Open session on international and regional initiatives in the Sahel Region
Amani Africa
Date | 17 December, 2018
Tomorrow (17 December) the Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to convene the only open session of the month. The session is to be held under the theme ‘International and Regional Initiatives in the Sahel Region: Promotion of Coordination and African Ownership for Peace, Security and Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development.’
The AU High Representative for Mali and the Sahel and Head of the African Union Mission for Mali and the Sahel (MISAHEL), Pierre Buyoya is expected to brief the Council. The UN Special Advisor for the Sahel, Ibrahim Thiaw, is also expected to brief the session. Representatives of the G5 Sahel including member countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger), other regional organizations notably Economic Community of West African States and the Economic Community of Central African states and the European Union (EU) and individual countries with Sahel strategy are also expected to participate in the session.
As pointed out in the background note for the session, the complex crises in the Sahel have engaged the attention and interest of large number of actors. The regional and international engagement is thus characterized by the multiplicity of actors involved and proliferation of initiatives and strategies.
In the security realm, the initiatives include the UN Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), the G5 Sahel Force, the AU’s political mission MISAHEL, three missions of the EU and the French regional operation Barkhane. The questions raised in the background note in respect of these initiatives include: ‘To what extent do international security initiatives, which include MINUSMA, the French Barkhane Force, as well as the different forms of support from the EU and its individual Member States, take into account the ongoing regional initiatives in the area of security? Do the coordination and consultation mechanisms put in place produce the expected results? What is the level of articulation between the efforts in the field of security in the Sahel, in general and those made for the implementation of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, signed in 2015, knowing that the Mali is the epicentre of the current crisis and the implementation of the Agreement is the best way to isolate armed terrorist groups?’
These questions clearly manifest concerns about duplication and tendencies of competing approaches in terms of focus and target groups and importantly about how priorities are set and by whom. There are also questions about how these various initiatives affect not only local and regional processes, notably the 2015 peace agreement of Mali and G5 Sahel, but also the operationalization of the APSA in the Sahel region. It is also to be recalled that concerns over the militarization of the Sahel region have been raised in various PSC session in the course of 2018. The briefings from Buyoya and statements from representatives of the G5 Sahel are expected to highlight these issues from the experiences in the implementation of these various security initiatives and the lessons from existing arrangements for coordination including the Ministerial Coordination Platform (MCP) for the Sahel Strategies of the countries of the region.
In the context of the discussion about the impact of diverse initiatives, an issue that deserves attention during tomorrow’s session is the state of operationalization of the G5 Sahel joint Task Force. Despite the initial plan to be fully operational in March 2018, and the second deadline of May 2018, the force still faces serious logistical, staffing, training, financial and constraints. The first two of the three military operations undertaken by the regional task force so were conducted with the support of the 4,000 French counterterrorism forces. The 29 June 2018 attack on the headquarters of the force triggering exchange of gunfire that lasted for hours raised serious questions on its autonomy, operational capacity and effectiveness.
The issues afflicting the G5 Task Force are associated with the funding of the Force. The Task Force is dependent on pledges and donations from individual countries. There are uncertainties on the long-term funding for the force, and it only received less than one fourth of the 420 million euros pledged by the international community at the fundraising event held at the start of 2018. In an attempt to address these challenges of predictability and sustainability of funding, the G5 countries and the AU have been seeking to secure a UN Chapter VII mandate and a support package akin to that offered to the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) based on UN assessed contributions.
The chairman of the G5 Sahel Group of Countries, President Mahamadou Issoufou of Niger, previously announced that the group would pursue direct funding from the United Nations under Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter. This is another issue expected to feature in tomorrow’s session. It is thus noted in the background note that the AU ‘continues to plead for the G5 Sahel Joint Force to operate under Chapter VII of the Charter and to receive funding from the assessed contributions of the United Nations budget.’
In the meantime, it is anticipated that, apart from updating the Council on the current political and security issues in the region and how MUNISMA’s efforts to address this issues, Thiaw would inform the PSC how MUNISMA is coordinating with and supporting the G5 Sahel Force.
The challenges facing the Sahel region are multiple and go beyond the realm of security. They cover state weakness involving poor capacity and level of control of its territory, ecological degradation, underdevelopment, and bad governance. In an attempt to address these plethora of political, climatic, developmental and security challenges, the various actors engaged in the Sahel region have adopted their own respective strategies. It is pointed out in the background note that ‘there are no less than fifteen Regional and International strategies and initiatives in support of the Sahel Region.’
One study undertaken in 2015 identified 14 major multilateral strategies and several other regional and individual country strategies and initiatives. Clearly, the Sahelian strategic landscape has become crowded. While the strategies converge in terms of the issues they seek to address and their objectives, they also differ in terms of geographical scope of application, focus areas and financing regimes. Thiaw is expected to update the PSC on the implementation of the UN strategy and how it interfaces with the regional strategies and efforts.
These numerous strategies by various actors with differing expertise and mandate raise questions similar to those relating to the security sphere noted above. One platform tracking strategies in the Sahel region pointed out the large number of strategies raise ‘questions about their relevance, their consideration for each other and their usefulness’. It is also noted in the background note for tomorrow’s session that the ‘concern about coordination also led some development partners such as Germany, France, the World Bank, the European Union, and others to establish the “Sahel Alliance” to support, particularly, the G5 Sahel, with a view to promoting coherence and pooling of resources.’
After several years of implementation, the fundamental question is whether the large number of strategies is making a difference in the conditions in the Sahel. The socio-economic, governance, security and humanitarian conditions of the region remain dire. These conditions are characterized by the presence of armed terrorist groups and allied networks of increasingly militarized transnational organised crime involving traffickers and smugglers, covering the Central part of Mali, Northern and the North East of Burkina Faso and the border between Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. It is to be recalled that on 2 July 2018 on the sidelines of the AU summit in Nouakchott, Mauritania, the Presidents of the member states of the G5 Sahel and the President of France held a meeting. It was agreed that the G5 Sahel would seek Chapter VII authorization for the G5 Sahel military operation from the UN Security Council. As a follow up to that meeting earlier this month on 6 December, a coordination conference of G5 Sahel partners and funders for the financing of the Priority Investment Program (PIP) of the Sahel region was held in Nouakchott. Developed as part of the G5 Sahel development and security strategy adopted by the leaders of the member states in 2016, the PIP is a three- year (2019-2021) program with a reported portfolio of 40 projects and with a budget of Euro 1.9 billion.
The background note indicates that the session has two objectives. These are a) to identify and evaluate the initiatives taken so far to ensure effective coordination of peace and Post-conflict Reconstruction Strategies in the Sahel Region and b) to explore, on the basis of this assessment, ways and means of improving the articulation of initiatives and strategies for the Sahel, founded on a division of labour, based on the comparative advantages of the actors. The expected outcome is a communiqué.
In the light of the issues highlighted above, various approaches may be taken for meeting the objectives of the open session. In terms of coordination, one approach could be to focus on reinvigorating the Ministerial Coordination Platform (MCP) for the Sahel Strategies with appropriately structured mechanism and measures, and working in concert with the ‘Sahel Alliance’, for ensuring a coordinated delivery on the priorities that the countries of the region, in collaboration with partners, have set.
Given the governance and development focus of the PIP, an approach related to the above could be to align the focus and resources of the various strategies around the PIP, with different actors taking responsibility for the areas on which they have comparative advantages.
In terms of addressing pressing concerns particularly in the security realm, one approach to realize the objectives of the session is to focus on how effectively the various actors and strategies can be mobilized a) for achieving the implementation of the 2015 peace agreement of Mali and b) for addressing the challenges facing the full operationalization of the G5 Sahel Task Force and its alignment with governance and development imperatives.
Another outcome area of the session is to contribute to the decision of the PSC’s 782nd meeting at ministerial level held in Nouakchott. That meeting requested the AU Commission to take the necessary measures to facilitate the review of the AU Sahel Strategy with a view to not only adapting it to the new political, institutional and security context of the Region, but also strengthening the coordination and cooperation between the various actors in the Sahel.
Briefing on the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF)
Amani Africa
Date | 5 December, 2018
Tomorrow (5 December) the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU) will receive the Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on the situation in the Lake Chad Basin and on the renewal of the mandate of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). The PSD is expected to make a statement introducing the report. The representatives of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) and representative of the troop contributing countries (TCC) of the MNJTF Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria and Benin are expected to participate.
The session will examine the security situation and operational capabilities and future mandates of the task force, which the PSC has described at its 702nd meeting held on 19 July 2017 as ‘a reference model of multinational cooperation that could serve positively other regions in Africa and beyond to address similar security challenges’. The session also presents an opportunity for the PSC to be updated about the regional strategy for the stabilization, recovery and resilience of the Boko Haram affected areas of the Lake Chad Basin region jointly developed by the AU and the LCBC.
There have been significant developments in the situation in the Boko Haram affected areas since the PSC renewed the mandate of the MNJTF at its 738th meeting held on 7 December 2017. The briefing is happening against the backdrop of rise in Boko Haram attempts at orchestrating attacks.
The past years saw significant reduction in the capabilities and territorial scope of Boko Haram operations following series of coordinated military campaigns by the MNJTF and the security forces of the individual members of the LCBC. The campaigns degraded the military capacity of the group, weakened its economic and recruitment base and pushed it out from its strongholds. Boko Haram was forced to abandon its seizure of territories.
Yet, as the Chairperson’s report notes Boko Haram remains a serious threat. Operating in a decentralized arrangement based on semi- autonomous groups, it has resorted to relying heavily on asymmetric guerilla and suicide attacks on isolated locations, soft civilian targets like markets, religious spaces and public gatherings.
Additionally, over the past months an upward trend in the activity of the terrorist group has been observed. There were more than 17 attempts by the group to overrun army bases since July 2018, and on 29 November 2018, the Nigerian army announced recent attacks by the Boko Haram killed 39 soldiers in northeast Nigeria. According to the statement of the Nigerian army reased use of drones ‘in the last two to three months, we have noticed daring moves by the terrorists, (involving) increased use of drones against our defensive positions and infusion of foreign fighters in their ranks.’
These dangerous developments prompted President Muhammadu Buhari, Chairperson of the Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), to convene meeting of the LCBC on 29 November at the headquarters of the LCBC in N’djamena, Chad. The meeting examined measures to enhance the capacity of the MNJTF to address the recent setbacks, and permanently neutralize the notorious group.
The report will also examine the progress made in the implementation of the Renewed Support Implementation Agreement (SIA) and the Memorandum of Understanding between the AU Commission and the MNJTF TCCs for streamlining the AU additional support to MNJTF and the renewed Concept of Operations (CONOPs). At it’s meeting on 7 December 2017, the PSC requested the commission to assist the MJNTF to fill its capability gaps. Tomorrow’s meeting will provide update on the efforts of the AUC to support the MNJTF in filling some of the gaps in its capabilities. In this respect, attention would be drawn to the delivery of various materials including level III medical services and financial contribution for implementing quick impact projects. Other challenges include the use and implementation of effective strategy for promoting surrender of Boko Haram fighters and for the handling of surrendered and/or captured Boko Haram fighters.
In the light of the rise in the threat from Boko Haram activities and as a follow up to the LCBC summit, tomorrow’s session will review the challenges facing the MNJTF. In this respect, the persisting gaps in the capability of the MNJTF as highlighted in the Chairperson’s report will receive particular attention. These gaps include lack of Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) equipment, lack of effective and robust communication strategy, and lack of more robust maritime capabilities to enhance MNJTF mobile operations in and around the Lake Chad.
Although not the main focus of the report, reference is made to the dire humanitarian situation in Boko Haram affected areas. As noted in the report, over 20 million people in the affected areas are exposed to acute need of humanitarian assistance. Of these 2.4 million people consisting of IDPs, refugees and returnees, all with about 490,000 children, are under threat of severe malnutrition. Continued attacks by the terrorist group have resulted in additional displacements, further exacerbating an already dire situation.
Also of note is the impact of the terrorist group Boko Haram on women and girls. They have been disproportionately affected having been been used as suicide bombers, subjected to forced marriage and sexually exploited among the 2.4 displaced persons. After they freed or escaping from Boko Haram, returnees often face stigmatisation.
The issue of the Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) efforts in the areas affected by and liberated from the Boko Haram will be one of the top issues in tomorrow’s briefing. Restoring the security, livelihood and social fabric of the millions displaced by the activities of Boko Haram and the campaigns against it will need huge resources and political commitment from the countries of the region and the international community. With the AU led Regional Strategy for the Stabilization, Recovery and Resilience of the Boko Haram-affected areas of the Lake Chad Basin, which was adopted by the Council of Ministers of the LCBC on 30 August 2018, the session can use the Strategy as a useful framework for disbursing the 672 million dollars pledged by donors for emergency assistance and reconstruction at the Oslo Humanitarian Conference on Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin region held almost two years ago.
The expected outcome of the briefing is a communiqué. Apart from renewing the mandate of the MNJTF for a period of 12 months effective 31 January 2019, the communiqué may call for the mobilization of all recovery and reconstruction efforts to be mobilized within the framework of the same strategy as has been adopted by the members of the LCBC. It could also address the need for developing workable approach to address the existing gaps in the capability of and in the pursuit of legally sound strategy by the MNJTF including in terms of the handling of surrendered or captured Boko Haram. With respect to the humanitarian situation, the PSC could also consider establishing an expert group that can propose ways and means of effectively operationalizing its mandate in respect to humanitarian action with particular attention to the situation in Boko Haram affected areas.
Briefing on Elections in Africa
Amani Africa
Date | 04 December, 2018
Tomorrow (4 December 2018) the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) will hold a briefing session on elections in Africa. It is expected that the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Minata Samate Cessouma, will present a briefing to the PSC. The Department of Peace and Security (PSD) is also expected to make a statement.
As highlighted in the program of the month, this is a quarterly briefing. While the practice of providing briefings on elections in Africa can be traced back to the Report of the Panel of the Wise entitled ‘Election-related disputes and political violence’ and the 392nd meeting of the PSC, it was at its 424th meeting that the PSC decided to have a briefing from the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) on elections in Africa on a quarterly basis.
The last time the PSC held this session was at its 747th meeting held on 18 January 2018.
Tomorrow’s briefing is expected to offer a review of the elections held on the continent between January and November 2018. The elections expected to receive attention within this context include those held in Cameroon, eSwatini, Gabon, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Rwanda, Soa Tome and Principe and Zimbabwe. Of particular interest would be the trend that the briefing is expected to highlight in terms of not only good practice and challenges observed in conducting elections but also in terms of the monitoring of elections. This may include reference to ‘any cases of election malpractices and shortcomings’ that the communiqué of the 747th meeting of the PSC required AU Electoral Observation Mission reports to highlight for future lessons.
While some of these elections continue to reflect continuing challenges relating to credibility of elections and confidence of parties in electoral bodies, others such as Madagascar show the importance of regional and continental engagement for addressing disputes relating to the electoral process. In terms of positive developments, the peaceful transfer of power from an incumbent party to a previously opposition party through election witnessed in Sierra Leone is expected to be highlighted as being exemplary. In countries with conflicts such as Mali and Cameroon, a major issue of interest is the implication of conflicts on electoral processes.
In terms of the role of this briefing session to provide early warning on election related disputes, the upcoming elections that the briefing is expected to highlight would in particular be crucial. In this respect, the run-off presidential election in Madagascar is expected to be a major test in terms of peaceful transition of power for a country that remains under the shadow of the political crisis resulting from the 2009 unconstitutional change of government. It is to be recalled that the PSC held a session on the situation in Madagascar on 18 November. With the major actors of the 2009 crisis Marc Ravalomanana and Andry Rajoelina, facing off in the run-off election, the bitter rivalry between the two have made the stakes in the run-off election higher than the first round of elections.
Another election that will receive the attention of the PSC is the presidential election expected to take place in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The issues relating to the election planned to take place on 23 December, including its timely convening as per the electoral calendar of 5 November 2017, have been subject of deliberation at the 808th session of the PSC held on 19 November. From the perspective of tomorrow’s briefing, what is of interest is an update from the DPA on the request of the PSC’s communiqué from its 808th session for the AU Commission (AUC) ‘to take all necessary measures for to dispatch an electoral observation mission, commensurate with the issues at stake in these elections.’
In terms of the elections expected to take place in the first quarter of 2019, the briefing is expected to cover the general elections in Nigeria, the presidential elections in Senegal and legislative elections in Benin. In respect of these elections, it would be of interest for PSC members to know about how the AUC plans to engage not only in terms of deployment of election assessment and observation missions but also in terms of identifying risks of electoral tensions.
From a perspective of the practice and methodology of election observation, it would be of interest for the PSC to get update on developments relating to the need that various PSC outcome documents including the communiqué of its 747th session indicated in terms of enhancing the African Union Election Observation methodology, reporting and coordination mechanisms with other relevant international missions. This includes the coordination with electoral observation missions of regional bodies.
The outcome of the session is expected to address the various issues arising from the briefing. It would, among others, highlight the continuing importance of elections in the democratization process of the continent, the need for improving the quality of elections including through ensuring the independent functioning of electoral management bodies and even playing field, and the importance of resolving existing crisis and conflicts as necessary condition for inclusive and credible elections. Enhancing the role of this briefing to map electoral risks for providing early warning to the PSC highlighting the measures that the AU could take for mitigating the risks through joint work of DPA and PSD would be of particular importance for the work of the PSC. To this end, the outcome could highlight the importance of holding the quarterly briefing timeously.
Briefing on Sustainable financing of African Peace & Security Agenda under the UN Charter
Amani Africa
Date |03 December, 2018
Tomorrow (3 December 2018) the Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to hold a briefing session on sustainable financing for African Peace and Security Agenda in the context of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. It is expected that Woinshet Tadesse, Ethiopia’s Permanent Representative to the African Union (AU), will provide the briefing to the PSC representing members of the African 3 members (A3) of the UN Security Council (UNSC).
The focus of tomorrow’s session is expected to be the draft resolution on financing of AU led or mandated peace support operations authorized by the UNSC that has been under negotiation in the UNSC. While major progress has been achieved in the quality of partnership, the issue of predictable and sustainable financing of AU peace support operations has remained a major area of disagreement. At the 18 July briefing at the UNSC, Smail Chergui, AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, observed that the AU has consistently advocated for more predictable and sustainable funding for AU peace operations through UN assessed contributions.
In the briefing, the A3 are expected to inform the PSC the efforts they have made in championing the longstanding demand of the AU for predictable funding to AU led peace support operations authorized by the UNSC including through the use of the UN assessed contributions. This is in line with the PSC communiqué of 30 May 2017 which underlined the critical role of the A3 in advancing AU Peace and Security Agenda at the UN level, in particular with regard to reaching a substantive resolution on the use of UN assessed contributions to support AU mandated or authorised PSOs.
Initiated by the A3, the draft resolution, if adopted, is meant to establish the principle that AU mandated or authorized PSOs authorized by the UN Security Council should be financed through UN assessed contributions, with decisions on the financing of specific missions to be taken on a case-by-case basis. As Côte d’Ivoire’s permanent representative to the UN noted in the UNSC session in July, the draft resolution ‘does not trigger the immediate provision of funding, but rather provides a framework for the Council’s assessment … for consideration on a case-by-case basis’. The briefing affords PSC members to discuss where the negotiations in the UNSC over this draft resolution stand.
When the PSC adopted its communiqué of 30 May 2017, there were two requirements of UNSC Resolution 2320 (2016) for the fulfillment of which the AU was tasked to take appropriate measures. The first was the implementation of the Peace Fund. The Second was the establishment of the relevant framework for ensuring compliance by AU PSOs with international humanitarian law and human rights law. In terms of the effort to secure the adoption of the draft resolution when it is tabled before the UNSC this month, this session offers an opportunity for the PSC to review the progress made in fulfilling these requirements. This is an area on which the Department of Peace and Security provides update to the PSC.
With respect to the Peace Fund, the AU has achieved the target that was set in PSC communiqué of 30 May 2017. With $65 million collected, the Peace Fund is on target to meet its funding target from the contribution of AU member states projected to reach 100 million in early 2019. The Peace Fund was officially launched at the 11th Extraordinary Session on 17 November 2018 and the members of the Board of Trustees representing the 5 AU Regions have also been appointed. This governance body was expanded to include representation of the UN and the EU in the Board to ensure the highest fiduciary standards.
The AU also made major progress with respect to instituting the relevant frameworks for ensuring compliance of AU peace support operations with international standards including human rights and international humanitarian laws. At its session held on 29 November 2018, the AU PSC adopted the AU Policy Documents on the Prevention and Response to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse and on Conduct and Discipline.
Given the progress made with respect to the requirements set under Resolution 2320 (2016), the draft resolution initiated by the A3 seeks to follow up on the intent of Resolution 2317 (2017). This notably refers to the intention that the UNSC expressed in this resolution ‘to give further consideration to practical steps that can be taken, and the conditions necessary, to establish the mechanism through which African Union led peace support operations authorized by the Security Council and under the Security Council’s authority under Chapter VIII of the Charter could be partly financed through United Nations assessed contributions, on a case by case basis, in compliance with relevant agreed standards and mechanisms.’
It is also an opportunity to reflect on the prospects for the adoption by the UNSC of the resolution when it is considered in the course of the month. Within the UNSC, there are differences over the draft resolution between the A3 and the US in particular. In the 18 July briefing at the UNSC, the United States will not consider use of assessed contribution to support AU operations under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, until benchmarks for financial transparency, conduct and discipline and human rights are demonstrably implemented across AU peace organizations and operations.
At the 20 November UNSC open debate held under the Presidency of China, the US raised other concerns. It in particular noted unanswered questions about the implication of support from assessed contributions on UNSC’s authority and the need for members to have time to ensure full political and legislative support from capitals. It is not clear if the US would change its positions when the draft resolution is tabled at the UNSC for adoption.
While the expectation of the PSC is for the draft resolution to be adopted setting a framework for the UNSC to take decision for use of assessed contributions to support AU led or mandated peace support operations authorized by the UNSC on a case-by-case basis, there are two issues of interest for tomorrow’s session. The first is whether the consideration and adoption of the draft resolution will happen as scheduled in December 2018. The second is the scope of conditions that may be included if the final version of the resolution is agreed.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. Drawing on the benchmarks set in the 30 May 2017 communiqué, this is expected to highlight the progress made towards meeting the requirements of resolution 2320 (2016). The communiqué is also expected to urge members of the UNSC to adopt the draft resolution that sets to elevate the strategic partnership between the AU and the UN to a higher level.
