PSC Program of Work for July 2018
Amani Africa
Date | July 2018
The Peace and Security Council (PSC) provisional program of work for July has a relatively light agenda and includes two major activities that takes the Council away from Addis; the joint consultative meeting with the UN Security Council and the field mission to Guinea Bissau. In a departure from what is recently becoming a culture of the Council to have at least one open session every month, the month will have no open session.
The program of the month started with a presentation by the President of the Republic of Togo of the Report of the Peace and Security Council on its activities and the State of Peace and Security in Africa, and the Report of the PSC on the Implementation of the AU Master Roadmap of the Practical Steps to Silence the Guns in Africa by Year 2020 to the 31st Ordinary Session of the Union.
After a break for a week, on 9 July the PSC will discuss the situation in the DRC. The meeting will receive a briefing on the political and security situation in the country in light of the increasing tension and conflict surrounding the holding of the parliamentary and presidential elections scheduled for December 2018.
The meeting on 10 July is dedicated for the preparation for the 12th Annual Joint Consultative Meeting with the UN Security Council that will take place from 16-20 July 2018 in New York. The same meeting will consider and adopt the draft provisional PSC program for the month of August 2018.
On 12 July, the Council will again discuss and finalize the preparation for the 12th Annual Joint Consultative Meeting with the UN Security Council. The meeting will also discuss the preparation for the PSC Field Mission to Guinea Bissau. On 24 July, the PSC will discuss the situation in Mali/Sahel. The meeting will take place against the background of the latest attacks that targeted the headquarters of the G5 Sahel Task Force. It will discuss the insecurity, the political process and the role of the AU in the G5 initiative. PSC’s field mission to Guinea Bissau, that will take place from 28-31 July 2018 will be the last activity of the PSC month. The field mission will closely examine and talk to stakeholders of the protracted political crisis in the country.
Summit Level Session on South Sudan
Amani Africa
Date | 30 June, 2018
Tomorrow (30 June 2018), the Peace and Security Council (PSC) will have a summit
level session on South Sudan. The Chairperson of the African Union (AU) Commission is expected to provide a briefing report to the session. Others expected to address the summit include South Africa’s President Cyril Ramaphosa, in his capacity as Chair of the High level Ad Hoc Committee on South Sudan and Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, in his capacity as Chair of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). It is also anticipated that President Omar Hussein Al-Bashir of Sudan and Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni will brief the PSC
on the talks that was convened in Khartoum and the subsequent signing of a declaration of agreement by President Salva Kiir and opposition leader Dr Riek Machar.
As framed on the agenda of the session, this meeting in part aims at reviewing
implementation of the PSC decision of its 720th meeting held on 20 September 2017. In this respect, the PSC would be interested to assess the progress made in terms of the IGAD peace process under the High-Level Revitalization Forum and the tripartite coordination between IGAD, AU and UN, and the signing and domestication of the MoU on the establishment of the Hybrid Court. Additionally, a major area of concern has also been the continuation of the conflict and violation of agreed terms particularly in relation to the ceasefire.
In terms of the briefing from the Chairperson of the AU Commission, issues expected to be covered include the continued nonimplementation and violation of commitments that the parties made under the ongoing peace process. Apart from expressing concern about these continuing challenges, it is expected that the PSC would urge support for and reinforcement of the role of the Joint Evaluation and Monitoring Mechanism (JMEC) and the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanisms (CTSAMM). In this respect, the briefing note underscores the need for equipping and enabling the CTSAMM to speedily investigate and report all violations. With respect to the role of the AU, one area that may receive close attention is the role of the High-Level Ad Hoc Committee of the AU on South Sudan. Indeed, the PSC summit follows immediately after the meeting of Ad Hoc Committee that President Ramaphosa is expected to chair. Apart from reviewing the state of the South Sudan peace process, the issue of how to leverage and reinforce the role of the Committee vis-à-vis the work of IGAD is expected to be high on the agenda of the Committee’s meeting. This is expected to feed into the PSC summit, which may define how best to leverage the role of the Committee. As the summit reviews the progress in the peace process, very important focus of tomorrow’s session is expected to be the recent round of the HLRF, including most notably the signing of the ‘Khartoum Declaration of Agreement between parties of the conflict of South Sudan’ on 27 June. As part of the IGAD briefing it is expected to update the PSC on the
recent round of the HLRF, which convened talks between the parties on governance and security arrangements from 17 to 23 June.
With the parties unable to reach a compromise, the IGAD proposed a “Bridging
Proposal” outlining a middle ground on the parties’ negotiating positions related to key governance and security issues. In further attempt to get the parties to resolve their differences, the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government convened on 21 June its 32nd Extraordinary Session in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia focusing on South Sudan. To this end, Ethiopia’s Prime Minister and IGAD Chairperson Abiy Ahmed brought President Kiir and Machar for a face-to-face meeting for the first time since the collapse of the peace agreement in 2016. With the parties still unable to agree to the IGAD bridging proposal, the IGAD Assembly assigned Sudan’s President Bashir to facilitate a second round face-to-face meeting between the two. This meeting convened in Khartoum with the presence of President Musenevi, who was not present during the IGAD Assembly meeting in Addis Ababa, led to the signing by the two sides the declaration of agreement referred to above. Others who signed the agreement are representatives of the South Sudan Opposition Alliance, Former Detainees and other political parties. Notably, it was witnessed by the IGAD Special Envoy and members of the Troika (Norway, the UK and the US) with Sudanese
President Omar al-Bashir as its guarantor.
In terms of content, the declaration stipulated that instead of IGAD’s proposal a ‘Revised Bridging Proposal’ will be concluded by the end of the current round of talks in Khartoum. Whether this has indeed been concluded and what the contents of the revised bridging proposal would be part of the issues that
President Bashir is expected to clarify in his briefing to the PSC. As indicated in the statement that the AU Commission Chairperson issued, the PSC is expected to welcome the signing of the declaration in Khartoum. For PSC members, given the repeated violation of previous agreements by the parties, there is interest to know the level of commitment of the parties for complying with the agreement. In this context, it is interesting if this signal for achieving a settlement would avoid discussion on punitive measures. As envisaged in the AUC Chair’s briefing note, the PSC could indeed welcome the outcome of the 62nd meeting of IGAD Council of Ministers and PSC’s 720th session decision to impose punitive measures against those who obstruct peace and violate peace agreements.
Other issues of interest from the perspective of the PSC relate to the operationalization of the Hybrid Court for which the AU has a responsibility under the South Sudan Peace Agreement. In this respect, despite the fact that the Government of South Sudan signed the MoU on the establishment of the Hybrid Court with the AU, it has not adopted the relevant legislative measure for the domestication of the MoU. A further issue for the PSC is the invitation by the parties in the Khartoum Declaration of Agreement of AU member states and IGAD to deploy the necessary forces to supervise the agreed
permanent ceasefire. What this actually means and how it can be operationalized would be of
interest to PSC members.
The expected outcome of the PSC summit is a communiqué. This is expected to commend the efforts of IGAD including the recent rounds of the HLRF and the IGAD Council of Ministers
and Summit meetings held in Addis Ababa. Most importantly, it would also welcome the signing of the Khartoum Declaration. As a measure that is necessary to support the peace process, the communiqué is also expected to encourage Sudan and South Sudan to intensify efforts to promote their bilateral relations particularly for the resumption of oil production in South Sudan. It is also expected to reiterate and endorse the plan for imposing punitive sanctions, while urging the speedy finalization of the conclusion of negotiation on the bridging
proposals. For the PSC, it would also be important to put in place a mechanism for finalizing the process of domestication of the MoU for the operationalization of the Hybrid Court. The issue of monitoring compliance with the cessation of hostilities agreement and the provision of humanitarian assistance and unfettered access to humanitarian actors would also receive attention.
Ministerial Session on the Operationalization of APSA in the Sahel
Amani Africa
Date | 27 June, 2018
Today (27 June) the PSC will hold a ministerial session on the role of Africa in the Harmonization of Initiatives and Operationalization of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in the Sahel’. It is expected that the ministerial meeting will receive a briefing report of the AU Commission Chairperson. Apart from its transnational character, the crisis in the Sahel presents particular challenges to the region and the continent for a number of factors. First, the crisis has multiple dimensions including terrorism, trafficking, porous borders, identity based conflicts and weak state institutions. Second, rather than being confined to a particular region, the Sahel crisis transcends regional boundaries covering parts of North Africa and of West Africa. Third and related to this is the fact that there is no one regional mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution on which the response to the crisis can be anchored. Fourth, the crisis intersects with the conflict in Libya and the conflict involving Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin. Fifth, the final factor relate to multiplicity of initiatives and divergence of roles and concerns over both
preponderance of external influence and significantly risks of fragmentation or weakening of the implementation of the APSA in addressing the crisis.
The session is expected to take stock of the political, security and regional developments shaping the crisis in the Sahel. In the political front, apart from the presidential and legislative elections in Mali scheduled for July and November respectively, the session will review the status of implementation of the 2015 Algiers Accord For peace and Reconciliation in Mali. The degree of success in the convening of the elections is seen to be critical. It presents an opportunity for renewed active pursuit of the peace process in the country, key to addressing the crisis in the country. From the perspective of the implementation of the 2015 peace agreement, issues of concern for PSC members include the lack of trust between the parties, slow pace of its implementation and the impact of heavy attention on security measures associated with the G5 Sahel Joint Force on the peace process.
Perhaps of major interest for the ministerial session of the PSC is the security dimension of the situation in the Sahel. Indeed, as pointed out in the briefing report, the session would zero on ‘the efforts of Africa to take ownership of the Sahel initiatives and to see how well the overall Regional ad-hoc initiatives fall within the framework of the African Standby Force (FAA), within the APSA, in conformity with the Communiqué of the PSC of 13 November 2017, in which Council, in the face of emerging threats in the Sahel in particular, stressed the need for a better articulation of Regional and interregional initiatives within the context of APSA.’ This particular focus of the session accordingly has two diemnsions. The first of this relate to the question of enhancing the ownership of African actors, particularly countries of the region, on the sahel initiatives. This seem to particularly concern the G5 Sahel Joint Force. This is a force of 5000 military personnel, police officers, gendarmerie and border patrol officers only of five states in the Sahel: Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. The PSC mandated the deployment of the Joint Force for an initial period of one year in the communiqué of its 679th meeting of April 2017. In terms of the operationalization of the Force, the Force headquarters was set up in Sévaré, Mali at the end of 2017. On 31 October 2017, the Force undertook its first cross border operation, ‘Hawbi’, in the central sector involving Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. It has since undertaken its second operation in the same sector.
Two areas would in particular be of interest to the PSC in the operationalization of the G5 Sahel Joint Force. First is the establishment of the command and organizational structures of the Force. Related to this is also the issue of coordination between the operations of the force and the implementation of the various Sahel strategies. Second is the provision and coordination of support including funding for the Joint Mission.
With respect to the command and organizational set up of the Joint Force, the operationalization of the Central Command Post and its coordination with and setting up of sectors’ command is of interest to the PSC. It is reported that France provides organizational structure to the Force and takes part in the six monthly meeting of the military command. Another area of interest is the mechanism required for ensuring coordination between the Joint Force and the various other regional and international operations in the Sahel and significantly with other Sahel countries outside of the G5. As noted in the AU Commission Chairperson’s briefing report, ‘there is an imperative need for cooperation but especially for coordination in order to avoid any competitive approach that would only be counterproductive to the resolution of the problems identified in the Region.’
The issue for the PSC here is how the G5 Sahel can accentuate regional ownership, reinforce the peace process in Mali and facilitate international support while operating within the framework of the APSA, allaying fears of weakening of the application of APSA processes and standards. It is to be recalled that the 13 April 2017 communiqué of the PSC envisaged close cooperation with Sahel countries that are not members of the G5 Sahel within the framework of the implementation plan of the concept of operations of the G5 Sahel Joint Force. Undoubtedly, international support including notably that of France seems key for the effective operationalization of the G5 Sahel Joint Force. Perhaps, one way of addressing concerns around the application of the APSA in the Sahel is the integration of APSA processes and standards in the operationalization of the G5 Force. This can be done through enabling the AU to provide the civilian capacity that the PSC communiqué authorizing the Force stipulated, including those necessary for enhancing compliance with international human rights and international humanitarian law by the Force. The other aspect relate to the operationalization of the MoU that the G5 Sahel Secretariat and the AU Commission signed on 23 March 2018 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
While there is heavy focus on the G5 Sahel Joint Force, other initiatives such as the Nouakchott Process, which seeks to facilitate horizontal security coordination and intelligence sharing and cooperation among all countries of the Sahel, did not fare well. The forces attracted support from the European Union (€100 million), Saudi Arabia (€100 million), the United Arab Emirates (€30 million), and Rwanda and Turkey. As the Chairperson’s briefing report rightly pointed out, ‘Rwanda remains to date the only African country to have made a financial contribution to the operationalisation of the G5 Force. Surely, the AU Member States should show greater solidarity with the Sahel and Lake Chad countries.’ In terms of the preferred option for addressing the challenges of predictable funding, the briefing note states that ‘the best option for an initiative such as the G5 Joint Force would be to establish it as an autonomous brigade within MINUSMA, modeled on the MONUSCO Intervention Brigade.’ Another issue that has increasingly become a conern for AU as reflected in PSC meetings is the issue around the presence of internaitonal forces in the Sahel involving what the report called ‘a gradual militarization of the foreign intervention in the Sahel, which only partially addresses the challenges in the region.’
The expected outcome of the ministerial session is a communiqué. It is anticipated that the communiqué will welcome the progress being witnessed towards the organization of the elections in Mali, notably the presidential election expected to take place next month. It is also expected to underscore the importance of the full and timely implementation of the 2015 peace agreement for consolidating peace, while expressing concern about new conflict trends intersecting ethnicity and terrorism. In terms of coordinaiton, it is expected to reiterate the previous decision of the PSC on close cooperation with Sahel countries including those not members of the G5 Sahel within the framework of the implementation plan of the concept of operations of the G5 Sahel Joint Force. Beyond emphasizing the importance of the Nouakchott Process the communiqué expected to provide for the establishment of a high level ad hoc committee for coordination and mobilization of support for Sahel within the framework of the APSA. It is also expected to urge international partners to support the operationalization of the APSA in the Sahel in the implementation of the G5 Sahel Force both for mobilizing wider regional support and consolidating the gains registered in establishing and activating the APSA for which partner support played key part. As part of this, the communiqué is expected to provide for the provision of civilian capacity including experts in human rights and international humanitarian law by the AU within the G5 Sahel Force and the operationalization of the MoU that the AU Commission and the G5 Sahel Secretariat signed in March this year. Other issues the communiqué is anticipated to address include the need for addressing the Libyan crisis, the concern over the gradual militarization of international intervention in the Sahel and the imperative for prioritizing political solutions and the economic development and post-conflict reconstruction programmes, within the priorities determined by the Sahel states themselves.
