Briefing on Elections in Africa
Amani Africa
Date | 19 August , 2019
Tomorrow (19 August) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will hold its 869th session focusing on elections in Africa. The PSC is expected to receive the Report of the AU Commission Chairperson on Elections in Africa for the period of January to December 2019. It is expected that the Department of Political Affairs will introduce the report to the PSC.
The practice of providing briefings on elections in Africa can be traced back to the Report of the Panel of the Wise entitled ‘Election-related disputes and political violence’ and the 392nd meeting of the PSC. But it was at its 424th meeting that the PSC decided to have a briefing from the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) on elections in Africa on a quarterly basis.
The last time the PSC held this session was at its 815th meeting held on 04 December 2018. From the 18 presidential and parliamentary elections on the AU calendar for 2019, tomorrow’s session is expected to offer a review of the nine presidential and parliamentary elections and one constitutional referendum held on the continent between January and June 2018. The elections expected to receive attention within this context include those held in Nigeria, Senegal, Guinea Bissau, Comoros, Benin, South Africa, Malawi, Madagascar and Mauritania as well as the constitutional referendum in Egypt.
Of particular interest would be the trend that the briefing is expected to highlight in terms of not only good practice and challenges observed in conducting elections but also in terms of the monitoring of elections. This may include reference to ‘any cases of election malpractices and shortcomings’ that the communiqué of the 747th meeting of the PSC required AU Electoral Observation Mission reports to highlight for future lessons.
Some of the issues observed in a number of the elections under review include election irregularity, incidents of violence, tense political environment, low voter turnout, change of electoral calendar, uneven playing field for candidates and restrictive environment. Low voter turnout seems to be a feature of most of the elections. While the AU notes that the 2019 general elections in Nigeria registered the lowest turnout of elections held on the continent during the reporting period, there is no statistics on percentage of voter turnout for the elections in Benin. Yet, given the impact of low turnout on quality of elections and voters’ confidence over elections, there is a need for addressing the various factors leading to low voter turnout. The exception to this trend of low voter turnout is that of Guinea Bissau where the turnout of registered voters was 84.69.
Beyond and above voter turnout, issues of participation of some segments of the public particularly women and youth are also highlighted as areas requiring attention. In this respect, it was observed that in South Africa ‘only 18.5% of youth in the 18-19 age bracket registered to vote.’ The AU accordingly observed that ‘t]hese call for serious attention as a significant proportion of first-time voters were apathetic.’
The elections that witnessed tense political environment and major contestations include those in Benin, Comoros and Senegal. In all of these cases, fierce disputes resulted from the introduction of electoral legal reforms on matters of political party registration, term limits, electoral system and increased cost of candidatures. Of these, the country that registered retrogression in its electoral processes is Benin, where the AU observed not only an environment that was exclusive of opposition candidates but also violative of individual liberties. These developments highlight that there is a need for the AU to closely monitor electoral legal reforms and develop standards that should be followed in undertaking such reforms as a means of preventing electoral disputes and violence.
Claims of vote rigging have been observed in the elections in Malawi. Of interest to the PSC in this respect would be the post-election protests that followed allegations of electoral fraud.
The impact of insecurity on the electoral processes also remains as has been the case, for example, in parts of Nigeria. This remains a major issue for the upcoming election in Mali.
In terms of positive developments, Mauritania witnessed the democratic transfer of power to a new elected president, the first in the post-independence history of the country is notable.
From a perspective of election observation practice of the AU, it was noted that the AU was not able to deploy election observation mission to Madagascar. In respect to the practice and methodology of election observation, it would be of interest for the PSC to get update on developments relating to the need that various PSC outcome documents including the communiqué of its 747th session indicated in terms of enhancing the African Union Election coordination mechanisms with other relevant international missions. This includes the coordination with electoral observation missions of regional bodies.
The upcoming elections expected to take place during the third and fourth quarter of 2019 that tomorrow’s session will cover are Algeria, Botswana, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia and Tunisia. The AU has envisaged to deploy election observation mission to all the six countries.
In respect of these elections, it would be of interest for PSC members to know about how the AUC plans to engage not only in terms of deployment of election assessment and observation missions but also in terms of identifying risks of electoral disputes and preventive measures that should be adopted. In respect of early warning on such electoral disputes, the upcoming elections that may in particular be of interest are the elections in Mali (on account of the security situation in the country) and Algeria (on account of the protest events in the country).
The expected outcome of the session is a communique. It is expected to address the various issues arising from the report. It would, among others, highlight the continuing importance of elections in the democratization process of the continent, the need for improving the quality of elections including through ensuring the independent functioning of electoral management bodies and the provision of even playing field, and the importance of resolving existing crisis and conflicts as necessary condition for inclusive and credible elections. Enhancing the role of this briefing to map electoral risks for providing early warning to the PSC highlighting the measures that the AU could take for mitigating the risks through joint work of DPA and PSD would be of particular importance for the work of the PSC. To this end, the outcome could highlight the importance of holding the quarterly briefing timeously. In terms of lessons from the elections in Senegal, Comoros and Benin, the PSC may highlight the need for ensuring that electoral legal reforms follow the requirements of inclusiveness, fairness, transparency and consensus of all political forces as a measure of democratic legitimacy and preventing electoral disputes.
State of foreign military presence in Africa
Amani Africa
Date | 14 August, 2019
Tomorrow (14 August) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will hold a session to assess the state of foreign military presence in Africa and its implications on the implementation of African Common Defense and Security Policy.
The AU Peace and Security Department is expected to brief the Council. The Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA) is also best placed to provide further inputs.
In recent years increasing concerns have been expressed over the surge in the establishment of foreign military presence in various parts of the continent. In its communique of its 776th session held in May 2018, the PSC expressed deep concern ‘over the potential negative effects of the presence of foreign military bases in some volatile parts of the continent to the future security and stability of Africa’.
The 19th meeting of the Panel of the Wise in November 2018 went further. It not only reiterated the concern about the ‘increasing militarization of parts of the continent, in particular the Sahel and the Horn of Africa regions’ but importantly ‘the increase in uncoordinated external interventions which undermines the efficacy of African‐led solutions to violent conflicts on the continent.’ In this respect, the Panel underscored that considerable attention should be devoted to understanding the dynamics of external involvement on the continent’s security landscape.
The trend in the militarization of parts of the continent is backed by data. Over the past three decades, the continent has witnessed the heavy military presence of multiple regional and international security actors. Particularly in the Horn of Africa region, the number of actors with military presence from Europe, the United States, the Middle East, the Gulf, and Asia has increased exponentially. Moreover, the increased volatility and complex security challenges in the Sahel and West Africa regions have also led to the expanded role of foreign security actors.
France has had a military presence in Djibouti since the late 1800. After Djibouti achieved independence in 1977, France retained several military facilities. In recent decades, in the Horn region, foreign military presence was first established for purposes of countering violent extremism and terrorism following the terrorist attacks in the United States in 11 September 2001. Since 2001, the Government of Djibouti leased Camp Lemonnier to the USA and ever since the US has made continuous investment to transform it into a permanent facility. Similarly, the US has also established presence in other countries in the Horn for its operation against al‐Shabab. Surveillance sites in South Sudan, Uganda and Democratic Republic of Congo have also been established aiming, among others, at capturing Joseph Kony.
China’s first major security step in relation to military presence in Africa came in 2008 when it launched an anti‐piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden. China has since maintained a permanent naval anti‐piracy presence in the Horn of Africa region and recently it launched its 32nd convoy fleet to the Gulf of Aden and Somali waters. In a landmark development, China established a People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) base in Djibouti in August 2017. While presented as a logistics support base and aiming at supporting China’s peacekeeping operations in Africa and its participation in the fight of international piracy off the coast of Horn of Africa and Gulf of Aden, the facility has been instrumental in the protection of China’s growing overseas assets and represents China’s plan to project power.
The UK similarly has deployed a number of military personnel at Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, for a closer cooperation with the US forces in the region.
Increased presence from emerging actors particularly the Gulf States has witnessed sharp increase starting from 2015‐2016. Saudi Arabia has significantly increased its presence in the region, particularly following the civil war in Yemen and has maintained a significant naval presence in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. After strained relationship with Djibouti, the UAE has directed its ties to Eritrea, Somalia and Somaliland.
The UAE has also targeted Somaliland by working on the military base in Berbera to strengthen its military capacity in the conflict in Yemen while also providing security for Somaliland’s coastal waters and coastline. Turkey has also opened a military training centre in Mogadishu in 2017 to train recruits for the Somali National Army.
Russia has become the latest power to emerge on the African security scene. In 2018, it has established presence in the Central African Republic (CAR) to equip and advise the CAR military. In apparent indication of long‐term presence, Bangui and Moscow signed a military cooperation pact.
The rivalry and competition among foreign powers has worsened already volatile security situation in the continent. In addition to the GCC crisis, the perceived rivalry between the US and China has further intensified the military presence. The US Africa Strategy has openly stated its intention of countering China and Russia’s influence in the continent.
These competing military engagements particularly among global powers will have a number of implications for the implementation of the African Common Defense and Security Policy.
One of the principal objectives of the policy is ‘to ensure collective responses to both internal and external threats to Africa… in conformity with the principles enshrined in the Constitutive Act’. The current security landscape and involvement of foreign power complicate the establishment of any collective security response by African states.
While there is recognition that individual member states have the sovereign prerogative for allowing their territories to be used by foreign militaries, there remain concerns about the extent to which such military presence is channeled for enhancing the collective security of the continent. Some of the bilateral engagements of member states are seen as being not fully coherent with existing continental commitments and mechanisms established by the AU. Rather there is seems to be fragmentation and ad‐hoc engagement with foreign powers, leading to fragmentation of the engagement of AU member states. Moreover, there is also a tendency of building closer ties with foreign power than with neighboring states in the security front. It is feared that this tends to fuel tension among neighboring countries.
IGAD during its 46th ministerial meeting cognizant of the changing geopolitics in the region, adopted ‘a collective approach to challenges in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden by strengthening regional cooperation, and establish a regional platform for IGAD Member States with a view to promote dialogue’ and agreed ‘to harmonize and develop a common position to protect the security and economic interests of the region’.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may take note of the increased level of unregulated presence of foreign militaries in Africa and destabilizing effects of antagonism and rivalry among powers on the peace and security of the continent. The PSC may urge member state for their immediate action in considering the continental and regional standards, particularly the Common African Defense and Security Policy, when engaging foreign security actors. The PSC may call on member states to work towards common security and intensify regional cooperation to effectively respond to any threat emanating from foreign power competition. As part of the effort to limit the pitfalls of foreign military presence, the PSC may task the AU Commission to present to it a report on the scope of foreign military presence, its adverse impacts and ways and means by which member states may coordinate with the AU on the role of foreign militaries in their territories.
Review of Partnerships between the AU Commission, non-African States and Organisations
Amani Africa
Date | 13 August, 2019
Tomorrow (13 August) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to review the institutional relationships and partnerships between the AU Commission, non-African states and/or organizations and their impact on the implementation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and the African Governance Architecture (AGA).
The Departments of Peace and Security and Political affairs are expected to brief the PSC on partnerships on the APSA and the AGA respectively.
The AU PSC, being the principal decision-making body with respect to both APSA and AGA, plays a key role in reviewing and providing guidance on the modalities of partnership. Critical to the role of the PSC is the review of how partnerships on the APSA and AGA are initiated, negotiated, designed and implemented.
The session is expected to offer an opportunity for PSC member states to be informed of the nature and diversity of partnerships established on the APSA and the AGA currently in place. Indications are that PSC members do not have full information on the various partnerships established on the APSA and the AGA. Apart from the information gap, PSC member states are also keen about accountability around the planning and implementation of partnership programs.
Other issues expected to feature during the session include the focus areas of the various partnerships, how the partnerships inform or shape the focus and orientation of the APSA and the AGA including their alignment with Agenda 2063, the extent to which partnerships may impact on the ownership and leadership of the AU in the planning and implementation of APSA and AGA projects and challenges of coordination and the burden of multiple reporting formats. Also, of interest would be the availability of mechanisms for engaging the PSC and reporting to it on the establishment and implementation of APSA and AGA partnerships programs.
Within the context of multilateralism, the session may identify and categorize the various forms of partnerships including with non-African member states, inter-governmental and international organizations as well international non-governmental organizations towards the operationalization of AGA and APSA. It may also look into the establishment of standardized partnership framework that can also streamline a harmonized support to the two complementary and mutually reinforcing architectures, APSA and AGA.
Moreover, given the existence of numerous state and non-state partners that engage the AUC the review may provide a clearer direction on coordination among partners and more organized AU engagement to prevent duplication of efforts and resources. Also given the overlap between the two architectures, the review of partnerships may explore the possibility of having a comprehensive common strategy for both the APSA and the AGA.
In terms of the multilateral partnerships on APSA and AGA, the most notable ones include those with the UN and the EU. APSA is anchored on the recognition of its complementarity to the multilateralist global collective security system articulated in the Charter of the United Nations (UN). Hence AU’s primary and well-established partner in the area of promoting peace and security has been the UN. The partnership in this specific area was strengthened when the AUC and the Secretary-General of the UN signed the Joint UN–AU Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security in April 2017 at the first UN–AU Annual Conference. The Framework outlines priority areas for cooperation including early warning, prevention, mediation, conflict management, and working together to sustain peace and address climate change. The Decision Assembly/AU/Dec.644(XXIX) adopted by the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government at its 29th Ordinary Session held in July 2017 which welcomed the signing of the framework, it also requested the Chair of the AU Commission to accelerate the process of accessing the UN assessed contributions to finance AU peace support operations.
The implementation of the key areas of the framework have also been spearheaded through the UN Office to the African Union (UNOAU), established in July 2010 to support the UN Secretariat’s presence in Addis Ababa on peace and security matters.
The EU has been AU’s longstanding partner on peace and security dating back to 2003, the early years of the APSA. The EU APSA-support program of the African Peace Facility was established in 2004 at the request of African leaders at the 2003 AU summit in Maputo, Mozambique. Tomorrow’s session is also taking place as two major multi-year and strategic engagements are being developed between the AUC and the European Union (EU), which directly target APSA and AGA: the support program for APSA IV (2020 – 2024) and support to (AGA) 2020-2023. These engagements build on the key common priorities on strengthening resilience, peace, security and governance identified at the most recent AU-EU Summit held in Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire in November 2017.
The second category of partnership is the AUC engagement with non-African member states. In this context, engagement with members of the UNSC may be particularly relevant for the promotion of the continental peace and security agenda including the preventive mechanisms identified in the AGA. Tomorrow’s session is timely particularly in light of recent developments where a number of cooperative platforms have been launched in 2019 with various non-African states. For example, the first China-Africa peace and security forum was launched in July 2019. The first session of the strategic dialogue between France and the AUC was held following the meeting between President Macron and the Chairperson of the Commission on 13 March 2019. A MoU was signed between the UK government and AUC in early 2019.
The PSC may need to identify a coherent policy direction in managing these multiple engagements, which over the years have deepened. It will also be essential for the Council to strategize ways in which the Commission can leverage from longstanding and emerging partnerships and advance the set objective in its normative and policy frameworks. This may require the close cooperation between the Council and Commission to jointly strategize in addressing partnership issues.
The third form of partnerships that the PSC may also review is with international non-governmental organizations and their role in the implementation of APSA and AGA. The review may look into the contribution of partners such as most notably the GiZ, which has provided long term support to both APSA and AGA.
The other key issue that may feature in tomorrow’s session is also the reform process and its effects on AGA and APSA operationalization. The proposed restructuring of the AUC in 2021 and the merger of the Departments of Political Affairs and Peace and Security will have direct implication on the harmonization between AGA and APSA. The main area that may require attention in this regard is on how establishing common objectives between the two architectures in order to generate coherent partnership policy. The changes associated with the reform will also affect the implementation of the activities of the two architectures and the long-term partnership built around them.
One of the ways in which the merger of the two departments and its implications on synergy between the two architecture can be accommodated is through the development of a common APSA-AGA roadmap. The opportunity for elaborating such common roadmap is present with the end of the current APSA roadmap in 2020.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may call for an enhanced coordination and a standardized partnership framework that governs AUC engagement with various actors on the implementation of APSA and AGA. It may urge the Commission to strengthen its efforts in providing regular update and analysis on partnership. It may particularly highlight the need for harmonization between the two architectures to also enhance coordinated partners engagement.
