Le Manuel du Conseil de paiX et de sécurité de l’Union africaine est une initiative d’Amani Africa Media and Research Services (Amani Africa), qui fournit des informations et des analyses faisant autorité sur le CPS et son travail. Comme pour les deux éditions précédentes du Manuel, la présente édition du Manuel a bénéficié de l’engagement d’Amani Africa avec les acteurs clés du travail du CPS. Je tiens à remercier les membres du CPS, en particulier les présidents mensuels du CPS, les Secrétariats du CPS et les membres du Comité d’experts pour leur soutien à la préparation de cette troisième édition du Manuel.

Je tiens à remercier tout particulièrement S.E. Bankole Adeoye, Commissaire aux Affaires politiques, la Paix et la Sécurité (PAPS) pour avoir honoré le présent manuel d’un avant-propos, soulignant l’importance de la recherche et de l’analyse pour soutenir la mise en œuvre du Protocole relatif à la création du CPS.

J’adresse un mot de remerciement à nos partenaires et parties prenantes qui ont fourni leurs réfleXions sur la valeur du Manuel du CPS de l’UA. À cet égard, je tiens à citer Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, Représentant spécial du Secrétaire général auprès de l’UA et chef de l’UNOAU, Comfort Ero, Président-directeur général de l’International Crisis Group, Bruce Mokaya, chef de la délégation du CICR auprès de l’UA et des organisations internationales, ainsi que Tim Murithi, chef des interventions de consolidation de la paiX à l’Institut pour la justice et la réconciliation et Professeur des études africaines.

Permettez-moi également de reconnaitre avec appréciation le soutien habituel du personnel du Secrétariat du CPS, en particulier Neema Nicholaus Chusi, chef par intérim du Secrétariat du CPS.

La présente édition du Manuel est le produit de l’engagement d’Amani Africa avec l’ensemble du personnel du Département du PAPS à qui nous eXprimons également notre gratitude.

Nous tenons à remercier le Gouvernement de la Suisse qui a apporté son soutien en tant que partenaire au projet de rédaction et de publication du présent Manuel.

Dr. Solomon Ayele Dersso, au nom de l’équipe d’Amani Africa

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by Amani Africa

PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL 1203RD MEETING CONCEPT NOTE

by Amani Africa

Update briefing on the Operations of SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM)

Date | 3 March 2024

Tomorrow (4 March), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1203^rd session for an updated briefing on the operations of the Southern African Development Community Mission in Mozambique.

The session opens with the opening remarks of Emilia Mkusa, the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Namibia and the Chairperson of the PSC for March. This will be followed by a statement from Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). Additionally, a representative from the Republic of Mozambique, as the concerned state and Kula Ishmael Theletsane, the Director of Politics and Security Affairs of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), are also expected to give briefings. The representative of Rwanda, which has deployed troops to Mozambique based on bilateral arrangements, may also deliver a statement.

The SADC Mission in Mozambique also known as SAMIM, was initially deployed in July 2021 following an approval by the extraordinary summit of the SADC that was held on 23 June 2021 in Maputo, Mozambique. The peace support operation was initially intended for a six-month duration, but it has since been extended three times. The first extension came in January 2022, extending the mission for three months, while the second extension in August 2022 extended the mission for a year. The PSC’s last discussion on the issue also took place following SAMIM’s second extension. The outcome of this meeting (1119^th session) held on 7 November 2022 led to the PSC endorsing two significant decisions from the 42^nd Ordinary Summit of SADC held in August 2022. The first decision was to extend SAMIM’s mandate for another year and the second was to de-escalate the intervention from scenario 6 to scenario 5 and eventually to scenario 4.

The most recent extension, which was officially confirmed on 28 January was a result of the decision made at the 43^rd Ordinary Summit of SADC, held on 17 August 2023 in Luanda, Republic of Angola. This summit endorsed the decision of the Organ Troika Summit of 16 August 2023 to extend the SAMIM’s mandate by 12 months, making the new end date 15 July 2024. Beyond the extension, the Summit instructed the leadership of SAMIM to initiate a step-by-step drawdown starting from 15 December 2023, with the complete withdrawal to be finalized by 15 July 2024.

The decision to withdraw SAMIM has raised questions, particularly in light of the attacks by the Islamic-State of Mozambique (ISM) resurgence in the Cabo Delgado province since September 2023. This has since escalated in January 2024 following the launch of ‘kill them where you find them’ campaign by the ISM. Until June 2023, the Islamic-State armed insurgency, which took root in October 2017 in Cabo Delgado province, has resulted in the death of more than 6,500 people. Additionally, as reported by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OHCA), the attacks have displaced over a million people throughout the years. By August 2023, a significant number of these internally displaced persons, totalling 571,468, returned to their homes. Notably, 540,958 of these returnees are from Cabo Delgado. The districts that are home to the most returnees include Mocímboa da Praia, Palma and Muidumbe people. However, since January 2024, the attacks have spread to Mocímboa da Praia district and the neighbouring districts of Palma and Muidumbe, including the district of Mocomia coast stretching to Mecufi. In the last two months, it is estimated that more than 67,000 individuals have evacuated the southern districts of Cabo Delgado, according to government officials. These are new developments indicate the security forces deployed in Mozambique including SAMIM are strained.

When the second extension of SAMIM was approved by SADC in 2022, its mandate shifted from an African Standby Force Scenario 6 military only operation (in the words of the PSC ASF based ‘peace-enforcement mission to neutralise the terrorist threat and restore state-authority in the affected districts in Cabo Delegado’) towards a more comprehensive approach, emphasizing peace building and governance. Despite some of the gains registered by SAMIM, its efforts toward peacebuilding and good governance have faced numerous challenges including funding shortages. Even the progress made through military offensives is put to the test as ISM insurgents adapt their strategies. They now operate in smaller groups, directing attacks on civilians and military targets and integrating into local communities, which makes them more difficult to detect and counteract. This situation casts doubt on the timeliness of the decision to withdraw SAMIM. One incident that highlights this issue is when Mozambican security forces, who have been struggling with food shortages and months of unpaid salaries, effectively gave up control of the crucial village of Mucojo on January 18. This withdrawal allowed the insurgents unrestricted access to the Macomia coast.

Given the persisting insurgency and the planned withdrawal of SAMIM, it is expected that Kula Ishmael Theletsane’s briefing to the PSC will shed light on the preparedness of the Mozambique Defence Armed Forces (FADM) to step in and address the potential ensuing security vacuum. Furthermore, the briefing may also elaborate on the withdrawal plan of SAMIM. It would also be of interest to the PSC to learn about the plan on how to fill in the potential vacuum that may arise on the departure of SAMIM and the role of the Rwandan Defence Forces (RDF). The role of the RDF is one of the aspects of the meeting between President Paul Kagame and President Filipe Nyusi held on January 25.

Tomorrow’s session is also an opportunity to follow up on the Council’s previous decisions with regard to AU’s equipment support to the SAMIM. During its 1119^th session, the PSC expressed concern over the delayed shipment of the second batch of equipment, which China had pledged to donate and ship directly to Mozambique. This decision was first made during the 1062^nd PSC session in January 2022. Due to this lack of progress, the PSC during its previous session on SAMIM requested the AU Commission to continue coordinating with the Chinese Embassy in Addis Ababa to expedite the delivery. The Director for Conflict Management in the AU Peace and Security Department undertook a field mission to Pemba, Mozambique on 17 November 2023. This action aligns with the PSC’s request for the AU Commission to deliver the donated equipment to the SAMIM support operation.

The expected outcome of the session is a Communique. The PSC may express concerns over the resurgence of attacks in Cabo Delgado and the persistence of the insurgency and the threat it poses to the various neighbouring districts of Cabo Delgado. The Council may endorse the communique of the 43^rd ordinary summit of SADC that extended the mandate of SAMIM. The PSC may also emphasize the need for ensuring that the exit of SAMIM does not lead to a security vacuum that may lead to the reversal of the gains made by the deployment of SAMIM. The Council may also emphasise on the need for enhanced coordination and cooperation between SAMIM, FADM and RDF. Cognizant of the need to address the structural causes of the scourge in northern Mozambique for lasting peace and stability in the region, the Council may emphasize the importance of enhancing the implementation of peacebuilding and reconstruction measures for the rehabilitation of affected communities, rebuilding of legitimate local government structures. The PSC may further emphasise the need for strategies for promoting long-term stability in Mozambique, including supporting initiatives aimed at addressing the root causes of conflict and promoting inclusive development and governance. Lastly, the Council may reiterate its request for the Commission and SADC Secretariat to provide regular progress updates to the Council on the process of drawdown and withdrawal of SAMIM’s mandate and the plan for avoiding the emergence of a security vacuum on the departure of SAMIM.

by Amani Africa

Briefing on the situation in Eastern DRC and deployment of the SADC Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC)

Date | 3 March 2024

Tomorrow (04 March), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will consider the security situation in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the deployment of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC), as one of the agenda items of its 1203^rd session.

Emilia Mkusa, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Namibia to the AU and PSC Chairperson for the month, will deliver opening remarks. Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) is also expected to make a statement. This will be followed with statements by a representative of DRC as well as a representative of the Republic of Zambia, SADC Chair of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Affairs. Kula Ishmael Theletsane, Director of SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Affairs is also expected to brief the PSC. Force Commander of the SAMIDRC may also participate in the session.

In the previous year, the PSC considered the situation in eastern DRC at the Heads of State and Government level, at its 1140^th session held in February. It also committed its 1145^th session held in March to the consideration of the report of its filed mission to the DRC conducted from 20 to 23 March 2023. Since then, there have been major developments in relation to the situation in the region as well as the response mechanisms deployed to manage the crisis, including SADC’s deployment of SAMIDRC on 08 May 2023. Tomorrow’s session offers the opportunity to discuss these developments.

Since October 2023, the security situation in eastern DRC has significantly worsened increasing regional tensions. While much attention has been directed towards the ongoing conflict involving the Congolese armed forces (FARDC) alongside allied militias and the Mouvement du 23 mars (M23), other domestic and foreign armed groups such as the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), the Coopérative pour le développement du Congo (CODECO), the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR), Red Tabara, and Mai-Mai also continue to wreak havoc in the region, significantly impacting the civilian population.

There have been ongoing regional initiatives under the auspices of the East African Community (EAC) and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) known as the Nairobi and Luanda processes to address the situation in eastern DRC. An EAC Regional Force (EACRF) was also deployed in eastern DRC as part of the Nairobi process but EACRF eventually withdrew from the region in December 2023 due to the Congolese government’s disappointment over the EACRF’s inability to resolve the issue of the M23 and its unwillingness to renew the Status of Force Agreement (SOFA).

Even before EACRF’s departure, the Congolese government had already turned its attention towards SADC, which on 8 May decided to deploy SAMIDRC with a mandate to support restoring peace and stability in eastern DRC. On 17 November, SADC signed a SOFA with the DRC to pave the way for the mission’s deployment in December 2023. SAMIDRC is comprised of contingents from Malawi, South Africa, and Tanzania which are actively engaged in providing support to the FARDC in the ongoing fight against M23. Tomorrow’s session marks the first time when the PSC will discuss the decision of SADC Heads of State and Government on the deployment of troops to the DRC on 08 May 2023.

Following EACRF’s departure, the M23 reportedly retook control of the areas that it handed to the force and made advances towards Goma, the capital of North Kivu. The ongoing fighting near Sake, a town 27 kilometres from Goma has exacerbated the humanitarian crisis in the region and the massive displacement of people has heightened international concerns. The situation has also increased regional tensions with escalatory rhetoric and accusations between DRC and its neighbours. For instance, recently, DRC accused Rwanda of targeting a Congolese military aircraft stationed at the Goma airport that reportedly sustained minor damage in a drone attack on 17 February 2023. Rwanda also accused DRC of posing a threat to its security by violating its air space and, announced its decision to adjust its security posture including measures to ensure complete air defense of Rwanda, and to degrade offensive air capabilities. Additionally, Rwanda accused DRC and Burundi of publicly declaring their support for regime change in Rwanda following the 12 February visit of Burundian President Évariste Ndayishimiye to Kinshasa, where he reportedly met with his Congolese counterpart to discuss the security situation in eastern DRC.

Burundi has deployed its forces in eastern DRC under a bilateral agreement with the Congolese government. Tensions between Rwanda and Burundi escalated after Burundi’s decision in January to close its borders with Rwanda, citing allegations of Rwandan support for Burundian armed groups—a charge Rwanda denies. Burundi’s border closure came in response to a 22 December 2023 attack by Red Tabara, a Burundian armed group operating in eastern DRC, which targeted a village near Burundi’s western border with the DRC, resulting in the loss of 20 lives, including 12 children. Another attack by Red Tabara on 26 February reportedly claimed nine lives and left several others injured.

On the margins of the AU Summit, Angolan President and Chair of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), Joao Lourenço, convened a mini-summit on 16 February which saw the participation of regional leaders and AU Commission Chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat. The mini-summit discussed ways of restoring a cessation of hostilities and facilitating direct talks between the DRC and Rwanda to avoid the further expansion of the conflict into a regional crisis. With the mini-summit ending without any concrete outcome and the two sides descending into heated exchanges, President Lourenço held bilateral meetings with the presidents of the DRC and Rwanda on 17 February. He continued his diplomatic engagement in Luanda meeting with President Felix Tshisekedi on 27 February who reportedly agreed in principle to meet with President Paul Kagame.

During the AU summit, there was also a tripartite meeting of the leaders of Burundi, the DRC, and South Africa in Addis Ababa on 17 February, which focused on the coordination of forces operating in eastern DRC in support of the FARDC. Burundi and South Africa are actively involved in providing support to the Congolese government in its military operations in North Kivu, with Burundi operating within a bilateral arrangement and South Africa participating as part of the SAMIDRC mission. The three leaders met again in Windhoek, during the funeral ceremony of the late Namibian President, to continue the discussion in the tripartite format.

On 14 February, two SAMIDRC troops from South Africa were killed and three others injured in a mortar attack, according to a 15 February press release of the South African National Defence Force. South Africa reaffirmed its commitment to continue assisting the Congolese people and underscored SAMIDRC’s role as a ‘bulwark against the expansion of the conflict to the whole country’. However, Rwanda alleged that SAMIDRC ‘is not a neutral force in the current crisis’, accusing it of supporting the DRC government’s ‘belligerent posture, which bears the potential for further escalation of the conflict and increased tensions in the region’, according to a letter the country sent to the Security Council.

This came against the backdrop of discussions about possible UN operational and logistical support to SAMIDRC. On 22 November 2023, SADC formally requested UN assistance for SAMIDRC, including the provision of facilities, equipment, air asset services, medical support, and information and intelligence sharing, among other forms of support. In resolution 2717 of 19 December 2023, which most recently renewed the mandate of the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO), the Security Council expressed its intention to evaluate the conditions under which ‘limited logistical and operational support may be provided to an AU-mandated regional force deployed within the area of MONUSCO’s deployment, in furtherance of MONUSCO’s mandate, and within existing resources’. It also requested the Secretary-General to submit a report in June, which will include his recommendations on this matter.

It is in this context that the PSC is meeting tomorrow to receive a briefing on the deployment of SAMIDRC. Unlike the East African Force which was tied to the political track of the Nairobi process and the inter-state focused Luanda process, there is no indication that SAMIDRC has a political and peace track on which it is anchored. As part of the discussion on possible support from the AU, one of the issues that tomorrow’s session may discuss includes whether and how SAMIDRC deployment is tied to and supports the Nairobi and Luanda processes. PSC members are also likely to explore possible AU support to SAMIDRC, including from the Crisis Reserve Facility (CRF) of the AU Peace Fund and to enable the force to airlift donated equipment from the AU Continental Logistics Base in Cameroon, as well as other support from partners such as the UN.

In line with resolution 2717, the only way that SAMIDRC gets the desired support from the UN is if the AU mandates it. Endorsement by the PSC may not be necessarily the same as mandating the mission and there could be further discussion on this when the issue is considered in New York in due course. Nevertheless, the PSC’s decision on the matter is likely to feed into the Secretary-General’s June report and recommendations on the provision of limited operational and logistical support through MONUSCO. These recommendations could also be premised on the assumption that MONUSCO stays in DRC beyond December 2024.

MONUSCO is currently implementing a disengagement plan agreed with the Congolese government and endorsed by the Security Council. It is expected to withdraw in April from one of the three provinces—South Kivu—where it is currently operating but the decision to withdraw from the remaining two provinces—North Kivu and Ituri—will be made based on an evaluation of the progress in the disengagement process and the evolving security situation on the ground. It is because of this reason that the Security Council intentionally avoided setting an artificial deadline for the mission’s exit, but Kinshasa seems to be of the view that MONUSCO should leave come December 2024. DRC’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and Francophonie, Christophe Lutundula said that his government is ‘fighting for everything to be done by the end of this year’, in a joint press conference with the Special Representative and Head of MONUSCO, Bintou Keita on 13 January. ‘As of December 31 of this year, we are at the end of the withdrawal process’, he emphasized.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may endorse SADC’s deployment of SAMIDRC. It may stress the importance of ensuring coordination of efforts deployed in the region and draw attention to the importance of aligning the force’s deployment with existing peace and political processes including the Nairobi and Luanda processes and the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework (PSCF), in order to achieve lasting and sustainable results in the resolution of the crisis. The PSC is also expected to emphasise concern over the intensification of hostilities in eastern DRC and the reversal of some of the key gains achieved including withdrawal of negative forces from strategic territories in the region. It may express serious concern over the deterioration of the relationship between DRC and Rwanda and urge the leaders of both countries to uphold commitments made under and commit to the Nairobi and Luanda processes. In this respect, the PSC may welcome Angolan president, President Lourenço’s recent efforts to facilitate direct talks between the two leaders and urge the two countries to extend full cooperation for the facilitation role of President Laurenço. The PSC may further call on all neighbouring countries of DRC to engage constructively towards averting further escalation of the situation into a regional crisis. On support to SAMIDRC, the PSC may request the AU Commission to work out modalities for using the CRF funds for supporting SAMIDRC.

by Amani Africa

AU's take on UN Security Council Resolution 2719 on financing of PSOs

Date | 1 March 2024

On the eve of Christmas, the UN Security Council (UNSC), against the background of its deepening polarization over its failure to mobilize collective action on the war in Gaza, pulled off a Christmas surprise. In a rare show of unity, the UNSC unanimously adopted resolution 2719 (2023). After years of, sometimes unsuccessful efforts, this resolution establishes a framework towards providing predictable and sustainable financing for African Union (AU) Peace Support Operations (PSOs) authorized by the Security Council through UN assessed contributions, seizing the new momentum that arose in 2023.

The AU Commission Chairperson, Moussa Faki Mahamat, welcomed the resolution calling it rather enthusiastically a historic development. Not surprisingly and considering the strong view that members of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) expressed on the issue of capping access to UN assessed contributions to a particular percentage, this resolution was not greeted with as warm a reception from all its member states.

The first opportunity for the PSC’s reaction to resolution 2719 following its adoption was in the context of the preparation of the report on its activities and the state of peace and security for submission to the 37^th AU Assembly of Heads of States and Government. The PSC report deemed the resolution as constituting an ‘initial step’, ‘inconsistent with the guidance provided by the Assembly’ and ‘contrary to the guidance provided by the PSC to the A3’. As we have reported in an earlier analysis based on extensive engagements and exchanges, this was not completely unexpected.

To the extent that AU’s deployment is in lieu of UN peacekeeping and as one avenue for implementing the primary responsibility of the UNSC, the expectation for the use of UN assessed contributions with no cap is not without merit. After all, the issue of predictable, adequate and sustainable funding of AU PSOs is principally about ‘the kind of arrangement that can best deliver on the pledge of the UN Charter for saving succeeding generations from the scourge of war’ rather than being about money, as we have argued in our briefing to the UN Security Council.

“To the extent that AU’s deployment is in lieu of UN peacekeeping and as one avenue for implementing the primary responsibility of the UNSC, the expectation for the use of UN assessed contributions with no cap is not without merit.”

At the same time, it is also important to put the adoption of this resolution in a historical perspective. This resolution was a result of more than a decade-old discussion and several attempts by the African members of the UN Security Council (A3) over the years. Particularly, in 2018, the A3 (Cote d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea and Ethiopia) managed to get an endorsement from the AUPSC for a draft resolution which they put in blue but was ultimately halted due to a U.S. veto threat, reticence by other Council members including the P5, and internal A3 divisions.

A comparative analysis of these two texts clearly highlights the global shift in perspectives. As discussed in our special research report and became apparent during the 25 May 2023 UNSC briefing on the subject, this shift includes, particularly among key Security Council members, greater appreciation of the role of AU PSOs and the need to finance them in a more sustainable and predictable manner, including through UN assessed contributions.

The two texts (the 2018 draft and resolution 2719) have significant similarities along with some major differences. Both underscore the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council for maintaining international peace and security and emphasize the oversight responsibilities of the Council for AU PSOs. They highlight the importance of cooperation between the UN and the AU, in line with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, to address conflicts in Africa effectively and acknowledge the need for collaboration with regional organizations, neighboring countries, and other relevant partners to address conflicts on the continent.

Both 2719 and the 2018 draft draw upon the Report of the Secretary-General on options for authorization and support for African Union peace support operations (S/2017/454) particularly in the areas of joint or consultative planning, mandating and decision-making, financing and budgeting processes, and human rights compliance and oversight. However, Resolution 2719, unlike the 2018 draft resolution that was put in blue, notably emphasizes that AU PSOs will be ‘under the direct, and effective command and control of the African Union.’

“Resolution 2719, unlike the 2018 draft resolution that was put in blue, notably emphasizes that AU PSOs will be ‘under the direct, and effective command and control of the African Union.’”

Resolution 2719 specifies detailed procedures for decision-making and authorization, including consultations, joint strategic assessments, and clear mandates. Conversely, the 2018 draft focuses more on the Security Council’s role in decision-making, with fewer details on specific procedures. While resolution 2719 clearly stipulates a joint decision-making process, the draft of 2018 gives the primary political role to the Security Council in areas such as planning, development, mandating (including renewal) and reporting of any AU PSO receiving financial support through UN assessed contributions.

In terms of financial arrangements, resolution 2719 establishes financial arrangements with detailed provisions on compliance with UN financial regulations, reimbursement frameworks, and the use of assessed contributions. It sets a hybrid approach to funding, with 75% from assessed contributions and the rest mobilized jointly by the AU and UN from the international community. The 2018 draft acknowledges the complementary role of UN Peacekeeping operations and stipulates the Council’s decision ‘in principle’ to use (on a case-by-case basis) UN-assessed contributions, not exceeding 75%, for AU-led peace support operations. However, it stays silent about how the 25% should be covered and provides fewer details on financial arrangements and oversight mechanisms.

Regarding financial burden sharing, the 2018 draft welcomed the AU’s commitment to fund 25% of AU peace support operation costs by 2021. While it envisages a joint AU-UN exercise to fill the 25% gap, resolution 2719 does not impose any specific financial contribution to be shared by the AU. Furthermore, it stipulates the Council’s commitment to consider all viable options in the event of significant shortfalls in resource mobilization.

“While it envisages a joint AU-UN exercise to fill the 25% gap, resolution 2719 does not impose any specific financial contribution to be shared by the AU.”

On human rights, resolution 2719 specifies compliance frameworks in detail, highlighting the operational necessity for AU-led PSOs to adhere to international law and other compliance frameworks, including human rights and humanitarian law. It emphasizes the protection of civilians, women’s participation, and collaboration in operational support. On the other hand, though draft resolution 2018 also emphasizes the importance of human rights protection, compliance with international law, and cooperation between the UN and AU, it provides fewer specifics on compliance frameworks.

The 2023 resolution includes detailed reporting and monitoring requirements, with mission specific reports every 180 days, an annual report, and a review three years after adoption. It emphasizes joint reports by the UN Secretary-General and AU Chairperson. Both expressed the Council’s intention to review any determination to provide financial support three years after such a decision.

Both the level of detail outlined in the resolution and the level of autonomous control that the AU maintains under resolution 2719 constitute positive gains over the 2018 draft. Indeed, the PSC report also did not stop at registering reservations both on process and substance. It took a realistic approach on how to take resolution 2719 forward.

“Both the level of detail outlined in the resolution and the level of autonomous control that the AU maintains under resolution 2719 constitute positive gains over the 2018 draft.”

The PSC report accordingly recommended to the AU Assembly to ‘take note’ of the resolution as ‘an initial step’ towards securing predictable, adequate and sustainable financing of AU-led PSOs. The AU Assembly, welcomed the decision as a ‘significant step forward towards securing predictable, adequate and sustainable funding’, with some leaders expressing strong support for it. Most significantly, the PSC recommended for the AU Assembly to urge the ‘full implementation of the resolution, in good faith, honoring the purpose and principles of the Charter… and …Article 24 of the Charter.’ Thus, despite the reservations or misgivings expressed on the part of AU policy bodies, the call for full implementation avails the opportunity for harnessing the value proposition of this resolution with all its limitations. A saying that aptly captures this take of the AU on resolution 2719 is ‘the taste of the pudding is in the eating.’ Indeed, whether this resolution constitutes a landmark development in responding to the long quest for predictable, adequate and sustainable funding would depend on its activation and implementation.

“A saying that aptly captures this take of the AU on resolution 2719 is ‘the taste of the pudding is in the eating.’”

Beyond its expected contribution to financing, the value of resolution 2719 in reinforcing the role of the AU in deploying PSOs and in bringing the application of its multilateral and normative policies and rules to all missions seeking to benefit from UN assessed contributions cannot and should not be overemphasized. This is made evident from the provision in the resolution that the Council will consider requests for support from UN assessed contributions only to those AU PSOs under the AU’s direct and effective command and control. The nature of the interactions and engagement that the decision-making processes and the reporting requirements entail are also sure to transform the working relationship between the AU and the UN.

Admittedly, while the extent to which it would indeed contribute towards addressing the perennial issue of predictable, adequate and sustainable funding of AU PSOs would become known and tested when the first test case arises, it should also be borne in mind that the devil lies in the implementation details. At the operational level, AU Commission personnel have started to indicate that the administrative and procedural requirements of 2719 may, in the end, limit speedy deployment and operational effectiveness considering the type of kinetic heavy role expected of AU PSOs. This reality is despite the recognition in the resolution of the aim of ‘early action and rapid deployment to prevent violent conflict and its escalation.’

Clarity on the details and the effective operationalization of resolution 2719 depends on answering a number of key questions. These include:

How would the diagram of consultative decision making that the Secretary-General presented in his report on options for authorization and support for AU PSOs be translated into action?
What are the processes for activation of the resolution? Who from the AU and the UN plays what role in the activation of the resolution?
What kind of working arrangements need to be put in place in New York and Addis Ababa to this end?
What kind of working processes and relationships need to be established or enhanced between the AU and the UN? Should a standing joint taskforce or working group of AUC PAPS and the UN Secretariat be established to interface continuously from the outset of any indication of the need for a 2719-type mission?
How can the ‘primacy of political solutions’ be maintained in 2719-type missions, recognizing that such solutions are the best pathway for sustainable peace? How can APSA tools be effectively strengthened and leveraged toward that end?
What kind of capacities need to be reinforced on the part of the UN, including in terms of the role of the UN Office to the AU in Addis Ababa to provide continuing support to the AU not only in mission planning, but also in mission management and, in due course, liquidation?
What of the capacities at the level of the AU in areas such as planning, monitoring, reporting, strategic assessment, compliance, budgeting, financial compliance and reporting, etc?
Does it matter how the 25% is mobilized? Should there be and is there a relationship between the 75% and the remaining balance?
What are the processes, not only just for decision-making, the authorization and use of UN assessed contributions but also for mandate review and renewals?

Clearly, a lot of work has to be undertaken to clarify these and related questions while bearing in mind that the answers to some of the questions may vary from case to case. It is only after such clarification and in the course of implementation that the actual worth of resolution 2719 would become apparent. Various commentaries and articles have recently been published to help enhance understanding on resolution 2719. A nice such recent work that actually offers some useful materials for responding to some of these questions is here.

“Clearly, a lot of work has to be undertaken to clarify these and related questions while bearing in mind that the answers to some of the questions may vary from case to case.”

We recognise that not all the answers may be immediately available and that the resolution may be vague in certain critical areas to maintain ‘constructive ambiguity’ and ensure consensus in the Security Council. Hence, the proof of the 2719 pudding will be in its operationalization in specific cases. Pending the required level of clarification to all these and related questions and to avoid disappointments on both sides, it is worthwhile that the AU and the UN engage in exchanges for developing the minimum required shared understanding of what resolution 2719 means and may require for its implementation.

by Amani Africa

Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - January 2024

Date | January 2024

In January, under the chairship of Ghana, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) had a scheduled program of work consisting of five sessions and a field mission to Tigray. After the introduction of a new agenda item in the course of the month, six sessions were convened.

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by Amani Africa