Briefing on the DRC

Amani Africa

Date | 12 July, 2018

Tomorrow (12 July), the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) will hold a briefing session on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The meeting is expected to receive a briefing from the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission and Head of the AU Liaison Office in the DRC, Ambassador Abdou Abarry. The Peace and Security Department will also make a statement, with the Department of Political Affairs providing update on preparations for the December 2018 elections. Representatives of the DRC, South Africa, representing the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), Gabon as chair of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), Africa 3 members of the United Nations (UN) Security Council (UNSC), the UN and the European Union (EU) are also expected to make statements at the session.

The political instability and the insecurity in the DRC show no sign of improvement. Both are intertwined with the uncertainties around the elections scheduled for December 2018. The main focus of tomorrow’s briefing is the preparations for the holding of the general elections scheduled for December 2018, already postponed two times since 2016. There are two issues that are of major significance in this regard.

The first relates to the need and prospect for holding free and fair elections. Apart from the logistical and technical preparations that should be put in place, this would entail that there is an even playing field and that the elections are conducted free from actions or omissions that undermine the credibility of the elections. In this respect, concerns are being expressed in respect to the treatment of opposition parties, civil society organizations and lack of respect for freedom of association and assembly. There are reports of attacks against opposition groups and restriction of and heavy-handed response to protestors. The confrontations between protestors and the government security forces is resulting in more violence further complicating the possibility of the talks between the government, the opposition and members of the civil society including the Catholic Church. Members of the opposition blame the security forces of using brutal and disproportionate force. The resultant tension means that the country continues to witness recurring political instability.

Also significant in relation to the credibility of the elections are concerns around the voter list, the use of the voting machines and the mechanisms for verification of the credible use of voting machines if they would be used for the election. Given the lack of confidence being expressed around the voter list, the major issue is whether the provisional voter list would be made available for verification and scrutiny by the electorate. Opposition and civil society also raise major concerns about the independence and impartiality of the Electoral Commission.

With respect to the voting machines, there are concerns that it is susceptible for tampering, particularly if its reliable use is not adequately tested and independently verified. Major opposition parties as well as civil society organizations urge the Electoral Commission not to use the machines. Apart from urging the full implementation of the Saint Sylvester’s agreement of 2016, the Catholic Bishops congress of 15-16 February called for the international certification of the new electoral voting machines. Despite the assurance that the Prime Minster gave that the digital voting system could help the election to run smoothly and in record time, the problems recently experienced when testing the system underscore the need for certification and putting in place mechanisms able to address technical problems of the digital voting system that may derail or put in doubt the credibility of the planned elections. There is no indication that the Electoral Commission plans to heed the calls for such independent verification. The second area relates to the uncertainty around President Kabila’s plans. Apart from the loss of legitimacy of the government and protesters’ determination of putting pressure on the government for implementing the Saint Sylvester’s agreement of 2016 on political transition, uncertainty over President Kabila’s plan to honour the constitutional term limit underline the political tension. Lambert Mende, DRC Information Minister clarified the position of the government on 5 February, saying that President Kabila will not run for re-election.

In the past two months indications have emerged that the President’s party and supporters are orchestrating efforts for extending the term of the President. However, his party, cabinet and the interest groups surrounding the government are taking actions and decision that indicate the possibility of Kablia running for another term. One of such decisions was made last month by the cabinet, which unanimously approved the creation of a ‘grand political electoral coalition’ the Common Front for Congo (FCC), naming Kabila as its ‘moral authority’. Although what the President may end up doing remains uncertain, it is possible that the courts may be requested to pronounce themselves on the question of term limits. Failing such options for overcoming term limits, other possibilities include the postponement of the elections.

The possibility of the prosecution of Moise Katumbi, former governor of Katanga Province and now an opposition with strong following will have a serious negative impact on the credibility of the judiciary and the electoral process. Jean-Pierre Bemba, former leader of the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC) was recently acquitted from charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity by the International Criminal Court. His release and possible entry to the political sphere and the presidential election will radically change the dynamics of the race.

Understandably members of the opposition, civil society organizations including the Catholic Church are calling for adherence to the 2016 Saint Sylvester Agreement, which bars the president from standing for election. The international and regional pressure is mounting on Kabila not to stand for the presidential elections scheduled in December 2018. At the regional level, Angola has sent clear message urging Kabila to adhere to the constitutional term limits. It remains uncertain if there could be unity of action on the part of relevant regional actors. Indications are that the government may rely on the central Africa region to dampen opposition to third term, this being a region where extension of term limits is seen to be common.

The nominations of official presidential candidates will open in less than two weeks and will stay until 8 August 2018. AU Commission Chairperson, Moussa Faki and UN Secretary-General were scheduled to travel to DRC earlier in the week. In a sign of rejection of the role of international engagement, they were unable to undertake the joint visit due to lack of confirmation of their meeting with President Kabila.
The question of the non-extension of President Kabila’s term is not simply an issue of constitutionalism and rule of law. The other aspect of the question is the availability of workable exit strategy for the president. As such, the resolution of this crisis depends not only on the constitutional dimension of this issue which ensures compliance with the terms of the Saint Sylvester’s agreement but also on crafting a strategy that offers realistic exist for Kabila.

Given the request of the PSC for the AU Commission Chairperson to establish a coordination mechanism bringing together regional and international actors that will facilitate policy coordination and mobilization of coherent support, tomorrow’s PSC session offers an opportunity to consider steps taken in this respect and the prospect of establishment of an international contact group.

In terms of regional dynamics the regional ramifications of the deteriorating security situation is of direct concern to DRC’s neighbors in the PSC particularly Angola, Congo, and Rwanda. One of the factors that shape the dynamics in the PSC is the divergence in the nature of the relationship between DRC and its neighbors and the interest of its various neighbors. In terms of sub-regional organizations, SADC is most active. SADC also sent a mission of Electoral Technical Committee and Political Assessment Mission. But SADC has recently abandoned its plan for opening an office in DRC and deploying a special envoy.

In the absence of a clear strategy shared by neighboring countries, SADC, UN and the AU both on the preparation of credible elections according to the electoral calendar and on workable exit for President Kabila, it is unlikely that this PSC session would go beyond reiterating existing AU positions on the resolution of the political crisis. The expected outcome of the session is a statement.


PSC Program of Work for July 2018

Amani Africa

Date | July 2018

The Peace and Security Council (PSC) provisional program of work for July has a relatively light agenda and includes two major activities that takes the Council away from Addis; the joint consultative meeting with the UN Security Council and the field mission to Guinea Bissau. In a departure from what is recently becoming a culture of the Council to have at least one open session every month, the month will have no open session.

The program of the month started with a presentation by the President of the Republic of Togo of the Report of the Peace and Security Council on its activities and the State of Peace and Security in Africa, and the Report of the PSC on the Implementation of the AU Master Roadmap of the Practical Steps to Silence the Guns in Africa by Year 2020 to the 31st Ordinary Session of the Union.

After a break for a week, on 9 July the PSC will discuss the situation in the DRC. The meeting will receive a briefing on the political and security situation in the country in light of the increasing tension and conflict surrounding the holding of the parliamentary and presidential elections scheduled for December 2018.

The meeting on 10 July is dedicated for the preparation for the 12th Annual Joint Consultative Meeting with the UN Security Council that will take place from 16-20 July 2018 in New York. The same meeting will consider and adopt the draft provisional PSC program for the month of August 2018.

On 12 July, the Council will again discuss and finalize the preparation for the 12th Annual Joint Consultative Meeting with the UN Security Council. The meeting will also discuss the preparation for the PSC Field Mission to Guinea Bissau. On 24 July, the PSC will discuss the situation in Mali/Sahel. The meeting will take place against the background of the latest attacks that targeted the headquarters of the G5 Sahel Task Force. It will discuss the insecurity, the political process and the role of the AU in the G5 initiative. PSC’s field mission to Guinea Bissau, that will take place from 28-31 July 2018 will be the last activity of the PSC month. The field mission will closely examine and talk to stakeholders of the protracted political crisis in the country.


Summit Level Session on South Sudan

Amani Africa

Date | 30 June, 2018

Tomorrow (30 June 2018), the Peace and Security Council (PSC) will have a summit
level session on South Sudan. The Chairperson of the African Union (AU) Commission is expected to provide a briefing report to the session. Others expected to address the summit include South Africa’s President Cyril Ramaphosa, in his capacity as Chair of the High level Ad Hoc Committee on South Sudan and Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, in his capacity as Chair of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). It is also anticipated that President Omar Hussein Al-Bashir of Sudan and Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni will brief the PSC
on the talks that was convened in Khartoum and the subsequent signing of a declaration of agreement by President Salva Kiir and opposition leader Dr Riek Machar.

As framed on the agenda of the session, this meeting in part aims at reviewing
implementation of the PSC decision of its 720th meeting held on 20 September 2017. In this respect, the PSC would be interested to assess the progress made in terms of the IGAD peace process under the High-Level Revitalization Forum and the tripartite coordination between IGAD, AU and UN, and the signing and domestication of the MoU on the establishment of the Hybrid Court. Additionally, a major area of concern has also been the continuation of the conflict and violation of agreed terms particularly in relation to the ceasefire.

In terms of the briefing from the Chairperson of the AU Commission, issues expected to be covered include the continued nonimplementation and violation of commitments that the parties made under the ongoing peace process. Apart from expressing concern about these continuing challenges, it is expected that the PSC would urge support for and reinforcement of the role of the Joint Evaluation and Monitoring Mechanism (JMEC) and the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanisms (CTSAMM). In this respect, the briefing note underscores the need for equipping and enabling the CTSAMM to speedily investigate and report all violations. With respect to the role of the AU, one area that may receive close attention is the role of the High-Level Ad Hoc Committee of the AU on South Sudan. Indeed, the PSC summit follows immediately after the meeting of Ad Hoc Committee that President Ramaphosa is expected to chair. Apart from reviewing the state of the South Sudan peace process, the issue of how to leverage and reinforce the role of the Committee vis-à-vis the work of IGAD is expected to be high on the agenda of the Committee’s meeting. This is expected to feed into the PSC summit, which may define how best to leverage the role of the Committee. As the summit reviews the progress in the peace process, very important focus of tomorrow’s session is expected to be the recent round of the HLRF, including most notably the signing of the ‘Khartoum Declaration of Agreement between parties of the conflict of South Sudan’ on 27 June. As part of the IGAD briefing it is expected to update the PSC on the
recent round of the HLRF, which convened talks between the parties on governance and security arrangements from 17 to 23 June.

With the parties unable to reach a compromise, the IGAD proposed a “Bridging
Proposal” outlining a middle ground on the parties’ negotiating positions related to key governance and security issues. In further attempt to get the parties to resolve their differences, the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government convened on 21 June its 32nd Extraordinary Session in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia focusing on South Sudan. To this end, Ethiopia’s Prime Minister and IGAD Chairperson Abiy Ahmed brought President Kiir and Machar for a face-to-face meeting for the first time since the collapse of the peace agreement in 2016. With the parties still unable to agree to the IGAD bridging proposal, the IGAD Assembly assigned Sudan’s President Bashir to facilitate a second round face-to-face meeting between the two. This meeting convened in Khartoum with the presence of President Musenevi, who was not present during the IGAD Assembly meeting in Addis Ababa, led to the signing by the two sides the declaration of agreement referred to above. Others who signed the agreement are representatives of the South Sudan Opposition Alliance, Former Detainees and other political parties. Notably, it was witnessed by the IGAD Special Envoy and members of the Troika (Norway, the UK and the US) with Sudanese
President Omar al-Bashir as its guarantor.

In terms of content, the declaration stipulated that instead of IGAD’s proposal a ‘Revised Bridging Proposal’ will be concluded by the end of the current round of talks in Khartoum. Whether this has indeed been concluded and what the contents of the revised bridging proposal would be part of the issues that
President Bashir is expected to clarify in his briefing to the PSC. As indicated in the statement that the AU Commission Chairperson issued, the PSC is expected to welcome the signing of the declaration in Khartoum. For PSC members, given the repeated violation of previous agreements by the parties, there is interest to know the level of commitment of the parties for complying with the agreement. In this context, it is interesting if this signal for achieving a settlement would avoid discussion on punitive measures. As envisaged in the AUC Chair’s briefing note, the PSC could indeed welcome the outcome of the 62nd meeting of IGAD Council of Ministers and PSC’s 720th session decision to impose punitive measures against those who obstruct peace and violate peace agreements.

Other issues of interest from the perspective of the PSC relate to the operationalization of the Hybrid Court for which the AU has a responsibility under the South Sudan Peace Agreement. In this respect, despite the fact that the Government of South Sudan signed the MoU on the establishment of the Hybrid Court with the AU, it has not adopted the relevant legislative measure for the domestication of the MoU. A further issue for the PSC is the invitation by the parties in the Khartoum Declaration of Agreement of AU member states and IGAD to deploy the necessary forces to supervise the agreed
permanent ceasefire. What this actually means and how it can be operationalized would be of
interest to PSC members.

The expected outcome of the PSC summit is a communiqué. This is expected to commend the efforts of IGAD including the recent rounds of the HLRF and the IGAD Council of Ministers
and Summit meetings held in Addis Ababa. Most importantly, it would also welcome the signing of the Khartoum Declaration. As a measure that is necessary to support the peace process, the communiqué is also expected to encourage Sudan and South Sudan to intensify efforts to promote their bilateral relations particularly for the resumption of oil production in South Sudan. It is also expected to reiterate and endorse the plan for imposing punitive sanctions, while urging the speedy finalization of the conclusion of negotiation on the bridging
proposals. For the PSC, it would also be important to put in place a mechanism for finalizing the process of domestication of the MoU for the operationalization of the Hybrid Court. The issue of monitoring compliance with the cessation of hostilities agreement and the provision of humanitarian assistance and unfettered access to humanitarian actors would also receive attention.