State of foreign military presence in Africa
Amani Africa
Date | 14 August, 2019
Tomorrow (14 August) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will hold a session to assess the state of foreign military presence in Africa and its implications on the implementation of African Common Defense and Security Policy.
The AU Peace and Security Department is expected to brief the Council. The Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA) is also best placed to provide further inputs.
In recent years increasing concerns have been expressed over the surge in the establishment of foreign military presence in various parts of the continent. In its communique of its 776th session held in May 2018, the PSC expressed deep concern ‘over the potential negative effects of the presence of foreign military bases in some volatile parts of the continent to the future security and stability of Africa’.
The 19th meeting of the Panel of the Wise in November 2018 went further. It not only reiterated the concern about the ‘increasing militarization of parts of the continent, in particular the Sahel and the Horn of Africa regions’ but importantly ‘the increase in uncoordinated external interventions which undermines the efficacy of African‐led solutions to violent conflicts on the continent.’ In this respect, the Panel underscored that considerable attention should be devoted to understanding the dynamics of external involvement on the continent’s security landscape.
The trend in the militarization of parts of the continent is backed by data. Over the past three decades, the continent has witnessed the heavy military presence of multiple regional and international security actors. Particularly in the Horn of Africa region, the number of actors with military presence from Europe, the United States, the Middle East, the Gulf, and Asia has increased exponentially. Moreover, the increased volatility and complex security challenges in the Sahel and West Africa regions have also led to the expanded role of foreign security actors.
France has had a military presence in Djibouti since the late 1800. After Djibouti achieved independence in 1977, France retained several military facilities. In recent decades, in the Horn region, foreign military presence was first established for purposes of countering violent extremism and terrorism following the terrorist attacks in the United States in 11 September 2001. Since 2001, the Government of Djibouti leased Camp Lemonnier to the USA and ever since the US has made continuous investment to transform it into a permanent facility. Similarly, the US has also established presence in other countries in the Horn for its operation against al‐Shabab. Surveillance sites in South Sudan, Uganda and Democratic Republic of Congo have also been established aiming, among others, at capturing Joseph Kony.
China’s first major security step in relation to military presence in Africa came in 2008 when it launched an anti‐piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden. China has since maintained a permanent naval anti‐piracy presence in the Horn of Africa region and recently it launched its 32nd convoy fleet to the Gulf of Aden and Somali waters. In a landmark development, China established a People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) base in Djibouti in August 2017. While presented as a logistics support base and aiming at supporting China’s peacekeeping operations in Africa and its participation in the fight of international piracy off the coast of Horn of Africa and Gulf of Aden, the facility has been instrumental in the protection of China’s growing overseas assets and represents China’s plan to project power.
The UK similarly has deployed a number of military personnel at Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, for a closer cooperation with the US forces in the region.
Increased presence from emerging actors particularly the Gulf States has witnessed sharp increase starting from 2015‐2016. Saudi Arabia has significantly increased its presence in the region, particularly following the civil war in Yemen and has maintained a significant naval presence in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. After strained relationship with Djibouti, the UAE has directed its ties to Eritrea, Somalia and Somaliland.
The UAE has also targeted Somaliland by working on the military base in Berbera to strengthen its military capacity in the conflict in Yemen while also providing security for Somaliland’s coastal waters and coastline. Turkey has also opened a military training centre in Mogadishu in 2017 to train recruits for the Somali National Army.
Russia has become the latest power to emerge on the African security scene. In 2018, it has established presence in the Central African Republic (CAR) to equip and advise the CAR military. In apparent indication of long‐term presence, Bangui and Moscow signed a military cooperation pact.
The rivalry and competition among foreign powers has worsened already volatile security situation in the continent. In addition to the GCC crisis, the perceived rivalry between the US and China has further intensified the military presence. The US Africa Strategy has openly stated its intention of countering China and Russia’s influence in the continent.
These competing military engagements particularly among global powers will have a number of implications for the implementation of the African Common Defense and Security Policy.
One of the principal objectives of the policy is ‘to ensure collective responses to both internal and external threats to Africa… in conformity with the principles enshrined in the Constitutive Act’. The current security landscape and involvement of foreign power complicate the establishment of any collective security response by African states.
While there is recognition that individual member states have the sovereign prerogative for allowing their territories to be used by foreign militaries, there remain concerns about the extent to which such military presence is channeled for enhancing the collective security of the continent. Some of the bilateral engagements of member states are seen as being not fully coherent with existing continental commitments and mechanisms established by the AU. Rather there is seems to be fragmentation and ad‐hoc engagement with foreign powers, leading to fragmentation of the engagement of AU member states. Moreover, there is also a tendency of building closer ties with foreign power than with neighboring states in the security front. It is feared that this tends to fuel tension among neighboring countries.
IGAD during its 46th ministerial meeting cognizant of the changing geopolitics in the region, adopted ‘a collective approach to challenges in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden by strengthening regional cooperation, and establish a regional platform for IGAD Member States with a view to promote dialogue’ and agreed ‘to harmonize and develop a common position to protect the security and economic interests of the region’.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may take note of the increased level of unregulated presence of foreign militaries in Africa and destabilizing effects of antagonism and rivalry among powers on the peace and security of the continent. The PSC may urge member state for their immediate action in considering the continental and regional standards, particularly the Common African Defense and Security Policy, when engaging foreign security actors. The PSC may call on member states to work towards common security and intensify regional cooperation to effectively respond to any threat emanating from foreign power competition. As part of the effort to limit the pitfalls of foreign military presence, the PSC may task the AU Commission to present to it a report on the scope of foreign military presence, its adverse impacts and ways and means by which member states may coordinate with the AU on the role of foreign militaries in their territories.
Review of Partnerships between the AU Commission, non-African States and Organisations
Amani Africa
Date | 13 August, 2019
Tomorrow (13 August) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to review the institutional relationships and partnerships between the AU Commission, non-African states and/or organizations and their impact on the implementation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and the African Governance Architecture (AGA).
The Departments of Peace and Security and Political affairs are expected to brief the PSC on partnerships on the APSA and the AGA respectively.
The AU PSC, being the principal decision-making body with respect to both APSA and AGA, plays a key role in reviewing and providing guidance on the modalities of partnership. Critical to the role of the PSC is the review of how partnerships on the APSA and AGA are initiated, negotiated, designed and implemented.
The session is expected to offer an opportunity for PSC member states to be informed of the nature and diversity of partnerships established on the APSA and the AGA currently in place. Indications are that PSC members do not have full information on the various partnerships established on the APSA and the AGA. Apart from the information gap, PSC member states are also keen about accountability around the planning and implementation of partnership programs.
Other issues expected to feature during the session include the focus areas of the various partnerships, how the partnerships inform or shape the focus and orientation of the APSA and the AGA including their alignment with Agenda 2063, the extent to which partnerships may impact on the ownership and leadership of the AU in the planning and implementation of APSA and AGA projects and challenges of coordination and the burden of multiple reporting formats. Also, of interest would be the availability of mechanisms for engaging the PSC and reporting to it on the establishment and implementation of APSA and AGA partnerships programs.
Within the context of multilateralism, the session may identify and categorize the various forms of partnerships including with non-African member states, inter-governmental and international organizations as well international non-governmental organizations towards the operationalization of AGA and APSA. It may also look into the establishment of standardized partnership framework that can also streamline a harmonized support to the two complementary and mutually reinforcing architectures, APSA and AGA.
Moreover, given the existence of numerous state and non-state partners that engage the AUC the review may provide a clearer direction on coordination among partners and more organized AU engagement to prevent duplication of efforts and resources. Also given the overlap between the two architectures, the review of partnerships may explore the possibility of having a comprehensive common strategy for both the APSA and the AGA.
In terms of the multilateral partnerships on APSA and AGA, the most notable ones include those with the UN and the EU. APSA is anchored on the recognition of its complementarity to the multilateralist global collective security system articulated in the Charter of the United Nations (UN). Hence AU’s primary and well-established partner in the area of promoting peace and security has been the UN. The partnership in this specific area was strengthened when the AUC and the Secretary-General of the UN signed the Joint UN–AU Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security in April 2017 at the first UN–AU Annual Conference. The Framework outlines priority areas for cooperation including early warning, prevention, mediation, conflict management, and working together to sustain peace and address climate change. The Decision Assembly/AU/Dec.644(XXIX) adopted by the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government at its 29th Ordinary Session held in July 2017 which welcomed the signing of the framework, it also requested the Chair of the AU Commission to accelerate the process of accessing the UN assessed contributions to finance AU peace support operations.
The implementation of the key areas of the framework have also been spearheaded through the UN Office to the African Union (UNOAU), established in July 2010 to support the UN Secretariat’s presence in Addis Ababa on peace and security matters.
The EU has been AU’s longstanding partner on peace and security dating back to 2003, the early years of the APSA. The EU APSA-support program of the African Peace Facility was established in 2004 at the request of African leaders at the 2003 AU summit in Maputo, Mozambique. Tomorrow’s session is also taking place as two major multi-year and strategic engagements are being developed between the AUC and the European Union (EU), which directly target APSA and AGA: the support program for APSA IV (2020 – 2024) and support to (AGA) 2020-2023. These engagements build on the key common priorities on strengthening resilience, peace, security and governance identified at the most recent AU-EU Summit held in Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire in November 2017.
The second category of partnership is the AUC engagement with non-African member states. In this context, engagement with members of the UNSC may be particularly relevant for the promotion of the continental peace and security agenda including the preventive mechanisms identified in the AGA. Tomorrow’s session is timely particularly in light of recent developments where a number of cooperative platforms have been launched in 2019 with various non-African states. For example, the first China-Africa peace and security forum was launched in July 2019. The first session of the strategic dialogue between France and the AUC was held following the meeting between President Macron and the Chairperson of the Commission on 13 March 2019. A MoU was signed between the UK government and AUC in early 2019.
The PSC may need to identify a coherent policy direction in managing these multiple engagements, which over the years have deepened. It will also be essential for the Council to strategize ways in which the Commission can leverage from longstanding and emerging partnerships and advance the set objective in its normative and policy frameworks. This may require the close cooperation between the Council and Commission to jointly strategize in addressing partnership issues.
The third form of partnerships that the PSC may also review is with international non-governmental organizations and their role in the implementation of APSA and AGA. The review may look into the contribution of partners such as most notably the GiZ, which has provided long term support to both APSA and AGA.
The other key issue that may feature in tomorrow’s session is also the reform process and its effects on AGA and APSA operationalization. The proposed restructuring of the AUC in 2021 and the merger of the Departments of Political Affairs and Peace and Security will have direct implication on the harmonization between AGA and APSA. The main area that may require attention in this regard is on how establishing common objectives between the two architectures in order to generate coherent partnership policy. The changes associated with the reform will also affect the implementation of the activities of the two architectures and the long-term partnership built around them.
One of the ways in which the merger of the two departments and its implications on synergy between the two architecture can be accommodated is through the development of a common APSA-AGA roadmap. The opportunity for elaborating such common roadmap is present with the end of the current APSA roadmap in 2020.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may call for an enhanced coordination and a standardized partnership framework that governs AUC engagement with various actors on the implementation of APSA and AGA. It may urge the Commission to strengthen its efforts in providing regular update and analysis on partnership. It may particularly highlight the need for harmonization between the two architectures to also enhance coordinated partners engagement.
Consultative meeting between the PSC and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights
Amani Africa
Date | 8 August, 2019
Tomorrow (8 August) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will held its 866th session. This session involves a consultative meeting between the PSC and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African (Banjul) Commission). With its Secretariat based in Banjul the Gambia for which it is also known as the Banjul Commission, the Commission is the oldest and premier human rights body of the AU.
It is expected that a member of the African (Banjul) Commission will deliver a briefing on the theme of the session. As the department of the AU Commission responsible for human rights and governance, a representative of the Department of Political Affairs is also expected to brief the PSC.
There are at least three legal bases for the convening of this session. The first of this relates to the mandate that the PSC has been explicitly assigned under the PSC Protocol for upholding human and peoples’ rights as part of its conflict prevention, management, resolution and post-conflict reconstruction mandate. It is envisaged that this is to be done in accordance with the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the founding treaty of the African human rights system that has near universal ratification by AU member states.
The second foundation for the convening of this session is the overlap in the mandate of the PSC and that of the African (Banjul) Commission. Given that the African (Banjul) Commission is the body with the expertise for the interpretation and application of the human and peoples’ rights of the African Charter, it is best placed to provide the requisite technical advice to enable the PSC in the implementation of the human rights dimension of its mandate including its role relating to Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act. It is worth noting in this regard that the African (Banjul) Commission has also established a thematic focus on human rights in conflict situations under its Resolution 332.
Finally, and crucially, tomorrow’s session is convened within the framework of Article 19 of the PSC Protocol. This article provides for the establishment of close working relationship between the PSC and the African (Banjul) Commission.
While Article 19 of the PSC Protocol provided for the establishment of close working relationship between the PSC and the African (Banjul) Commission and the Conclusions of the 2007 Dakar retreat of the PSC on its working methods stipulated annual consultative meeting between the two as one avenue for operationalizing Article 19, no meeting has been held between the PSC and the African (Banjul) Commission neither prior to the 2007 Dakar retreat of the PSC since the latter’s establishment in 2004 nor since that retreat. Tomorrow’s session thus presents a good opportunity not only to activate the consultative meeting envisaged in the Dakar retreat conclusions but also take stock of the nature of the relationship between the two bodies thus far.
Despite the fact that there was no institutionalized interaction and the PSC, the African (Banjul) Commission have had working interactions on various occasions. There have been various instances in which the PSC requested the African (Banjul) Commission. From recent experiences, one good example is the African (Banjul) Commission in early December 2015 undertook an investigation mission into human rights violations in Burundi in the context of the 2015 crisis in Burundi on the request of the PSC. Most recently, the PSC made reference to the role of the African (Banjul) Commission with respect to the investigation missions it called for in relation to the situation in Sudan and that of Libya. Admittedly, the working relationship is characterized by ad hocism. As such even when a request is made by the PSC for the Commission to undertake such investigation, there are no established modalities for follow up in terms of both enabling the African (Banjul) Commission execute such task in pursuit of the mandate of the PSC and inscribing a session for the receipt and processing of the findings of the Commission after the African (Banjul) Commission undertook the investigation mission.
In the briefing, the representative of the African (Banjul) Commission is expected to inform the PSC both on the relevant work of the Commission that are of material interest to the mandate of the PSC and on the various modalities (in addition to the annual consultative meeting as per the Dakar retreat conclusions) for the full operationalization of Article 19 of the PSC Protocol. In this respect, the work of the African (Banjul) Commission that would deserve particular mention for being of interest to the PSC include the work in relation to women rights under the Maputo Protocol, its Guideline on protecting human rights while countering terrorism, transitional justice under its Resolution 235 and human rights in conflict situations under its Resolution 332.
In terms of the modalities for the operationalization of Article 19, some of the approaches that may feature in the briefing include: informal consultations; institutionalizing PSC requested investigation missions by the African (Banjul) Commission through a more clear arrangement for follow up on the conduct and outcome of such mission; information sharing including through an established arrangement for incorporating relevant work of the African (Banjul) Commission into the Continental Early Warning system (CEWS); provision of briefings to the PSC in between the annual sessions on the human rights dimension of conflict situations on the agenda of the PSC or on themes of interest for the PSC such as protection of human rights in countering terrorism or transitional justice in post-conflict countries; establishment of a standing thematic agenda of the PSC on human rights and peace and security in Africa; and joint filed missions.
The intervention from the Department of Political affairs (DPA) is expected to highlight existing practices and work undertaken with the active role of the Department that are of direct relevance to the theme of the session. One such area of work of the Department which commonly feature on the agenda of the PSC concerns elections. Another one relates to the work of the DPA on the African Governance Architecture (AGA) including that relating to unconstitutional changes of government. And in this respect the institutionalization of the annual consultative meeting under Article 19 offers an opportunity for enhancing the synergy between the AGA and the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Also, of interest for highlighting in the intervention by the DPA include the work done on transitional justice – particularly the adoption during the February 2019 summit of the AU of the AU Transitional Justice Policy – a key instrument for implementing the accountability dimension of the mandate of the AU broadly and the PSC specifically. From the perspective of PSC’s mandate, also worth mentioning is the emerging practice of deployment of human rights experts (monitors) as part of an AU mission and in collaboration with the African (Banjul) Commission has been done in Mali and Central African Republic or as a standalone deployment as has been the case since 2015 in Burundi.
The expected outcome of the session is a communique. It is expected that the PSC would welcome the work of the Commission and the opportunity for full operationalization of Article 19 of the PSC Protocol. In this respect, one major expected outcome is the establishment of the annual consultative meeting as standing agenda of the PSC to be inscribed into the annual indicative plan of work of the PSC. The PSC may also decide to establish a thematic agenda on human rights and peace and security as an avenue for receiving briefing by the African (Banjul) Commission both on the human rights dimension of situations on the agenda of the PSC and on other ways of full implementation of the human rights related mandate of the PSC. The outcome document may also stipulate arrangements for sharing of information of early warning value, for effective implementation of PSC requests for human rights investigation mission by the African (Banjul) Commission and for undertaking joint field visits.
