PSC VTC Session on the situation in Somalia
Amani Africa
Date | 24 September, 2020
Briefing on the future of AMISOM and the upcoming elections in Somalia
Tomorrow (24 September) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to have a session on the situation in Somalia. The PSC is expected to consider the report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the situation in Somalia. It is envisaged that the meeting will take place through VTC.
The Chairperson’s Report, prepared in accordance with the communiques of the 848th and 923rd sessions of the PSC and para 36 of UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2520(2020), is expected to be introduced by Smail Chergui, the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security. Francisco Madeira, the Special Representative of the AU Commission Chairperson (SRCC) and Head of Mission of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), is also expected to provide update to the Council. As per the practice of the Council, it is expected that the representative of Somalia will also make a statement during the partially open segment of the session.
The last time the Council met to discuss the situation in Somalia was in May 2020, when it decided to renew the mandate of AMISOM and requested the Commission to review the AMISOM CONOPS, by September 2020, in order to align it with urgent priorities. The AU Commission is also expected to work closely with the United Nations, and the Government of Somalia to conduct, by 15 November 2020, an independent comprehensive assessment of the security environment giving due attention to broader and comprehensive stabilization and security requirements, with a view to presenting options for consideration to the PSC and UN Security Council on the role of the AU, UN and international partners in Somalia post-2021. Discussions are said to be currently underway in this regard.
Tomorrow’s session will be taking place against the backdrop of intense political engagements to address the political tensions among Somali political forces, which, among others, led to a vote of no confidence by Parliament in the Prime Minister and his resultant resignation. As Somalia gears up to hold elections, intense discussions have been underway between the leadership of Federal Government of Somalia and the Federal Member States on the conditions and terms for the holding of the election sanctioned under Somalia’s Constitution. Agreement was reached between the Somalia Federal Government and three of the five regional leaders of Somalia at the meeting held on 21 August in Dhusamareb.
The outcome of the Dhusamareb meeting, which led to the establishment of a technical committee to come up with the election modalities, was very much welcomed. Accordingly, agreement has been reached on a revised national election model known as the “Electoral Constituency Caucuses” with some changes to the outcome of the Dhusamareb meeting. This indirect election system is now expected to replace the one person one vote election envisaged under the Constitution. While the new election model is similar to the past clan-based indirect voting, attempt has been made to try to make it more inclusive by increasing the number of MPS casting the vote. However, this new model has as yet to be approved by the two chambers of parliament. The term of the parliament is to expire in November and President Formajo’s term will end in February next year. While the agreement on the model for the election helps in easing the political tensions, it remains to be seen if this would completely settle the power tussle that fuels the tension both among federal institutions and between the Federal Government and some of the regional governments.
Although members of the UNSC expressed regret that the agreed modalities fall short of the longstanding goal of direct voting for members of parliament in this election cycle, they acknowledged that the agreement was reached on the basis of a Somali led and Somali owned dialogue. Somalia’s international partners also underscored the need for the 2020/21 electoral process to be free, fair, transparent, and inclusive. They also called for a roadmap with clear milestones, agreed among Somali political leaders, to ensure decisive democratic progress going forward. Furthermore, the Partners appealed to the leadership of the Federal Government of Somalia and Federal Member States to continue meeting regularly in a spirit of dialogue and compromise to address urgent national priorities, including security and economic reform as well as inclusive politics.
Having reached agreement with the leaders of the Federal Member States, President Formajo appointed Hassein Roble as his new Prime Minister. This was following the resignation of Former Prime Minister Hassan Ali Khaire from his position after a vote of no confidence against him. Not surprisingly, the Khaire has already announced his candidature to run for the Presidency.
Tomorrow’s meeting is also coming against the background of mounting security threats, and increasing humanitarian challenges and the briefings will provide update on developments since the last PSC session in May. The security situation remains very concerning. Al-Shabaab attacks have intensified lately, giving rise to fears that the terrorist group may elevate its attacks ahead of national elections in the country. Series of deadly terrorist attacks have been perpetrated by the group recently in Mogadishu and several other regions claiming the lives of many innocent civilians. A number of factors have allowed the group to intensify its attack, including the prevailing tension between the center and the region, its exploitation of local dynamics, and issues surrounding delivery on the benchmarks in the Somalia Transitional Plan (STP) including slow pace of progress in the building of the Somali security institutions. The COVID pandemics and heavy rainfall and flashfloods, which coupled with the problem of dessert locusts, have also exacerbated the humanitarian situation in Somalia.
In terms of the role of AMISOM, its support to the Somali National Forces (SNF) in degrading the activities of Al Shabaab remains absolutely critical. It is to be recalled the PSC has been expressing concern over the security implications of AMISOM’s drawdown. In this regard, in its communique of the 923rd session, it has stressed the imperative need for a halt in further reduction of AMISOM uniformed personnel to ensure the safe holding of elections and the successful implementation of the Somali Transition Plan leading to 2021. The briefing from SRCC is expected to provide update on the activities of AMISOM and issues of command and control and the operationalization of the force enablers including air assets specifically raised in the previous session of the PSC.
Another issue in respect of which tomorrow’s session will provide update is the request the PSC made in its 923rd session communique regarding the revision of the STP. The AUPSC in particular called for a comprehensive review of the Somali Transition Plan and its implementation modalities, led by the FGS, with full participation of the AU, UN, EU and key FGS bilateral partners by July 2020, in order to provide a solid basis for the reprioritization of critical elements in the Transition Plan leading to 2021, which would also inform AMISOM’s CONOPs review and guide the confirmation of Somali priority initiatives for post-2021, as well as support by the international community. There has however been inadequate progress. With the very little time left before the election and the end of the year, there is now a pressing need for finalizing this work.
At its meeting tomorrow, Council is expected to take note of the progress made in the discussion between the Federal Government of Somalia and the Federal Member States and welcome the agreement reached on the modalities for the upcoming elections. It may also wish to encourage the Somali Political Stakeholders to continue their dialogue and cooperation to ensure conditions propitious for the holding of elections and promote greater stability in the Country. The AUPSC may also strongly condemned the upsurge of terrorist attacks by Al-Shabaab which claimed the lives of many innocent civilians, paying tribute to the Somali Armed Forces and AMISOM for their continued efforts in the fight against Al-Shabaab. Underscoring the continued critical role of AMISOM, the PSC may also urge for the mobilization of support for AMISOM. With respect to the STP, the Council may reiterate its previous decisions for its comprehensive review and urge that this process is completed without further delay to recalibrate the priority areas for AMISOM’s support and updating its CONOPS. It may also urge the Federal Government and the Federal Member States to speed up the process of recruitment and deployment of SSF and the integration of the regional forces into the SSF. The AUPSC may also express concern over the serious humanitarian situation because of the multiple challenges facing Somalia and appeal to the international community for enhanced support to the country to reach out to those in urgent need of life-saving assistance.
Common African Position on the 2020 Review of the UN Peace building Architecture
Amani Africa
Date | 22 September, 2020
Tomorrow (22 September) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to hold its 948th session to consider the report of the AU Commission Chairperson on the ‘Common African Position (CAP) on the 2020 Review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture: Towards an Enhanced Global Peacebuilding System.’ The meeting is expected to take place through VTC.
AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, Smail Chergui, is expected to brief the PSC and introduce the Chairperson’s report. Fatima K Mohammed, Head of the Permanente Observer Mission of the AU to the UN, is also expected to deliver a briefing on the review process and the development of the CAP.
The CAP is prepared in line with the 899th ministerial session of the PSC held in Luanda in December 2019 which requested the AUC ‘…to evolve a draft common African position ahead of the review conference of the UN Peace building Architecture to take place in 2020, for consideration by the PSC.’ The purpose of the CAP is to ensure that African contributions to the 2020 Review of the UN Peace building Architecture are articulated in a comprehensive document that guide African Member States during the inter-governmental negotiation process.
The last review of the UN peace building architecture was undertaken in 2015. This current review is taking place in the context of the twin resolutions A/RES/70/262 and S/RES/2282 (2016) of the UN General Assembly that call for a comprehensive review of UN peace building at its 74th session. The resolutions further underlined the importance of improving partnership and cooperation between the AU and the UN in peace building. To this effect the resolutions urge the Peace building Commission (PBC) to hold regular exchanges of views, joint initiatives, and information-sharing between the Peace building Support Office and the AU Commission.
This cooperation has also materialized through the annual interaction between the PSC and PBC, which was first held in October 2016. This interaction has regularly been held since then in subsequent years. During the most recent interaction held in November 2019, PSC’s 893rd session urged the AUC and the PBC to work in close cooperation with the countries concerned, to promote national priorities by enhancing national ownership, leadership and full participation in the peace building activities and development projects, as well as conflict prevention and addressing root causes of conflicts.
The cooperation between the AU and UN on peacebuilding has been strengthened through overarching frameworks including the Joint UN-AU Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security, in 2017, and the AU-UN Framework for the Implementation of Agenda 2063 and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, in 2018.
In line with the decision of the twin UNGA resolutions, in October 2019, the UN Secretary-General launched the process for the five-year review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture. To this end the AU Permanent Observer Mission to the UN in partnership with the African Group developed the CAP. The position paper also benefited from inputs from a wide range of stakeholders including the department of Peace and Security, Political Affairs, Gender Women and Development, the Office of the Special Envoy for Women, Peace and Security as well as the AU Missions in South Sudan and Sudan. The document was also developed based on consultations with the African Caucus on Peacebuilding at the UN in New York, Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) and African civil society organisations, as well as think tanks including Amani Africa.
The CAP identifies a number of key priority areas drawing on AU policy frameworks on peacebuilding namely the AU PCRD Policy of 2006 and the AU Transitional Justice Policy of 2019 as well as based on best practices from previous peacebuilding efforts. Towards informing the review process, the areas that the CAP highlights as priority areas include financing, conflict prevention, governance, transitional justice, combating terrorism as well as partnership. Additionally, it also covers crosscutting thematic issues related to women, peace and security and youth.
In addition to existing policy instruments, the issues captured in the CAP are also linked with the political leadership of the PSC and the technical input of AU Commission structures including the Cairo based PCRD center. With respect to PSC’s role three issues may be of interest for PSC members. The first is the active participation of national stakeholders in the conception, planning and implementation of peace building support. The second is the existence of a political strategy on which peace building support is to be anchored.
Finally, it would also be of interest for PSC members to get details how the CAP envisages both strategic level synergy between the PSC and the PBC in deciding on and regularly following up peace building intervention and the technical level collaboration between the AU and the UN. If the PSC is to play its political leadership role, it is necessary for the PSC to have the countries on the Peace building Commission on its agenda.
The CAP is also expected to include salient features to enhance cooperation among actors that support peacebuilding efforts. In this regard, the three components it highlights to inform and guide inter-institutional cooperation include: ‘assistance in the design of national peacebuilding framework; financial support for peacebuilding; and mechanism for periodic consultation, joint monitoring, review and reporting on progress in implementation of peacebuilding process’. The harmonization of support and partnership in these critical areas and national ownership highly determine the effectiveness of peacebuilding efforts.
The AU may also utilize this opportunity to advance strategic matters relating to increasing its ownership of PCRD efforts in Africa; a more synergized partnership between AU, RECs/RMs and the UN as well as the operationalization of the peacebuilding efforts at the field level.
Between 2007-2020 African countries have received approximately 82.7% of the UN Peacebuilding Fund, which is a demonstration of the PBC’s priority and commitment in the continent. Given that Africa, as a region, is the biggest recipient of the funding it is essential that relevant national and continental actors take active part in informing the peacebuilding efforts of the PBC, which will have effect on a number of countries. In this respect, it would be of interest for PSC members to receive clarification on the strategy to be used for ensuring that African member states participate actively in the negotiation process speaking with one voice.
It is also to be recalled that currently there are about four African countries on the agenda of PBC, namely, Burundi, Central Africa Republic, Guinea-Bissau and Liberia. Hence, tomorrow’s session also serves to review the experiences from these countries for enhancing the cooperation between the AU and PBC in particular country contexts.
The expected outcome is a communiqué. The PSC may underline the importance of the global peacebuilding architecture for consolidating peace, particularly working in close coordination with AU’s PCRD. It may endorse the key recommendations towards effective peacebuilding efforts, which are articulated in the CAP with particular emphasis on the need for peacebuilding to be anchored on a political strategy for ensuring national ownership and full participation of national actors. For the PSC to play a more active role in providing strategic guidance and political support, it may request that the countries on the agenda of the PBC are also included on the agenda of the PSC and that the AU Commission together with the UN provide regular briefing and update on the post-conflict reconstruction and development efforts in those countries. The PSC may also urge the AUC for continued support to member states in ensuring that key recommendations of the CAP are well captured in the UN review process. It may call for a more coordinated and continuous effort between the AU office in New York and the AUC to ensure a coherent messaging on the basis of the CAP and to effectively inform the review process. It may also call on African member states to actively participate in the review process based on the CAP and speak with one voice. The PSC may also make reference to its annual interaction session with UNPBC as a key platform to further deepen the strategic cooperation on peacebuilding.
Briefing on the situation in Mali
Amani Africa
Date | 17 September, 2020
Tomorrow (17 September) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to hold a briefing on the situation in Mali. The meeting is expected to take place through VTC.
As per the terms of the communiqué of the 941st session of the PSC, the Council is scheduled to receive update from the AU Commission Chairperson on the evaluation of the situation in Mali. This is to be presented by the Commissioner for Peace and Security, Smail Chergui. The AU High Representative for Mali and the Sahel and the Head of MISAHEL, former Burundian President Pierre Buyoya is also expected to brief the Council. It is also anticipated that the PSC will hear from the current Chairperson of ECOWAS on its engagements with the Malian stakeholders for the restoration of constitutional order in Mali.
After continued popular protest for several months organized under the umbrella alliance of opposition groups and CSOs known as the June 5 Movement-Rally of Patriotic Forces (M5-RFP), on 18 August mutinying soldiers detained Ibrahim Boubacar Keita and Prime Minister Boubou Cisse. The same day the President announced his resignation and the dissolution of his government and the National Assembly.
Following these developments, which the PSC deemed as an unconstitutional change of government, the Council held an emergency meeting on 19 August and decided to immediately suspended Mali from participating in all AU activities until the restoration of constitutional order in the country.
On 20 August ECOWAS Heads of State and Government held an extraordinary session through videoconference on the situation in Mali. They called for the immediate restoration of the constitutional order and the immediate reinstatement of President Keita. In a pursuit of this objective, a delegation led by the ECOWAS mediator former President Goodluck Jonathan was dispatched to Mali. The delegation met President Keita, with the Constitutional Court as well as with the National Committee for the Salvation of the People (CNSP) to discuss the steps for the restoration of the constitutional order in the country. Few days after ECOWAS’s mission CNSP announced the release of President Keita.
On 28 August, in a follow up extraordinary summit, ECOWAS Heads of State and Government recalibrated their 20 August decision on reinstatement of President Keita and took note of his resignation. The ECOWAS summit called for speedy establishment of a civilian transitional authority with appointment of a civilian transition president and civilian prime minister. It decided that the political transition should not exceed 12 months and the civilian transitional administration should be established based on consultations with the Constitutional Court, political parties, CSOs and other members of the public.
The Malian protest group known as the M5-RFP met with the military junta that ousted President Keita and expressed its intention to work with CNSP. After delays of the initial plan for the meeting between the M5-RFP and the CNSP, the meeting was finally held at the Kati military base outside of Bamako. The two held another meeting on 4 September. The CNSP also held consultations with political parties on 31 August at the Ministry of Defence and Veterans. Although the CNSP announced a plan to travel to northern Mali for meeting with key political forces, it was reportedly cancelled due to bad weather conditions.
After the various meetings held with various stakeholders including the M5-RFP, political parties and CSOs, on 6 September the CNSP announced that a national consultation will be held for an agreement on the transitional roadmap. The national consultation on the transition in Mali took place on 10-12 September. Convened in Mali’s capital Bamako, the national consultation brought together 500 participants from various sectors of the public including the M5-RFP, CSOs, political parties, and journalists. Among the international observers present at the opening of the consultation was the AU High Representative for Mali and the Sahel, Buyoya.
In his briefing, some of the areas in respect of which Buyoya may provide details include the national consultation and the transitional charter. In this respect, issues of particular interest for tomorrow’s session also include the composition of the national consultation and the degree to which it reflects the diversity of social and political interests in Mali, the conduct of the consultation and the implications of the strong objection that the M5-RFP expressed against the transitional charter.
Despite the apparent national character of the participants of the national consultation, armed groups that are active in Northern Mali, including the Coordination for the Movement of Azawad, who signed the 2015 peace agreement, did not participate. Sidi Brahim Ould Sidatt, the leader of the Azawad group, is reported to have said ‘we have two choices …either we enter the transition process and have made a new constitution of Mali together in which we reorganize ourselves or we wait after the transition and we continue negotiations with the government that will be put in place.’
At the start of the consultation the leader of the CNSP colonel Assimi Goîta stated that the consultation was an opportunity for the nation’s vital forces to discuss the concerns of the moment and the future, underscoring the need to diagnose the evils which undermine efforts of democratization and adopt urgent measures. During the consultation, the participants considered and proposed inputs for a transitional charter that was drafted by an expert committee. At the end of the two days of national consultations, participants adopted a transitional charter, which faced opposition, among others by the M5-RFP.
The transitional charter establishes the office of the president, the vice president, a transitional government with a prime minister and maximum of 25 ministers. It also defines their responsibilities with the vice president for example assigned to be in charge of defence, security and the reorganization of the state. The Charter also establishes a transitional national council, which will serve as a legislative assembly. The membership of legislative body is envisaged to be made up of 121 members from the defense and security forces and all sectors in the country.
According to the spokesperson who presented the report on the consultation, under the Charter the interim president can be a civilian or a military and will preside over a transitional period of 18 months before elections are held. It is also envisaged that the interim president will be selected by a council chosen by the military junta. This is indicative of the enormous influence and pressure that the junta exerted on the national consultation and in shaping the contents of the transitional charter.
Indicating the lack of consensus on the transitional charter finalized during the national consultation and the political disagreement on the transitional process, the M5-RFP, the influential coalition which led the mass protest that created the conditions for the downfall of President Keita, stated that it ‘distances itself from the resulting document.’ The M5-RFP said the document did not take into account what it said was a majority vote for civilian interim. It deemed the document as an attempt by military leaders to ‘grab and confiscate power.’
It is clear that the situation in Mali has descended into further political uncertainties. The factors that account for this include the apparent determination of the juntas to exercise firm control over the transition, the opposition that the M-RFP raised to the transitional charter and the non-participation of key northern actors in the national consultation. Unless urgent measures are taken to address this situation, there is risk of deepening uncertainty on the governance of the country. If the opposition to the transitional charter escalates into political contestation over the transition with return of protesters to the streets, it can plunge Mali into further instability, aggravating the prevailing insecurity in the country.
ECOWAS’s 57th ordinary session of Heads of State and Government held on 7 September adopted a decision that the Malian forces has to appoint a transitional civilian president and prime Minister by no later than 15 September or face further sanctions. It is to be recalled that ECOWAS has already imposed sanctions on Mali including closure of its borders with its neighbours.
When ECOWAS convened a consultative meeting in Accra, Ghana under the Chairperson of the ECOWAS Authority, President Nana Addo Akufo-Addo on 15 September, the deadline that ECOWAS set for the appointment of a civilian led transitional government has not been met. The AU was represented in the ECOWAS meeting through the AU High Representative for Mali and the Sahel, Buyoya, who, in his intervention is also expected to provide updates on the Accra meeting. Apart from underscoring the urgency of establishing a responsible government in Mali at the start of the meeting, President Akufo-Addo, who told reporters that ‘we have not reached agreement with the military junta’, insisted that ‘we need a civilian leadership of the transition and we have also made it clear that the minute that leadership is put in place, the sanctions would be lifted.’ ECOWAS had decided that the transition has to be led by civilian president and prime minister throughout the entire period of the transition. Upon the establishment of the civilian transition ECOWAS pledged to accompany Mali in the effort toward the reestablishment of constitutional order in conformity with the applicable protocols of ECOWAS. It is however agreed that the duration of the transition period would be for 18 months as stipulated in the transitional charter rather than the 12 months set by ECOWAS.
The situation presents a major challenge to both the ECOWAS and the AU norms banning military coups. With its deadline unmet, the military junta bent on assuming leading role during the transition and the civilian opposition to the transitional charter, the applicable norms are sure to necessitate further sanctions on the military junta if it persists with its wish to preside over the transitional process. It is to be recalled that in 2012 ECOWAS imposed economic, financial and diplomatic sanctions after the junta that usurped power by coup failed to meet a 72-hour deadline set by the regional body. Similarly, rejecting what it called, ‘all delaying tactics of the perpetrators of the coup d’état’, the PSC at its 316th session decided, ‘in view of the refusal of the military junta to respond immediately and in good faith to the requests of the AU and ECOWAS, to impose, with immediate effect, individual measures, including travel ban and asset freeze, against the leader and members of the junta, as well as against all individuals and entities contributing, in one way or another, to the maintenance of the unconstitutional status quo and impeding AU and ECOWAS efforts.’
The expected outcome of the meeting is a communique. The PSC is expected to express its concern about the lack of progress towards the establishment of a transitional civilian authority and the restoration of constitutional order and the adverse impacts of this delay on the peace process in Mali and the effort to stabilize the country. The PSC may reiterate its strong rejection of the interference of the military in political affairs contrary to the 2000 Lomé Declaration on Unconstitutional Changes of Governments and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance and condemn the intransigence of the military junta and the delays for transferring power to a civilian transitional authority. Expressing its support for the efforts of ECOWAS, the PSC may also endorse the decision of the ECOWAS from its 15 September meeting in Accra on the necessity of transferring power to a civilian transitional authority paving the way for the restoration of constitutional order, which needs to be in accordance with the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. The PSC may also take further measures for adding pressure on the junta to facilitate, within the framework of ECOWAS decision and the rules of the various applicable AU norms, the speedy designation of the civilian authorities that will preside over the transitional period.
VTC Briefing on the situation in South Sudan
Amani Africa
Date | 15 September, 2020
Tomorrow (15 September 2020) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will hold a briefing session on the situation in South Sudan. This 944th session of the PSC is expected to consider the report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the latest situation in the country. The Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission for South Sudan, Joram Biswaro, is expected to introduce the report. It is also envisaged that the PSC receives update from the Office of the Legal Counsel regarding the request of the 917th session of the PSC for progress report on the process for the operationalization of the Hybrid Court.
The PSC will also receive the statements of the representative of South Sudan, the Interim Chairperson of the Revitalized-Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, Sudan, as the Chair of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the representative of the UN.
The last time that PSC was briefed on South Sudan was in April 2020. The meeting is scheduled to take place via VTC.
It is exactly two years since the signing of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS). Therefore, this meeting will provide an opportunity to take stock of the progress made in the implementation of the peace agreement and the challenges that still persist since the last meeting of the PSC.
As noted during the last session, the agreement reached by the parties to form an inclusive transitional government has certainly rescued the country back from the brink. The announcement of the formation of the R-TGoNU with an inclusive new cabinet was very welcomed. This is essentially what has been considered as a progress. However, over the last couple of months since the formation of the R-TGoNU, the delays in fully operationalizing the governance structures and implementing the national security arrangements has been a source of major concern.
It has been noted that despite the formation of the R-TGoNU, the parties to the R-ARCSS were unable to agree on the distribution of responsibilities at the state and local government levels. As reported by R-JMEC, the resultant delay in the formation of state governments.
The Chairperson’s report is expected to highlight developments since the last session. In June, bilateral discussions between President Salva Kiir Mayardit and the First Vice President Dr Riek Machar resulted in some progress with the two sides agreeing for ITGoNU headed by the president to nominate governors to the states of Unity, Eastern Equatoria, Warrap, Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Central Equatoria and Lakes; The SPLM/A-IO for the states of Upper Nile, Western Bahr el Ghazal, and Western Equatoria; and SSOA for Jonglei state. Despite the issuance by President Kiir of Republican Decrees No. 51/2020 and 53/2020 naming eight of the ten governors and three Chief Administrators of the Administrative Areas respectively, four of the six parties comprising the Other Political Parties (OPP) continue to object to this agreement as being contrary to the terms of the R-ARCSS.
This delay in the formation of the state and local government leadership has impacted negatively on the formation of the Transitional National Legislature (TNL), comprising both the Transitional National Legislative Assembly (TNLA) and the Council of States (CoS). Thus, this key component of the transitional institutions has as yet to be established. The delay also contributed to a security vacuum in several states; evidenced by escalating inter-communal violence in the states of Warrap, Lakes, Unity and Jonglei. Countless numbers of individuals have been killed and others wounded in ongoing cattle rustling episodes and revenge attacks.
Another area of concern relates to the inadequate pace of progress in the implementation of the transitional security arrangements. Despite the PSC urging the parties to facilitate the ‘unification, training and integration of the various armed groups to enable deployment of the Unified Forces’, registration and screening, and detailed unification training have been suspended, and plans to complete graduation at all training centres within 30 days from 28 May 2020, followed by immediate redeployment of the NUF have not materialized. According to R-JMEC, high levels of the forces abandoning the cantonment sites and training centres due to severe food shortages, lack of medicines, and care facilities for the female personnel. The other area of immediate concern is the escalation of fighting, allegedly between the SSPDF/SPLA-IO and NAS with adverse effect on the protection of civilians.
The increase inter-communal violence coupled with the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and the flood disaster has also been exacerbating the humanitarian situation in the country affecting the wellbeing of many South Sudanese people. There have been continued sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) incidents, including rape and gang rape in some areas of the country. There has also been increasing reports of attacks against humanitarian workers, and a near-complete halt to the voluntary return of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), and refugees. Furthermore, the socio-economic situation has been extremely dire. It is in the face of all these challenges that the second anniversary of the peace agreement is being marked this month.
Two years after the signing of the peace agreement, the South Sudanese people are not yet experiencing the dividends of peace. Lack of political will and trust among the parties is a major obstacle for making any meaningful progress. It is absolutely imperative that they set aside their difference and work together in a spirit of collegiality for the sake of the South Sudanese people who have endured so much for far too long. It is in this spirit that they can accelerate the implementation of the peace agreement and resolve the remaining outstanding issues. It is also vital that the financial constraints impeding progress are addressed as highlighted in the communique of the 917th PSC session. But it is only if there is meaningful commitment and action on the part of the South Sudanese stakeholders that the international community will be able to provide the necessary support. The Troika in a statement issued on 12 September 2020 observed “South Sudan’s leaders have a real opportunity to deliver the foundation of a stable and prosperous nation for all, and to demonstrate their commitment to peace. We urge them to demonstrate this as a matter of urgency and will work with South Sudan to support progress”.
The briefing from the Legal Counsel is expected to provide update on the status of operationalization of the Hybrid Court. While the legal instruments necessary for the formation of the Hybrid Court including the MoU between the AU and South Sudan have been drafted, these have as yet to be finalized with the signing of the MoU. The delay in the establishment of the TLA also means that the legislation envisaged in the R-ARSSC has as yet to be initiated.
It would be of interest to members of the PSC to know whether the legal instruments prepared through the Legal Counsel have reflected the useful guidance from the AU Transitional Justice Policy adopted by the AU Assembly in February 2019. Additionally, it would also be of interest where the process stands with respect to the other components of the transitional justice Chapter of the R-ARCSS. As the June 2020 R-JMEC report to IGAD noted, ‘Consistent with Articles 5.1.4 and 5.1.5 of the R-ARCSS, the RTGoNU is expected to receive support from the UN, AU and the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights (ACPHR) in furtherance of the implementation of Chapter V of the R-ARCSS.’ It is worth noting that the ACHPR is undertaking work to deliver on this expectation pursuant to its Resolution 428 on the human rights situation in the Republic of South Sudan (ACHPR/Res.428(LXV)2019) which tasked the Country Rapporteur for South Sudan to engage with the AU Commission and the Government of South Sudan with proposals on the operationalization of Chapter V of the R-ARCSS.
The expected outcome of tomorrow’s meeting is a communique. The AUPSC may wish to welcome the progress made in the formation of the various components of the R-TGoNU including in resolving the issues surrounding the allocation and appointment of the leadership of state governments. The Council may express concern over the slow pace of progress in the implementation of the transitional security arrangements and the challenges observed since its last session including suspension of activities for unification, training and integration of various armed forces and incidents of fighting. The PSC may also reiterate its call for the parties to implement the establishment and operationalization of the expanded Transitional National Legislative Assembly (TNLA). The PSC may wish to call on the parties to demonstrate high levels of responsibility and urgency working together in a spirit of consensus and compromise to resolve all outstanding issues to complete the formation of the R-TGoNU in line with the peace agreement. With respect to the transitional justice chapter of the R-ARCSS, the PSC may welcome the engagement of the AU Commission to support the work towards the operationalization of the Hybrid Court and call on South Sudan to fully collaborate with the AU to address all challenges in the delivery of Chapter V of the peace agreement including with the contribution of the ACHPR and having regard to the useful guidance in the AU Transitional Justice Policy for finalizing the legal instruments and the MoU on the Hybrid Court.
