Inaugural Consultative Meeting of the Peace and Security Council and Regional Economic Communities (RECs)/Regional Mechanisms (RMs)
Inaugural Consultative Meeting of the Peace and Security Council and Regional Economic Communities (RECs)/Regional Mechanisms (RMs)
Date | 23 May, 2019
Tomorrow (24 May) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security council (PSC) will convene its 852 session on the inaugural consultative meeting of the PSC and the peace and security decision-making organs of Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs).
The session convened in line with Article 16 of the PSC Protocol and the conclusions of the various retreats of the PSC convened over many years on its working methods. As the first consultative meeting being convened 15 years after the coming into effect of the PSC, this session is also a reflection of the institutional reform of the AU, which puts emphasis on enhancing close working relationship and coordination with the policy organs of the RECs/RMs.
The AU Commission is expected to present by way of a report a background document on the Inaugural Meeting of the AU PSC and the Policy Organs of the RECs/RMs for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution on Promotion of Peace, Security and Stability in Africa. Accordingly, the focus is not on the interface between the AU Commission and the secretariats of the RECs/RMs but on the PSC and the policy decision-making organs of the RECs/RMs.
The chairpersons of nine RECs/RMs peace and security policy decision-making organs are expected to participate. These are Chad as Chair of CEN-SAD, Ethiopia as Chair of IGAD, Gabon as Chair of ECCAS and the Peace and Security Council of ECCAS, Madagascar as Chair of COMESA, Namibia as Chair of SADC and SADC Political and Defense Organ, Nigeria as Chair of ECOWAS and the Mediation and Security Community of ECOWAS, Rwanda as Chair of EAC and Tunisia as Chair of UMA. Additionally, invitation has also been extended for all Executive Secretaries of the RECs/RMs to participate in this inaugural consultative meeting.
In terms of defining the outline for coordination between the two levels, there is no lack of adequate legal rules. Article 7(1) (e) of the Protocol enjoins the PSC ‘promote close harmonization, co-ordination and co-operation between Regional Mechanisms and the Union in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa’. Most importantly, Article 16 of the Protocol articulates the place of RECs/RMs in the Africa Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and outlines at some length the details of how the PSC together with the Chairperson of the AU Commission shall go about developing policy coordination and close working relationship with RECs/RMs. With nine sub-articles, Article 16 is the longest and most detail of the PSC Protocol articles that define relationships between the PSC and other actors.
While acknowledging the primary role of the PSC, Article 16 affirms that RECs/RMs ‘are part of the overall Security Architecture of the Union’. Its sub-article 1 emphasizes the need for aligning the role of RECs/RMs with the objectives and principles of the AU. It further underscores the need for enduring ‘effective partnership between them and the PSC in the maintenance of peace and security’. Eschewing a one size fits all approach, it envisions that such effective partnership is to be pursued on the basis of ‘the comparative advantage of each and the prevailing circumstances’. Other than requiring alignment of normative objectives and principles, this approach does not consider a rigid and hierarchical relationship between the two levels. Instead it opts for a flexible approach leveraging the comparative advantage of both the PSC and RECs/RMs. Thus, sub-article 2 of Article 16 envisions a consultative decision- making process.
In terms of how the close working relationship and the coordination of policy is to be operationalized, sub-article 6 of Article 16 provides that RECs/RMs ‘shall be invited to participate in the discussion of any question brought before the Peace and Security Council whenever that question is being addressed by a regional mechanism is of special interest to that organization.’ In undertaking conflict prevention, peacemaking and peace building functions, the PSC and RECs/RMs are required under sub-article 3 of Article 16 to fully and continuously inform each other of their activities.
As highlighted in the background document for the meeting, these detailed provisions have been complemented with further provisions elaborated in the conclusions of the various retreats of the PSC on its working methods. Most notable in this regard are the May 2015 Swakopmund and the September 2015 Abuja retreats of the PSC.
There have been two major gaps that have led to the lack of effective coordination between the PSC and RECs/RMs. The first of this was the non-implementation of both the provisions of Article 16 of the PSC Protocol and the relevant conclusions of the PSC Retreats on its Working Methods. This was despite the fact that for at least the past few years the indicative annual program of work of the PSC envisaged the convening of the annual consultative meeting envisaged in Article 16 of the Protocol. The other was the lack of initiative for developing the kind of arrangements and mechanisms established for the PSC – UN Security Council relationship for the operationalization of the provisions Article 16 on policy coordination and close working relationship.
Experience from various conflict situations show that the resultant lack of effective and institutionalized policy coordination between the two levels has produced increasing disaffection on both sides. While tomorrow’s consultative meeting is long overdue, it is key for addressing the growing challenges of policy coherence and coordinated action in responding to conflicts. As the PSC’s role in conflict prevention, management and resolution has become institutionalized and the role of RECs/RMs in this area shows expansion, the instances for policy divergence and dissonance has also increased over the years. Such differences and uncoordinated interventions have been observed in a number of conflict situations. In the past this has been the case with respect to the situations in Cote d’Ivoire, Madagascar, Guinea Bissau, Mali and Central African Republic (CAR). In recent years, this has been evident in the situations in Burundi and South Sudan. In some of these cases, there has been normative disconnect between the two levels. This is particularly notable with respect to situations involving electoral disputes and unconstitutional changes of government.
Apart from the impact of such divergent policy approaches and uncoordinated interventions in fragmenting peace and security decision- making on the continent, they have importantly undermined the effort for the resolution of conflicts, thereby allowing the conflicts to rage on perpetuating the suffering of the affected populations.
It is expected that apart from the foregoing, the background document for the meeting will outline other gaps observed in PSC – RECs/RMs peace and security decision-making processes. These notably include lack of clear criteria for determining the application of the principle of subsidiarity, lack of clarity on the format and mechanics of organization of the consultative meetings, lack of clarity on horizontal coordination among RECs and the role of the PSC in facilitating such horizontal coordination, the challenges arising from trans-regional security threats that don’t fall within the jurisdiction of no one REC/RM, and lack of clarity on decision-making role between the PSC and RECs/RMs on the mandating and deployment of the African Standby Forces.
Another area worth looking into in this context is the need for reviewing whether and how the legal instruments or decisions of policy-making organs of RECs/RMs established provisions recognizing the role of the PSC similar to those found in Article 16 of the PSC Protocol. Such provisions will prove critical not only to give legal basis in RECs/RMs instruments but also to institutionalize mutual recognition and close working relationship between the two levels. Such provisions are also key for institutionalized operationalization of one of the conclusions of the September 2015 Abuja PSC Retreat, which stipulates that ‘RECs/RMs shall extend invitations to the AUC Chairperson and the Chairperson of the PSC in their statutory and other decision-making meetings on peace and security.’
In terms of the operationalization of the principles of subsidiary, complementarity and comparative advantage, the annual consultative meeting may take lessons and best practices from AU-UN partnership on peace and security. This entails that instead of rigid application of principles, they should recognize that both levels have a role to play and engage in joint analysis of the situation and joint formulation of policy options which ensure policy coherence and joint collective action that leverages the role and contribution of each. Other best practice include the joint field visits to conflict situations, thus the PSC and the concerned REC/RM can plan and undertake joint field visits as a means of enhancing collective action and policy coherence.
Taking stock of the forgoing and the experience in PSC and RECs/RMs relationship, the annual consultative meeting can identify the best practices thus far and the remaining challenges. In this regard, one measure that the annual consultative meeting can establish is to consolidate into one coherent and authoritative document the various modalities and frameworks for cooperation articulated in diverse documents. On the basis of such single document that consolidates best practices and articulated additional options for coordination, the PSC and the policy organs of RECs/RMs on peace and security can develop and sign a memorandum of understanding or framework agreement.
It is expected that the outcome of the consultative meeting would take the form of Proposals/Recommendations on Harmonisation and Coordination of Decision Making Processes/Division of Labour between the AU and RECs in the area of peace and security. This is expected to be part of the working documents that will be considered during the inaugural AU-RECs/RMs summit to be held in Niamey, Niger on 4-5 July 2019. The Proposals/Recommendations are to outline agreed interpretation of the principles that govern relationships between the PSC and RECs/RMs peace and security policy organs and the modalities, format and timelines for coherent policy making and operational coordination of interventions.
Report on the challenges faced by AU led Peace Support Operations
Amani Africa
Date | 23 May, 2019
Tomorrow (May 23) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to consider the African Union Commission’s report on the challenges faced by AU led Peace Support Operations (PSOs) and on mechanisms to address them. The military staff committee and the Peace Support Operations Division are expected to brief the Council.
The session is expected to identify challenges faced by mandated, authorized, endorsed and hybrid peace operations in Africa. A wide range of challenges are expected to be addressed including those that are recurring in all forms of operations as well as the ones that are distinct to a specific type of operation. Issues related to leadership, funding, coordination and division of labor, with a particular focus on the relationship between host nations and troop contributing countries are expected to feature in the briefing. The impact of such factors on the sustainability of mandates and their effective operationalization are also expected to be addressed.
The AU has mandated and managed and/or authorized some ten PSOs since its first mission to Burundi. The largest, most deadly and expensive mission of the AU to date is AU Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) since 2007. AU has also authorized and provided political and technical support for the establishment and operationalization of three ad hoc security forces against terrorist groups including the G5 Sahel Joint Force, the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram and the Regional Coordination Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord’s Resistance Army (RCI-LRA) which are all deployed based on the cooperation of affected countries in the respective regions. Moreover, the AU jointly with the United Nations (UN) has managed the AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur for more than a decade (UNAMID).
PSOs in Africa are increasingly tasked with broad and complex mandates including protection of civilians, stabilization, counterterrorism and counterinsurgency and long term post conflict reconstruction operations. The international security system is gradually relying more on the response of the AU and its sub-regional institutions, particularly in the context of high security threats and counter terrorism operations in the continent. This has been largely the case for AMISOM and is central to the mandate of the MNJTF and the G5 Sahel. However, the delivery of these mandates highly depends on the financial and technical partnership of the UN and other multilateral and individual partners. Apart from dependency on such external sources, a major challenge has been the delivery of the logistics and equipment that matches the nature of the activities of the operations and in a timely manner. The protracted nature of the deployment timeline of PSOs is the other factor that is posing challenge in securing sustainable funding. The human and capital cost of such counterterrorism operations is also very high.
Challenges related to resource and funding have mainly contributed to the decision of drawdown and the eventual exit of peacekeeping operations such as UNAMID and AMISOM. Both missions have been in place for more than ten years however the situation on the ground remains volatile and highly insecure. PSC may also address the challenges associated with the exit process particularly in relation to such long standing operations and the kind of vacuum their withdrawal might create. In line with agreed upon timeline UNAMID’s military component will be reduced to 4,050 by 30 June 2019 and AMISOM’s uniformed personnel has already been reduced to 20,626. The unpredictable political and security recent developments in Sudan are likely to have impact on the troop withdrawal. In this regard, a major concern is the serious threat that the security risk that arises from the implementation of the withdrawal of PSOs without the presence of a trained and prepared national force that is able to take effective control. In order to prevent the risks of the reversal of the security gains, there is a need for strengthening national security mechanisms.
In these and other operations, perhaps the most crucial challenge has been the lack of political strategy for addressing the conflict issues. The absence of such strategy means that PSOs are deployed for a prolonged period of time caught up in the protracted task of trying to manage the conflict situation and hence making the planning of their exit difficult.
The other related challenge in various PSOs is the coordination among the various stakeholders involved in the implementation of the missions. There have been disagreements between nations that send troops and those that fund missions. Countries that either contribute troops or whose citizens are directly affected by peacekeeping missions often have limited say in how missions are designed and mandated given that funding and technical support is provided by other countries or partners. The interest and relationship with the host country adds an additional layer of complexity. The same is true of the relationship between the mission leadership and the sector contingents.
The mismatch between the mandate of PSOs and what their capacity and resources also remains a major challenge facing AU mandated and/or authorized missions. The challenge faced particularly by hybrid peacekeeping missions such as UNAMID is related to the asymmetrical relationship between the AU and UN. Although the AU has the political leverage in mobilizing African states for troop contribution and in managing the engagement with the government of Sudan, it however depends entirely on UN budget and resources. Although hybrid missions have deepened UN and regional organization cooperation in peacekeeping operations, in reality however the relationship between the two organizations in managing the mission has not necessarily been even.
The second aspect of tomorrow’s briefing session is expected to focus on providing solutions to the multifaceted challenges faced by the various forms of AU led PSOs. Based on these categorizations and recommendations that will be provided by the MSC and PSOD, the PSC is expected to agree on ways to address challenges faced by the various PSOs. One of the recommendations or area of intervention is expected to address the issues related to prolonged PSOs and on ways to prevent open ended mandates by strategizing on definite exit timeline.
With regards to responding to the financial challenges the launch of the AU Peace Fund in November 2018 which aims at mobilizing 400 million USD by 2021 including for the financing of PSOs is another option that may be explored. So far, around 105 million USD has been mobilized towards the Peace Fund.
The progress that is being made in strengthening Africa’s ownership in PSOs through the reinvigorated Peace Fund may also facilitate the political engagement with UNSC. Particularly in relation to the pending UNSC resolution which establishes that the AU mandated or authorized PSOs should in principle be financed on a case by case basis through UN assessed contributions. In its recent resolution 2457 (2019) the UNSC stated its ‘intention to consider steps that can be taken to enhance practical cooperation with the African Union in the promotion and maintenance of peace and security in Africa in line with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter’. During the briefing Ramtane Lamamra High representative of the AU for Silencing the Guns by 2020 reiterated the importance of UN’s favorable response to the critical and the long-standing calls for the funding of UN assessed contributions to be accessed by AU-led PSOs.
The expected outcome of the session was not known at the time of the production of this Insight. The PSC may however consider to adopt a communiqué that identifies tasks and responsibilities for addressing the challenges that AU PSOs face and assigns the AU Commission to develop action plan for a coordinated and sustained effort for addressing the challenges. In the communiqué, the PSC may request for AU Commission reports on current missions to include analysis of the steps taken both at the strategic and operational levels to address the forgoing challenges as they relate to the specific missions. It is also expected that the outcome of the session will provide key recommendations based on the experiences and lessons learnt from past and ongoing PSOs.
Report on the challenges faced by AU led Peace Support Operations
Amani Africa
Date | 23 May, 2019
Tomorrow (May 23) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to consider the African Union Commission’s report on the challenges faced by AU led Peace Support Operations (PSOs) and on mechanisms to address them. The military staff committee and the Peace Support Operations Division are expected to brief the Council.
The session is expected to identify challenges faced by mandated, authorized, endorsed and hybrid peace operations in Africa. A wide range of challenges are expected to be addressed including those that are recurring in all forms of operations as well as the ones that are distinct to a specific type of operation. Issues related to leadership, funding, coordination and division of labor, with a particular focus on the relationship between host nations and troop contributing countries are expected to feature in the briefing. The impact of such factors on the sustainability of mandates and their effective operationalization are also expected to be addressed.
The AU has mandated and managed and/or authorized some ten PSOs since its first mission to Burundi. The largest, most deadly and expensive mission of the AU to date is AU Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) since 2007. AU has also authorized and provided political and technical support for the establishment and operationalization of three ad hoc security forces against terrorist groups including the G5 Sahel Joint Force, the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram and the Regional Coordination Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord’s Resistance Army (RCI-LRA) which are all deployed based on the cooperation of affected countries in the respective regions. Moreover, the AU jointly with the United Nations (UN) has managed the AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur for more than a decade (UNAMID).
PSOs in Africa are increasingly tasked with broad and complex mandates including protection of civilians, stabilization, counterterrorism and counterinsurgency and long term post conflict reconstruction operations. The international security system is gradually relying more on the response of the AU and its sub-regional institutions, particularly in the context of high security threats and counter terrorism operations in the continent. This has been largely the case for AMISOM and is central to the mandate of the MNJTF and the G5 Sahel. However, the delivery of these mandates highly depends on the financial and technical partnership of the UN and other multilateral and individual partners. Apart from dependency on such external sources, a major challenge has been the delivery of the logistics and equipment that matches the nature of the activities of the operations and in a timely manner. The protracted nature of the deployment timeline of PSOs is the other factor that is posing challenge in securing sustainable funding. The human and capital cost of such counterterrorism operations is also very high.
Challenges related to resource and funding have mainly contributed to the decision of drawdown and the eventual exit of peacekeeping operations such as UNAMID and AMISOM. Both missions have been in place for more than ten years however the situation on the ground remains volatile and highly insecure. PSC may also address the challenges associated with the exit process particularly in relation to such long standing operations and the kind of vacuum their withdrawal might create. In line with agreed upon timeline UNAMID’s military component will be reduced to 4,050 by 30 June 2019 and AMISOM’s uniformed personnel has already been reduced to 20,626. The unpredictable political and security recent developments in Sudan are likely to have impact on the troop withdrawal. In this regard, a major concern is the serious threat that the security risk that arises from the implementation of the withdrawal of PSOs without the presence of a trained and prepared national force that is able to take effective control. In order to prevent the risks of the reversal of the security gains, there is a need for strengthening national security mechanisms.
In these and other operations, perhaps the most crucial challenge has been the lack of political strategy for addressing the conflict issues. The absence of such strategy means that PSOs are deployed for a prolonged period of time caught up in the protracted task of trying to manage the conflict situation and hence making the planning of their exit difficult.
The other related challenge in various PSOs is the coordination among the various stakeholders involved in the implementation of the missions. There have been disagreements between nations that send troops and those that fund missions. Countries that either contribute troops or whose citizens are directly affected by peacekeeping missions often have limited say in how missions are designed and mandated given that funding and technical support is provided by other countries or partners. The interest and relationship with the host country adds an additional layer of complexity. The same is true of the relationship between the mission leadership and the sector contingents.
The mismatch between the mandate of PSOs and what their capacity and resources also remains a major challenge facing AU mandated and/or authorized missions. The challenge faced particularly by hybrid peacekeeping missions such as UNAMID is related to the asymmetrical relationship between the AU and UN. Although the AU has the political leverage in mobilizing African states for troop contribution and in managing the engagement with the government of Sudan, it however depends entirely on UN budget and resources. Although hybrid missions have deepened UN and regional organization cooperation in peacekeeping operations, in reality however the relationship between the two organizations in managing the mission has not necessarily been even.
The second aspect of tomorrow’s briefing session is expected to focus on providing solutions to the multifaceted challenges faced by the various forms of AU led PSOs. Based on these categorizations and recommendations that will be provided by the MSC and PSOD, the PSC is expected to agree on ways to address challenges faced by the various PSOs. One of the recommendations or area of intervention is expected to address the issues related to prolonged PSOs and on ways to prevent open ended mandates by strategizing on definite exit timeline.
With regards to responding to the financial challenges the launch of the AU Peace Fund in November 2018 which aims at mobilizing 400 million USD by 2021 including for the financing of PSOs is another option that may be explored. So far, around 105 million USD has been mobilized towards the Peace Fund.
The progress that is being made in strengthening Africa’s ownership in PSOs through the reinvigorated Peace Fund may also facilitate the political engagement with UNSC. Particularly in relation to the pending UNSC resolution which establishes that the AU mandated or authorized PSOs should in principle be financed on a case by case basis through UN assessed contributions. In its recent resolution 2457 (2019) the UNSC stated its ‘intention to consider steps that can be taken to enhance practical cooperation with the African Union in the promotion and maintenance of peace and security in Africa in line with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter’. During the briefing Ramtane Lamamra High representative of the AU for Silencing the Guns by 2020 reiterated the importance of UN’s favorable response to the critical and the long-standing calls for the funding of UN assessed contributions to be accessed by AU-led PSOs.
The expected outcome of the session was not known at the time of the production of this Insight. The PSC may however consider to adopt a communiqué that identifies tasks and responsibilities for addressing the challenges that AU PSOs face and assigns the AU Commission to develop action plan for a coordinated and sustained effort for addressing the challenges. In the communiqué, the PSC may request for AU Commission reports on current missions to include analysis of the steps taken both at the strategic and operational levels to address the forgoing challenges as they relate to the specific missions. It is also expected that the outcome of the session will provide key recommendations based on the experiences and lessons learnt from past and ongoing PSOs.
Mitigating the threat of Cyber Security to Peace and Security in Africa
Amani Africa
Date | 19 May, 2019
Tomorrow (20 May), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to hold a session on cyber security as one of the emerging threats to peace and security in Africa. The Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA) and the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) are expected to brief the Council. The Directorate of Information and Communication and the Department of Infrastructure and Energy of the African Union Commission (AUC) may also deliver statements.
The main objective of the session is to highlight the threats associated with the expanding use by government agencies, businesses, individuals and other sectors of society of information and communication technologies (ICT). The growth of ICT has enhanced interconnectedness, e-commerce, efficient delivery of services and information sharing. However, this development was also accompanied by the threat of cybercrime which has brought about a number of private and public security challenges. The increased use of ICT by state and non-state actors for undertaking a wide range of economic, social and private activities has heightened cyber risks and vulnerabilities. As a result, government agencies, businesses, individuals, financial institutions and critical facilities operating on the basis of ICT continue to be exposed to cyber crimes and attacks. These threats also pose great risk to national, regional and international peace and security.
Thus while acknowledging the critical importance of ICT, the session will also look into the challenges of how weak networks and information security systems and lack of effective regulation and preparedness have exposed the countries of the continent to cyber security threats.
Although cyber crime is a global concern, African countries like many parts of the developing world, remain particularly vulnerable. Despite the growth of the ICT sector in Africa and increasing dependence of various sectors of African economies and increasing number of people, the readiness and possession of the required technology and know-how for addressing cyber security threats remains weak. There is no adequate awareness and appreciation of the scope and forms of vulnerabilities and the nature, manifestations and sophistication of cyber crimes. Additionally, many countries in Africa do not possess specific cyber legislation and this has made the countries vulnerable to cybercriminals.
Moreover, even already existing cyber laws are not strictly implemented and enforced and there is a general lack of awareness about cyber security measures which all have created the space for cyber crime in the continent. With limited resources most African countries would struggle to effectively tackle cyber crime.
Tomorrow’s session envisages to examine the state of the current legal regime for dealing with cyber security at the regional level and articulate mechanisms and actions through which the nature of this emerging threat is adequately identified and it can effectively be addressed. At the continental level the AU has adopted the African Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection in 2014 at the 23rd AU Summit. The Convention is a broad framework that offers clear guidelines and principles on the management of electronic transactions, on safety systems of personal data and measures to promote cyber security. However, the Convention has not yet entered into force. To date only thirteen countries have signed and four have ratified. As a way of enhancing the digital governance structure the session may call for renewed commitments in ratifying and implementing the provision of the continental legal instrument. The Convention itself tasked the AUC Chairperson to establish a monitoring mechanism that encourages the implementation of cyber security measures, collects and shares information, offers advice to member states and regularly report to the decision making organs of the AU on the implementation of the Convention. The Council may also follow up on the steps taken by the AUC as per the responsibilities articulated in the Convention.
In 2018 the Executive Council endorsed the decision of the Specialized Technical Committee (STC) on Communication and ICT to establish an Africa Cyber Security Collaboration and Coordination committee. The committee which is also known as the AU Cyber Security Expert Group (AUCSEG) has the central role of advising and providing guidance to decision makers on cyber security policies and strategies. The AUCSEG is also expected to facilitate information sharing and cooperation among AU member states. The session may review if steps have been taken to the operationalization of AUCSEG and other related activities.
Despite the steps taken at the continental level, the level of readiness do not match the multifaceted threat of cybercrime. One of the characteristic features of the cyber space is that individuals and groups with expertise in ICT can use it for organizing, mobilizing, or perpetrating criminal acts ranging from identity theft to using malware for attacking businesses and government agencies. Apart from how the internet has been used by groups such as Al Shabaab and Boko Haram for recruiting and mobilizing funds, the cyber space has become a site for circulating false information and inciting division and violence. In this context, the 812th session of the PSC stressed ‘the need to counter the use of ICT technologies by terrorist groups, whether in their fundraising, narrative promotion, and recruitment of others to commit terrorist acts’.
As part of the efforts towards mitigating cyber threats, the PSC may recall its previous 627th session which put forward concrete measures to respond to the challenge. It urged member states to develop national cyber security legislations and to create national and regional computer emergency response teams (CERT) and/or computer security incident response teams (CSIRT).It also supported the creation of a special unit within the Peace and Security Department (PSD), which will be exclusively dedicated to the efforts of prevention and mitigating cybercrime at continental level in close partnership with member states. PSC members may inquire on the progress of such initiatives.
The 749th meeting, held on 27 January 2018, at the level of Heads of State and Government, on the theme: “Towards a Comprehensive Approach to Combating the Transnational Threat of Terrorism in Africa” has similarly welcomed and recalled the need to organize an African Dialogue aiming at combating terrorism online and securing cyberspace. Given that cyber security concerns are broader than national boundaries it is necessary to put in place such kinds of robust and collective defensive cyber mechanisms. It is held that such a dialogue affords an opportunity for facilitating coordination among national and regional CERTs may also play a critical role in creating a continent wide security system. African Dialogue may also serve as a key tool to raise awareness on the threats associated with the use of ICT and on mitigation mechanisms. The PSC may thus wish to request an update on this initiative.
While it is clear from the foregoing that various AU bodies have been seized with the issue of cyber security and they proposed initiatives, their engagement and initiatives lack a common organizing strategy. Beyond and above reviewing the status of the various initiatives, it would be of interest to PSC members to review whether the different initiatives are complementary and the steps required for having a common strategy that ties them all together towards a set of shared objectives leading to a cyber governance and security architecture, anchored on partnership with other regions and international organizations. Also of interest to member states is to identify how to leverage the role of Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms and AU’s partnerships with the UN and the EU. Additionally, in the light of the legal measures adopted by the EU on data protection, the PSC may review the effectiveness of the personal data protection provisions of the 2014 AU Convention and the implications, if any, of the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).
The expected outcome of the session is a press statement. Previous Executive Council, STC and PSC decisions have already laid out the relevant steps in setting up continental mechanisms and this particular session may provide more guidance on their operationalization and coordination. PSC may wish to offer guidance on ways to spearhead the accelerated ratification of the 2014 Convention on Cyber Security, and more particularly follow up on the work of AUCSEG and its harmonization with the specialized unit within PSD and other relevant AUC departments and organs. Given that cyber security systems require specialized expertise and resources as well as partnerships, the PSC may also put forward recommendations on ways to enhance the capacity of member states and the role of the AU in leveraging their efforts and its partnerships with African and international actors for collective action.
Mitigating the threat of Health epidemics to Peace and Security in Africa
Amani Africa
Date | 16 May, 2019
Tomorrow (May 16), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to hold it 850th meeting on mitigating the threat of health epidemics to peace and security in Africa with a particular focus on Ebola. The Africa Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) is expected to brief the Council. The World Health Organization (WHO) is also expected to make an intervention. Apart from Hope Tmukunde Gasura, Ambassador of Rwanda and Chair of the PSC, who will be delivering the opening statement, representatives of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and United Nations Office to the AU (UNOAU) are also expected to deliver a statement.
In the briefing the CDC is expected to provide update on its work since its establishment in 2017 and the challenges it faced. This presents an opportunity for reviewing progress made through CDC in putting in place a framework for prevention of and responding to epidemics. It is to be recalled that at its 511th session, the PSC requested the AU Commission to review the AU Humanitarian Policy Framework with a view to developing a comprehensive disaster management protocol and filling all existing gaps in the coordination of the Commission’s responses to disasters and emergencies consistent with Article 15 of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council and other relevant AU instruments’. This raises questions about the relationship between CDC and the AU Humanitarian Framework.
In terms of current issues, the briefing will be mainly focusing on the most recent Ebola virus outbreak in the North Eastern part of the DRC and the volatile security situation in the region.
On 1 August 2018, the Ministry of Health of the DRC declared a new outbreak of Ebola virus disease in North Kivu Province. As of 7 May, a total of 1600 confirmed and probable Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) cases have been reported, of which 1069 have died. This is the tenth Ebola outbreak in DRC and the second largest outbreak recorded of Ebola after the 2014 epidemic in West Africa which killed more than 10,000 people in Sierra Leone, Guinea and Liberia.
The outbreak has mainly affected North Kivu and Ituri provinces. The role of CDC and how it worked with others such as the WHO in the efforts for containing the Ebola outbreak is one of the issues of interest for PSC members. Perhaps a pressing issue that the areas of the DRC affected by the outbreak have given rise to is the interface between control of the outbreak of an epidemic like Ebola and the security situation.
Unlike the Ebola outbreak in west Africa, the efforts for controlling the outbreak in the DRC faced two major security challenges. The first is the fact that the affected provinces are conflict areas, where armed conflicts and violence are obstructing the provision and access to public health services. In some instances Ebola response activities have been suspended. The security factors have also increased the risks of disease spread both within DRC and to neighboring countries, although the epidemic hasn’t crossed borders yet. Second is the direct attack against responders to the crisis. Armed groups have deliberately targeted Ebola Treatment Units (ETU) and health care workers. Since the beginning of the year alone three ETUs in Butembo and Katwa have been burnt down and health facilities and equipments have been destroyed. A WHO epidemiologist has been killed in Katwa and beginning of this month Mai-Mai militia groups have attacked an ETU in Butembo. Both towns of Butembo and Katwa which are the Ebola hotspots continue to be severely affected by persistent infection.
WHO records show that beyond Katwa and Butembo, EVD transmission is highly intensified in Mandima, Mabalako, Musienene, Beni and Kalunguta hotspots, which collectively account for the vast majority (93%) of the 303 cases reported almost within the last month.
The compounded effects of the deteriorating security situation, fear and mistrust among communities towards aid agencies and workers have also severely hampered the response process. This has also resulted in the very low number of families reporting their symptoms to health officers. In this regard the newly elected president Felix Tshisekedi addressed the challenges that emanated from suspicion and rumors and urged population to cooperate more with following instructions. It also called on armed groups to surrender through disarmament programs.
This will be the first time since the outbreak, for the PSC to hold a session dedicated specifically to the epidemic and the security situation. When the PSC met last time at its 808thsession that took place in November 2018, it called for a regional response. The Council urged ‘the political, military and health authorities of the DRC, Uganda and Rwanda to enhance their cooperation to contain the epidemic’. It further requested the Chairperson of the AUC in consultation with MONUSCO and WHO, to provide substance to the regional strategy. During this meeting the PSC may recall this previous decision and follow up on progress.
The UNSC 2439 (2019) resolution, although it condemned the killing of health workers and called for cessation of hostilities, the violence has worsened since. Despite the presence of United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) the security incidents have escalated. This is partially given that MONUSCO is limited to provide support within its area of operations which are more related to traditional peacekeeping operations. Although the resolution recognizes the leadership of WHO in this context, the deteriorating security situation requires a more robust protection response for of health workers and communities.
Moreover WHO has stated that only 74 million USD has been received from the total required amount of 148 million USD. However, without stability and security, it’s unlikely that the international community provides additional resources or experts to the affected areas. The lack of commitment from all belligerent groups to cease attacks poses high risk in the fights against EVD outbreak and in effectively containing it in North Kivu and Ituri provinces. Despite these challenges and risks however the WHO has announced that the Ebola outbreak in DRC is not yet a global public health emergency.
The high rates of population movement taking place from the EVD outbreak affected areas to other parts of the country and across fluid borders to neighboring countries particularly during periods of heightened insecurity further elevates the risks of spread. DRC shares borders with multiple countries in the various regions of the continent including with countries that are experiencing political instability and that do not possess a robust health care system. This puts an already vulnerable large group of population into further exposure to health hazards.
In light of this context, the briefing is expected to provide an overview of the existing security challenges in responding to the epidemic. The multiple security hurdles which continue to inhibit access to EVD affected communities and the provision of treatment will be highlighted. By shedding light on the magnitude of the potential risks if operations continue to be hampered, the briefing may also put forward a set of recommendations on ways to enhance response. Through the PSC, presenters may call on the various actors to elevate security and protection measures and for further attention by actors at the national, regional and global levels.
The expected outcome of the session at the production of this Insight was not known. However the PSC may issue a communiqué that calls on the immediate cessation of hostilities and for a strengthened protection for health workers and treatment centers. It may call on the international community to provide the necessary resources and support in fighting the epidemic. Also important is for the PSC to receive a report on how the prevention of and effective response to epidemics is integrated into the African Peace and Security Architecture and the mandate of the AU Humanitarian Agency.
