Briefing on Elections in Africa in the Context of the COVID19 Pandemic
Amani Africa
Date | 09 July, 2020
Tomorrow (9 July) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to hold its 935th meeting to receive a briefing on elections in Africa in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic.
It is expected that PSC members will conduct the meeting through video teleconference. It is expected that AU Commissioner for Political Affairs Minata Samate Cessouma will brief the Council.
Since the advent of the pandemic in the continent, countries have adopted various measures to curb the spread of the COVID19 pandemic through various social distancing measures, lockdowns and declaration of state of emergency or state of disaster. The nature of the pandemic and the public health response measures are such that they directly affect electoral processes. The COVID19 measures affect not only the logistical preparation for elections but also the exercise of various rights including the convening of political meetings and rallies that are key for communicating the agenda of contesting political parties and for the electorate to express its views on its needs and be informed of the position of the candidates.
On the other hand, electoral processes by their very nature lead to the gathering of people, the convening of political meetings and the staging of rallies. As such, if not conducted with due regard to the social distancing measures, electoral processes can become the ground for the spread of COVID19 and the resultant rise in the morbidity and mortality that the virus causes.
Tomorrow’s briefing on elections will be the first one to be taking place in the context of COVID19 and presents an opportunity for considering how COVID19 affects electoral plans in Africa. It would additionally afford the opportunity to consider on whether and how elections could be held amid the pandemic and the parameters to be observed if they are to be postponed.
According to the AU calendar of elections, there are about 18 planned elections in 2020 in Africa. The Department of Political Affairs is scheduled to provide an overall update on current developments in countries that have recently concluded elections, those that are preparing to undertake elections and those that have decided to postpone elections.
The last time the PSC held a session on elections was at its 869th on 19 August 2019. In the communiqué, the PSC underlined the need for strengthened citizens participation in democratic process and it also requested the finalization of the reports of AU Election Observation Missions in a timely manner and the early planning for the deployment of the AU Election Observation Missions.
During tomorrow’s session, the PSC may assess the challenges COVID19 poses on electoral processes in Africa. More particularly, of interest to the PSC would be an overview on the challenges that have emerged due to the COVID19 pandemic and their impact on holding transparent, fair and free elections in Africa. Considering these issues affords the PSC an important opportunity to provide guidance to member states on how to manage elections in the context of COVID19. This is important in order to ensure that the holding of elections under restricted conditions or postponement of elections due to COVID19 measures would not lead to electoral disputes and instability. The elections that are expected to receive attention include the recently concluded ones in Burundi, Mali, and Malawi as well as the constitutional referendum in Guinea. The briefing may also provide an overview of upcoming elections in Ghana, Burkina Faso, Cote D’Ivoire, and postponed elections in Ethiopia and Chad. The Council may also particularly address countries such as Somalia and Central African Republic that are experiencing fragile transition and instability and are planning elections in 2020.
From the list of countries that held elections or scheduled to hold elections, it is clear that not all of them are on the same standing in terms of the sensitivity of the election for unstable contestation. This means that apart from the general guidance required on how elections may be held in all the countries, there is a need for paying particular attention to the situation of elections in countries with fragile transitions.
The briefing may highlight challenges related to restrictions on mobility. This can have negative impacts on candidates communicating with their supporters and electorates critically engaging with political parties and candidates. As the election in Mali illustrated, the other challenge is also related to the low voter turnout due to fear related to the spread of the pandemic.
The other impact is that it has adversely affected the deployment of independent observers in countries that have held elections this year. Restrictions on international travels means that the AU has not been able to deploy international observers in some of the recent elections held in the context of COVID19. One of the issues that members of the PSC may wish to get information on during the briefing is the adjustments and new changes that the Department of Political Affairs introduced in its provision of support to member states in the context of COVID19.
With respect to the various avenues taken by member states the PSC may address key elements on the processes and procedures of elections. First, for countries that have opted to hold elections, it may urge Africa CDC to develop and adhere to strict safety and public health guidelines to prevent the further spread of the virus. It will be essential for the PSC to urge member states to evaluate their capacity to hold credible and transparent elections while keeping citizens safe. Moreover, these measures have also direct effect on the level of participation of election observers. Hence, the PSC may also request member states to address challenges and provide alternative plans to fill this gap.
Second, with regards to countries that opt to postpone elections, the PSC may urge for the respect of legal processes and political consensus, to prevent instability or charges of unconstitutionality. The PSC may pronounce itself on the need to comply with established constitutional processes when opting for postponing elections. Additionally, consideration should be had for states to build consensus with all the stakeholders including electoral bodies, opposition parties and civil society actors not only to address the legitimacy deficits that may result from postponement of elections but also to ensure that postponement does not lead to political instability. Irrespective of whether member states opt to postpone or hold elections, there is also a need for ensuring that there is greater transparency by governments on their decisions and the process they use for arriving at such decision.
Also, of interest for PSC members is to receive indication from the briefing on countries expected to have highly contested elections and countries expected to hold elections in fragile transitions. These countries require particular attention not only to ensure that COVID19 does not further exacerbates an already volatile situation but also to ensure that contestations surrounding election does not undermine their efforts towards containing the virus. For example, in Malawi, the newly elected government changed the plan for the inauguration of the new president on account of reports of spike in the spread of the virus during the electoral process.
In the context of recent elections, the briefing by DPA may also highlight positive developments including the role of an independent judiciary in the democratization process of countries as demonstrated in the election in Malawi. The briefing may also present best practices that might guide countries that are planning to hold elections.
The expected outcome is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to address the various challenges arising from COVID19 and their effects on planned elections and the electoral process. It may in particular express concern on the negative impacts of COVID19 on holding elections in context that is free from fear and insecurity. With respect to member states that opt for proceeding with scheduled elections, the PSC may urge that they comply with the applicable standards of holding free, fair and credible elections. To this end, it may call on those states to put in place the necessary public health measures including social distancing and hygiene measures during the electoral process. For member states that opt for postponing elections, it may urge them to ensure that proper constitutional procedures are followed and close working relationship and consultations are maintained with all stakeholders in rescheduling the calendar for the elections. The PSC may call on Africa-CDC working with the Department of Political Affairs to develop guidelines on the holding of elections in the context of COVID19. It may request the AU Department of Political Affairs to adjust the provision of its support to member states to the COVID19 environment to ensure that its critical role in the democratization process through supporting electoral processes is not disrupted as a result of COVID19.
Provisional Program of Work for the Month of July 2020
Amani Africa
Date | July 2020
Burundi assumes the role of the monthly chairpersonship of the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) for the month of July. The provisional program of work, involves some six substantive sessions including three focusing on country specific situations.
The first session of the month is expected to take place on 7 July. On this day the PSC is scheduled to receive a briefing on elections in Africa in the context of the COVID19 pandemic. The Department of Political Affairs is scheduled to provide an overall update on current developments in countries that have recently concluded elections, those that are preparing to undertake elections and those that have decided to postpone elections. The meeting is expected to take place through video teleconference (VTC).
This session affords the PSC an important opportunity to provide guidance to member states on how to manage elections in the context of COVID19. This is important in order to ensure that the holding of elections under restricted conditions or postponement of elections due to COVID19 measures would not lead to electoral disputes and instability.
On 10 July the PSC will consider the situation in the Central African Republic. The PSC is expected to assess the implementation of the peace agreement signed last year particularly in relation to the ongoing fighting and COVID19 pandemic and the overall humanitarian situation in the country. This meeting is also expected to be held via VTC.
On 14 July the PSC will receive a briefing on the Ebola Virus Disease outbreak in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the context of the COVID19 pandemic and implications for healthcare and humanitarian workers. The PSC is expected to receive update on the new Ebola outbreak declared on 1 June 2020 as well as the compounded effects of COVID19 on the health sector and humanitarian action. The session is expected to take place through VTC.
The consideration and adoption of the provisional program for the month of August is scheduled for 16 July. The draft program is expected to be circulated to all PSC member states through email and members will share their inputs.
On 21 July, the PSC is scheduled to consider the third country specific session. During this session, the PSC will receive an update on the status of implementation of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Crisis in South Sudan. It is to be recalled that the PSC held its last session on South Sudan on 9 April 2020. This session is expected to review developments since the last session. This session is also scheduled to take place through (VTC).
On 24 July, the PSC will have a preparatory meeting on two agenda items. The first one is the annual joint consultative meeting with the UN Security Council (UNSC). Due to the disruptions that COVID19 has caused, it is not anticipated that the two Councils will hold meetings physically. It also does not seem possible that the Committee of Experts would travel to New York for the annual meeting with UNSC political coordinators and negotiating the draft joint communiqué.
The second meeting for the day is the discussion between the PSC and A3 on the preparation of the upcoming presidencies of the A3 in the UNSC. The meeting is expected to take place through VTC.
On 28 July the PSC will receive an update on of operationalization of the African Standby Force in the context of Africa’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The PSC may also take in consideration the existing guideline on the role of the ASF in Humanitarian action and Natural Disaster Support (HANDS). The session is scheduled to take place through VTC.
The last session of the month is scheduled for 31 July. On this day, the PSC will receive a briefing from the PSC Military Staff Committee on the ‘revised concept note on the guidelines for the deployment of 3000 AU troops in the Sahel’, which is prepared based on the Strategic Concept Note prepared as a follow up to the decision the AU Assembly adopted during the February 2020 AU summit. It is to be recalled that AU Commissioner for Peace and Security presented a draft Strategic Concept Note to the PSC in April. This meeting is also expected to take place through VTC.
The Socio-Economic Impact of COVID19 on Peace and Security in Africa
Amani Africa
Date | 30 June 2020
Tomorrow (30 June) on the last session of the month, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to hold its latest session on the novel coronavirus (COVID19), this time with a focus on the socio-economic impact of COVID19 on peace and security in Africa.
It is expected that PSC members will conduct the meeting through video teleconference. The AU Commissioner for Economic Affairs Victor Harison is expected to deliver a remark to the Council. Africa CDC and Department of Social Affairs will make presentations. Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa Vera Songwe is scheduled to make a presentation as well. Additionally, Founder and Executive Director of the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) Vasu Gounden will deliver a presentation.
Since the outbreak of the virus, the AUPSC has been undertaking discussions to assess the multiple impacts of the pandemic on the peace and security of the continent. The discussion on Tuesday is a follow up of this ongoing discussion with a particular focus on the socio-economic impacts. As the Director of the African Centre for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) aptly put it, COVID-19 could be “a national-security crisis first, an economic crisis second, and a health crisis third”.
According to data compiled by the Africa CDC, the virus has already infected more than 350 thousand people across the continent and 9 thousand people have so far lost their lives. The spread of the virus has shown major surge during the course of the past month. This spread has as yet to reach its peak.
More than the health crisis, what has actually been worrying for Africa is its devastating socio-economic impacts. In one of its first sessions on the virus, the PSC, in its communique of the 918th session, noted ‘with deep concern the profound socio-economic consequences of COPVID19 within Africa, including the fall in commodity prices and the attendant loss of national resources’.
For tomorrow’s session, it would be of interest for members of the PSC to receive update on the scale of the socio-economic impact of COVID19. Based on UNECA’s projections, “Africa will be hard hit by the projected medium to long-term social and economic impacts of the pandemic”. The drop in GDP could lead to stalled economies and exacerbate historical structural inequities in most African economies. The pandemic has affected social interaction and significantly reduced economic activities because of the series of measures, including social distancing and stay at home orders, undertaken to contain its rapid spread. This has had enormous implications for the lives and livelihoods as well as socio-economic wellbeing of Africans, particularly those vulnerable groups of the society who earn their living from the informal economy. In this respect as well, the PSC expressed its deep concern about ‘the pronounced negative impact of COVID19 on the informal sector, which is the source of livelihood for the majority of the population in both, rural and urban areas.’
Africa’s economy is likely to enter into recession perhaps for the first time in decades with a projection of a 1.1% growth rate this year in the best-case scenario and a contraction of -2.6 per cent in the worst case. The economic impact of this crisis will have ripple effects across different sectors. This has been manifesting itself in various forms, and according to UNECA, these include “falling demand for Africa’s commodities; capital flight from Africa; a virtual collapse of tourism and air transport associated with lockdowns and border closures; and depreciation of local currencies as a result of a deterioration in the current account balance”.
Also, of interest for tomorrow’s session is the impact of the pandemic on regional integration processes on the continent, including in the implementation of some of the flagship projects of Agenda 2063. It has been pointed out within AU that Africa was making progress towards implementing the African Continental Free Trade Area (ACFTA) to boost intra-African trade but now this has been upended because of the pandemic. Simultaneously, as much of the adverse consequences are linked to the excessive dependence of Africa on global supply chains, COVID19 also underscored the imperative of investing in the ACFTA and continental economic integration.
All the negative consequences of COVID19 on the economy are undermining the gains made over the past decades in making a dent on poverty and exasperate already existing socio-economic difficulties. According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the pandemic will likely increase poverty and inequalities jeopardizing the well-being of millions of people for many years to come. In this regard, the International Growth Centre estimates that 9.1% of the African population may have already been pushed into extreme poverty. The Centre also estimates that the pandemic is” likely to make the savings of about 30% of the population [in sub-Saharan African countries] essentially vanish, removing all resilience capacity to future shocks”. The reversal of the development gains that the continent made, the fall of millions of people on the continent into extreme poverty, and the expected limited or absence of economic opportunities particularly for the youth that accounts for the vast majority of the continent are all potential areas of concern for political stability and peace.
Many African countries find themselves facing the risk of becoming food insecure. The World Food Programme has already warned, for instance, that “the number of acutely food insecure people [in east Africa and the Horn] is likely to increase to between 34 and 43 million from May through July due to the socio-economic impact of the pandemic”. This coupled with the multiple crisis affecting the region, including the massive outbreak of desert locusts and flash floods threatens to wipe out the lives and livelihoods of millions of people.
Another area of interest for members of the PSC during tomorrow’s session is the efforts underway to limit and mitigate the socio-economic adverse effects of COVID19 in Africa. The UNDP argues, ‘[d]evelopment trajectories in the long-term will be affected by the choices countries make now and the support they receive’. Leading experts, such as former UNECA Executive Secretary, pointed out that Africa needs ‘a stimulus package of at least 5% of GDP, either in the form of capital mobilization, or in the form of debt relief or restructuring, or support for the social sectors’. Similarly, the UN Secretary-General also launched an initiative for mobilizing $200 billion, which he said is required, for delivering economic relief package to prevent the worst impacts of the pandemic. It is to be recalled that the Bureau of the AU Assembly, among others, urged G20 countries to provide an effective economic stimulus package that includes relief and deferred payments. In this regard, the Bureau called for the waiver of all interest payments on bilateral and multilateral debt, and the possible extension of the waiver to the medium term, in order to provide immediate fiscal space and liquidity to governments. Furthermore, the Bureau also urged the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, African Development Bank and other regional institutions to use all the instruments available in their arsenal to help mitigate against the scourge and provide relief to vital sectors of African economies and communities. UNECA points out that these measures need to include direct support that will keep households afloat and businesses solvent with particular focus on the vulnerable sections of the society.
No doubt, the socio-economic impact of the pandemic varies from countries to countries given the different strengths and vulnerabilities. For this reason, one of the issues that requires attention during tomorrow’s session is identifying how the socio-economic impact of COVID19 would affect transitional processes of countries in transition, peace processes and the peace and security dynamics of countries in conflict.
As far as African countries not affected by conflict prior to COVID19 is concerned, it would of course be difficult to argue in terms of a direct causal link between the socio-economic impact of the pandemic and its possible ramifications for stability. But there is no doubt that the institutional capacity of governments in Africa are being stretched to the limit. Indications are also that domestic violence and crime are on the rise and there is a sense of frustration and disillusionment particularly on the part of people who depend on the informal sector and most affected by the socio-economic impact of COVID19. The potential of this socio-economic situation eventually eroding societal cohesion and becoming a source of instability cannot simply be overlooked. ‘If not controlled early, the pandemic could quickly morph into humanitarian, socioeconomic, development, and political crises, with profoundly destabilizing effects’, UNECA warns.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The AUPSC is expected to assess the corona virus situation in Africa and the response efforts in the continent. It may wish to express appreciation to the ongoing national, regional, and continental efforts to mitigate the socio-economic impact of this pandemic. In particular, the Council may commend the measures taken by African governments and African people including CSOs and business to implement socio-economic response to save lives and livelihoods. It may also wish to commend the work of some of the regional and continental organizations in support of these national efforts.
The Council may note the various implications of socio-economic impacts of COVID-19 to the peace and security of the continent. In this regard, it may wish to emphasize on the impact of the pandemic on fragile countries, which require urgent attention and look at ways and means of extending support and solidarity to those countries. In this context, while welcoming the Sudan partnership meeting of 25 June that mobilized a much needed financial support to sustain the transitional process in Sudan, the PSC may renew its appeal to the international community to provide much needed support and, reiterating its the communiqué of 928th session, urge follow up on call by the UN Secretary-General for a $200 billion economic relief package to avoid the worst consequences of the socio-economic impact of the pandemic. It may further look at the underlying structural issues that expose Africa’s vulnerabilities to shocks and reflect on measures that could be taken at various levels to address those vulnerabilities. It may also encourage greater synergy at the national, regional, and continental efforts to provide effective socio- economic response to protect the wellbeing and livelihood of the African people. Beyond the immediate and short to medium term emergency response efforts, the Council may also wish to look at how Africa could ensure a better socio-economic recovery while also trying to promote and maintain its peace and stability.
The fifth Anniversary of the Peace and Reconciliation Agreement in Mali resulting from the Algiers Process
Amani Africa
Date | 26 June, 2020
Tomorrow (26 June) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to hold its 933rd session on the 5th Anniversary of the Peace and Reconciliation Agreement in Mali resulting from the Algiers Process.
It is expected that PSC members will conduct the meeting through video teleconference. It is expected that AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, Smail Chergui will deliver a remark to the Council. Representative of Mali is also expected to make a statement. Presentation will be made by the representative of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which also includes Francis Behanzin, ECOWAS’s Commissioner for Political Affairs Peace and Security. Additionally, Mahamat Saleh Annadif, Special Representative of the Secretary General to Mali and head of MINUSMA is scheduled to deliver a presentation.
This month marks the fifth anniversary of the signing of the Peace and Reconciliation Agreement in Mali. The main objective of the session is to take stock of the process of implementation of the agreement and strengthen the support to the actors in Mali to speed up the implementation and ownership of the peace agreement. The session is also expected to assess the progress made and the key challenges that have emerged in implementing the peace agreement over the past five years.
There are some gains that have been made from the peace agreement. Despite the jihadist threat and the mounting political opposition facing President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita’s government, the agreement helped in stabilizing northern Mali. In the political front, in December 2019 Mali held a national dialogue that resulted in the adoption of four main resolutions. The resolutions primarily called for the holding of legislative elections before May 2020 and constitutional referendum, the redeployment of the restructured armed forces and State administration in the country and a review of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali. The national dialogue played some positive role in reinfusing some momentum and mobilizing the signatories for the implementation of the peace and reconciliation agreement.
As per the agreement of the national dialogue, the legislative elections were held on 29 March and 19 April. Due to the fear of insecurity and the COVID19 pandemic there was a low turnout. Voters in the two new regions (Ménaka and Taoudenit) created in northern Mali could not choose deputies in the April 2020 legislative elections because the electoral districts had not yet been delineated. Despite the various challenges the elections were held and the country’s Constitutional Court has confirmed the results of the legislative elections.
With respect to the parts of the agreement on development (Section IV) and reconciliation (Section V), no major progress registered. As a recent report pointed out, a long-term development fund designed to support initiatives in northern Mali has been set up, but its joint administration by the Malian authorities and armed groups remains a challenge. Mali’s truth, justice and reconciliation commission, established in 2014, has continued its role as defined in the 2015 agreement, and it began holding public hearings in December 2019. In terms of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process, the redeployment of reconstituted forces has taken place in Northern parts of the country.
Yet, major implementation gaps persist. According to the Carter Centre, which was designated as the independent observer in Mali, in 2017, 22 per cent of the agreement’s provisions had been put into effect, compared to 23 per cent three years later. As noted in the report of the UN Secretary-General
submitted on 2 June 2020, political actors are still under discussion on setting a timeframe for the constitutional reform, which was expected to take place following the election. It is important to note that the constitutional review, key for the implementation of the political and institutional reform of Mali’s system of governance based on devolution and through instituting a senate and regional assemblies whose presidents would be elected through direct universal suffrage, has been postponed since 2017.
Despite the redeployment of reconstituted forces in Northern parts of the country, the parties have as yet to find mutually acceptable effective way of integrating former armed groups’ members in the national army and its chain of command. The operationalization of deployed forces requires training and capacity building, which has been delayed due to the COVID19 pandemic. This has affected the disarmament and reintegration process as well.
While the agreement is a critical stepping-stone for the country’s stability and remains the only viable peace framework agreement, it however suffers from lack of political commitment for its implementation. Community based organizations in both northern and southern Mali meant to ensure representation of local population were excluded. There are now more public campaigns protesting against the peace agreement than in support of it. For the PSC, one of the key issues of interest in respect of which members may seek insights from the briefers is the apparent lack of sense of ownership of the peace agreement even among the signatories and how this can be addressed.
Apart from issues internal to the peace process, there are other issues that have adverse impact on the peace agreement as well. The heightening political opposition and tension in Bamako is one such factor. On 5 June, a major opposition protest was staged with protesters calling for the resignation of President Kieta. In a sign of the protest movement gaining steam, further protests involving large group of people took place on 19 June. Prompted by complaints about the election outcome and the abduction of leading opposition leader Soumaila Cisse while campaigning ahead of the parliamentary election in March. On 22 June, AU Commission Chairperson, Moussa Faki Mahamat, issued a statement expressing ‘deep concern’ about ‘the serious crisis that has plagued Mali since the popular protest on June 5, 2020’. The other factor which also contributes to the political instability is the security situation. Currently, the overall security situation in Mali and the Sahel region remains worrying. Terrorism and inter-communal clashes are still prevalent. The impact of the pandemic on restriction of movement has also enabled terrorist groups to utilize the security vacuum to make advances and attack civilians and security forces. As indicated in the Secretary General report over the past three months alone a total of 169 civilians were killed.
The compounded effects of socio-economic challenges, weak state control, and protracted violence and conflict exacerbated by the impact of means that the humanitarian situation continues to be dire. There are close to 200,000 Malian refugees taking refuge in neighbouring countries and about 250,000 are internally displaced.
Thus, the fifth anniversary of the agreement is taking place in a midst of a number of political upheavals and security challenges putting the peace agreement at peril. It would be of interest for the PSC to review how to maintain the peace process and retain the gains made and how it may also contribute working with ECOWAS and the UN towards addressing the multifaceted challenges inhibiting progress.
It is to be recalled that the worsening of the security situation has resulted in the decision of the AU Summit in February 2020 to deploy the Joint Multinational Task Force (JMTF) with 3000 troops for six months, in order to further degrade terrorist groups in the Sahel by supporting the G5 Sahel and working closely with ECOWAS. Although the details of the JMTF are still being developed and this force, when deployed, can contribute towards stemming the expansion of terrorism in the region, it is debatable if the further militarization of the country and the region is what the situation in Mali warrants.
Tomorrow’s session is also taking place ahead of the UNSC session on United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the situation in Mali. Before the end of this month the UNSC is also expected to hold a session to renew the mandate of MINUSMA, which expires on 30 June. UN Security Council Resolution 2480 (2019) extended the mandate of MINUSMA until 30 June with the capacity of 13,289 military personnel and 1,920 police personnel.
In the same resolution the Security Council urged for the swift and strengthened implementation of the agreement noting of the delays created in the earlier years of agreement. Additionally, before the end of the current mandate of MINUSMA, among other it urged Malian political actors to complete of the constitutional reform and the transfer of decentralized State services to local authorities, resolve pending issues related to the concept of reconstituted and reformed Malian national forces. In the briefing to the PSC, the head of MINUSMA is expected to inform the PSC about these issues and the contribution of MINUSMA to the peace process in Mali, including in supporting the DDR process. The expected outcome is a communiqué. The PSC may welcome the gains registered in Mali with respect to the peace agreement. It may particularly welcome the successful conclusion of the national dialogue and the legislative election as well as the deployment of a reconstituted Malian army battalion in February 2020 in Kidal. It may urge the government to adopt a more inclusive and consultative approach in implementing the agreement. It may also underscore the imperative for the
signatories to assume their full responsibilities under the peace agreement and take full ownership for its implementation on the basis of firm political will and active mobilization public support. The PSC may in particular urge the government and all Malian political forces to create the conditions for the convening of the constitutional referendum as reaffirmed in the outcome of the December 2019 national dialogue. The PSC may
also welcome the statement of the AU Commission Chairperson and reiterate his call for the parties to work together to find consensual solutions to end the political crisis following the June 5 public protests. It may also express concern over the deteriorating humanitarian and security situation in the country, which continue to undermine the gains made so far and the efficacy of the peace agreement. It may condemn the abduction of Soumaila Cisse and urge the government to strengthen efforts for his immediate release. It may call on the international community to strengthen their efforts, including on the basis of benchmarks and processes of support jointly crafted by Mali and the guarantors of the peace agreement, in bringing lasting peace and stability in the region by ensuring the complete implementation of the agreement.
Youth, Peace and Security in Africa
Amani Africa
Date | 23 June, 2020
Tomorrow (23 June) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to have its 932nd session on Youth, Peace and Security in Africa. The briefing from the Peace and Security Department (PSD) is circulated to the members of the PSC in a written statement, which will be circulated to the members.
It is expected that PSC member states will conduct the session remotely and share their input via email communication. Subsequently, the PSC Secretariat together with the Chairperson are expected to draft a communiqué and circulate for its adoption through silence procedure.
The 807th inaugural PSC meeting on Youth, Peace and Security (YPS) was held on 8 November 2018. At the end of the session the PSC decided to institutionalize the agenda by dedicating an annual session on the theme. During the same meeting the PSC requested the Commission to undertake a study on the role of the youth in promoting peace and security in Africa and to finalize the Continental Framework on YPS and appoint the five African Youth Peace Ambassadors (AYPA), who among others, work with the AU Youth Envoy.
The PSC held the second session on YPS on 15 November 2019. The focus of the session was to “review actions undertaken since the inaugural (807th) PSC open session on 8 November 2018”. In addition, the session also received presentation on ‘the Study on the Roles and Contributions of Youth to Peace and Security in Africa’. It was also at this session that the five African youth ambassadors for youth were introduced and presented to the PSC. It is to be recalled that subsequently, the 33rd AU Summit endorsed the appointed ambassadors and requested the Commission to institutionalize the Y4P Program within the PSD with a dedicated desk.
Tomorrow’s session is a follow up to the previous year’s open session and will afford the Council with the opportunity to consider the revised drafts of the Continental Framework on YPS and the ‘Study on the Roles and Contributions of Youth to Peace and Security in Africa’. Accordingly, the PSD’s briefing is expected to provide an overview on the joint work undertaken by the Commission and the PSC committee of experts in finalizing the continental framework and in providing additional inputs in the study. With regards to the continental framework the briefing may shed light on its objectives and its five priority areas namely: participation, prevention, protection, partnership and coordination as well as disengagement and reintegration.
The central objective of the framework is to ensure the active engagement of the African youth in all aspects of peace and security. The framework also aims at tackling the hindrances to the active participation of the youth including limitation related to financial and technical capacity of youth initiatives and limited role of youth in formal peacebuilding initiatives.
The second part of the briefing is expected to provide update on the progress of the study. The rationale behind the study is to document and adequately portray the active contribution of youth in peace and security in Africa. A similar study conducted by the UN ‘The Missing Peace: Independent Progress Study on Youth and Peace and Security’ interrogates existing stereotypes related to youth and violence and illustrates the relationship between youth, government and communities and youth’s participation in political, economic and social aspects.
It is of interest for members of the PSC to review persisting challenges limiting the active role of the youth. In this respect, some of the issues affecting the youth include structural limitations and cultural attitudes, requirements for experience for their engagement in institutional activities for peace and the lack of space and access to platforms for peace processes. Consideration of these and related issues affecting youth, particularly young women, is critical to identify the concrete initiatives and measures that member states and the AU should take to support and strengthen the role of youth, including their participation in AU peace processes.
In terms of following up on the 33rd AU Assembly decision on institutionalizing the AU program on youth peace and security in the Department of Peace and Security, an issue of interest for PSC members is the steps taken to implement this decision and how the PSC could support the full implementation of this decision. The briefing from the PSD may call on strengthened financial and technical support for youth led projects.
The briefing from the PSD may also put forward recommendations for the adoption of the two documents. The priority areas of the continental framework are informed by UN Security Council Resolution 2250 (2015). An important aspect of tomorrow’s session is accordingly to discuss the opportunities for effective inclusion of youth in peace processes. It would also be of interest to the PSC to review and assess the benchmarks under the various pillars of participation, prevention, protection, partnership and coordination and disengagement and reintegration. In the light of concerning trends mainly the spread of radicalization and violent extremism on the continent over the years and its impact on the youth, it would be of interest to the PSC to examine mechanisms to support the youth in regions affected by activities of terrorist operations to help prevent radicalization and their involvement in any actions related to terrorism and violent extremism.
The subsequent UNSC resolution on YPS, 2419 (2018) further called for a more robust youth participation in peace efforts at national, regional and global levels. One particular aspect that is underscored in the resolution, which may also be of interest to the PSC is around gender inequalities that put young women at particular risk. This offers the PSC to also recommit to the empowerment of young women and gender equality and to call on all member states to eliminate all forms of sexual and gender-based violence and to protect young women.
There is a need to streamline policies and programs at the Commission level as well in close collaboration with the Regional Economic Communities (RECs)/Regional Mechanisms (RMs) and member states. The PSC may encourage a closer partnership between RECs and the five regional African Youth Peace Ambassadors (AYAP). It may also urge member states that have not done so to ratify the African Youth Charter and to develop national youth policies in line with the Charter’s Article 12.
Tomorrow’s session is also taking place within the context of COVID19 pandemic. The AU Youth Envoy has noted the unprecedented impact on educational systems and youth employment. It would be critical for the PSC to also assess the adverse consequences of closure of schools and unemployment on youth’s role in peace and security, respect for the rights of young women and in fighting radicalization and extremism.
The expected outcome is a communiqué. The PSC may recognize the agency and active role of youth in peace efforts. It may also underline the need to address the structural challenges that hinder their active engagement in peace efforts including in formal mediation and prebuilding processes. The PSC may commend the work undertaken by the Commission and for completing the various frameworks requested by the PSC. The PSC may welcome the recommendations put forward by PSD in the briefing note. The Council may decide to adopt the two documents of the continental framework and the study. The PSC may also note the importance of policy harmonization and coordination among the various stakeholders namely the Y4P, Office of the Youth Envoy, the five regional ambassadors and relevant departments in the Commission to ensure that the YPS agenda is implemented in a coherent manner. The PSC could also require that particular attention is given to the gender dimension of the role of youth in order to ensure that issues affecting young women are recognized and addressed.
