSC authorized or mandated missions expand their focus to cover the peace and security impacts of COVID19, while ensuring the safety and security of their personnel.


Renewal of G5 Sahel Joint Task Force and adoption of Strategic Concept of AU Force

Amani Africa

Date | 21 April, 2020

Today (21 April) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council is expected to consider the renewal of the mandate of the G5 Sahel Joint Force and the adoption of the Strategic Concept Note to allow the development of a new Concept of Operation on the deployment of a 3000 AU force in support of the G5 Sahel. It is to be recalled that on 9 April 2019 the PSC renewed the mandate of the G5 Sahel Joint force during its 838th meeting, the PSC renewed the mandate of the G5 Sahel Joint Force for a period of 12 months until 12 April 2020. During today’s session the PSC is expected to renew the mandate of the Joint Force for a further period of 1 year from 13 April. The impact of measures adopted by countries of the Sahel to contain the novel coronavirus on the Joint Task force would be of interest for member states of the PSC. Also, of interest to the PSC is the current state of operationalization of the Joint Task Force.

The Joint Force continues to face various operational, capability and equipment shortfalls, limiting its full operationalization. The lack of air assets, armored vehicles and transport capabilities and individual protection equipment compounds the threat posed by the use of improvised explosive devices. The Joint Task Force is not the only ongoing operation in the Sahel. It operates alongside the UN Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). The relationship between the G5 Sahel Joint Task Force and MINUSMA is governed by resolution 2391 of 8 December 2019, under which MINUSMA provides operational and logistical support to the Joint Task Force.

Despite the large number of initiatives and the on-going efforts of the G5 Sahel Joint Task Force, the situation in the Sahel has witnessed major deterioration during the last quarter of 2019 and in early 2020. Perhaps more than any other part of the continent, where the sound of the guns has become loudest is in the Sahel. The number of violent incidents in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger has increased sharply. In geographic scope as well, the violence in the Sahel has during 2019 spread across the region. As the UN Chief Representative for West Africa said in a briefing to the UN Security Council on 8 January 2020, this geographic expansion of terrorist attacks ‘is increasingly threatening West African coastal States’. Over the course of 2019, fighting and terrorist attacks in Mali forced more than 80,000 people flee their homes. In Burkina Faso, that witnessed the most surge in violence in 2019, the number of people displaced increased by tenfold to over 560,000, with the figure predicted to skyrocket to 900,000 people by April 2020. Across the three affected countries of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, since the start of 2019, more than 670,000 children have been forced to flee their homes. According to UNICEF, between April 2017 and December 2019, the three countries witnessed a six-fold increase in school closures due to violence.

Against the background of the deteriorating security situation and in the context of the debate of the AU Assembly for a continental support for Sahel countries in the fight against the expanding terrorist threat, the 33rd Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly decided to deploy 3000 troops for a period of six months. It is to be recalled that during the ECOWAS summit on 14 September 2019, the Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS tasked their respective ministers of defence and security with assessing the possibility of deploying and using the ECOWAS Standby Force in counter-terrorism operations. The Heads of State also pledged to mobilize $1 billion (2020–2024) for regional counter-terrorism efforts.

In pursuit of the AU Assembly decision, on 16 March 2020 the AU Commission convened a High-Level Consultative meeting with ECOWAS and G5 Sahel representatives in Niamey, Niger. One of the outcomes of the consultative meeting was the establishment of a technical committee of representatives of the AU Commission, ECOWAS and G5 Sahel to conduct the planning of the operation.

To inform today’s session relating to the endorsement of the 3000 AU troops to the Sahel, a strategic concept note has been shared with members of the PSC. The strategic concept note envisages that the strategic end state of 3000 AU troops is ‘to significantly degrade terrorist groups to allow the Sahel countries facilitate stabilization efforts across the affected communities and ensure effective capacity building of their National Defense and Security Forces to assume responsibilities in addressing regional security challenges’.

In considering the strategic concept note, it is of interest to member states of the PSC to consider a number of issues. One such issue is the scope of the mandate of the AU force. This relates to the question of whether the main role of the force is engaging in combat operation against armed terrorist groups in support of G5 Sahel countries. The other issue is the question of the relationship between the AU force and the G5 Joint Task Force. Other issues include the plan for mobilizing the troops and the provision of the required funding including for troop allowances, mission support and importantly the logistics.

In terms of command and control, there is also a question of clarity around the respective roles of the AU, ECOWAS and G5 Sahel. The 3000 AU force is initiated as an expression of solidarity of AU member states with countries of the Sahel region. While it requires for its success the use of a political strategy and the mobilization of the required legitimate infrastructure of local governance and socioeconomic
development interventions, the deployment of this force brings a much-needed additional support for the campaign to roll back the spread of terrorist operations in the Sahel region.

The expected outcome of the session is a communique. It is expected that the PSC would express its concern about the expansion of terrorist attacks in the Sahel region. While welcoming the role of the G5 Sahel Joint Task Force, the PSC is also expected to renew the mandate of the Force for a further period of 12 months. In doing so, the PSC would also call for the provision of financial, training and logistical support to the Joint Task Force. The PSC is also expected to adopt the strategic concept note on the deployment of the 3000 strong AU force and give guidance on the planning of the deployment of the force including close consultation with the UN to prepare the ground work for authorization by the UN Security Council.


Briefing session on the peace and security impacts of COVID19 in Africa

Amani Africa

Date | 14 April, 2020

Tomorrow (14 April) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to hold a briefing session using the other new format of its meeting, namely via virtual teleconference (VTC). It is envisaged that the session will focus on the implications of COVID19 on peace and security in Africa. Introduced as a measure to enable the PSC to work continuously, following a trial remote meeting on zoom on 8 April, arrangements are made with AU IT experts for the first VTC meeting of the PSC to be held tomorrow.
It is anticipated that John Nkengasong Director of Africa Centre for Disease Control (Africa CDC) will join the session to deliver the briefing. Invitation has also been extended for Tedros Adhanom Gebreyesus, the Executive Director of the World Health Organization (WHO), to present a briefing. The expectation is that these interventions help establish how the novel coronavirus (COVID19) affects peace and security, clarify the gravity and various dimensions of the impact and proffer recommendations on mitigation strategies.

The virus, which first emerged in China, has now affected 1.7 million people and killed more than 100, 000 others in countries from all parts of the world. So far, COVID19 cases have been reported in 52 member States of the AU, with a total of about 14,000 infected people and 747 deaths, according to the latest statistics released by the Africa CDC. The threats that the pandemic poses have prompted the convening of two meetings of the Bureau of the AU Assembly remotely.

As the novel coronavirus (COVID19) spreads rapidly across Africa and member states started to take measures for preventing and containing the spread, the AU Chairperson, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa convened two virtual meetings of the Bureau of the AU Assembly on 26 March and 3 April respectively. The communique of the first meeting warned that ‘poverty, poor sanitation, an existing disease burden, overstretched health systems and extreme urban population density mean that the pandemic could explode in an even more catastrophic way than has been seen thus far in Africa.’ Underscoring the need for urgent prevention measures and collective action, the meeting decided the establishment of a continental anti-COVID-19 Fund to which the members of the Bureau to immediately contribute US $12,5 million as seed funding.

In the second meeting, focusing on the socio-economic impact of COVID19, the Bureau highlighted, in the communique it adopted, ‘the devastating socio-economic and political impact of the pandemic on African countries.’ With the Bureau focusing principally on the public health response and the socio-economic consequences of COVID19, it paid little attention to the peace and security impacts of the virus in Africa. There were only two peace and security relevant issues referenced in passing. Thus, the communique stated the need for giving special attention to the Sahel in the light of terrorist activities and the imperative to establish humanitarian corridor. Yet, no less grave in the African context the public health and socio-economic dimension of the pandemic is its impact on peace and security. Indeed, the Director of Africa CDC, John Nkengasong, is quoted for noting that the coronavirus could be a ‘national security crisis first, an economic crisis second and a health crisis third’ depending on how African countries respond to the pandemic. Indeed, the prospects of the impact of pandemic on peace and security in Africa is very dire and even if difficult to measure, it can involve risk of a widespread breakdown of peace and security at a scale unprecedented since the AU came into operation. Given the risk of deterioration of the situation of countries in conflict, the relapse back to new forms of conflict of countries in transition and the descent of other into instability due to pressure related to COVID19, the significance of tomorrow’s session of the PSC cannot be overstated.

The concern on the peace and security impact of COVID19 arises from a number of factors. The first of such factors is the impact of the spread of COVID19 in countries with conflict. For these countries including those on the agenda of the PSC namely Central African Republic, Libya, Mali and Sahel, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan and countries in Sahel and Lake Chad Basin, it would have the effect of worsening the security situation and the humanitarian impact of conflicts. Countries in the Sahel region, which are already facing the threat of terrorism and violent extremism, will now have to wage another battle against the spread of COVID-19. The insecurity coupled with poor health care infrastructure and capacity also has the effect of limiting efforts for containing the spread of the virus with potentially devastating consequences for conflict affected populations and the most vulnerable among them.

A related concern arises from the disruptive impact of COVID19 and the measures adopted to contain it on national, regional and international efforts for conflict management and resolution. As UN Secretary-General warned on 25 March the pandemic threatened to divert international attention and resources from resolving ongoing conflicts and supporting peace processes.

The first consequence of the impact of COVID19 on conflict resolution efforts is that ongoing peace processes come under increasing stress. Indeed, some peace processes have stalled, while others are facing delays. For instance, the PSC has learned from its latest meeting on the situation in South Sudan that COVID19 would affect the timelines and implementation of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan. The second consequence is increasing risk of escalation of violence as conflict parties seek to use the situation for gaining military advantage. Examples in this respect include the spike in terrorist attacks observed in the Lake Chad basin and the attacks on hospitals reported in Libya.

For members of the PSC, the impact of the pandemic on AU peace support operations notably the AU Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), the ad hoc coalitions authorized by the PSC namely the Multinational Joint Taskforce (MNJTF) and the G5 Sahel Joint Taskforce and the joint UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). PSC member states, particularly contributing countries would be keen on measures taken to safeguard the personnel of these missions from COVID19 and to adjust the operation of these missions including rotation of troops or planned drawdown of troops.

The other factor for concern arises from abuse by some in government of the anti-COVID19 measures for clamping down on dissenting political voices, opposition political parties and civil society organizations. Related to this is also the excessive use of force by security forces against civilians, fueling resentment and tension. As security forces resort to draconian measures, as leaders in Kenya, South Africa and Uganda admitted, to curb the spread of this deadly disease, human rights and civil liberties will be at risk. This could trigger resistance from affected communities, leading to the eruption of instability and where the capacity of governments gets stretched beyond limits, resulting in breakdown of law and order.

This is directly related to the human rights dimension of the mandate of the PSC as provided for in Articles 3 and 19 of the PSC Protocol. In this context, a major area of interest for the PSC is how to ensure that measures taken for containing COVID19 are done within the bounds of applicable AU human rights standards, within the framework of the communique of the 866th session of the PSC including the guidance that the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) provided through its 24 March statement.
In countries where contested transitions are underway or where elections expected to be contested or closely fought are scheduled, the pressure resulting from both the spread of COVID19 and its socio-economic consequences is sure to deepen existing fault lines, thereby triggering simmering political tensions to boil over. Major peace and security issue would thus arise where changes to election schedules are made due to COVID19 without minimum consensus among various political forces or where elections are held amid the disruption that the pandemic caused to electoral politics. The situation can be particularly dire for countries going through a fragile transition. Sudan is already facing dire economic conditions and hundreds came out to the streets in Khartoum few days ago in protest against the transitional government.

Finally, the peace and security of African states also stands to face major test from the social instability that the socio-economic impact of the COVID19 measures could trigger. Irrespective of how countries fare in dealing with the public health dimension of COVID19, it is unlikely that any country can escape the dire socio-economic consequences of the pandemic. According to a study of the AU, the disruption that the anti-COVID19 measures that countries in the world adopted and the spread of the virus have caused on economic activities could lead to a loss of 20 million jobs. The World Bank also warned that the pandemic is expected to push African countries into recession in 2020, the first time in 25 years. Trade and investment flows have declined significantly, and the tourism and airline industries are already hit very hard. Many in Africa who depend on the money that their kit and kin in the diaspora send for their survival will feel the pinch as remittances dry up as do the majority of people who depend on the informal sector. Governments are also feeling the impact of foreign currency crunch. The damage that these economic consequences would have on the livelihood of millions of people, the majority of whom are young people, is sure to fuel social tension and put citizens and governments on a collision course.

Other areas of concern for tomorrow’s PSC session include the humanitarian impact of the virus as COVID19 measures disrupt humanitarian supply chains, movement of humanitarian actors and access to those in need of humanitarian assistance. Countries hosting huge number of refugees and internally displaced persons will bound to face an enormous burden posing serious protection challenges. In this respect, an issue of particular importance for members of the PSC is the steps that need to be taken not only to protect IDPs, refugees, asylum seekers and migrants from COVID19 but also from humanitarian disaster that may result from lack of supply of humanitarian assistance. This raises questions on how the AU assists in restoration of humanitarian supply chains and facilitate humanitarian action and support for humanitarian actors.

Recognizing the threat posed by the COVID-19 pandemic to the maintenance of international peace and security, the United Nations Secretary-General has called for an immediate global ceasefire. Chairperson Moussa Faki has also echoed the urgent call by the Secretary-General underscoring the need to silence the guns and mobilizing all our efforts in the fight against COVID-19.

The expected outcome of the session is a communique.

It is expected that the PSC will express grave concern about the impact of COVID19 on peace and security in Africa noting in particular the risk for a widespread breakdown of peace and security on the continent at a scale unprecedented since the AU came into existence, reversing gains made through the investment that the AU in partnership with the international community mobilized over the years with consequences for continental and international peace and security that are difficult to contemplate.

The PSC may also urge that particular attention is given to countries in conflict not only in terms of facilitating the provision of the required technical, medical and socio-economic support but also in supporting conflict resolution efforts in those countries. Welcoming the call for global ceasefire by the United Nations Secretary-General, the PSC may call of the AU Commission and Regional Economic Communities working alongside the UN to support efforts for cessation of all hostilities by conflict parties.

Having regard to the implications of COVID-19 on the AU’s conflict prevention, management and resolution efforts including contributions to AU Peace Fund, the PSC may underscore the need to reinvigorate the AU peace and security architecture in light of this new and emerging challenge in order to help address the threat for a widespread breakdown of peace and security on the continent. The PSC may urge the AU Commission working with relevant RECs/RMs to initiate communication with member states for assessing peace and security risks and helping them initiate mitigating measures. It could also request that AU regional and liaison offices, PSC authorized or mandated missions expand their focus to cover the peace and security impacts of COVID19, while ensuring the safety and security of their personnel.

Regarding elections taking place in Africa this year, Council may call upon member States to undertake the necessary consultation with political stakeholders and build national consensus on the way forward. It may also appeal to governments to undertake their COVID-19 response efforts without contravening their commitments to respecting applicable human rights principles as provided for in the ACHPR statement of 24 March.

Given the direct consequences of the socio-economic impact of the pandemic on peace and security in Africa, the PSC may welcome the communique of the first virtual meeting of the Bureau of the AU Assembly establishing the special fund and urge member states and others to contribute to the fund. The PSC may also similarly welcome the outcome of the second AU Assembly Bureau meeting, particularly the call for a comprehensive stimulus package for Africa, including, deferred payments, the immediate suspension of interest payments on Africa’s external public and private debt in order to create fiscal space for Covid-19 response measures and for rapid and concrete support as pledged by G20 and the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, including flexible disbursement policies and IMF Special Drawing Rights (SDRs).

The PSC could also underscore the critical role of Africa CDC and the imperative for collective global action in the fight against COVID19 and reiterate the support expressed by the Chairpersons of the Union and the Commission to the WHO under the leadership of Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus.


Briefing on the Locust Invasion in East Africa

Amani Africa

Date | 09 April, 2020

Tomorrow (10 April), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to have a briefing on the locust invasion endangering food security of millions of people in the East Africa region. The briefing is expected to take place through electronic exchanges. It is envisaged that the PSC will consider the written briefing from Workneh Gebeyehu, the Executive Secretary of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

The PSC previously held sessions on the impacts of climate change induced whether events including El Nino and the cyclones that affected in the Eastern and Southern Africa coasts. Thus, the 558th session of the PSC was dedicated to “The impact of EI Nino on Peace, Security and Stability in Africa and the Humanitarian Consequences’’. Under Article 6(f) of the PSC Protocol, it is envisaged that one of the functions of the PSC covers humanitarian action and disaster management. It is within the framework of these foundations that tomorrow’s remote briefing is being held on the locus invasion.

Before the novel coronavirus (COVID19) became the global emergency that has taken the center stage in policy processes across Africa, as in other parts of the world, the largest locust invasion threatening the food security and livelihood of millions of people has already been under way in the East Africa region. In his address during the opening of the AU Summit on 9 February, AU Commission Chairperson, Moussa Faki Mahamat remarked in passing on the threat posed by the locust invasion in East Africa. The AU along with FAO organized the first ministerial meeting for the Desert Locust affected countries on 7 February 2020. This was followed by IGAD Heads of State and Government Summit.

The locust invasion has been spreading rapidly across this region since December 2019. Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia remain the most heavily impacted, with bands of hoppers and swarms of adult locusts devouring vegetation in multiple areas; mature desert locusts continue to breed in all three countries as of early March. According to reports of World Food Program (FAO), locust infestations have also intensified in Djibouti, Eritrea, and Sudan in recent months due to increased rainfall and the arrival of desert locust swarms from other affected countries. Other countries feared to be affected by the infestation include South Sudan, Uganda and Tanzania.

The scale of the invasion and the attendant impact is unprecedented in recent decades. It is reported to be the worst infestation in 70 years. It is reported that the swarms are extremely large. In North-Eastern Kenya, one swarm was measured to be 37 miles long and 25 miles wide. The swarms, which can contain as many as 80 million adult locusts, travel up to 80 miles each day. Just a small swarm of the insects can eat as much food as 35,000 people daily.

The invasion has already adversely impacted communities in affected parts of the countries concerned. Things can get worse. The fear is that the number of locusts could grow up to 500 times before drier weather arrives if the efforts of countries including the aerial spraying is not able to bring the swarms under control. According to the FAO, the longer the locust outbreak continues in an already environmentally fragile region with existing food security problems, the higher is the risk of famine. This is particularly the case in conflict affected areas.

Even without the locust outbreak, some 25 million people in East Africa already faced high levels of food insecurity. It is pointed out in Gebeyehu’s briefing note that ‘one major concern is that the new infestation will lead to significant crop losses in areas previously affected by droughts and floods as it will increase vulnerability among the affected households.’ IGAD’s chief also warns that ‘[a]ny spread to major producing areas could cause more significant impact in the region. Under the worst-case scenario, FAO estimates that there would be approximately 2.5 to 4.9 million additional caseload of food insecurity or worse.’ In an appeal to the world for mobilizing $76 million to end the locust plague, the FAO Director warned that inaction will affect 13 million people ‘devastated by the loss of their crops and livelihoods’.

The crisis has become a major issue in the affected countries. Highlighting the gravity of the threat posed by the locust invasion, Somalia declared a state of emergency. Aerial spraying of pesticides is the most effective way of controlling the locust swarm. Countries in the region have tried to use both ground and aerial spraying of pesticide. As pointed out in Gebeyehu’s briefing note, these operations have faced various challenges. These challenges include the size and speed of mobility of the swarms, their coverage of areas not easily accessible and security issue arising from presence of Al Shabaab. Of contemporary concern is the impact of measures announced by various governments to prevent escalation of COVID-19 pandemic including disruption of surveillance control operations, and deployment of control experts and equipment and delayed supply of pesticides and equipment, including aircrafts.

Given the regional scale of the outbreak, there a need not only to support the efforts of affected countries for containing the spread of the infestation but also for a regional coordination and approach. It is here that the role of the regional body IGAD becomes critical.

While the threat that the locust invasion presents to the food security and livelihood of millions of people in the region deserves attention in its own, as a phenomenon induced by climate change, it should also be addressed in relation to the thematic focus of the PSC on climate change and its various peace and security and humanitarian impacts in Africa.

The expected outcome of the remote briefing is a communique. This is expected to cover various issues including measures for enhanced response for the infestation most importantly enhanced continental and international support for desert locust surveillance and control operations. In this respect, apart from mobilizing resources and support for such operations, the PSC may call on affected countries to coordinate their responses and in collaboration with IGAD provide the required cooperation to ensure that the impact of COVID19 measures are limited to the absolute minimum. In areas affected by Al Shabab, the PSC may call on cessation of hostilities and provision of access to those areas for undertaking the operations for controlling the locust in those areas. Given the impact of the infestation on the livelihood and food security affected communities and the humanitarian crisis it poses, the PSC may call for provision of humanitarian assistance and urge member states of the AU and the international community to heed the appeal of the FAO for mobilizing the funding necessary for the operation to stop the plague. The PSC may also urge the need for enhancing continental action for dealing with the multifaceted manifestations and impact of climate change and the non-military threat that this locust invasion poses to the development, peace and security of affected countries.


The PSC during April 2020

Amani Africa

Date | April 2020

Kenya takes over from Equatorial Guinea the role of the monthly chairpersonship of the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) for the month of April. Although a draft provisional program of work of the PSC for April was being finalized, it has become impossible to proceed with the draft program of work that was being finalized due to the decision to freeze the holding of physical meetings until the end of April in response to the novel coronavirus (COVID19).

The term of office of the ten members of the PSC serving for two years term since 2018 has come to an end on 31 March 2020. Below is the list of these outgoing members of the PSC from which Djibouti will remain in the PSC as a member of the PSC re-elected during the February 2020 AU Summit.

Table 1 PSC members whose two-year term ended on 31 March 2020

Region States whose term ends in 2020
Central Africa Equatorial Guinea and Gabon
Eastern Africa Djibouti and Rwanda
Northern Africa Morocco
Southern Africa Angola and Zimbabwe
Western Africa Liberia, Sierra Leone and Togo

The ten newly elected and returning members of the PSC have assumed their role as members of the PSC as of 1 April 2020. See below in table 2 the list of the members of the PSC starting their two-year term from 1 April.

Table 2 PSC members whose two-year term starts on 1 April

Region States whose term ends in April 2020
Central Africa Cameroon and Chad
Eastern Africa Djibouti and Ethiopia
Northern Africa Egypt
Southern Africa Malawi and Mozambique
Western Africa Benin, Ghana and Senegal

Due to the disruption of PSC activities because of COVID19, the reintroduction of the new members to the work of the PSC as observers during March 2020 and through the convening of an induction retreat scheduled to take place in Maputo has not been possible. Apart from getting introduced to the work of the PSC and its working methods electronically and in the course of participating in the activities of the PSC, the new members will also have to adjust to the improvisation required in the method of work of the PSC during the period which the PSC could not hold meetings physically.

The ordinary conduct of PSC’s work through the regular convening of meetings physically will not take place as envisaged in Article 8 of the PSC Protocol and the 2004 Rules of Procedure of the PSC (PSC Rules). It is however expected that the PSC will continue to conduct essential functions on account of the continuous nature of its mandate pursuant to Articles 2 and 8 of the PSC Protocol. Notwithstanding the provisions of the PSC Protocol and the PSC Rules on the conduct of business of the PSC under normal circumstances via physical meetings, these instruments and the Working Methods do not prohibit the PSC from conducting its business through working modalities other than meeting physically.

Accordingly, although much of the activities envisaged in the draft program of work of the PSC that was under finalization before the interruption by the COVID19 pandemic including the annual session on genocide and hate crimes could no longer be undertaken, the PSC is improvising to avoid the total freezing of its work including by focusing on essential works. Pursuant to the Manual on the PSC Working Methods, there is a list of mandatory/statutory meetings, which are reflected in the Annual Indicative Work Plan that the PSC is required to conduct. These include what are known as technical rollovers, which are related to the renewal of mandates of PSC mandated or PSC authorized missions.

The PSC is required to renew the mandate of such missions to ensure that they continue to function and that they have the legal basis for continuing to operate. During April, the PSC is expected to renew the mandate of the G5 Sahel Joint Taskforce, which was extended in 2019 until 11 April 2020.

The PSC will also continue to monitor the peace and security landscape on the continent to respond to new or emerging situations. It is to be recalled that the PSC during its last meeting on COVID-19, the 915th session, has requested to be briefed regularly on the fight against COVID-19. In the light of the concerns around the dire socio-economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and the challenges arising from the
measures that countries are adopting, how the pandemic affects countries/regions experiencing conflict and risks of social tensions are issues deserving of PSC’s attention as a follow up to its 915th session.

It is expected that for purposes of these activities the PSC will resort to existing electronic medium of communication by adapting and building on the provisions in the Manual on the PSC Working Methods on silence procedure.


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