Open Session on Women, Peace and Security in the context of the AU theme of the year for 2023
Open Session on Women, Peace and Security in the context of the AU theme of the year for 2023
Date | 14 March 2023
Tomorrow (14 March), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1144th meeting which will be committed to its annual open session on women, peace and security (WPS). In line with AU’s theme for the year 2023 – acceleration of implementing the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) –, it is expected that the session will pay particular attention to integration of WPS agenda in the implementation of the AfCFTA. This session is also convened at the time of the 20th anniversary of the landmark Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights on the Rights of Women (Maputo Protocol).
Following opening remarks by Innocent Eugene Shiyo, Permanent Representative of Tanzania and Chairperson of the PSC for the month of March, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, is expected to make a statement. It is expected to pay homage to the contribution of women and AU Commission’s work on WPS. Bineta Diop, AU Special Envoy on WPS, is also expected to brief the PSC. Representatives of United Nations (UN) Office to the AU (UNOAU) and UN Women may also make statements.
Since its 223rd session convened on 30 March 2010 when it decided to hold annual open sessions dedicated to the WPS theme, the PSC has institutionalised its session dedicated to WPS agenda in Africa. The last time the PSC held a session on WPS, the 1109th session committed to commemoration of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on WPS (S/RES/1325), the focus was on the persisting challenge faced in the fight against sexual and gender based violence (SGBV) in conflict and crisis settings. One of the key outcomes of the session was PSC’s request to the AU Special Envoy to ‘establish a forum for knowledge sharing amongst the AU Member States and partners to leverage experience, lessons learnt and good practices in addressing sexual violence against women in conflicts and crises’. While the follow up and report on action taken in this regard is expected to take place in the session of the PSC on WPS focusing on 1325 later in the year, tomorrow’s session may address it by drawing attention to the ways in which the integration of WPS within the AfCFTA implementation also enhances protection of women and girls from SGBV.
Estimates indicate that between 70% and 80% of African informal cross-border traders are women. The engagement of women in informal cross-border trading not only advances women’s empowerment, but also significantly contributes to poverty reduction in the continent by presenting women the opportunity for income generation. However, women cross border traders operate their businesses under serious risks to their person and property. This is particularly the case in border areas in fragile and conflict affected territories.
The result of the lack of targeted protection measures particularly for informal traders means not only that women traders are subject to various kinds of risks but their societies are deprived of the opportunity to benefit from the full scale of the socio-economic contributions of women cross border trade. In various regions of the continent, women cross border traders face challenges emanating from the absence of proper regulatory frameworks that govern their activities. Studies indicate for example, women cross border traders in the west African region experience multitude of challenges and insecurities due to the informal nature of their trading activities. Although the regional economic bloc, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) provides the proper platform for facilitating protected free trade in the region, this platform caters to formal sectors of trade while those engaged in informal cross border trade largely remain marginalised. Representing about 60% of informal traders in the region, women hence bear the brunt of the absence of policies that regulate their trading practices. The same is true for women informal traders in the East African Community (EAC) region, 90% of which are estimated to rely on cross border trade as their only source of income.
Due to the informal nature of their activities, women engaged in cross border trade are excluded from accessing information related to customs and border regulations. They also do not benefit from initiatives aimed at enhancing inter-state trade at national and regional levels, including in the form of access to profitable markets and credit services. In addition, the lack of sufficient awareness and uncertainties about border procedures among women informal traders exposes them to corrupt practices and manipulation.
One good example of an activity women in cross border trading are largely engaged in is Artisanal and Small-scale Mining (ASM). In Africa, it is estimated that no less than 40% to 50% of the workforce engaged in ASM is comprised of women. Due to deeply rooted misconceptions of gender roles and constrictive legal standards that are influenced by oppressive cultural norms, women engaged in ASM are often left behind in accessing relevant equipment, technology and institutional support key for a successful engagement in the sector. As a result, majority of these women are forced to pursue informal routes for trading in mines and minerals across borders. Not only does this expose women to multi-layered risks, it also imposes an economic disadvantage to states by facilitating illegal smuggling of mines outside of their borders.
Worse still, women cross border traders in conflict and post-conflict settings face even more serious violations that range from verbal abuse, to physical harm and sexual violence. Regulatory vacuums that result due to the situation of insecurity and instability in such settings leave women vulnerable to gender specific risks and exploitations. For instance, a 2022 report by the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) indicates that at the Goma border post between the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Rwanda, not only are women cross border traders subjected to indecent searches by male inspectors, but are also raped after confiscation of their goods. Poor infrastructure and absence of state presence in the northern parts of DRC also subject women cross border traders to travel long distances in insecure settings, exposing them to varying forms of sexual violence and even murder according to the report.
In the context of displacement, women living in refugee camps are also largely engaged in informal trade activities. Due to the way refugee camps are often established and the general form in which populations fleeing conflicts and instability in their country of origin tend to settle in border areas of neighbouring states, such areas often end up being hot spots for intense informal cross border trade. However, women refugees engaged in informal trade in such settings operate not only under major financial and infrastructural constraints as well as restrictions to their movements, they also conduct their business under the constant fear of being discovered by border control police provided that their informal trade is treated as illegal activity.
It is in the light of these realities that the integration of WPS in the implementation of the AfCFTA becomes a critical point of discussion for the PSC within the framework of its annual engagement on the WPS agenda. The AfCFTA Agreement already envisages under Article 27, the commitment of states parties to improve ‘the export capacity of both formal and informal service suppliers, with particular attention to micro, small and medium size women and youth service suppliers’. The Agreement further recognises the importance of gender equality in order to attain sustainable and inclusive socio-economic development as well as structural transformation of states parties. This focus on the provision of regulatory protection to women cross border traders in the informal sectors also enables border communities and trading societies to harvest the full scale of the socio-economic contributions of women’s cross border economic and trade activities.
The AfCFTA, when fully operational, also presents multiple practical opportunities for women involved in informal cross border trade. These include the free movement of persons and goods as well as the reduction of burdensome trading costs through the elimination of tariffs for intra-Africa trade, among others. Hence, the AfCFTA framework already provides critical entry points for integration of women rights and WPS. The implementation of AfCFTA in a manner that takes into consideration the specific concerns of women engaged in cross border trading, particularly in conflict and crisis settings, largely depends on the level of commitment and political will of relevant policy actors. Tomorrow’s session hence serves the PSC to urge all relevant stakeholders to factor in the importance of both gender equality and the WPS agenda for the full realisation of the objectives of the AfCFTA in its implementation.
The outcome of tomorrow’s session is expected to be a Communiqué. The PSC is expected to emphasise the importance of integrating WPS into the implementation of the AfCFTA. It may emphasis how such integration helps to enhance regulatory protection to women cross border traders as a measure to foster both their equal participation in trade and their important contributions to Africa’s economy. It may recall Aspiration 6 of Agenda 2063 which calls for ‘an Africa, whose development is people-driven, relying on the potential of African people, especially its women and youth’ to emphasise the centrality of women’s full inclusion and involvement in the AfCFTA. It may further call on AU member states to take their commitments to gender equality and implementation of WPS agenda into consideration in the development of their national policies on implementation of the AfCFTA for the enhancement of cross border trade. The PSC may also note the 20th anniversary of the adoption of Maputo Protocol, urge states parties to the protocol to ensure its full implementation and call on member states that have not yet ratified the instrument to do so. The PSC may request the Special Envoy on WPS to work with the AfCFTA Secretariat and the PAPS Department both to undertake activities that document and popularise the cross border trade activities of women including those in fragile and conflict affected territories and to outline targeted proposals on how the WPS can be meaningfully integrated in the processes and implementation of the AfCFTA as part of the AU theme of the year for protection of women (informal) traders and harnessing of the contributions of their trade activities to the socio-economic advancement of their families, communities and societies.
Annual Activity Report of Amani Africa 2022
Annual Activity Report of Amani Africa 2022
HIGHLIGHTS OF THE YEAR
2022 was yet another year of major milestones in Amani Africa’s emergence as the leading source of information and analysis on matters African Union (AU) in general and its peace and security, democratic governance and international relations works in particular. Apart from producing most current information and analysis on some of the major developments in these various areas of work of the AU, we have become a trusted technical institution for contributing to the policy activities of AU actors, international organizations, diplomatic missions and CSOs.
Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - January 2023
Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - January 2023
Date | January 2023
Uganda was the stand-in chair of the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) in January. Five sessions were convened during the month. Out of these, two were substantive sessions with specific thematic focus while the remaining three were committed to the consideration of reports and outcome documents emerging from the PSC’s various activities in the preceding months.
The case for a feminist approach to peace and security
The case for a feminist approach to peace and security
Date | 08 March 2023
Solomon Ayele Dersso, PhD
Founding Director, Amani Africa
For a number of years, some countries such as Canada, France, Mexico and Spain have adopted a feminist foreign policy. At the start of this month, coinciding with the women’s month, German Foreign Minister announced new feminist guidelines on foreign policy. As we mark the international women’s day, it is very fitting to reflect on the case for such a feminist approach to peace and security. I attempt to do this by drawing on the work of the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC).
It was in 2010 that the PSC took a decision to have the women, peace and security (WPS) theme as its standing thematic agenda. However until its convening on WPS at the level of Ministers in 2021 under Kenya’s Chairship, its engagement has broadly taken two dimensions. The first and key dimension concerns the question of protection. This is premised on the recognition of the gendered nature of conflicts and its vicious impact on women and girls. The second dimension, which also affects the first, relates to the place of women in peace processes. This is the concern about women’s participation and leadership role in decision-making on peace and security and in peace processes. Arguably, much of the policy actions of the PSC and the AU on WPS mostly centered around these two areas.
A broader feminist approach to peace and security that concerns itself with the structural conditions that lead to gender oppression affecting women and girls, going beyond manifestations of gender oppression in situations of insecurity, has not received as much attention. The PSC came close to having such a feminist approach during its ministerial level session at its 987th meeting held on 22 March 2022.
Two elements of the communique of this session standout in terms of espousing elements of a feminist approach to peace and security. The first is the acknowledgement of the significance of the issue of gender equality in society in general beyond peace and security. As contained in operational paragraph 1, it underscores ‘the need to promote peaceful and inclusive societies … broadening women’s access to education, improving their participation in the economy and decision-making, providing access to justice for all and building effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels’.
The second element reflecting the feminist approach is the reference to a comprehensive approach. Thus, in operational paragraph 6 the PSC put premium on the ‘Pertinence of adopting a comprehensive approach resting on the four pillars of prevention, protection, participation and, recovery and relief for the full and effective implementation of gender equality and the Women, Peace and Security agenda.’ The nod towards gender equality in particular is most significant.
In a statement that we submitted to the session at the time, we at Amani Africa welcomed the focus on ‘gender inclusive culture of peace’. This framing that centers WPS on a feminist approach, we argued, helps us to discuss the source of oppression of women and girls in society. This is the source of oppression that both limits women’s access to equal enjoyment of all their human rights and their equal role in society and exposes them to some of the most barbaric acts of violence, particularly in times of conflict as reports from ongoing conflict settings attest.
This feminist approach thus brings to the center of our analysis of how to advance WPS agenda the core issue at the heart of gender oppression. This is patriarchy and how patriarchy defines the roles and place of women and men in society. Patriarchy and its pervasiveness in nurturing and perpetuating structures of hierarchy and inequity in the social, political, economic and cultural life of society sustains the conditions for the unequal access of women and girls to the full measure of their rights. As the renowned Egyptian author and feminist advocate, Nawal El Saadawi, who passed away the day before the convening of the 987th session, put it, men are also less free due to the burden that patriarchy puts on them. This unfreedom of men relates to the fact that the expectation that patriarchy sets for them to act and live in a certain for them to be treated as worthy of being men.
Indeed, the way politics is organized and mobilized as well as the continuing hold of patriarchal conceptions of power not only enables social traits of domination and violence in society but also inhibits gender inclusivity. The resultant absence or weakness of gender inclusive culture of peace both exposes women and girls to domination and violence in times of negative peace (one cannot be able to speak of positive peace in conditions of pervasive oppression of women and widespread perpetuation of GBV and sexual violence) and makes them more vulnerable to be targets of violence in conflict situations.
The feminist approach to peace as a matter of necessity thus requires the dismantling of the association of politics and power to patriarchal masculinity. The dismantling and reframing of the patriarchal approach to and conception of politics and power is indeed a pre-requisite for ensuring a gender inclusive culture of peace and thereby creating the conditions for women and girls both to enjoy the full measure of their rights on an equal basis but also to live a life free from fear. This radical approach goes beyond the symptoms and manifestations and targets the underlying factors of vulnerability of women and girls to become targets of oppression and violence both in times of (negative) peace and during conflicts.
With respect to the representation and participation of women in peace processes, this approach makes it clear that the assumption of leadership positions by women at various levels of decision-making at the national level is essential. In the absence of such widespread presence of women in positions of leadership at the national level it would not be possible to have the pool of women leaders from which women can be recruited to participate and take leadership in peace processes. Additionally, there is a need for the creation of gender sensitive conditions of work in peacekeeping operations and in mediation and peace negotiation as critical measure for ensuring their effective participation in these processes free from the constraints of a patriarchal work environment that does not take account of the specific needs of women.
Arguably therefore, taking the WPS agenda to the next level requires the full embrace of this feminist approach to peace and security. The foundation laid by the 987th session of the PSC with its emphasis on gender inclusive culture of peace offers a unique opportunity to carry out this important undertaking.
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Dedicated to the women leaders in Africa and beyond who are at the fore front of champing the WPS agenda – especially the AU Special Envoy on Women, Peace and Security, the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Women in Africa (past & present), the women in diplomacy particularly the women ministers, Ambassadors and colleagues in the field of peace and security and to the many women colleagues at Amani Africa and in and beyond Africa as well as to my daughter, wife and Emaye. Happy international women’s day!
The content of this article does not represent the views of Amani Africa and reflect only the personal views of the authors who contribute to ‘Ideas Indaba’
Briefing on the situation in Somalia and Operations of ATMIS
Briefing on the situation in Somalia and Operations of ATMIS
Date | 07 March 2023
Tomorrow (07 March), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1143rd session to assess key developments in the situation in Somalia and operations of the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS).
Following opening remarks by Innocent Eugene Shiyo, Permanent Representative of Tanzania and Chairperson of the PSC for the month of March, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, is expected to make a statement. Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission (SRCC) for Somalia and Head of ATMIS, Mohammed El-Amine Souef may also brief the PSC. The representatives of the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU) are also expected to deliver statements.
The last time the PSC considered the situation in Somalia and operations of ATMIS was at its 1121st meeting held on 11 November 2022, when it approved the Somali government’s request to extend Phase I of ATMIS operational timelines for six months. Tomorrow’s meeting will afford the PSC the opportunity to deliberate on the security situation in Somalia, including the ongoing offensive operations against Al-Shabaab. The meeting is also expected to assess the status of force generation and integration and efforts being made to meet the extended deadline of 30 June 2023 for ATMIS Phase I drawdown. It will also follow on the request it made for the AU Commission to submit a joint report, including a technical assessment of progress made and compliance with agreed benchmarks, in order to guide the PSC on the next steps in the transition including proposals on revisions of the CONOPs and force generation requirements.
The Somali National Army (SNA) together with allied local militia have succeeded in dislodging Al-Shabaab from some of its strongholds in Galmudug and Hirshabelle regions in central Somalia. New operations have also been launched against the group in South West State and Jubaland in southern Somalia. President Mahmoud hosted a regional leaders’ summit on 1 February in Mogadishu to mobilize support for the ongoing offensive operations against Al-Shabaab. This was attended by the presidents of Djibouti and Kenya and the prime minister of Ethiopia. The leaders agreed to develop joint operational strategy against Al-Shabaab. In addition to their soldiers serving under ATMIS, these three countries are expected to deploy troops in Somalia in a matter of few weeks to support the offensive operations, according to media reports.
While under intense pressure, Al-Shabaab still continues to carry out heinous attacks using improvised explosive devices and other asymmetrical tactics. The group continues to carry out such attacks repeatedly in Mogadishu, sometimes in areas of the city meant to be protected from access to the group. Last month, ten people were killed in Mogadishu in an attack perpetrated by Al-Shabaab targeting military officials and militia fighters involved in the ongoing offensive operations. The possibility of Al-Shabaab acquiring commercial drones to enhance its capabilities seems to have also become a major concern.
In terms of the role of ATMIS in the current Somali led offensive against Al-Shabaab, at the recently held meeting of the UN Security Council (UNSC) on Somalia, SRCC Souef explained that ATMIS has been providing support to the offensive operations by SNA and allied militia including through close air support, casualty evacuation and medical evacuation, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, indirect fire support and combat service support such as ammunition, water, drugs and field accommodation.
At the PSC meeting on 7 March, SRCC Souef may explain the status of progress in terms of the implementation of Phase I of ATMIS drawdown which hinges on the progress made by the Somali government in terms of force generation and integration. At the UNSC meeting, SRCC Souef said that Somali is on track to meet its target of training 15,000 new forces this year but called on the UN to enhance its support package to the Somali security forces (SSF) beyond the mandated 13,900 forces. He also underscored the need to undertake more detailed planning on a sector-by-sector approach to identify which areas that ATMIS should continue to hold and which areas the Somali government is ready to take over or accept the risk of some ATMIS troop drawdowns.
Only three months are left for the expiry of the extended deadline and, once again, there seems to be a need for consultation on the way forward not to allow a reversal of the gains made as a result of the recent offensive operations. This is expected to be raised at the UNSC meeting which is going to be held later this month to discuss the transition in Somalia with the participation of Representatives from Somalia, the AU, the EU, and ATMIS troop-contributing countries. Two reports to be presented by the end of April pursuant to resolution 2670 (2022) will also inform future UNSC discussion and action over the coming months. These include a sector-by-sector assessment of the security situation in Somalia and ATMIS performance to be presented by the AU as well as a progress report on the implementation of the Somali transition plan, including an updated force generation plan to be presented by the Somali government.
One possible way forward could be a further extension of the ATMIS timeline to facilitate more progress with the ongoing offensive operations, sustain the gains made recently and allow the Somali government to accelerate the force generation and integration process to pave the way for ATMIS drawdown. Like what happened in November last year, the request may have to come from the Somali government itself if there is a need for a further extension of the timeline. It is to be recalled that the PSC and UNSC in their joint communique of their 16th annual consultative meeting pointed out ‘the need to ensure ATMIS Force protection and to conduct the security transition in Somalia in a manner that does not lead to a security vacuum to be exploited by Al-Shabaab.’ However, such adjustments also require sustaining international support and finding a way of addressing the funding shortfall that ATMIS is facing. When the timeline for its Phase I drawdown was extended by six months, the expectation was that bilateral and international partners will continue supporting the mission financially. A very positive development in this respect is the announcement by the EU of additional funding on 2 March last week. According to the statement from the EU, the EU Political and Security Committee approved additional Euro 85 million in support of both SSF and ATMIS. While this may not cover the funding shortfalls facing ATMIS, it would help in narrowing down the current funding gap.
The AU during the summit last month also reiterated its longstanding appeal to the UNSC to provide support to ATMIS and other AU peace support operations from UN assessed contributions. This is likely to be raised later this month when the UNSC meets to discuss the transition in Somalia. The issue of financing of ATMIS from UN assessed contributions cannot be separated from the broader discussions on the financing of AU peace support operations. This broader discussion will take place in the UNSC based on the upcoming report of the Secretary-General prepared pursuant to a 30 August 2022 Presidential statement and will be submitted by the end of April. The report is expected to provide updates on progress made by the UN and the AU to fulfill the commitments set out in resolutions 2320 (2016) and 2378 (2017), including recommendations on how to move forward on the financing of AU peace support operations that reflect good practices and lessons learned with the view to secure predictable, sustainable and flexible resources. The AU consensus paper on predictable, adequate, and sustainable financing for AU peace and security activities which has been under discussion by the PSC has now been adopted by the 36th AU Summit. This could also contribute to the discussion over the coming months.
Tomorrow’s session can also serve as an opportunity for the PSC to follow up decisions from last year including from its 1075th session and the joint communique on the 16th consultative meeting of the PSC and the UNSC which invited ‘the UN Secretary General and the Chairperson of the AU Commission to consider jointly convening an international pledging conference for ATMIS operations, by March 2023.’
The expected outcome of the session is a Communiqué. The PSC may welcome the ongoing offensive by the Somali government to degrade Al-Shabaab and commend ATMIS for its continued support. It may further welcome the joint operational strategy against Al-Shabaab planned by Somalia and its neighboring countries and encourage their continued efforts in this regard. The PSC may emphasize the need for consultations between the AU, UN, EU and the Somali government to determine timelines and exact areas for ATMIS drawdown ahead of the expiry of the fast approaching extended timeline for Phase I drawdown of ATMIS. It may also reiterate its earlier call for joint assessment and submission of report by the AU Commission. The PSC may welcome the announcement by the EU on the provision of additional funding to ATMIS and SSF. It may also echo the call made at the 36th AU Summit, for the UNSC to provide support to ATMIS and other AU peace support operations from UN assessed contributions.
The 36th AU Summit beyond peace and security: Reform of the multilateral system and the AfCFTA
The 36th Ordinary Session of the African Union Assembly was held on 18-19 February preceded by the 42nd Ordinary Session of the Executive Council on 15-16. As part of covering this year’s summit, we profile some key issues and events around the summit. We present in our ‘Ideas Indaba’ the issues that received particular attention: reform of the multilateral system and the AfCFTA.
The 36th AU Summit beyond peace and security: Reform of the multilateral system and the AfCFTA
Date | 03 March 2023
Solomon Ayele Dersso, PhD
Founding Director, Amani Africa
The members of the African Union (AU) Assembly, African Heads of State and Government, did not disappoint. They did not show up in their numbers to their own party. Well you may say, after all Addis Abeba is not Brussels, Beijing or Washington DC. One cannot help wondering if it would be a good idea for purposes of full attendance if the AU rather considers holding its summit back-to-back the summits our leaders hold with their counterparts form elsewhere in the world.
But is it really about the venue? Or is it about the value they attach to the AU, to matters pan-African? If the report of the claim by France that it is responsible for getting the President of Comoros, Azali Assoumani, to become AU Chairperson for 2023 is true, clearly there are countries like France who seem to value the AU more. As to the venue, yes, Addis Abeba is not like any of those other cities. And there is nothing bad about that. After all, Addis is Africa’s foremost diplomatic capital. A city with its own charm. Being in Addis also has an added value. It spares our dear leaders from the pain of spending our money on shopping. A huge plus in this time of crushing socio-economic distress.
Speaking of socio-economic distress on the continent, I would consider you lucky if you are not feeling the very painful pinch on your pocket. The spike in cost of living, which continues to grow every month and massively, seems to have made currencies in our continent worthless. The prospect does not look promising either. Most of our economies on the continent are facing serious debt distress during 2023 and 2024.
So, one of the questions we had was whether the leaders of our beloved continent would make this debilitating erosion of the little we have in our pockets as one of the priority agenda items during the summit. This issue also received particular attention in the summit of representatives of CSOs from across the continent held on 17-18 February in Addis Abeba for which Amani Africa had the privilege of playing a host.
It was encouraging that the dire economic issues from inflation to debt took the limelight at the summit. During the opening segment of the AU Summit, AU Commission Chairperson, Moussa Faki Mahamat, asserted that in the face of the prevailing economic challenges, the ‘activation of various mechanisms of internal resilience, intra-African solidarity, rapid implementation of African financial institutions, all supported by virtuous governance seems in my view to be the way to salvation’.
The most profound idea came from the UN Secretary General, Antonio Guterres. He hit the nail on the head by properly naming the leading source of the current economic woes facing countries such as those in Africa – the global financial system. In the words of Guterres, ‘the global financial system routinely denies them debt relief and concessional financing while charging extortionist interest rates’.
To end this unjust system, which is beyond the reach of ‘the mechanisms of internal resilience’ central to Faki’s speech, Guterres called for a new Bretton Woods moment, a moment that necessitates a fundamental reform of the system. This call was not limited to the opening session. It was echoed, among others, forcefully by President William Ruto of Kenya in his maiden address to the Assembly.
Yet, the AU summit has not gone far enough. For example, it did not put in place a common African proposal on the reform of the global financial system, something akin to the Bridgetown Initiative led by the Prime Minister of Barbados, Mia Mottle. The most the AU did was the announcement of a debt observatory. This, according to AU Commissioner for Trade and Industry, Albert Muchanga, ‘is going to be a debt observatory to enable us monitor the debt situations. We intend to have real-time data with respect to debt management around the countries of Africa.’
Unsurprisingly, this year’s theme of the AU: acceleration of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) was also a major focus of the summit. Apart from COVID-19, which highlighted the depth of lack of preparedness of African health systems and Africa’s exclusive dependence on and the unreliability of global supply chains and the skewed nature of the global trading system as the resistance to the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) waiver attested, the food and energy price crises that ensued following the invasion of Ukraine by Russia have further accentuated the imperative for intra-African trade and urgency of full operationalization of the AfCFTA.
During the summit, the theme of the year was launched with the AfCFTA Secretary General presenting the concept for the theme of the year. The three Protocols on Competition Policy, Investment and Intellectual Property Rights were tabled and considered for adoption during the summit. As the AU Assembly’s Champion for AfCFTA, former President of Niger, Mahamadou Issoufou put it, ‘the implementation of the AfCFTA will enable the continent to emerge from the colonial pact that reduced it to a mere reservoir of raw materials.’
While it did not take center stage during this year’s summit, peace and security issues, attracted some attention. AU’s highest standing decision-making body on matters of peace and security, the Peace and Security Council (PSC), held a summit level session on 17 February on the pressing conflict in Eastern DRC. Among others, the summit called for ‘the cantonment and disarmament of M23 under the control of the DRC authorities, and the supervision of EAC Regional Force.’
The Assembly also debated the African Consensus position on funding of AU peace operations, including through accessing UN assessed contributions. As stated in the consensus position paper, the AU ‘will endeavor to pay up to 25% of PSO budgetary component of AU PSOs’ from member states contributions. This, according to the paper, ‘progressively covers in large part the preparation stage of AU-Led PSOs especially effective assessment, planning, and readiness for efficient mandate implementation. In addition, this will cover costs related to strategic planning, mission-specific pre-deployment training, mission-specific technical assessments and fact-finding missions, recruitment and selection process of mission personnel, pre-deployment verification of personnel and equipment, negotiations and signing processes for the MoU between the AU and Police/Troop Contributing Countries (PTCC), negotiations and signing processes for AU-Host Country Status of Forces/Mission Agreements, negotiations and signing processes for Letters of Assists between the AU and Countries Contributing capabilities for AU-Led PSOs.’
In terms of financing of Peace Support Operations (PSOs), one of the major outcomes of the AU PSC summit on the DRC was the decision for contributing to the funding for the East African Force from the AU Peace Fund. While various figures were floated by member states during the consideration of the report of the PSC to the Assembly, the only portion of the Peace Fund, which was approved following the financial rules and available for use during 2023, is the USD 5 million from the Conflict Reserve Fund (CRF) of the Peace Fund.
One of the items that also attracted some interest was the agenda on the request for reform of the PSC with a focus on increasing representation of the Northern region, which in the current PSC set up only has the least number of seats with one three years and one two years term seats. The debate on this item was cut short with the new AU Chairperson, Assoumani, announcing that as no consensus was emerging he would take it up with his peers. As no decision was adopted by the Assembly, it remains unclear if and how this agenda would be followed up.
On the global geo-political situation, President Kagame of Rwanda pointed out in his intervention that ‘Africa must not become a casualty of geopolitical tensions. What Africa wants and needs first is peace’. At the same time, as the debate on the report of the Ministerial Committee of Ten on the Reform of the UN Security Council revealed, there is a recognition that this could be an opportune moment for advancing Africa’s longstanding quest for permanent membership in the UN Security Council. Of course, the debate also made it apparent that AU member states should guard against the pressure facing them from various quarters in the jockeying of different groupings on the reform of the UN Security Council. As the Chair of the Committee at Assembly level, Sierra Leone’s President put it, ‘Africa should stay the course, continue to speak with one voice.’
This proved to be a summit that is not dominated by peace and security issues. However, in terms of whether it makes any difference depends a great deal on the quality of decisions and the adoption by states of the measures necessary for implementation of those decisions. Thus, as a year for acceleration of implementation of the AfCFTA, the catalyst role of the AfCFTA, as the acting chief of the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) put it, in bringing supply chains closer to home and facilitating the production and trading of food and fertilisers in Africa, depends a lot on whether the requirements for harnessing its potentials would be prioritized in the ongoing push towards the operationalization of the world’s largest free trade area.
These requirements include legislation by states parties on tariffs, customs and certification of origin. Also not any less important are speeding up industrialization (and expanding manufacturing capacities including the manufacturing of medicines – we were told that our governments have left us to be dependent on importation for 98% of medicines people on the continent need), free movement of people without which goods and services could not fully move (by ensuring ratification and implementation of the protocol on free movement of persons), cross border cooperation (by ensuring ratification and implementation of the Niamey Convention) and investing in agricultural development (by among others, implementing commitments under AU’s flagship program Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Programme (CADAP) and the outcome of the Dakar Summit on food security – so that a continent with 60 % arable land reduces its dependence on importation of staple food resources from elsewhere in the world).
The content of this article does not represent the views of Amani Africa and reflect only the personal views of the authors who contribute to ‘Ideas Indaba’