Open Session on Hate Crimes and Fighting Genocide Ideology in Africa
Open Session on Hate Crimes and Fighting Genocide Ideology in Africa
Date | 3 April 2024
Tomorrow (4 April), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1206th session on the theme prevention of hate crimes and fighting genocide ideology in Africa.
Following opening remarks by Ambassador Jainaba Jagne, Permanent Representative of the Republic of The Gambia to the AU and stand-in Chairperson of the PSC for April 2024, Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) is expected to make a statement. Presentations will also be delivered by the Representative of the Republic of Rwanda; Special Adviser of the UN Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide; Representative of the European Union (EU); and Representatives of Regional Economic Communities (RECs).
Tomorrow’s session is being convened in line with a PSC decision adopted at its 678th session held on 11 April 2017 in which it decided to convene annually, in April, a meeting on prevention of the ideology of hate, Genocide and hate crimes in Africa. The meeting also forms part of the yearly remembrance of the 1994 genocide which will be observed on 7 April under the theme Remember-Unite-Renew, in accordance to AU Assembly Decision Assembly/AU/Dec.695 of 2 July 2018.
This year marks 30 years since Africa witnessed its most shocking violence since the end of colonialism, during the genocide against the Tutsi. For the PSC and the AU in general, one of the issues that this 30-year commemoration raises is how to safeguard the memory of this tragic catastrophe perpetrated at extraordinary scale and brutality for avoiding its recurrence anywhere in the continent as promised in Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the AU. It is only through recognizing the graveness of the brutal mass killing, maiming, rape and psychological harm that victims and survivors including women and children endured during the genocide and keeping the memory alive that the region and the continent as a whole can avoid falling back into a situation where the event ‘continues to be overlooked as a minor African hiccup’, in the words of Salim Ahmed Salim’s report on the establishment of an International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events. Most significantly, for the AU this issue of memory of what happened and its meaning is inseparable from the raison d’etre for its founding, while it may be debatable if the AU has lived up to the promise encapsulated in Article 4(h) considering events in some conflict settings in recent years.
Separate but related concern for the AU and tomorrow’s session is also the lessons from this experience and its consequences. As the first elected president of democratic South Africa, President Nelson Mandela, put it in his maiden address to the June 1994 Organization of African Unity (OAU) summit in Tunis while the genocide was still unfolding, ‘Rwanda stands out as a stern and severe rebuke to all of us for having failed to address Africa’s security problems. As a result of that, a terrible slaughter of the innocent has taken place and is taking place in front of our very eyes.’ The AU stands a chance of not repeating the failure of the OAU that Mandela spoke of only by continuing to draw the necessary lessons from this manmade disaster and adopt the relevant measures of vigilance in all conditions of conflicts and crises. In this respect, it is of paramount significance that the AU reinvigorates its work on addressing hate speech and supporting actions against the denial or revisionism of the genocide against the Tutsi as stipulated in various PSC decisions. Similarly, it is critical to enhance AU’s work in following up on PSC’s decision for reinvigorating the early warning mechanism and including an analysis on indicators of hate crime and risk factors for them to escalate to genocide pursuant to the decision of the 836th session of the PSC. In this respect, it is worth recalling that under Article 7(1)(a) the PSC is mandated to ‘anticipate and prevent … policies that may lead to genocide and crimes against humanity.’
Rwanda stands out as a stern and severe rebuke to all of us for having failed to address Africa’s security problems. As a result of that, a terrible slaughter of the innocent has taken place and is taking place in front of our very eyes.
Nelson Mandela June 1994 OAU Summit
This 30th commemoration of the 1994 genocide should also serve as an occasion for the PSC and the wider AU to interrogate why and how some of the issues identified in the report of the OAU Panel of Eminent Personalities remain unresolved and continue to fester to this day. This issue currently has particular resonance in respect to the conflict in Eastern DRC. While the genocide ended in July 1994, as the report of the OAU Panel of Eminent Personalities pointed out, its consequences continued to reverberate in the Great Lakes Region at the time the Panel finalized its report and since. According to the report, ‘the failure to disarm the genocidaires and the re-emergence of Mobutu’ (‘as a central actor in the tragedy’ involving the genocidaires to whom he gave diplomatic protection and supply of arms) ‘combined to trigger a series of stunning developments, most notably two successive wars centred on Zaire/Congo.’ While Mobutu’s Zaire/Congo and contemporary DRC are not the same, some of the issues that led to the two successive wars that the Panel cited including the continued presence of the genocidaires notably the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and ethnic tensions in Eastern DRC seem to be apparently at play in the current conflict in Eastern DRC.
Tomorrow’s session can also serve for finding ways of implementing some of the outstanding decisions of the PSC on the subject. The last PSC session on this theme was its 1147th session held on 6 April 2023. As can be noted from the outcome of this and previous sessions, some of PSC’s decisions have been recurrent. These include PSC’s request to the AU Commission to develop a shared working definition of what constitutes ‘hate speech’ and ‘hate crimes’, in order to enable member states to enact necessary legislation to combat these scourges. Another decision is the request to the Chairperson of the AU Commission to expedite the appointment of an AU Special Envoy on the Prevention of Hate Crimes and the Crime of Genocide. There has been also the call by the PSC for the need to consider the Rabat Action Plan as the basis for establishing an Annual African Forum, in coordination with the AU Commission, on the prevention of ideology of hate, hate crimes and genocide, which will be an annual event that will bring together all concerned actors within the framework of PSC meetings to address the scourge and for fighting the ideology of hate, hate crimes and genocide. In addition, the PSC also requested the AU Commission to undertake a review of the status of implementation of the recommendations contained in the Report of the OAU International Panel of Eminent Personalities on the 1994 Rwanda Genocide and the Surrounding Events by the Panel of the Wise and called for the establishment of an African Centre for the Study of Genocide (1088th session).
Amani Africa recommended that, since 2024 marks the 30th anniversary of the Rwanda genocide, it would be valuable for the PSC to organize a comprehensive stock taking exercise at the continental level, aimed at reaffirming their commitment to the principle of ‘never again,’ as outlined in Article 4 (h) of the AU Constitutive Act. 2024 also marks the 20th anniversary of the operationalization of the PSC. This commemoration, which will be celebrated in May 2024, will be an opportunity for the PSC to showcase its accomplishments over the past two decades in contributing to sustainable peace including through its efforts to address hate crimes as well as learning from historical events, in particular the Rwanda genocide, and efforts in ensuring prevention of such atrocities from recurring.
The expected outcome of the session is a communique. As in the previous sessions, PSC may express its concern over the persistent trend of the ideologies of hate, genocide and hate crimes in Africa and may in this light reaffirm the importance of using the annual commemoration as useful avenue for articulating practical actions for addressing the challenges posed by hate speech and misinformation and disinformation on the basis of ethnic identity, particularly in fragile and conflict settings. It may also commend the progress made particularly at the national level in Rwanda to overcome the consequences of the genocide against the Tutsi. The PSC is likely to call upon member states who have not yet done so, to sign, ratify and/or accede to the relevant international legal instruments particularly the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and to adopt formal and informal education policies to foster social cohesion free from ethnic, regional, national and religious biases, while emphasizing human rights protection. PSC may urge member states to intensify their collaboration with the RECs and Regional Mechanisms (RMs) in order to enhance their efforts on prevention strategies including those that holistically tackle the underlying causes and catalysts of violent conflicts. PSC may call for the need for dealing with the regional consequences of the genocide including through enhancing collective action for resolving the conflict in Eastern DRC. Within the framework of the 30-year anniversary, the PSC may also decide that a stocktaking exercise is undertaken as part of the 20 years anniversary of the operationalization and official launch of the PSC including for facilitating implementation of the decisions of its previous sessions including the designation of a special envoy on the prevention of genocide.
Analytical briefing on the Strategic Planning for Post-ATMIS Somalia
Analytical briefing on the Strategic Planning for Post-ATMIS Somalia
Date | 2 April 2024
Tomorrow (03 April), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to have a closed session dedicated to analytical briefing on the strategic planning for post-AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) Somalia.
Following opening remarks by the Permanent Representative of The Gambia and PSC Chairperson for April, Jainaba Jagne, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, is expected to deliver a statement. It is expected that the AU Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) will provide the briefing to the PSC.
The last time the PSC held a session on Somalia/ATMIS on 8 March in an informal consultation, the focus of the session was on plans and preparations towards a post-ATMIS engagement. This built on the 1173rd session that requested the Commission to ‘work out a viable ATMIS exit strategy, which should include proposals on AU’s continued engagement with and support to Somalia post 31 December 2024.’
Tomorrow’s briefing comes against the backdrop of Somalia’s submission of its proposal on the strategic planning for post-ATMIS mission, pursuant to UN Security Council resolution 2710 (2023). The resolution requested the Government of Somalia to present a proposal for post-ATMIS security arrangements to the Security Council by 31 March 2024. As a follow-up to this request, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has developed Strategic Planning for Post-ATMIS Proposal, defining the mandate, scope, size, and composition of the post-ATMIS mission in support of Somali state building priorities. It is also to be recalled that in an informal consultation held on 27 March 2024 upon the request of the Government of Somalia, the PSC was briefed by representative of the Government on Somalia’s on the proposal for post-ATMIS security arrangements. After the briefing from Somalia, member states requested that the PAPS Department provides analytical briefing offering insights on the proposal for the post-ATMIS mission.
Tomorrow’s analytical briefing draws on the mission that the AU PAPS undertook to Somalia in February and the proposal that the Government of Somalia presented on strategic planning for post-ATMIS. During the meeting of the AU high-level delegation led by Alhadji Sarjoh Bah, PAPS’ Director for Conflict Management, and Somalia’s authorities at the end of January and early February 2024, Bah noted that the strength, mandate, posture, composition and the overall architecture that will replace ATMIS will be based on ‘a very comprehensive security assessment that focuses on the threats and other variables’. Subsequently, on 13 February, the AU also convened the Core Security Partners Group high-level consultative meeting in Addis Ababa, which brought together key partners, to explore avenues for supporting ‘Somali-led and owned security arrangements post-ATMIS’.
According to the document on Strategic Planning for Post-ATMIS that the FGS submitted, the mandate of the post-ATMIS mission will be of limited scope. It specifically envisages that focus of the mission will be ‘securing identified strategic population centers, key infrastructures in Mogadishu and the FMS capitals (e.g. airports, sea ports); providing air support to the SSF, and permitting SNAF elements to conduct offensive operations.’ Accordingly, one of the request of the FGS proposal is for ‘an AU-led, UN-authorized multilateral mission,’ which is limited in size, scope and timeframe. The mission is intended to assist Somalia in stabilizing and securing the country; enabling state building priorities; and ensuring a coherent and orderly transfer of security responsibilities to the Somali authorities and increasingly capable security forces.
With respect to the size of the mission, the document states that the FGS does not expect the size of the mission to exceed 10,000. This is despite stating that ‘joint strategic assessment will determine the required size of mission based on capability gaps identified by the FGS.’ These personnel are projected to deploy across 14 Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) within four sectors—Sector 1 (Mogadishu City and Banadir Region and Lower Shabelle), Sector 2 (Lower and Middle Juba and Gedo), Sector 3 (Bay and Bakool), and Sector 4 (Middle Shabelle, Hiraan and Galgaduud regions). While no specific timeframe is outlined for the new mission, the Proposal highlights that it should align with the timeframe specified in the Somali Security Development Plan (SSDP), which anticipates achieving sovereign capability for security responsibilities within three to five years.
In considering the proposal from FGS, of interest for PSC members are the composition of the post-ATMIS mission, and whether and how elements of ATMIS would constitute part of this new mission to avoid vacuum that may arise due to complete lack of continuity. In clarifying these issues, as well as how the mission will be organized and how it interfaces with FGS and its security forces, the request Somalia made during the Somalia security conference last December and the lessons from AMISOM and ATMIS provide useful basis. Of not any less significance is the consideration to the contribution that AMISOM and ATMIS troops made and the role that ATMIS troop and police contributing countries will play regarding the post-ATMIS AU-led mission. Somalia’s Proposal does not provide details on this issue. It is anticipated that some contingents currently operating in ATMIS will form the ‘Core Nucleus’ of the new mission to ensure continuity.
There is recognition that whatever form that the post-ATMIS mission takes is expected not only to build on the progress in the drawdown and exit processes of ATMIS but also the overall peace and security conditions in Somalia and institutional readiness of Somalia Security Forces (SSF). In this respect it is worth recalling that even with respect to phase 3 drawdown of ATMIS, UN Security Council Resolution 2710 urged ‘ATMIS and its Troop- and Police-Contributing Countries to work closely with the FGS and Somalia’s Federal Member States (FMS) to ensure that the Phase 3 drawdown is gradual and conducted in line with Somalia’s strategic needs, including progress with force generation, as well as taking into account the situation in Somalia and the importance of maintaining security and stability.’ In the light of this, it is of paramount importance that the determination of the size and composition of the post-ATMIS mission is determined on the basis of the strategic assessment which should provide assessment of the threat that Al Shabaab poses, lessons from phase 3 drawdown expected to lead to the withdrawal of 4000 troops by 30 June 2024, the progress in force generation and in consolidation of national reconciliation and political cohesion between FGS and Federal Member States. The nature of continuing security and institutional challenges that Somalia faces when ATMIS completes exit should not be underestimated. Similarly, the enormity of the responsibility should be fully appreciated.
The other issue worthy of PSC’s attention in tomorrow’s session is the financing dimension. This is a particularly significant issue considering the funding challenges that ATMIS experienced. During the 19 February UN Security Council briefing on Somalia, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia, Catriona Laing, alluded to the use of UN assessed contribution within the framework of resolution 2719 (2023) on the financing of the AU-led peace support operations as one of the potential funding modalities. Indeed, this presents the first test for the practical application of resolution 2719. The proposal from the FGS is ‘a UN mandated logistical support to the new mission, and the Somali Security Forces (SSF) in joined (sic) and coordinated operations with the new AU-led mission.’ The Strategic Planning for post-ATMIS Proposal emphasizes the imperative of securing reliable and sustainable funding. Two funding modalities are proposed to address this critical issue. The first modality involves accessing the UN assessed contributions within the framework of the landmark UN Security Council resolution 2719 (2023). This resolution determined that AU-led PSOs that are authorized by the Security Council will have access to funding from the UN assessed contributions, on a case-by-case basis. The second modality entails considering other ‘complementary options’, including voluntary contributions from a broader range of donors with ‘multiyear commitments’, in line with the principle of burden-sharing among the various stakeholders.
It remains unclear whether there will be a formal outcome document following tomorrow’s session. However, while welcoming Somalia’s Strategic Planning for post-ATMIS Proposal, PSC may emphasize the need for enhanced engagement between the AU Commission and the FGS, along with other partners to ensure mutual understanding on the key aspects of the proposed mission and to address any outstanding issues. In this respect, the PSC may encourage the AU Commission and Somalia to establish a joint monitoring, assessment, consultation and planning mechanism that will, among others, help clarify critical questions relevant to the development of the concept of operations (CONOPs) for the Post-ATMIS mission. PSC may also specify a timeframe for the next briefing to receive updates on progress made toward the development of the CONOPs for the new mission and preparations for the phase 3 ATMIS troops drawdown.
Provisional Program of Work for the Month of April 2024
Provisional Program of Work for the Month of April 2024*
Date | April 2024
The Gambia will serve as the stand-in-chairperson of the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) for the month of April 2024. According to the rules on rotation of the monthly chairperson of the PSC in alphabetical order (Article 8(6) of PSC Protocol & Rule 23 of the PSC Rules of Procedure), Nigeria was set to be the chairperson for April. However, due to the absence of ambassadorial representation, the typical alphabetical rotation could not be applied this month. Consequently, The Gambia have stepped in as the stand-in-chairperson, as provided under Paragraph 67 of the Manual on Working Methods of the Council.
The PSC’s Provisional Programme of Work includes five substantive sessions and a ‘field visit’ to Abuja for the Abuja High- Level Meeting on Counterterrorism meeting. Two of the sessions will address region-specific issues, while the remaining three will cover thematic topics. All sessions are scheduled to be held at ambassadorial level.
The first session of the month scheduled to take place on 4 April will focus on hate crimes and fighting genocide ideology in Africa. The session also takes place within the framework of the 30th commemoration of the Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda. While the session is in line with PSC’s 678th meeting which decided to dedicate an open session to the theme every year in April, the commemoration is in accordance with the AU Assembly Decision [Assembly/ AU / Dec.695] of 2 July 2018 as well as the Communique of the PSC adopted at its 761st session. The forthcoming session, on ‘prevention of the ideology of hate, genocide and hate crimes’ that has become a standing agenda item of the PSC may take stock of Rwanda’s transitional justice and post-conflict reconstruction journey and discuss the growing relevance of the lessons gleaned from the genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda. In the light of various large scale atrocities experienced in various conflict settings and the continuing violations to which civilians are subjected in various conflicts such as Sudan, the session is expected to underscore the urgency of maintaining vigilance in implementing the lessons from that unprecedented tragedy as institutionalized in the AU norms and peace and security architecture. It is also anticipated that the session will serve as an occasion for following up on some of the previous decisions of the PSC on this theme including mots notably the call for the appointment of a special envoy on the prevention of genocide in Africa.
The second session of the month and the first region-specific session to be held on 8 April will be dedicated for the briefing on the situation in the Lake Chad Basin with regards to the operations of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) operations. The session is in accordance with the PSC ‘s request for the Commission in coordination with the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) Secretariat, to report to Council regularly on the activities of the MNJTF, in line with the relevant provisions contained in the Communique PSC/AHG/ COMM.2(CDLXXXIV) of 29 January 2015. The last time this issue was discussed was during the PSC’s 1197th session held on 30 January 2024. It is recalled that the session decided to renew MNJTF’s mandate for one-year period, effective from 1 February 2024. It is also anticipated that the PSC will be briefed on the request it made during its previous session to the AU Commission and the LCBC to renew the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and Support Implementation Agreement (SIA) between AU, LCBC and MNJTF Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs). Furthermore, the session is also anticipated to assess the implementation of the Regional Strategy for the Stabilization, Recovery and Resilience of the Boko Haram-affected Areas of the Lake Chad Basin Region (RSS) that was adopted in August 2018 by the LCBC and later endorsed by the PSC. The session is further expected to address Climate Change impacts in the region.
On the same day, the PSC will be briefed on the preparations for the high-level African Counter Terrorism Meeting in Abuja, scheduled for 22-23 April 2024. As part of these arrangements, the PSC has scheduled to participate in the event on 22 – 25 April. The meeting will take place under the theme ‘Strengthening Regional Cooperation and Institution Building to Address the Evolving Threat of Terrorism in Africa’. During this briefing, it is anticipated that PSC members will receive detailed information regarding the strategic objectives of the meeting, the agendas to be covered and the key stakeholders involved. The briefing may also delve into strategies to boost regional cooperation against the rising threat of terrorism, which could inform discussions of the high-level meeting. In a commendable development that should be replicated and regularized, as part of the ‘field mission’, the PSC is also expected to hold consultation with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Mediation and Security Council.
On 16 April, the PSC will hold its fourth session of the month, focusing on ‘Unblocking the obstacles to the effective Continental Early Warning System (CEWS)’. This session aligns with the PSC’s decision from its 1014th session held on 26 July 2021, which called for quarterly briefings on emerging threats to peace and security in Africa. This request was directed towards the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services (CISSA), the African Center for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) and the African Union Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL). These entities are expected to provide updates on emerging trends affecting the continent’s peace and security landscape. On a particular note, the briefing is also expected to address the persisting issues of terrorism, with focus on the Sahel region, in accordance with the communique adopted by the PSC during its 1170th session on 22 August 2023.
The PSC will convene its next session on 18 April to explore the security conditions in the Gulf of Guinea and devise the required response to combat maritime insecurity and piracy. The council last addressed this issue during its 1174th session on September 18, 2023. During the session, recognizing a decade of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct’s implementation, the PSC proposed its expansion to encompass the entire Atlantic coast. As such, the upcoming session will provide an opportunity for the PSC to review updated assessments of the Code’s strategies and provisions. The session may receive an update on the progresses towards the operationalizing the Yaoundé Architecture’s structure and the assessment as to whether it is adequately equipped to respond to emerging threats and realities.
The initial programme of work for the PSC is expected to expand with the addition of two more sessions. One of these sessions is expected to focus on the situation in Somalia/ATMIS, a topic last discussed in an informal consultation on 27 March 2024 upon the request of the Government of Somalia. This meeting was also in response to the Council’s request during its 1173rd session in September 2023, to develop a feasible exit strategy for ATMIS, which would include proposals for the AU’s sustained support to Somalia beyond December 31, 2024. During the informal consultations, the PSC received updates on the completion of phase 2 drawdown, preparations for phase 3 and ongoing discussions regarding post-ATMIS security arrangements. Furthermore, it is recalled that, at the Somalia security conference held on 12 December 2023, in New York, Somalia requested a new, limited multilateral mission post-ATMIS, aiming to protect strategic population centers and crucial infrastructure in Mogadishu and Federal Member State. As previously anticipated in our insight for the session on 8 March, detailed information on the proposed mission was expected and the 27 March informal briefing to the PSC provided some clarity on Somalia’s perspective. Furthermore, Somalia’s active involvement in ATMIS’s drawdown and exit and in planning the post-ATMIS mission, were also part of discussion points. However, during the 8 March session the PSC members did not reach a definitive agreement on certain issues. Both the 27 March informal session and the session proposed for this month are based on UN Security Council Resolution 2710. It is recalled that the UNSC, under resolution 2710, requested the FGS and the AU to conduct a joint technical assessment by 31 March 2024 to evaluate phase 2 drawdown, and provide an update by 30 April on their preparations for phase 3 drawdown. Therefore, the upcoming session is expected to continue these discussions, with the goal of reaching consensus on the unresolved matters.
The other session that is expected to be included in the Council’s programme is the situation in Sudan. It is anticipated that the session will review the developments in the war that will mark one year on 15 April since its outbreak in April 2023. The war has continued to rage on with devastating consequences to civilians with nearly 14,000 fatalities, 8.1 million displaced and 24.8 million people in need of humanitarian assistance, of which significant number facing imminent famine. In its 1185th session convened back in November 2023, the PSC made the decision to establish ‘a High-Level Ad Hoc Panel on Sudan.’ This panel is tasked with collaborating with all Sudanese stakeholders to facilitate a civilian-led political transition. Accordingly, on 3 February 2024, the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Moussa Faki Mahamat, announced the formation of this high-level panel. The panel, chaired by Dr. Mohamed Ibn Chambas, the AU High Representative for Silencing the Guns, includes Dr. Specioza Wandira-Kazibwe, the former Vice President of Uganda, and Ambassador Fransisco Madeira, the former Special Representative of the Chairperson to Somalia and former Head of ATMIS. Over the past two months, the panel undertook consultation tours which took the members of the Panel to Port Sudan and Cairo. The Panel has engaged with various stakeholders, including the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Expanded Mechanism for the Resolution of Sudan’s crisis, and most recently, the Foreign Minister of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Therefore, the PSC is expected to receive an updated briefing from the high-level panel on its consultations and plans for implementing the AU Roadmap for the Resolution of the Crisis in Sudan.
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*Post-script: The analytical briefing on strategic planning for Post-ATMIS in Somalia, scheduled for April, is now confirmed to occur on 3 April, following the flag ceremony for the newly elected members of the PSC, where they will install their flags at the PSC Chamber. The briefing will be held in a closed session, which will also include a separate session for the engagement between the PSC and the Chairperson of the AU Commission.
Amani Africa wishes to express its gratitude to the Australian Embassy in Ethiopia for the support in the production of this Insight on the Monthly Programme of Work of the AU Peace and Security Council
Ministerial High-Level Meeting on Women, Peace and Security in Africa
Ministerial High-Level Meeting on Women, Peace and Security in Africa
Date | 22 March 2024
Tomorrow (23 March), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene a ministerial high-level seminar on women, peace and security (WPS), with a specific focus on women’s participation and leadership in peace processes in Africa.
Peya Mushelega, Minister of International Relations and Cooperation of the Republic of Namibia and Chairperson of the PSC for the month will deliver opening remarks followed by Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). Bineta Diop, Special Envoy of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on WPS and Hanna Tetteh, UN Secretary General Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa are expected to brief the Council on the progress made in the implementation of WPS Agenda in line with the relevant instruments of the AU and UN. Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, Special Representative of United Nations (UN) Secretary-General to the AU and Head of UN Office to AU (UNOAU) and representative of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) are expected to make statements on the strategic objectives of the ministerial high-level PSC meeting. Other participants expected to contribute to the discussions include Shirley Botchwey, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration of the Republic of Ghana and PSC member; Liberata Mulamula, Steering Committee of African Women Leaders Network (AWLN) and Member of the FemWise-Africa Network; Effie Owour, Co-Chair of FemWise-Africa and Member of the AU Panel of the Wise; Mpule Kgetsi, African Youth Ambassador for Peace for Southern Africa and Renata Dalaqua, Head of Programme of Gender and Disarmament of UN Institute for Disarmament Research. Of particular significance is also the on the ground experience from women peace builders from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and South Sudan.
Being convened within the framework of international women’s day on the occasion of which the PSC annually convenes a meeting during the month of March, tomorrow’s meeting, organised as a high-level ministerial seminar, is aimed at highlighting the 20th anniversary of the operationalization and official launch of PSC by taking stock of women’s participation and leadership in peace processes in Africa. The last time the PSC discussed the WPS agenda at its 1187th meeting, the AU Special Envoy for WPS was requested to conduct a comprehensive review of the status of women’s involvement in peace processes and to propose recommendations for enhancing women’s engagement in this respect. Tomorrow’s ministerial session accordingly fits into and presents opportunity for discussing the work that the Special Envoy is undertaking in this respect.
As emphasised in the various outcome documents of PSC’s sessions on this topic, women, who continue to be disproportionately impacted by armed conflicts and other forms of threats to peace security in the continent, are yet to be proportionately and meaningfully involved in decision-making and peace processes. This is despite the encouraging policy and normative level work that has been done by the AU, various Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) and member states.
At the continental level for example, the adoption of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (Maputo Protocol) and specifically the articulation under Article 10 of the Protocol granting women the ‘right to participate in the promotion and maintenance of peace’ and imposing responsibility on member states to ‘take all appropriate measures to ensure the increased participation of women in conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peacebuilding’ has been a critical step. The institutionalisation of WPS as an agenda item of the PSC, the appointment of the AU Special Envoy for WPS, the establishment of FemWise-Africa, and the adoption of the Continental Results Framework (CRF) for tracking implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on WPS by member states constitute key milestones and institutional processes towards ensuring women’s involvement in peace processes.
At the regional level as well, some RECs/RMs have adopted Regional Action Plans (RAPs) for the realisation of WPS agenda and are in engaged in promoting the WPS through the adoption and implementation of National Action Plans (NAPs) by member states across their respective regions. Further to the development of NAPs by 34 countries as of December 2023, a number of member states have also taken the necessary steps for implementing their NAPs through the enactment of relevant policies.
Despite these efforts and achievements, most of the work done for the realisation of WPS agenda in Africa, particularly the meaningful participation of women in peace process remains restricted largely to the adoption of norms and principles. In terms of expanding the representation and participation of women in peace processes at various levels nationally and continentally, the progress remains far from satisfactory. This is not however for lack of women activism and mobilization for peace. Various women-led initiatives, particularly at the grassroots level, play a significant role in advancing conflict prevention, resolution and peacebuilding through the deployment of community focused dialogues, advocacy, joint calls for ceasefires, identification of women’s priorities and specific experiences in conflict settings and other critical contributions. Yet, the lack of their formal involvement suggests that the formal (track 1 peace processes) and similar platforms lack the flexibility and the tools to tap into and establish close working arrangements that ensure the channelling of the work of women groups at local levels into the formal processes. Indeed, it is not uncommon for local level women groups and movements to accuse such track 1 diplomacy processes for their elitism and hence exclusionary mode of organization and operation. Thus, such women-led peace initiatives in the so-called ‘informal arena’ do not get to have their members and engagements to directly shape policy and decision-making on matters relevant to continental peace and security, in the ‘formal’ settings.
“Despite these efforts and achievements, most of the work done for the realisation of WPS agenda in Africa, particularly the meaningful participation of women in peace process remains restricted largely to the adoption of norms and principles.”
“Yet, the lack of their formal involvement suggests that the formal (track 1 peace processes) and similar platforms lack the flexibility and the tools to tap into and establish close working arrangements that ensure the channelling of the work of women groups at local levels into the formal processes. Indeed, it is not uncommon for local level women groups and movements to accuse such track 1 diplomacy processes for their elitism and hence exclusionary mode of organization and operation.”
In terms of areas of peace processes for women participation, one important aspect of peace processes in which women are glaringly missing is in peace negotiations and mediation. In recent years, various peace talks and negotiations were initiated in a number of countries across the continent including in countries such as South Sudan and Ethiopia, and in the ongoing peace processes for Sudan such as on ceasefire, women’s role and participation was mostly lacking despite the fact that women have faced the brunt of conflicts and instability disproportionally. Regardless of their experience, involvement of women at the formal negotiation tables and in mediation processes in these and other African countries has been largely underwhelming, if not virtually missing.
Another key area within the scope of peace processes with respect to which women continue to be insufficiently engaged and involved in is the deployment of AU-led peace support operations and UN peacekeeping missions. Despite the existing rich normative framework for enhancing women’s increased participation in the deployment of AU-led peace support operations, practice clearly demonstrates that gender is yet to be effectively mainstreamed in the recruitment and employment of female troop members deployed within this framework. Primarily, this is an issue to be tracked to troop contributing countries who need to set up gender quotas and take the necessary measures to increase enrolment of women troop members in various ranks. At the AU level, there is also need for developing specific guidelines to encourage recruitment of women personnel by troop contributing countries.
In UN peacekeeping missions deployed in Africa, some progress has been made in ensuring gender parity in the deployment of troops. While the experiences of women peacekeepers and their unique contributions to bridge cultural barriers in specific settings is a key practice demonstrating the critical nature of women’s engagement in such capacity, UN peacekeeping missions also continue to confront challenges mainly associated with insufficient enrolment of women in national military and police forces, patriarchal perceptions of the roles of women and the absence of family-friendly policies, according to the 2018-2028 UN Peacekeeping Gender Parity Strategy.
Tomorrow’s ministerial high-level PSC meeting offers an opportunity to take stock of the various bottlenecks that continue to hamper representation and effective participation of women and chart avenues for addressing them. As the foregoing discussion illustrate, these challenges canvased during the 4th High-Level Africa Forum on Women, Peace and Security held at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa last December include ‘a broader and more deeply ingrained resistance to women’s participation, limitations within the existing framework of peace processes, isolated approaches that primarily focus on women’s security in conflict situations, and a failure to recognize the continuum of violence that women face in both peace and conflict contexts.’
The expected outcome of tomorrow’s meeting is a Communiqué. The PSC is expected to welcome the milestones achieved in the implementation of WPS in Africa since its establishment and most notably since it institutionalized WPS as a standing agenda in 2010. Noting the remaining work that needs to be done for the full realisation of UNSCR 1325 and WPS agenda in the continent, the PSC may underscore the need to enhance at the continental, regional and local levels, the meaningful participation and representation of women throughout all aspects of conflict prevention and resolution as well as peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts. To this end, the PSC may call on the AU and its member states to create more flexible and women friendly mode of organization and operation of formal peace/political processes in order to effectively tap into women mobilization and work at the informal or grassroots levels. The PSC may also call on the AU and its member states to establish systems and incentives that facilitate the recruitment and appointment of women in the political, diplomatic and security fields as the foundation for expanding the pool that would increase women’s representation and participation including in leadership roles in national, regional and continental peace processes. It may call on the AU, through the office of the Special Envoy for WPS and the Fem-Wise, to upscale efforts for enhanced engagement of women in peace processes including in the deployment of preventive diplomacy, mediation and in peacekeeping missions as well as peace support operations.
