Provisional Programme of Work for the Month of September 2022

Provisional Programme of Work for the Month of September 2022

Date | September 2022

During September, Ghana will take over chairship of the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC). The provisional programme of work for the month envisages five substantive sessions addressing six agenda items. Three of these are expected to address country/region specific situations whereas the remaining three will focus on various thematic topics. One of the sessions to be convened during the month will also be taking place at Ministerial level while the remaining will be convened at Ambassadorial level. In addition to the various sessions, the provisional programme of work also envisages field missions among the activities planned for the month of September 2022.

On 1 September, the PSC will start the month with a preparatory meeting for the field mission it will undertake in Togo and Niger. The Chair is also expected to provide an overview of the sessions and activities that will be conducted in September.

The first mission of the month will be to Togo and is planned to take place from 5 to 6 September. This field mission has two purposes. The first one is to celebrate Africa Amnesty Month which has been commemorated by the PSC every September since 2017, in line with the decision of the AU Assembly adopted at its 29th Ordinary Session [Assembly/AU/Dec. 645 (XXIX)]. It is to be recalled that Assembly/AU/Dec. 645 (XXIX) declared the month of September each year, starting from 2017 till 2020, as “Africa Amnesty Month” for the surrender and collection of illegally owned weapons and arms. In December 2020, the AU Assembly, at its 14th Extraordinary Session, extended the commemoration and conduct of the Africa Amnesty Month for ten years until 2030 [Ext/Assembly/AU/Dec.1(XIV)]. The Council is expected to commemorate this year’s Amnesty Month through various symbolic activities including collection and burning of weapons and arms. During this commemorative event it is important to also reflect beyond the destruction of weapons, particularly on aspects related to security sector reform, boosting security of arms depots, enhancing the professionalization of security forces and addressing the gaps in states’ security institutions. This approach that focuses on the demand side rather than the supply side is critical in addressing the root causes of illegal circulation of arms.

The second purpose of the field mission to Togo is for the PSC to join the Mali Transition Support Group (GST-Mali) meeting taking place in Lomé on 6 September. The GST-Mali was established in 2020 with the basic purpose of supporting Mali’s political transition after the coup of 18 August 2020. The GST-Mali held its inaugural meeting on 30 November 2020 in Bamako, Mali and its second meeting on 08 March 2021 in Lomé, Togo, under the auspices of the co-chairs of the group – AU, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and United Nations (UN). The upcoming meeting of the GST-Mali will be essential in outlining the areas of support for Mali’s current transition authorities, taking into account changes that have been introduced following the second coup of 24 May 2022.

From 8 to 9 September, the PSC is scheduled to conduct its second field mission of the month which will be a visit to Niger. This field mission will serve as an opportunity to reflect on the increasing expansion of the threat of terrorism in the region.

On 12 September, Council will consider and adopt the draft provisional programme of work for the month of October 2022. On the same day, the PSC Committee of Experts (CoE) is expected to meet in preparation for the 7th Informal Joint Meeting and the 16th Annual Joint Consultative Meeting of the PSC and UN Security Council (UNSC), which is expected to take place during October. Preparation for the 14th PSC retreat and consideration of the draft communiqué of the Ministerial session planned during the month, also form part of the agenda items of the CoE meeting.

On 14 September Council will convene the first substantive session of the month which will be an inaugural annual consultative meeting between the PSC and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs). Although this will be the first time for the PSC to convene a consultative meeting with CSOs, Art.20 of the PSC Protocol sets the framework for the Council’s engagement with non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and CSOs. Moreover, at various occasions, the PSC has been briefed by CSOs and it has increasingly recognised the importance of their engagement in advancing the Council’s mandate and in promoting peace and security in the continent. The upcoming inaugural consultative meeting is expected to have a specific focus on engagement between the PSC and CSOs in the implementation of the Accra Declaration on Unconstitutional Changes of Government (UCG) and the Malabo Decisions on terrorism, UCG and humanitarian situation in Africa. The session aims at bringing umbrella organizations and regional focal points focusing on peace and security and governance.

The second substantive session of the month will be taking place on 15 September. The first agenda item of this session is expected to be consideration of the status report on the implementation of the Continental Structural Conflict Prevention Framework (CSCPF) with a focus on Country Structural Vulnerability and Resilience Assessment (CSVRA). The CSCPF was developed by the AU as a strategy aimed at addressing structural issues which evolve overtime with the potential to cause violent conflicts. It aims to deploy preventive measures through operational and direct interventions before structural weaknesses turn into large-scale violence. Within the framework of the CSCPF, the CSVRA is designed to facilitate identification of a member State’s vulnerabilities to conflict at an early stage. It assesses a member State’s performance in areas which are of relevance to the prevention of violent conflicts including socio-economic development, good governance, rule of law, democracy and human rights. It is to be recalled that Ghana volunteered to be the first country to conduct CSVRA and underwent the process in 2017 at national and regional levels. More recently, in November 2021, Zambia also conducted CSVRA. The status report to be considered at the upcoming session could highlight lessons and best practices from the experiences of these and other countries that have undergone the CSVRA.

The second agenda item expected to feature at the session taking place on 15 September is consideration of PSC’s field mission reports to Togo and Niger.

On 19 September Council will convene the third substantive session of the month to receive updates on some countries in political transition. As envisaged in the provisional programme of work for the month, Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea and Mali will be the four countries that will be discussed at this session. In addition to dedicating separate sessions to address the transitions in these countries, it is to be recalled that updates regarding transitions in each were presented at Council’s 1076th session convened on 14 April 2022. Key developments since then which could feature at the upcoming session include the lifting of economic and financial sanctions imposed against Burkina Faso and Mali by ECOWAS at its 61st Ordinary Summit which took place on 3 July 2022. This was in response to the adoption of 24 months’ transition timetables by the transition authorities of both member States. Guinea’s transition authorities on the other hand continue to uphold the 36 months transition period which ECOWAS declares unacceptable. The authorities are also growingly facing opposition from within as the demonstrations conducted during August indicate. After much delay, Chad’s national dialogue has commenced on 20 August. The dialogue which is expected to last for three weeks will be essential in determining key issues such as reforms of State institutions and drafting of a new constitution. While reportedly over 1,400 representatives from various sectors including rebel groups are taking part in the dialogue, some key oppositions have boycotted the talks.

The fourth substantive session of the month is scheduled to take place on 23 September and will be a Ministerial session on prevention and combating terrorism and violent extremism in the continent. The session will be the third Ministerial level meeting of the year. In 2021, it is to be recalled that of the ten Ministerial sessions convened during the year, three were committed to terrorism and violent extremism, demonstrating the increasing concern and corresponding Council’s attention over the expansion of terrorism and violent extremism in the continent. The upcoming session which will be taking place in the margin of the 77th UN General Assembly is expected to have a focus on strengthening regional organisations in the maintenance of peace and security in the continent. The session will also afford the PSC the opportunity to reflect on a new approach in responding to the threat of terrorism that continues to spread in the continent.

From 26 September to 01 October, the PSC CoE is expected to convene a workshop to discuss the operationalisation of the PSC Sub-Committee on Sanctions and on protection of children in conflict situations.

On 29 September, Council will convene its last session of the month to consider the political and security situations in Abyei region. Since early 2022, intercommunal tensions have been on the rise in Abyei. Clashes between communities in the region were particularly high during February and March, claiming the lives of multiple people and displacing many more. The latest news coming from the region indicates that relative calm has returned to the region following talks among representatives of the disputing community members, mediated by the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA). In addition to discussing these and other recent developments in the region, the coming session will be an opportunity for the Council to reflect on broader AU efforts to resolve the status of Abyei since its last briefing delivered at the 966th session of 24 November 2020.

The provisional programme of work for September also envisages in footnotes, a joint briefing on the AU Peace Fund and consultations between the PSC Chair and UNSC President for the month France, on dates to be determined.


Situation in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

Situation in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

Date | 31 August 2022

Tomorrow (31 August), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1103rd session to address the situation in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

Following opening remarks of the Permanent Representative of The Gambia to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for the month, Jainaba Jagne, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye is expected to deliver a statement. Statements will also be presented by the respective representatives of DRC, Republic of Rwanda, Republic of Angola (on Luanda Peace Process and as the Chair of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR)), the Republic of Kenya (on Nairobi Process), Republic of Burundi as Chair of the East African Community (EAC), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) Secretariat, Southern African Development Community (SADC) Secretariat and United Nations (UN) Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO).

The last time Council discussed the situation in eastern DRC was at its 1078th session on the Great Lakes Region (GLR) which took place on 19 April 2022. An issue of central concern which featured at that session was the resurgence of the March 23 Movement (M23), a development which further aggravates the challenges to security facing eastern DRC. In addition to deliberating on the security threats imposed by M23 and other armed groups’ insurgency in eastern DRC, tomorrow’s session is expected to address the growing concern over the possibilities of regional conflict among countries neighbouring the DRC. The session is also expected to serve as an opportunity for the PSC to discuss how it can contribute to ongoing efforts and initiatives spearheaded by EAC and ICGLR to deescalate tensions among countries in the region and to effectively respond to the armed insurgency in eastern DRC.

The recent resurfacing of M23, a movement which was assumed to have been effectively defeated through the collaborative efforts of the DRC military, MONUSCO and the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), represents the most serious security challenge to eastern DRC in recent years. Since the resumption of its military activities in March 2022, M23 has been able to advance and capture key strategic towns in Kivu and Ituri provinces. In North Kivu in particular, the M23 was able to overran the Rumangabo military base which is the largest military base of the Armed Forces of DRC (FARDC). By June 2022, a wing of M23 was able to take over the city of Bunagana along the border with Uganda. Although M23’s activities became widely apparent in March 2022, reports indicate that the movement has been infiltrating key military positions and strategic areas in North Kivu since at least November 2021.

The deteriorating insecurity in eastern DRC due to revival of M23 is also having grave humanitarian consequences. In just a few weeks of fighting and attacks by M23, over 170,000 people were reportedly displaced. According to the latest report of UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), “North Kivu has recorded twice as many cases of gender-based violence between January and June [2022] compared to the same period in 2021”. In Ituri province, the same report records the killing of over 60 civilians just between 30 July and 11 August 2022, due to intensified attacks. As a result of heightened insecurity, some non-governmental organisations (NGOs) delivering humanitarian assistance have also been forced to cease their activities in some parts of the region. The death toll among displaced populations has also been causing increasing concern among humanitarian actors in the region. In Ituri, over 800 deaths were recorded in the period from January to June 2022 and out of these, 715 are reported to have been sheltered in internally displace persons (IDP) camps. Having been redeployed to fight M23, a significant portion of the Congolese army has been unable to provide protection to vulnerable communities including IDPs.

In addition to worsening the insecurity in eastern DRC and its humanitarian toll, M23’s revival has also resulted in political tensions between DRC and Rwanda in particular. The tension has led to suspension of Air Rwanda flights to DRC and freezing of diplomatic relations. In June 2022, the DRC decided to close its border with Rwanda after a Congolese soldier was found shot dead in Rwandan territory. Since then, the tension between the two countries escalated with the two countries trading accusations and blames. On the one hand, DRC has been alleging Rwandan involvement in reviving the M23 while on the other hand, Rwanda blames DRC forces of firing rockets into its territory. Further to that, Rwanda also accuses DRC of supporting the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), an armed rebel group operating in eastern DRC and with links to the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi.

Other developments during end of 2021 and into 2022 that also apparently contributed to the heightened regional suspicion include the deployment of Ugandan forces into eastern DRC to pursue the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), a Ugandan rebel armed group which also operates actively in North Kivu province of eastern DRC. In December 2021, DRC allowed the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) to enter its territory to chase ADF fighters. Further to that and as part of the military agreement between DRC and Uganda, an MoU was also signed between the military chiefs of the two countries for the construction of roads linking DRC and Uganda. According to some reports, the MoU which has not been made public, allows the UPDF to provide security services for the construction of the roads that extend to DRC territories, which gives huge advantages to Uganda.

Following complaints expressed by DRC against alleged Rwandan support for M23 during the Executive Council meeting in Malabo, the AU Assembly at the Extraordinary Summit of 28 May 2022 entrusted Angola, as the chair of the ICGLR, to mediate talks between DRC and Rwanda. As a follow up to that, the Angolan President, João Lourenço facilitated talks between President Félix Tshisekedi and his counterpart Paul Kagame on 06 July 2022. The talks resulted in the adoption of the Luanda Roadmap which among other key points provides for the adoption of de-escalation measures including discussions around addressing the issue of FDLR. As a follow up to the adoption of the Luanda Roadmap, another meeting was held between the foreign ministers of the two countries on 21 July which led to the establishment of a Joint Permanent Commission for monitoring implementation of the roadmap.

Prior to the Luanda process, the EAC on its part has initiated the Nairobi Process for stabilising eastern DRC, under the outgoing Chairship of Kenya. The Nairobi Process envisages two parallel tracks for stabilising the region. The first one is a political track focusing on facilitating dialogue between DRC government and armed non-State actors including M23 operating in the region. The second track is a military track proposing the deployment of a regional force to contribute to the fight against negative forces.

On the proposed military track of the Nairobi Process, the EAC plans to deploy between 6,500 and 12,000 soldiers with a mandate to ‘contain, defeat and eradicate negative forces’ in the eastern DRC. While the first deployment took place during this month with Burundian troops, the deployment of other forces amid the breakdown of trust and the financing of the troops remain unclear. Two issues that the PSC is expected to address include the mandating of the force, including bringing the deployment under the ASF framework and how the AU may lend support for sourcing funds for the mission.

In terms of the role of the AU, another issue of major interest for members of the PSC is determining how the AU can support the two processes and facilitate coordination and complementarity between the Luanda and Nairobi processes. On the military track, while supporting the initiative, it is also of interest for PSC members to draw on the lessons from past experiences including from the deployment of the FIB of MONUSCO. One such lessons is the challenges of armed militias and insurgencies in eastern DRC could not be addressed through military means. This underscores the need for the primacy of political processes and also the necessity for both undertaking the military measures in strict respect to the sovereignty of the DRC and in compliance with applicable AU and UN norms, including those relating to international humanitarian law (IHL), human rights and protection of civilians.

The outcome of tomorrow’s session is expected to be a Communiqué. Council is expected to express grave concern over the developments in eastern DRC, particularly the resurgence of M23 and the resultant deterioration of the security and humanitarian situation in the region. It is also expected to express concern over the political tensions between countries in the region, particularly between DRC and Rwanda and call on both to take all necessary de-escalation measures including through good-faith engagement in mediation efforts facilitated by the AU mandated Luanda process and the relevant RECs/RMs. Council may further express its support for the Luanda and Nairobi Processes and call on all member States of the GLR to lend their support to efforts aimed at de-escalating tensions and degrading negative forces operating in the region. To enhance its role in supporting the two processes and enhancing coordination between them, the PSC may also call on the AU to establish a support mechanism that leverages existing AU processes including its liaison offices in DRC and Burundi. Council may further emphasise the importance of prioritising political solutions and implementation of military tracks in support of such political solutions. It may also stress the need to ensure respect to DRC’s sovereignty as well as standards of IHL and human rights law in the implementation of military efforts. It may further emphasise the importance of sustained and full implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework Agreement for the DRC and the region (PSCF), particularly its provisions on disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), for sustainable resolution of conflict and insurgency in the region. Having regard to the dire humanitarian situation in eastern DRC, Council may also appeal to AU member States, partners and the international community to redouble their humanitarian assistance to affected communities in the region.


Lessons Learning Session on the Implementation of the AU Transitional Justice Policy: Impact on National Resilience and Democratisation

Lessons Learning Session on the Implementation of the AU Transitional Justice Policy: Impact on National Resilience and Democratisation

Date | 22 August 2022

Tomorrow (22 August), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1102nd session on ‘Lessons Learning session on the implementation of the AU Transitional Justice Policy: Impact on National Resilience and Democratization’.

Following opening remarks of the Permanent Representative of The Gambia to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for the month, Jainaba Jagne, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye is expected to make a statement. For the experience sharing, presentations are expected from the representatives of The Gambia, Libya, South Africa, South Sudan, Sierra Leone, and Rwanda.

Tomorrow’s session will be the first time that Council discusses the AU Transitional Justice Policy (AUTJP) since its adoption in February 2019. However, Council has dedicated several sessions on the theme of ‘peace, justice and reconciliation’ since at least 2013 which in fact contributed great deal in articulating the African conception of transitional justice (TJ) and clarifying the policy options for Member States to undertake TJ process. For instance, during its 383rd meeting held at the ministerial level in Algiers in June 2013, Council highlighted around six elements that could serve as a basis for the conduct of national reconciliation processes in Africa, including the use of traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution and reconciliation and the imperative of a judicious combination of measures relating to truth telling, repentance, justice, healing, forgiveness, solidarity, reparations, reintegration and socio-economic development. These elements are indeed incorporated in the AUTJP, which reflects the contributions of the Council in shaping the Policy. At its 672nd session convened in March 2016, Council recognized that the ‘issue of achieving an equilibrium between reconciliation and justice is work in progress in the continent and that there is no universal approach or model in applying these two concepts on the ground.’ Council also underscored the importance of balancing retributive, reparative, and distributive types of justice, further highlighting the intricacies in the idea of sequencing of peace, reconciliation, and justice in Africa. It is also to be recalled that during its 525th session in July 2015, Council agreed to make the theme ‘Peace, Reconciliation and Justice’ a standing item while the 899th session which was held in December 2019 at a ministerial level decided to dedicate annual session aimed at experience sharing and lessons learning on ‘national reconciliation, restoration of peace and rebuilding of cohesion in Africa’.

As indicated in the Concept note prepared for the session, tomorrow’s session is aimed at sharing the experience on the establishment and implementation of the AUTJP at various levels of governance in Africa, as well as sharing of experiences by Member States who have implemented transitional justice processes. Such experience sharing is expected to serve as an inspiration for other Member States who are dealing with violent past. The session also presents a platform to familiarize the AUTJP and its salient features.

The AUTJP is the culmination of a nearly decade-long legislative process, having its root in the 2011 report of the Panel of the Wise titled ‘Non-Impunity, Truth, Justice and Reconciliation’. Building on the June 2006 AU Policy on Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) and drawing from the rich experiences of African countries in transitional justice, the Policy provides practical guide to Member States with violent and/or authoritarian legacies to navigate through difficult transition towards sustainable peace, justice, and democratic order. While the Policy takes significant inspiration from international norms and standards on TJ, it offers an alternative perspective to the dominant conception of TJ that is shaped by its own history, political and socio-economic realities. The Policy defines TJ to cover not only the formal mechanisms but also non-formal or traditional justice approaches that recognize the importance of symbolic and dialogic justice and traditional or religious ritual processes, as well as culturally and socially relevant forms of reparations. While the mainstream model prioritizes retributive approach focusing on criminal justice and accountability, the AUTJP tries to balance the demand for retributive criminal justice and the need for society to achieve reconciliation and rapid transition to a shared democratic future. The other saliant feature of the Policy is the emphasis given to national ownership. As highlighted in para. 32 of the Policy, national ownership entails two substantive components. The first is ‘process leadership and decision making’ whereby national stakeholders involving all sides most importantly victims drive the design and implementation of TJ. The second is the ‘primacy of national resources and capacities’ which emphasizes the need to adapt and exhaust all suitable formal and traditional mechanisms that are available at the local level before resorting to foreign sources and capacities.

The AU is one of the actors identified in the AUTJP bestowed with the role of providing the strategic political leadership at the continental level for the successful implementation of the Policy. It is in this framework that the AU Commission developed a Roadmap for the implementation of the Policy in 2020, which serves as the vehicle for coordinating AUC’s activities regarding the implementation of the Policy for the period 2020-2024. In tomorrow’s briefing, the Commission may highlight some of its activities towards the implementation of the AUTJP. The Commission is likely to mention range of technical assistances provided to Member States including the provision of trainings on the application of the Policy (The Gambia, Zimbabwe, and South Sudan), support to the development of national transitional justice strategy and policy (DRC and South Sudan), support to the development and implementation of TJ programmes (Libya), and translation of the AUTJP into local languages (such as Ethiopia).

The other aspect of the session is expected to be experience sharing where invited Member States are expected to shed light on their experiences, best practices, and challenges, as well as how they addressed peace versus justice dilemma.

In the case of The Gambia, one of the issues likely to be raised is how the proceedings of the transitional justice process enormously uplifted the political consciousness of the public and provided platform not only to expose the depth of the violations perpetrated by the previous regime but also for public hearing and acknowledgement of the brutalities victims and their families and communities endured. In his recent piece published on 8 June, the former Executive Secretary of The Gambia’s Truth, Reconciliation and Reparation Commission (TRRC), Baba Galleh Jallow, stated that in a radical departure from previous experiences of truth commissions, ‘the Gambian TRRC created an institutional structure, operational method, and strategic communication processes built on the twin principles of inclusivity and transparency that allowed it to be visibly transformative well before the completion of its work and submission of its final report and recommendations to the Government.’ This is on account of the strong interest that the works of the Commission, particularly its public hearings, evoked among the public, which was previously experienced profoundly during South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission proceedings as well. In balancing between justice and reconciliation, the Commission combined different modalities including prosecution, amnesty, and reparation. TRRC delivered a final report documenting violations and abuses of human rights from 1994 to 2017 and the government also issued a white paper in May containing its response to the recommendations of the report. While these are steps in the right direction, the success story of The Gambia’s TJ process would remain incomplete without translating those recommendations into action.

Rwanda’s experience reveals the use of combination of customary African values with international and domestic criminal justice to deal with the crime of genocide. International, national, and traditional criminal courts operated together but the traditional Gacaca community justice process remain its key feature. The Gacaca court is lauded for its role in filling in for the formal court system that were decimated during the genocide. It was also instrumental in facilitating truth telling, promote reconciliation, and end impunity. However, forgetting that the Gacaca courts were dealing with extraordinary conditions of mass atrocities that also destroyed formal legal institutions and implicated extraordinarily large number of peoples, some have wrongly sought to hold the processes of the Gacaca courts to standards that are crafted and envisaged for ordinary times.

The TJ process in Sierra Leone was marked by the simultaneous operation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission and a special hybrid court. It allowed the country to pursue both justice and reconciliation, and it is particularly raised in the context of its special attention to the subject of sexual abuses and to the experiences of children within the armed conflict. The simultaneous existence of the truth commission and a hybrid special court however brought about confusion over mandates. The two processes were also constrained by the focus on national level actors and the vertical state-society relations, thereby leaving enormous vacuum for reconciliation & justice at the local level, which the traditional processes used at the local levels tried to fill in, enabling child soldier to be reintegrated back to the community and broken social relationships to start to heal.

In the world of transitional justice, the experience that received world-wide recognition for making truth and reconciliation commissions globally popular is South Africa. The TJ process in South Africa emphasized truth and reconciliation over criminal prosecution. The process has delivered political transformation and democracy to the country. There are today calls for consolidation of the gains achieved through the TRC process by implementation of the recommendations in the TRC Report, notably those relating to reparations, and by instituting process for addressing the socio-economic dimensions of South Africa’s past that continues to imped the structural transformation of the society and the dismantling of pervasive inequalities affecting the historically oppressed majority of South Africans.

In Libya and South Sudan, the TJ process is not only in its nascent stage but also facing enormous challenge. In case of South Sudan, the establishment of the Commission of for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing as well as Reparation Commission is a welcome development. For these processes to deliver the justice expectations of victims and survivors of the brutal civil war, it is imperative that they are organized and carried out in full compliance with the standards set in the AUTJP including the inclusive and transparent process of constituting the members of these bodies and ensuring their full independence from political interference and full participation of victims and survivors. Additionally, attention should be paid on how to take advantage of the unique legal and policy resources that the AUTJP  offers for operationalization of the hybrid court in a way that addresses the challenge to balance criminal accountability and reconciliation. In Libya, the process has been stalled as the country continues to reel under political and security crisis. However, the representative may shed light on recent activities including the support provided by AU Commission towards the development of a legitimate TJ programme and National Reconciliation Commission.

Issues of political buy-in from Member States and financial limitations are expected to be highlighted as challenge to the implementation of TJ in the continent. As rightly captured in the AUTJP, it is the primary responsibility of Member States to pursue TJ process and its success ultimately depends on the political commitment, leadership, and capacity of the concerned country. Financial constraint is another factor likely to compromise the level and quality of support that AU could provide to Member States. It was also for lack of funding that the AU ended its Technical Support Team in The Gambia (AUTSTG), one of its success stories in supporting countries in political transition. One important avenue that the Council may consider addressing this challenge is the utilization of the Peace Fund. It is worth recalling that transitional justice mechanisms, truth and reconciliation processes are identified as one of the strategic priorities under Window 2 for the utilization of the Peace Fund.

The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communique. Among others, Council may recognize the development and adoption of the AUTJP as an important milestone in having a comprehensive policy framework that guides not only Member States in their TJ undertakings but also the AU, RECs/RMs, and non-state actors in their effort to support such undertakings. While acknowledging that there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to TJ, it may reiterate some of the key elements of the TJ Policy that should serve as a basis for the implementation of TJ. In this respect, Council may stress the imperative of national ownership of the process, the use of traditional mechanisms, and striking a balance between reconciliation and justice, as well as between retributive, reparative, and distributive types of justice. Council may highlight the importance of popularizing and sensitizing the Policy to ensure greater political buy-in from Member States given that the success of any TJ initiatives as well as the effective implementation of the Policy largely depends on the political will and good faith of the political leadership. It may also commend the AU Commission for the steps it has put in place to promote the implementation of the AUTJP in countries in transition and the need for ensuring that relevant AU organs, such as the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, which contributed to the drafting of the AUTJP and to the TRRC, to contribute to and use their mandate for promoting the implementation of the AUTJP.

Council is expected to re-emphasize the imperative of sharing experiences and lessons learned in promoting TJ and assisting countries that confronted violent past to address their challenges of reconciliation, accountability, social cohesion, and nation-building. In this regard, it may stress on the need to follow up its decisions, at its 899th session, to dedicate annual session on TJ. Regarding the financial constraint, Council may allude to the utilization of the Peace Fund for AU’s TJ activities as the Union moves towards the operationalization and pilot utilization of the Peace Fund. Council may call for enhanced cooperation and coordination between AU and RECs/RMs, as well as international partners in supporting Member States in their TJ initiatives. Council may commend the countries that shared their experiences with initiating and implementing TJ processes. The Council may note that transitional justice is not a one time process but a continuous one that aims at addressing ever more forcefully and increasingly legacies of past wrongs and violations and the inequities that they have created in affected societies. It may call on the states to implement the recommendations of truth commissions and continue the work for achieving increased levels of reconciliation and healing as well as irreversible cohesion through implementing inclusive development policies and deepening democratic and accountable system of political governance.


HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE 41ST ORDINARY SESSION OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL AND THE 4TH AU MID-YEAR COORDINATION MEETING IN LUSAKA

HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE 41ST ORDINARY SESSION OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL AND THE 4TH AU MID-YEAR COORDINATION MEETING IN LUSAKA

Date | August 2022

INTRODUCTION

The 41st Ordinary Session of the Executive Council and the 4th AU Mid-year coordination meeting were held on 14-15 July and 17 July respectively in Lusaka, Zambia. The meetings were preceded by the 44th Ordinary of the Permanent Representative Committee (PRC) held from 20 June to 8 July in Addis Ababa under the chairship of Senegal.

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HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE 41ST ORDINARY SESSION OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL AND THE 4TH AU MID-YEAR COORDINATION MEETING IN LUSAKA

HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE 41ST ORDINARY SESSION OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL AND THE 4TH AU MID-YEAR COORDINATION MEETING IN LUSAKA

Date | August 2022

INTRODUCTION

The 41st Ordinary Session of the Executive Council and the 4th AU Mid-year coordination meeting were held on 14-15 July and 17 July respectively in Lusaka, Zambia. The meetings were preceded by the 44th Ordinary of the Permanent Representative Committee (PRC) held from 20 June to 8 July in Addis Ababa under the chairship of Senegal.

Read Full Document