Consideration of the half-year Report of the Chairperson of the commission on elections in Africa: July to December 2024 and Outlook for 2025
Consideration of the half-year Report of the Chairperson of the commission on elections in Africa: July to December 2024 and Outlook for 2025
Date | 23 January 2025
Tomorrow (24 January), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1255th session to consider the half-year report of the AU Commission on elections in Africa, covering the period between July and December 2024.
Following the opening statement of the Chairperson of the PSC for the month of January, Ennio Maes, Permanent Representative of Cote D’Ivoire, Bankole Adeoye, the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to present the report. Statements are also expected from the representatives of Member States that organised elections during the reporting period and from the representatives of the Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) that observed the elections.
The chairperson’s mid-year report on elections in Africa aligns with the PSC’s 424th session decision to receive quarterly briefings on national elections in Africa. Tomorrow’s session builds on the updates provided during the 1224th session on elections that were conducted during the first half of 2024. It will review the outcomes of elections held between July and December 2024, discuss broader trends in electoral governance across the continent and provide a snapshot of elections planned for the first half of 2025.
Dubbed an ‘election super year’, 2024 witnessed significant electoral activities in Africa, with at least 17 AU Member States conducting elections. In the second half of 2024, from July – December alone, 11 Member States organised presidential and parliamentary elections, namely: Algeria, Rwanda, Tunisia, Mozambique, Botswana, Mauritius, Gabon, Senegal, Namibia, Ghana and Chad. While the AU deployed Election Observation Missions (AUEOMs) that were notable for their inclusivity, with significant representation of women and youth among the observers to nine of these Member States, no missions were deployed to the Republics of Algeria and the parliamentary elections in Chad as the AU did not receive invitations from these Member States. The lack of such invitations risks setting a precedent that undermines AU missions and potentially weakening collective efforts to ensure transparent and credible elections on the continent.
The comprehensive electoral support extended by the AU to Member States includes deploying Election Observation Missions comprising diverse teams of short-term observers, technical experts, and representatives from civil society, youth and women’s organisations. The AU conducts pre-election and needs assessment missions to evaluate political environments stakeholder preparedness, and technical gaps. Capacity-building initiatives, such as training electoral experts and publishing reports on best practices, enhance institutional effectiveness. The AU also promotes stakeholder engagement, preventive diplomacy, and electoral reform advocacy to foster peaceful and inclusive elections. Financial and logistical support includes resources for Election Management Bodies (EMBs) and advocating state funding for equitable media coverage. Additionally, the AU emphasises post-election stability through legal dispute mechanisms and follow-ups to ensure adherence to democratic principles.
While the AUEOMs highlighted constructive roles played by political parties and EMBs in fostering inclusivity and transparency, challenges such as increased voter abstention in some member states and security concerns in areas like Mozambique were noted.
The Republic of Rwanda held its General Elections from 14 to 16 July 2024, electing a President and representatives for the Chamber of Deputies. The elections reaffirmed Paul Kagame’s hold on power with a landslide victory of 99.18% of the votes.
On 6 October, Tunisia held its first presidential election under the 2022 constitution, with Kaïs Saïed reelected in the first round with 90.69% of the votes. Despite this decisive victory, the election was marked by the lowest voter turnout since the 2011 revolution, 28.7%. The AUEOM highlighted the importance of broader voter engagement in future elections. The AU’s deployment of observers despite the deteriorating political environment, including the arrest of opposition figures and activists and a last-minute change to the electoral law that excluded judicial oversight of electoral violations, was criticised for legitimising Tunisia’s democratic backsliding.
Mozambique’s general elections, held on 9 October, underscored significant challenges in a country already grappling with security concerns in its northern provinces. Daniel Chapo of the incumbent FRELIMO secured 65.17% of the vote, extending the party’s decades-long dominance. However, the elections were marred by allegations of vote rigging, ballot box stuffing, and intimidation. The electoral environment was further marred by post-election violence, including politically motivated assassinations and a deadly crackdown on protests. The Constitutional Council’s decision to uphold the election results fueled further instability, and on 25 December, the AUC Chairperson issued a statement urging the ‘[g]overnment and all the national political and social actors to seek a peaceful solution to resolving the current crisis to avoid further loss of life’. A subsequent SADC summit, ‘mandated the SADC Panel of Elders supported by the Ministerial Committee of the Organ (MCO) Troika Member States, namely Malawi, Zambia and the United Republic of Tanzania, and the SADC Secretariat, to engage with the Government of Mozambique and key leaders of the opposition on the post-election environment in Mozambique, and report to the Chairperson of the SADC Organ by 15 January 2025.’ The summit also directed the Inter-state Defence and Security Committee to ‘propose measures to protect the regional trade routes, humanitarian corridors, and energy supplies while finding solutions to the political and security challenges in the Republic of Mozambique.’
The 30 October general elections in Botswana marked a historic victory for the Umbrella for Democratic Change (UDC), ending the Botswana Democratic Party’s (BDP) decades-long dominance. The AU commended Botswana for its peaceful political transition and high voter turnout of 81.42%. The concession of defeat by the BDP and the peaceful transfer of power were seen as positive developments.
Mauritius also held National Assembly elections on 10 November, that saw the incumbent conceding peacefully with the Alliance for Change securing a landslide victory. The elections, characterised by a voter turnout of 77.82%, were praised for their transparency and adherence to international standards.
Gabon conducted a constitutional referendum on 16 November, paving the way for a return to democratic order following the 2023 coup d’état. The referendum, which passed with 91.64% voting in favour, was a critical step towards the presidential and parliamentary elections scheduled for August 2025. While the Chairperson of the AU Commission has applauded it as an ‘important step on the restoration of democratic constitutional order’, the provisions in the newly approved constitution enable the junta leader’s potential candidacy in 2025, which is in contrast to Article 25 (4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance which prohibits perpetrators of unconstitutional change of government from running in elections that mark the formal end of governments installed by coups.
Senegal held early legislative elections on 17 November, resulting in a victory for the ruling PASTEF Party, which secured 130 seats. The peaceful and prompt acceptance of results by all parties displayed political maturity and minimised post-electoral tensions.
Namibia’s presidential and National Assembly election held on 27 November saw Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah of the ruling SWAPO elected as the country’s first female president. The elections were characterised by high voter turnout of 76.86% and peaceful conduct that further consolidated Namibia’s democratic credentials.
Ghana’s presidential and parliamentary elections on 7 December resulted in the return of John Dramani Mahama as president, with a 56.55% vote share. Ghana’s electoral process was widely regarded as exemplary, with strong institutional support and high voter confidence.
In addition to these reviews, tomorrow’s PSC session will likely examine trends in electoral governance and the importance of timely elections. The report also emphasises the need for sustained AU technical and financial support to EMBs and civil society organisations to strengthen Africa’s democratic processes.
Looking ahead, the session is expected to provide a snapshot of elections scheduled for the first half of 2025, including legislative elections in the Union of Comoros and Burundi. The AU’s readiness to deploy observation missions and technical support, contingent on Member State invitations, will be a focal point.
The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communique. The PSC is expected to adopt the report of the chairperson of the Commission and may consider recommendations to address persistent challenges, including increasing voter engagement, ensuring timely elections, and bolstering AU mission resources to match the scale and scope of other international election observation efforts. The PSC may also congratulate the Member States that organised peaceful elections during the review period and express concern over the post-election violence in Mozambique and may also call on the Mozambican authorities, concerned opposition parties and members of the public to extend full cooperation to the efforts of the AU and SADC to find a peaceful resolution to the post-election crisis and violence.
Consideration of the Report of AUC Chairperson on the activities of MNJTF and mandate renewal of the Force
Consideration of the Report of AUC Chairperson on the activities of MNJTF and mandate renewal of the Force
Date | 12 January 2025
Tomorrow (13 January), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC), in its first session of the year, will consider the report of the AU Commission Chairperson on the activities of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) and renew the force’s mandate.
Following opening remarks by Ennio Maes, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Cote d’Ivoire to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for January 2025, Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to make a statement introducing the Chairperson’s report. As usual, the Executive Secretary of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), Mamman Nuhu, is also expected to brief the PSC.
It was during its 1197th session held on 30 January 2024 that the PSC last renewed the mandate of the MNJTF for another period of twelve months, which is set to expire on 1 February 2025. The PSC also requested the AU Commission and the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) to renew the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and Support Implementation Agreement (SIA) between AU, LCBC and MNJTF Troop Contributing Countries, which will guide the provision of AU additional support to the MNJTF, for a year. Tomorrow’s session could focus on the state of operation of the MNJTF, the security situation in the Lake Chad Basin and the implementation of the regional stabilisation strategy.
There have been some notable developments during the year in the operation of the MNJTF. Although it took the MNJTF two years since the conduct of Operation Lake Sanity in 2022, the Force managed to undertake Operation Lake Sanity II during April-July 2024, following its postponement from 2023. This focused on focused on the degradation of the capacity of terrorists within the fringes of the Lake Chad Islands while enhancing local support to isolate them and induce more surrender. It is reported that the operation and related activities led to the ‘neutralisation’ of 344 members of terrorist groups and the capturing of various weapons, including one RPG bomb, 2 Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) tubes and 4 Anti-Aircraft guns. Despite these successes, it was noted in the report of the 4th LCB Governors Forum that ‘the urgent need remains to clear remnants of Boko Haram fighters from their bases on the Tumbuns (islands on the fringes of the Lake Chad) from which they continue to launch attacks on the surrounding areas and beyond. The Tumbuns serve as their logistics hub, secure havens, and staging grounds. Their occupation of these islands also facilitates their generation of funds through illegal fishing and farming activities.’ To this end, it emphasised ‘[o]ne key area of need is enhancing its (MNJTF’s) amphibious and naval capabilities in and around Lake Chad.’
The MNJTF has also continued to implement non-kinetic activities in support of the regional stabilisation strategy, including civil-military coordination (that seeks to foster trust, community dialogue and close coordination with local communities and facilitate humanitarian activities), quick impact projects and counter-messaging radio and other communication programmes. The Chairperson’s report also recorded that by ‘November 2024, the MNJTF had facilitated the return of over 3,800 IDPs to Kukawa and other communities within the MNJTF Area of Operation and about 2,306 refugees to Banki town in Nigeria.’
During 2024, the MNJTF also faced operational challenges not just from lack of resources but also from divergence of national interests and variations in military strategies among participating countries, as well as geopolitical challenges. In October 2024, 40 Chadian soldiers were killed in a terrorist attack targeting a military base near Chad’s border with Nigeria. Boko Haram was allegedly responsible for the attack, prompting the Chadian security forces to launch a military operation, reportedly killing at least 61 terrorist elements. Following this incident, Chad’s President Mahamat Idriss Déby threatened to withdraw from the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), accusing the force of failing to address the security threats posed by terrorist groups. Additionally, the MNJTF was forced to operate for much of 2024 without the participation of Niger, which suspended its participation following the souring of relations owing to the sanctions imposed on Niger by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). As such, the Force operated its 13,799 troops in 3 MNJTF Sectors of Cameroon, Chad and Nigeria.
However, a major positive development took place during the third quarter of 2024 with respect to Niger’s participation in MNJTF. The December 2024 report of the UN Secretary-General on West Africa noted that on ‘28 August, the defence chiefs of Niger and Nigeria signed a memorandum of understanding in Niamey to boost cooperation against terrorism in the Lake Chad basin, with the Niger resuming its participation in the Multinational Joint Task Force.’
The security situation in the region indicates that the LCB region continues to maintain the significant degrees of stabilisation achieved in the affected areas, with military operations contributing to eroding the capabilities of terrorist groups operating in the areas of operation of the MNJTF and successfully restoring state presence in several borders and other areas in the region. Yet, the major terrorist groups operating in the region, namely Boko Haram and its splinter group Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), continue to pose a significant threat.
One major development that persisted during the reporting period is the worrying increase in the use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). Thus, despite the overall decline in the threat level of the region, there has been a spike in the use of IEDs, particularly in the Far North Province of Cameroon and corresponding areas on the Nigerian side of the border, targeting the MNJTF and national armed forces as well as civilians. According to the Chairperson’s report, ‘a total of 70 IED incidents were recorded compared to 50 similar incidents during the same period in 2023, with 37 soldiers and 13 civilians killed during these attacks against 34 soldiers and 57 civilians killed during similar attacks in 2023.’ Further threats to the security situation arise from suicide attacks, kidnappings and other militant and criminal activities, including predatory attacks by terrorist groups on civilian communities. In June and July 2024, suicide attacks were reported in Borno State, Nigeria, attributed to Boko Haram/Islamic State West Africa Province, resulting in several fatalities. Additionally, in September 2024, suspected Boko Haram members targeted communities in Yobe State.
The threats from the two major terrorist groups in the region, combined with the impact of climate change, have exacerbated the humanitarian crisis in the region. The report of the 4th Governance Forum of the LCB noted that during the 13 years of insurgency and conflicts, ‘Boko Haram and ISWAP continue to attack and unleash violence on communities, producing around 2.9 million internally displaced (IDPs), including 2 million in Nigeria alone.’ According to the latest UN figures from September, there are approximately 21,650 refugees, more than 220,600 internally displaced persons, and around 16,885 returnees in Chad. In Cameroon, the numbers are about 120,600 refugees and 453,660 internally displaced persons. The humanitarian situation is also affected by inadequate humanitarian and rehabilitation support, which undermines returnees. In this respect, the Chairperson’s report noted that ‘[w]hile the number of resettled populations have continued to rise, most of these communities received little or no form of humanitarian assistance, and there is a need for urgent actions to enhance the livelihoods of these resettled communities.’ Climate change further aggravates the difficult humanitarian situation in the region, as recent flooding events affecting all of LCB countries highlighted. The UN reported that as of ‘2 December, over 4.9 million people have been affected by floods, with 1.94 million in Chad, 1.52 million in Niger, 612,700 in Nigeria and over 448,000 in Cameroon.
The other issue expected to receive attention during tomorrow’s session is the implementation of the Regional Stabilisation, Recovery, and Resilience Strategy for Areas Affected by Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin. One of the major developments in this respect during the reporting period is the updating of the Strategy. On 20 September 2024, the 5th meeting of the Steering Committee for the implementation of this regional strategy took place virtually. The meeting approved the adjusted Regional Strategy and Community-based Reconciliation and Reintegration Policy for 2025-2030, which is expected to be endorsed by the LCBC Council of Ministers. The revised strategy seeks to shift focus from stabilisation efforts to sustained stability and put greater emphasis on socio-economic development on the basis of the security, humanitarian and development nexus approach.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may commend the MNJTF for the progress it registered in degrading the capabilities of the terrorist groups operating in its areas of operation in the LCB region and the resultant progress in the stabilisation of the affected regions. It may also welcome the productive conclusion of Operation Lake Sanity II undertaken by MNJTF. The PSC may commend the MNJTF participating countries and encourage them to sustain and enhance the close coordination between them. In this respect, the PSC may welcome the MOU signed between Nigeria and Niger and the resumption of Niger’s participation in the MNJTF. It may call on AU and LCBC to mobilise additional support to the MNJTF particularly in terms of enhancing its anti IED and amphibious and naval capabilities. It may request the renewal of the MoU between the AU and the LCBC for another year. In light of the threat that terrorist groups in the LCB region pose and the need for sustaining gains made, the PSC is expected to renew the mandate of the MNJTF for a further period of 12 months. The PSC may also commend the LCBC for its role in the stabilisation of the region through the implementation of the Regional Stabilisation Strategy and the progress made towards the revision and adjustment of the Strategy. The PSC may express concern about the humanitarian situation in the region, including the impact of climate change and the recent flooding. It may underscore the need for a climate change sensitive programming and provision of rehabilitation support for affected regions and communities.
The African Union Peace and Security Council Handbook - 2024
Amani Africa
2024
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The African Union Peace and Security Council Handbook is an initiative of Amani Africa Media and Research Services (Amani Africa) that provides authoritative information and analysis on the PSC and its work. As with the previous three editions of the Handbook, this edition of the Handbook benefited from Amani Africa’s engagement with the key actors in the work of the PSC. I wish to acknowledge members of the PSC, in particular the monthly chairpersons of the PSC, the PSC Secretariat, and members of the Committee of experts for their support towards the preparation of this edition of the Handbook.
I wish to extend special thanks to H.E. Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for the Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) for the Foreword, underscoring the importance of research and analysis in supporting the implementation of the PSC protocol.
Allow me to also recognize with appreciation the usual support of the staff of the PSC Secretariat, particularly Neema Nicholaus Chusi, the Head of the PSC Secretariat.
This edition of the Handbook is a product of Amani Africa’s engagements with the wider staff of the PAPS Department to whom we also extend our gratitude.
We wish to thank the Government of Switzerland that provided partner support for the project on the updating and publication of this new edition of the Handbook.
Dr Solomon Ayele Dersso, on behalf of Amani Africa team
Provisional Programme of Work of the Peace and Security Council for January 2025
Provisional Programme of Work of the Peace and Security Council for January 2025
Date | January 2025
The Republic of Côte d’Ivoire will be chairing the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) in January 2025 through Ennio Maes, Permanent Representative of Côte d’Ivoire to the AU. The Provisional Programme of Work (PPoW) for the month envisages seven substantive sessions covering eight agenda items. Seven of the eight agenda items are on thematic issues while one is dedicated to a country situation. All the sessions are scheduled to take place at the ambassadorial level. No open session is stipulated in the PPoW.
The first session of the month, scheduled for 13 January, will consider the AU Commission’s report on the activities and mandate renewal of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), which is set to expire on 1 February 2025. The session is also expected to evaluate the security situation in the Lake Chad Basin (LCB) and the MNJTF’s efforts in countering Boko Haram and the two main splinter groups Jama’tu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS) and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) who continue to pose significant threats to regional peace and security. Despite the MNJTF’s operational success in neutralising several Boko Haram elements and disrupting the group’s supply lines, critical developments such as Niger’s suspension of its MNJTF membership and Chad’s potential withdrawal pose significant challenges that could greatly weaken the coalition’s efforts.
On 20 January, the PSC will convene its second session on strengthening cooperation and collaboration between the PSC and RECs/RMs in the management of conflict and new security threats on the continent. In 2024, the PSC commendably convened two of its Inaugural Annual Joint Consultative Meetings with the Mediation and Security Council of ECOWAS in April in Abuja, Nigeria and Southern African Development Community (SADC) Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security in August in Gaborone, Botswana. These meetings aimed to enhance the coordination and collaboration between the PSC and RECs/RMs in line with Article 16 of the PSC Protocol and various PSC instruments, including the 2008 Memorandum of Understanding. This session is expected to discuss trends and developments in the relationship between the two levels and areas for collaboration and coordination in matters of peace and security with all regional blocs to enhance synergies in regional peace and security efforts.
The third session is expected to be held on 22 January and will be committed to receiving updates on the situation in Somalia and the deployment of the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission (AUSSOM). The session will come shortly after the AUUSOM’s mandate is launched and will seek to assess the deployment of the mission in line with the CONOPS that the PSC adopted during its 1225th session on 1 August and the Roadmap that was endorsed at the 8th UN – AU High-Level Conference on 21 October 2024. Despite the clear timelines and processes outlined in various PSC communiques, the implementation of the final phase of ATMIS and, importantly, the finalisation of the preparation of the design and components of AUSSOM were not finalised as planned. ATMIS becomes AUSSOM on 1st January before the process of ATMIS liquidation has been finalised. Resolution 2767 of the UN Security Council endorsing the decision of the PSC on the deployment of AUSSOM thus stipulated that the realignment of all AU troops from ATMIS to AUSSOM has to be completed by 30 June 2025. Additionally, the composition of AUSSOM, which, according to Somalia’s representative to the UN, was decided bilaterally rather than as envisaged in the PSC communiqué of the 1253rd meeting of the PSC, remains a source of contestation.
On 24 January, the Council will convene the PSC’s bi-annual consideration of the half-year report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on elections in Africa. Following the 1224th session held on 25 July 2024, when the PSC considered the Chairperson’s report on elections conducted in the continent during the first half of 2024, the forthcoming session is expected to consider the report on elections conducted during the second half of the year July – December 2024. In addition, the report is also expected to provide information on upcoming elections taking place in 2025, with a focus on those expected to be held during the first half of the year. Some of the elections from the second half of 2024 that could be expected to feature in the report and thus generate some discussion in the PSC are Ghana, Senegal, Rwanda, Mauritius, Namibia, Mozambique, Tunisia and Guinea Bissau. Special attention may be given to Mozambique due to the post-electoral violence that erupted in Maputo and other cities following Mozambique’s general elections. Reports of election irregularities, including ballot stuffing and intimidation and the killing of PODEMOS members, led to protests that were met with deadly force by security forces. Tensions and instability are escalating following the confirmation of the results by the Constitutional Council.
On 28 January, the PSC will convene a session with two agenda items: Consideration of the report of the activities of the Peace and Security Council and the state of Peace and Security in Africa and consideration of the report on the Implementing of the AU Master Roadmap of Practical Steps to Silencing the Guns in Africa: Achievements, Challenges and Prospects. The first agenda item, in line with Article 7 (q) of the PSC protocol and established practice, will consider the report detailing the Council’s activities in 2024 and an assessment of Africa’s peace and security landscape and submit to the 38th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly scheduled to take place in February.
On 30 January the PSC will convene to receive an Update on the operationalisation of the African Standby Force (ASF). While the ASF is a key element of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) as outlined in Article 2 (2) of the PSC protocol, its operationalisation has faced challenges. Though steps have been taken towards the operationalisation of the ASF, its full operationalisation remains a question of political will. On 12 May 2023, the 15th Specialised Technical Committee of Defence, Safety and Security (STCDSS) adopted the MoU between the AU Commission and the RECs/RMs. The adoption of the MoU was a significant step towards clarifying the respective roles and responsibilities of the AU and the RECs/RMs in the planning, deployment, employment, and post-deployment stages of the ASF. Following this, during its 1159th session held on 22 June 2023, the PSC requested the AU Commission to expedite the implementation of decisions of the 15th meeting of the STCDSS, particularly the strategic review of the ASF. The AU Commission kicked off the process of strategic review of the ASF with a technical consultative meeting held in Algiers, Algeria, on 2-4 December 2024. It is expected that the PSC will receive updates on recent developments and the next steps towards the full operationalisation of the ASF.
The last activity of the Council will be a session on 31 January where the council will commemorate Africa Day of Peace and Reconciliation for the third time to discuss the state of peace and security on the continent, share experiences on national reconciliation and lessons learnt in how the AU can best advance peace and reconciliation. The African Day of Peace and Reconciliation is celebrated annually on January 31. It was designated at the 16th Extraordinary Session of the African Union (AU) Assembly of Heads of State and Government in May 2022 in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea. The first commemoration took place on 31 January 2023, and the second on the same date in 2024. During the same summit, Angola’s President, João Manuel Gonçalves Lourenço, was appointed as the AU Champion for Peace and Reconciliation in Africa.
The PSC Committee of Experts (CoE) is also scheduled to meet during the month, from 15 – 17 January, to consider the ‘Report on the Activities of the Peace and Security Council and the State of Peace and Security in Africa’ and on 21 and 23 January to consider the ‘Report the Implementing of the AU Master Roadmap of Practical Steps to Silencing the Guns in Africa: Achievements, Challenges and Prospects’ before both of these are tabled to the PSC on 28 January as elaborated above.
Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - November 2024
Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - November 2024
Date | November 2024
In November 2024, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) undertook its activities under the chairship of the Democratic Republic of Congo for the first time since the council’s formation 20 years ago. The initial Provisional Program of Work (PPoW) envisaged seven substantive sessions in addition to the annual joint consultative meeting with the European Union Political and Security Committee (EUPSC) and its 16th retreat on the review of its working methods. The PPoW underwent two revisions that resulted in a postponement of planned sessions.
Amani Africa Briefing to the 1252nd session of the Peace and Security Council on Silencing the Guns in Africa
Amani Africa Briefing to the 1252nd session of the Peace and Security Council on Silencing the Guns in Africa
Date | 18 December 2024
Solomon Ayele Dersso, PhD
Founding Director, Amani Africa
Chairperson of the African Union Peace and Security Council, Ambassador Abdi Mohamoud Eyeb,
Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, Ambassador Bankole Adeoye,
Excellencies, distinguished members of the Peace and Security Council
A very good morning to you all.
It is an honor for me to address you today representing my organization Amani Africa Media and Research Services, an organization that is dedicated to the advancement of peace and security through supporting the noble mandate of this august house. our Union’s standing peace and security decision-making body.
Chairperson, Ambassador Adeoye, your excellencies members of the PSC,
I would like to commend you for dedicating today’s session for reviewing the state of implementation of African Union’s (AU) flagship project of silencing the guns.
It cannot be disputed that silencing the guns is the most pressing policy agenda of the AU that demands the utmost attention and urgent collective action of the entire African Union system under the leadership of this Council.
What informs the issues that are highlighted and the policy proposals presented in my address today are this urgency and supreme importance of achieving registering irreversible progress for silencing the guns in Africa. In drawing attention to these issues and outlining the proposals, I will be drawing on our recent major research report titled Memo to the new AU Commission leadership from the roaring guns on AU’s first decade of silencing the guns.
Before moving further, it is important to underscore the importance of the critical role of the AU and this Council for achieving progress towards silencing the guns. Without the AU and this Council, it is not difficult to imagine how dire the peace and security situation on the continent would have been and how untenable it would have been to even conceive of silencing the guns.
As we have pointed out in our study, the state of the peace and security situation on out continent ‘makes the AU and its standing decision-making organ, the PSC, more critical than ever. With rising global geopolitical tensions and a weakened multilateral system, the effective functioning of the AU and its PSC is now a strategic imperative for Africa.’
The first key message of this major research report, a product of more than a year of research and analysis on the first ten-year of silencing the guns, is that silencing the guns is more deeply pressing today than a decade ago when it was adopted.
Despite the efforts of the AU and various AU stakeholders and the progress registered in some cases, our report established that conflicts and crises have shown exponential increase during the decade since the launch of Silencing the Guns in Africa. Our analysis of the number of conflict situations on the agenda of the PSC during the decade since 2013 highlighted the increase in conflict and crisis situations in Africa by nearly threefold. This is further substantiated by our analysis of global conflict datasets, which adduce data showing the alarming spike in conflict events on the continent, with the compound annual growth rate of conflicts in Africa at a staggering 9.6%. While the level of increase is not the same, our study established that the increase is across conflict types, including state-based conflicts, one-sided conflicts, non-state conflicts and internationalised conflicts.
Not only has the number of conflicts alarmingly increased, but their geographic spread and humanitarian and socio-economic impacts have also exploded. Many more territories on the continent are affected by conflicts and crises today than when silencing the guns was launched. The number of people that bear the brunt of wars and crises on the continent has increased by many folds during the past ten years and reached a level larger than the highest number of people affected by conflict during the past six decades in absolute terms. Beyond and above the large number of lives these conflicts have claimed and displacements they have precipitated, Africa has lost enormous resources and treasures to the devastating impacts of these conflicts.
As our report put it, these conditions turned the first ten years of silencing the guns into the years of the roaring guns. The increase in the number of conflicts, their geographic spread and the severity of their impacts are making a mockery of AU’s agenda of STGs. There is no clear sign of this state of affairs changing as the AU embarked on the second phase of the STGs. The various sources of data and the accompanying analysis suggest that the approach to STGs pursued during the first ten-year period had largely failed. In his address to the opening session of the 37th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government on 17 February 2024, the AU Commission Chairperson candidly painted the grim state of the situation when asking, ‘How should we stop watching terrorism ravage some of our countries, without doing anything? How can we accept just watching African countries destroyed, entire Regions engulfed by tremours and Tsunamis, without doing anything significant?’
Our conclusion, excellencies from this bleak picture is not that silencing the guns is doomed. Nor is that we should give up on the agenda of silencing the guns.
Our conclusion is that the nature and scale of conflicts in some of the regions affected by these conflicts is such that they pose existential threat to the affected peoples and countries. This is particularly true today in the countries of the Sahel affected by conflicts involving terrorist groups and in Sudan.
Our conclusion is that the increase in the number of conflicts and the scale and consequences of the conflicts and crises has reached emergency levels. We are not being hyperbolic in making this assertion. It is how those affected experience these conditions.
Our conclusion is that the business-as-usual approach to peace and security adopted thus far in pursuing the goal of silencing the guns is not working.
Our conclusion is that STGs has to entail a more effective mobilisation of collective action for ending violent conflicts and preventing the eruption of new ones in order to register irreversible progress towards silencing the guns by 2030.
Our conclusion is that targeted policy action must be deployed in two ways: one for resolving ongoing violent conflicts and another for preventing the risks of eruption of new conflicts or relapse back to conflicts.
Excellencies,
Against this background, we outline below some of the recommendations distilled from our report:
- There is a need for a strategic review of the situation on the continent and the issues impeding the effective role of the AU and the APSA in pursuing the agenda of STGs. Such a strategic review should be one of the priorities of the AU for 2025, and it is our submission that such a review should be accompanied by a special summit of the AU under the new leadership of the AU Commission.
- The PSC needs to designate the most serious conflict situations as reaching emergency levels and constituting existential threats to the affected peoples and states. This is particularly true with respect to conflicts in the Sahel and Sudan. This necessitates the establishment of an emergency situation room dedicated to these situations with a high-level task force with the responsibility for mobilising response measures that involve a mix of stabilisation, peace enforcement and peacebuilding capacities that leverage and are deployed along with livelihood supporting and economic opportunity enhancing development interventions as well as negotiation, mediation and reconciliation.
- The PSC needs to call for the development of a conflict management and resolution strategy tailored to each conflict situation backed by the requisite technical, diplomatic and financial resources. The strategy needs not only to ensure the design and use of conflict resolution tools tailored to the specificities of each conflict situation informed by such strategy but also to provide guidance on the means and methods of ensuring the effectiveness of the use of such tools.
- There is a need to pay increasing attention to inter-communal conflicts that constitute the majority of non-state conflicts in Africa. This necessitates enhancing the development and use of peace and security tools tailored to addressing such non-state conflicts. Of interest in this respect is the need for enhancing the mapping of intercommunal conflicts and their trends through the Continental Early Warning system. It also necessitates the enhanced use of interventions that target the impacts of climate change, enhance peaceful dispute resolution mechanisms between diverse communities and deliver livelihood-enhancing and other adaptation and resilience-enhancing support.
- There is clearly a need for a much forceful and proactive approach to conflict prevention if new conflicts are to be presented from erupting. This entails that the AU and RECs/RMs as well as international organizations such as the UN and partners are able to effectively map situations that face risks of violent conflict and initiate timely policy intervention to prevent such risks from materializing.
- There is also a need to reinvigorate the use of AU-led peace support operations on the basis of the ASF. Since the deployment of the last major AU-led peace support operations in CAR and Mali, a vacuum has emerged, leading to the proliferation of ad hoc missions which are not fully anchored on the APSA and have the unintended consequence of undermining the use of AU-led peace support operations. Accordingly, AU needs to assert its leadership role in deploying peace support operations as it did some years back and leverage Resolution 2719, which affirms AU’s leadership role in peace support operations.
- We also propose foregrounding political solutions and diplomacy as the primary means of silencing the guns and thus addressing the governance and institutional fragilities and weaknesses that create the conditions both for the expansion of the terrorist threat on the continent and the eruption of violent conflicts. The PSC and the AU need to reinvigorate the primacy of diplomacy and, to this end, call for the development and implementation of a strategy that clearly establishes the range of AU diplomatic instruments and, bolsters their effectiveness and enhances their use as primary means of advancing peace and security and pursuing silencing the guns.
- The PSC may call for the development of guidelines on negotiation and dialogue for peace in conflict situations involving terrorist groups. Currently, the use of such peace and security tools (negotiation and dialogue) is frowned upon due to the exclusion of such tools in the context of the global war against terrorism. There is now a recognition that an approach that excludes negotiation and dialogue does not yield success. As such, the guidelines that the AU develops, using its well-established norm development role, help in providing guidance on how to pursue negotiation and dialogue with terrorist groups with regard to the delicate issue of de-radicalization, accountability for and reconciliation with affected members of communities.
- The PSC and the AU broadly ill afford to continue the current path of sustaining the bare minimum of their functions and increasingly contested credibility. The PSC and the AU need to reinvigorate the assumption of their leadership role in not only outlining well-grounded political solutions for the resolution of conflicts but also in mobilising the level of consensus and support from member states and other key stakeholders necessary for advancing the implementation of such political solutions supported by relevant peace and security instruments of the APSA.
