Briefing on the Situation in Somalia and the Renewal of the Mandate of AMISOM

Amani Africa

Date | 07 May, 2020

Tomorrow (7 May), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will hold a briefing on the situation in Somalia and consider the renewal of the mandate of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which expires on 27 May. The PSC will base its consideration of this agenda on the basis of the briefings from AU Commissioner for Peace and Security Smail Chergui and the Special Representative of the AU Commission Chairperson (SRCC) and Head of Mission of the AMISOM, Francisco Madeira. It is expected that the representative of Somalia will also share a statement as per usual practice.

Somalia continues to face multifaceted challenges. The global COVID-19 pandemic, the locust invasion affecting east Africa and the massive floods caused by heavy rains in the region are further compounding its situation. The country is expected to hold elections in 2020/2021, which is considered to be a key milestone in the stabilization and peacebuilding efforts of Somalia but in the face of these unprecedented challenges, the future of the election could possibly be hanging in the balance. Progress has been made over the last couple of months in pushing forward the legislative agenda, notably the finalization of the electoral law and the Public Finance Management and Corporate Legislation Act but there is need to enhance dialogue in finalizing the constitutional review process.

Unfortunately, Somalia’s politics has been overshadowed by the prevailing tension between Mogadishu and the regions.

Therefore, easing these tensions will be critical in finalizing the constitutional review and ensure the smooth and peaceful conduct of the election to lay the foundation for democratic and inclusive politics. This requires that constructive dialogue takes place between Mogadishu and the regions to overcome differences and resolve the prevailing stalemate.

The controversy surrounding the election in Jubaland was one of the contentious and divisive issues between the Federal Government and the Jubaland administration.

The dialogue between the Jubaland administration and the leadership of the Jubaland Council for Change, which culminated in a reconciliation agreement signed on 23 April is welcomed by international partners. Unlike other times, the AU and IGAD are conspicuously absent from the list of partners who endorsed the statement welcoming the reconciliation, which came out on 28 April 2020. The statement welcomed this positive development, which will contribute to de-escalating the ongoing tensions in the region. Similar other initiatives are also said to be underway in South West State and Galmudug to form unified and inclusive administrations.

That tensions have been rising in the larger neighborhood are not helping matters. Somalia has also been a battlefield for competition among other extra regional actors. The need for regional consensus and unity of purpose in support of Somalia is, therefore, deemed critical to preserve the gains made over the past decade.

The deadly crash on Tuesday of a Kenyan cargo plane operated by African Express and chartered by an NGO to deliver medical supplies to Somalia has the potential to exasperate tensions with various speculations circulating on social media. President Formajo is said to have called President Uhuru to express regrets and convey condolences for the loss of lives. He also offered readiness to work with the relevant Kenyan authorities to investigate the circumstances surrounding the incident.

According to AMISOM, the leadership of Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia have agreed to investigate the incident, which claimed the lives of six people.

In terms of the overall security situation, Al Shabaab remains a potent force capable of causing havoc and mayhem in the country. It continues to perpetrate indiscriminate attacks using IEDs to target civilians, government institutions, AMISOM and humanitarian actors operating on the ground. Defeating Al-Shabab and expanding state authority has indeed been a matter of priority. Nevertheless, the implementation of the Somaliled Transition Plan has been rather slow and there is a long way to go before the Somali National Army is ready to take over full and effective security responsibilities from AMISOM. That is why it is important that the drawdown of AMISOM forces in accordance with resolution 2472 (2019) should be predicated on the evolving situation on the ground. In addition to the military strategy, there is also the issue of putting in place a socio-political strategy involving some form of negotiation, engagement that encourages desertion and surrender of Al Shabaab fighters and deradicalization processes as important component of success in the effort to degrade and end the threat posed by this militant group.

In terms of the security situation, another issue that may be of interest to PSC members is the reports of civilian casualties from the continuing air strike by US forces in Somalia. What steps are taken to avoid civilian casualties, coordination in undertaking strikes with Somalia authorities, investigations into incidents of civilian injury, killings and damage, and the provision of compensation for the affected are matters on which the PSC could seek clarification.

In this context, the High-Level Virtual Meeting on Somalia, which took place on 29 April 2020, underscored the need to take a fresh look at what steps need to be taken by Somalia and international partners to enable Somalia to assume primary responsibility for security and facilitate the completion of AMISOM’s mandate. The communique issued following the virtual meeting emphasized the need for a common, coordinated and comprehensive approach among the Somalia stakeholders on the one hand and with AMISOM troop contributors on the other hand, which would enable the Somali Federal government to pursue the security sector reforms necessary, including force generation to develop the capability needed to relieve AMISOM of security responsibilities for Somalia. Accordingly, the meeting called for the transition plan to be revised and updated with clear defining roles for all key stakeholders. The meeting also recognized the need for a further reconfiguration of AMISOM and called for the upcoming mandate renewal of the mission to consider the realities on the ground.

It is expected that Chergui will provide insights on the implications of the outcome of this meeting regarding the role of AMISOM and indeed the process of its drawdown. Based on this input and indeed the views from the representative of Somalia, the expectation is that the PSC will forward its proposal to serve as the basis for the UNSC decision in this regard. In its communique, the AUPSC may express sympathy and condolence over the loss of lives due the plan crash.

The Council may note the many complex and difficult challenges facing Somalia and call for concerted international effort in support of the country. It may highlight in this regard the looming humanitarian crisisfacing the country due to the impact of COVID-19, the locust invasion and the heavy floods. The PSC may wish to note the progress made in terms of the preparations for the upcoming elections, particularly the legislation of important laws. The Council may reiterate its concern over the prevailing tensions between the Federal Government and the regions and urge the Somali stakeholders to exert every possible effort to resolve their differences through constructive dialogue and negotiation with a view to building the necessary political consensus towards the election. It may also urge further concerted engagement regarding the constitutional review process.

The PSC could welcome the signing of the reconciliation agreement between the Jubaland administration and the leadership of the Jubaland Council for Change and encourage reconciliation initiative currently underway in other regions.

The Council may express concern over the volatile security situation in Somalia and condemn the continued attack by Al-Shabaab. In this context, it may call for reinvigorated efforts in fighting the menace of terrorism in Somalia not only militarily but also through social and political means including processes that encourage desertion of Al Shabaab fighters, deradicalization and reintegration into society. The PSC may also express concern over civilian casualties resulting from US air strikes and urge for investigation and compliance with due process of the law with adequate compensation for affected families and communities. Council may express concern over delays in the implementation of the Somalia-led Transition Plan and welcome the outcome of the High-Level Virtual meeting held recently. It may appeal to the Security Council to consider its decision on the drawdown of AMISOM forces considering the situation on the ground during the upcoming discussion on the mandate renewal of the mission. It may also reiterate its appeal to the United Nations and other international partners for ensuring predictable and sustainable financing for AMISOM.


Briefing session on the situation in South Sudan

Amani Africa

Date | 09 April, 2020

Briefing Session on the Situation in South Sudan

Tomorrow (9 April 2020), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council under the Chairpersonship of Kenya will have a briefing session via remote electronic exchanges. Instead of the delivery of the briefing in person, the PSC will consider the written briefing of the Special representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission for South Sudan. The PSC will also consider the statement of the representative of South Sudan and the statement of the Interim Chairperson of Revitalized-Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission. While there is no indication on input from IGAD, the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangement Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM) has also shared a brief to the PSC.

The purpose of tomorrow’s meeting is to review the developments in South Sudan since PSC’s field visit to South Sudan and the subsequent formation of the Government of National Unity of South Sudan, inaugurating the transitional period under the Revitalized – Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS).

It is to be recalled that the AUPSC had undertaken a field mission to South Sudan from 18-20 February 2020 to evaluate the status of implementation of the peace agreement and express solidarity with the people of South Sudan. The visit took place at a very critical moment when the extended pre-transitional period was about to expire in two days’ time, and important discussions were underway in relation to the formation of an inclusive Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (R-TGoNU). The visit was a good opportunity for members of the AUPSC to undertake important consultations with the leadership, the national pretransitional Committee (NPTC), UNMISS, the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (R-JMEC), the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM) and other relevant stakeholders in this regard.

Although it came almost at the 11th hour before the expiry of the deadline for the extended pre-transitional period, President Salva Kiir made a compromise proposal to revert to the ten states plus three administrative areas for resolving the stalemate on the issue of the boundaries.

It is this compromise proposal that helped revive hope and restored the confidence of the parties to the peace process, who then agreed to address other remaining outstanding issues, including the transitional security arrangements, during the transition period. This is what paved the way for the formation of the inclusive transitional government of national unity.

The agreement reached by the parties to form an inclusive transitional government has certainly rescued the country back from the brink. One of the issues that the region and other in the international community raise if whether the arrangement will pass the test of time and avoid the illfated fortune of the previous transitional government of national unity that ended in July 2016.

As the briefing from the AU SRCC highlighted, the parties have succeeded in putting in place a new presidency and a new cabinet. The Presidency as announced on 21 February by President Kiir is made up of the President, First Vice President and four other Vice Presidents responsible for a cluster of ministers. The announcement by President Salva Kiir of the formation of the R-TGoNU with an inclusive new cabinet was welcomed. Ministerial portfolios were allocated among the parties to peace agreement with the President nominating 20 Ministers from his side, including Finance and Interior Ministers, while Dr. Reikh Machar nominating nine Ministers, including Defense and Petroleum Ministers. The South Sudan Opposition Alliance (SSOA) got three Ministers, Former Detainees two Ministers and Other Opposition Political Parties one Minister in the new cabinet.

While the distribution of cabinet portfolios has led to defection from both the SPLM-IO and the side of SPLMIG, no major disagreement that puts the R-TGNU has risen over the assignment of cabinet posts. Members of the cabinet were appointed on 12 March.

However, there two major areas of delay for the full constitution and operationalization of the R-TGNU. As highlighted in the statement of the Interim Chairperson of R-JMEC, the first relates to the delay in the formation of the Transitional National Legislative Assembly and the
restructuring and reconstitution of the Council of States.

Second, there has been a deadlock on responsibility sharing at state and local government levels and this is delaying the completion of the establishment of the structures and composition of the revitalized transitional government. In line with the revitalized peace agreement, the State and local levels of government will be reconstituted with power–sharing among the Parties at these levels. Accordingly, 55% will be allocated for Incumbent SMPL-in Government (SPLM-IG) led government and 27% for SPLM/A–IO, while SSOA will get 10% and other opposition parties will have 8%. The SPLM-IG and the SPLM-IO disagree over the interpretation of the prescribed percentages for allocating State Governors under the R-ARCSS. Series of meetings between the parties are said to have taken place on this issue but no consensus has yet been achieved. The government is said to be insisting on taking six states, while other parties are opposing the government’s position on this issue.

The delay in the appointment of governors is said to have created a power vacuum at the state level. This has contributed, among other things, to incidents of intercommunal violence. Therefore, the parties have been called upon by the Interim Chairperson of R-JMEC to resolve this issue in a spirit of compromise and collegiality. The slow implementation of the security arrangements and the delay in the training of the Necessary Unified Forces, and the shortage of supplies also remains a matter of concern. Given that this has been the major factor behind the collapse in July 2016 of the first unity government, issues facing the transitional security arrangements is an area of major concern that should receive major attention.

Other issues highlighted in the various documents include the lack of consultation by the President with the TGNU presidency in making senior appointments to public institutions, and the inconsistencies of the Constitutional Amendment Act No.6 of 2020 issued on 19 February with the R-ARCSS due to changes that the President Kiir’s government made to the Constitutional Amendment Bill. The CTSAMVM also reports various incidents that occurred since the formation of the RTGNU including allegations of rape and violent sexual abuse, defections and armed assault on members of the CTSAMVM.

These challenges notwithstanding, the latest developments in South Sudan has rekindled hope for silencing the guns in the country. The South Sudanese peace process has no doubt been fraught with so many challenges, and the road ahead is by no means easy. But the hope and expectation is that the parties will defy the odds and try to work together for the sake of the south Sudanese people who have endured so much for far too long.

Based on the input that members of the PSC will provide electronically after reviewing the various briefing notes and statements, the expected outcome of this remote briefing on the situation in South Sudan is a communique.

The AUPSC may wish to welcome the formation of the inclusive revitalized transitional government with the announcement of the new cabinet and the show of increasing trust and collegiality between President Kiir and First Vice President Machar. The Council may express concern over the delay in the formation of the Transitional Legislative Assembly, the State Council and the appointment of governors. Also of concern for the PSC is the slow implementation of the transitional security arrangements and urge the parties to avoid the slow progress in security arrangements from derailing the transitional process. In this regard, the PSC may wish to call on the parties to continue to work together in a spirit of consensus and compromise to resolve some of these outstanding issues to complete the formation of the RTGoNU in line with the peace agreement. As South Sudan became the latest country in Africa to confirm new cases of corona virus infection, the AUPSC may also call on the AU, IGAD, UN, EU and others to support the effort of South Sudan for containing the virus while ensuring that COVID19 does not lead to major disruption in the transitional process in South Sudan.


Briefing on the future of AMISOM and the upcoming elections in Somalia

Amani Africa

Date | 24 February, 2020

Briefing on the future of AMISOM and the upcoming elections in Somalia

South Sudan’s military said on Monday it will retaliate against the attacks by the militia group, the National Salvation Front (NAS) led by renegade general Thomas Cirilo which previously opted out of the 2018 revitalized peace deal.

Lul Ruai Koang, military spokesperson warned that they are ready to retaliate against NAS in case of continued attacks on their positions and on civilians.

“South Sudan People’s Defense Force (SSPDF) reaffirms commitment to the Rome declaration, but reserves the right to respond with deadly force in self-defense and that of civilians and their properties,” Koang said in a statement issued in Juba.

NAS refused to sign the revitalized peace deal to end the more than five years of conflict, since the outbreak in December 2013, as it called for renegotiation of the peace pact to include a federal system of governance.

This came following last week’s deadly ambush by the rebel group on the convoy of James Wani Igga, second vice president, which left six of his bodyguards killed.

NAS, a rebel group fighting against the government in Central and Western Equatoria State recently claimed responsibility for the attack that took place at Lobonok, which is the home area of the second VP located on the outskirts of the capital.

Koang also blamed NAS for the Aug. 7 attack on a local gold mine, which left nine civilians killed.

He called on the ceasefire monitors to investigate violations.

The government on Jan. 13 inked a peace deal dubbed the “Rome Declaration” in Rome, with the South Sudan Opposition Movement Alliance (SSOMA), a coalition of opposition groups that did not sign the 2018 peace agreement.

NAS is part of SSOMA but its persistent attacks on government troops have meant violation of the Cessation of Hostilities under the Rome Declaration.

The revitalized peace deal was inked in Ethiopia in September 2018 between the government and the main opposition, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM)-In-Opposition led by now First Vice President Riek Machar.

Under the ten-point statement dubbed the Rome declaration, the parties reaffirmed their commitment to cease hostilities and continue to dialogue.


The Quest for Restoration of Constitutional Order in Mali

Amani Africa

Date |  26 August, 2020

Following the ouster of President Ibrahim Keita on 18 August, both African and other international organizations condemned the acts of the army and called for restoration of constitutional order. The West African regional organization, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has taken the lead for achieving this end state. Yet, there remains uncertainty as to what form restoration of constitutional order would take in the context of Mali. In this policy brief, we seek to explain how the effort for restoring constitutional order may unfold and the form it could take.

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The Quest for Restoration of Constitutional Order in Mali

Amani Africa

Date |  26 August, 2020

Following the ouster of President Ibrahim Keita on 18 August, both African and other international organizations condemned the acts of the army and called for restoration of constitutional order. The West African regional organization, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has taken the lead for achieving this end state. Yet, there remains uncertainty as to what form restoration of constitutional order would take in the context of Mali. In this policy brief, we seek to explain how the effort for restoring constitutional order may unfold and the form it could take.

Read Full Document

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