Making the Panel of the wise fit for purpose critical for effectively delivering on AU’s preventive diplomacy role
Making the Panel of the wise fit for purpose critical for effectively delivering on AU’s preventive diplomacy role
Date | 9 May 2024
Solomon Ayele Dersso, PhD
Founding Director, Amani Africa
Previne Habu
Researcher, Amani Africa
While the Panel of the Wise is one of the pillars of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) operational since 2007, both its effective functioning and the carving out of clear space in executing its role, primarily involving conflict prevention, remain a work in progress. This can be gathered, for example, from the recent briefing of the Panel to the 1204th session of the Peace and Security Council (PSC). The measures specified in the outcome of this session and their implementation are key for making the Panel a fit-for-purpose continental preventive diplomacy tool. At the same time, it is critical that the Panel is not encumbered with roles that spread it thin and undermine its effectiveness in its primary role of conflict prevention.
The reflections in the PSC session can be logically organised as focusing on not only the activities of the Panel but also it’s a) the Panel’s institutional interface with bodies with relevant mandates, b) institutional and operational arrangements, and c) its working methods. As the communique of the 1204th session indicates, on the institutional interface of the Panel with AU bodies with relevant mandates, the issues that the PSC deliberations covered include:
i. the Panel’s role in revitalising cooperation with similar mechanisms at the Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) [i] and
ii. the operationalisation of the roles of the subsidiary mechanisms of the panel – FemWiseAfrica, PanWise and Network of African Youth (WiseYouth).
The deliberations and the communique also highlight the importance of coordination and ensuring synergy of efforts in conflict prevention as well as the need for creating platforms of meaningful participation of women and youth in preventive diplomacy, mediation and peacebuilding and the engagement and the signing of Framework of Cooperation with APR Panel of Eminent Persons. The PSC also encouraged the Panel to extend a similar relationship with the Banjul Commission, which is erroneously stated in the communique as the African Court instead of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights.
In terms of the institutional and operational arrangements of the functioning of the Panel, the activity report of the Panel highlighted the perennial challenges of provision of the requisite resources for the effective execution of its mandate. Indeed, apart from the composition and dynamism of the members of the Panel, the effective implementation of the Panel’s mandate depends on the secretarial and institutional support that the AU Commission puts at its disposal.
In this respect, the PSC reiterated its request for the AU Commission ‘to provide requisite resources, including political, human and financial resources, to enable the Panel to implement its mandate effectively in line with its modalities to ensure the timely prevention and resolution of conflicts in Africa.’ Additionally, the PSC also tasked the AU Commission to ‘facilitate rapid deployment mechanism for the Panel of the Wise to timely respond to emerging conflicts and crises.’ This is a major step forward in the evolution of the institutionalisation of the work of the Panel. It is worth recalling that despite the fact that the PSC Protocol envisages that the Panel meets as may be required for the performance of its mandate, the Panel is not a standing body. Accordingly, among others, facilitating a rapid deployment mechanism for the Panel necessitates that the Panel and its membership be organised to operate on a standby basis.
The other aspect of the functioning of the Panel that the session addressed concerns the working methods of the Panel. In this respect, the Communique of the session canvased issues of the Panel’s working methods as part of the key actionable decisions of the session. Thus, the PSC requested the AU Commission to:
i. facilitate the provision of mission reports of the Panel of the Wise to the Council;
ii. ensure the Panel of the Wise receives early warning information and analyses to enable the Panel to proactively deploy preventive diplomacy efforts;
iii. strategic reviews of the Panel of the Wise’s activities to evaluate the effectiveness of the Panel’s interventions, identify areas for improvement, and adjust strategies in alignment with the dynamic nature of conflict and crisis situations on the continent; and
iv. support and facilitate joint deployments of the Panel of the Wise with similar regional bodies, particularly in contexts requiring urgent attention, leveraging the collective expertise and resources for conflict prevention and management efforts.
One of the other key outcomes of the 1204th session was the call of the PSC for a follow-up and re-engagement plan by the Panel for maintaining sustained attention to countries that the Panel visited as part of its conflict prevention initiative. Additionally, the PSC requested the Panel to continue engaging stakeholders in countries where it undertook missions. Developing these working practices is key not only for following up on recommendations made by the Panel as pointed out by the PSC but also for monitoring developments in those countries, among others, in order to initiate follow-up engagement that the situation in those countries warrants.
As documented in the AU PSC Handbook, the Panel’s track record also shows that it has identified an effective mechanism for exercising its advisory role through its thematic reflections. As a strategy for building its preventive diplomacy role, it has also developed preventive missions to countries with potential risks of crises particularly in the context of elections. In this respect, it is also expected that the Panel will have another mission to South Sudan before the country’s general elections in December 2024. While these experiences provide guidance towards making the Panel fit for purpose, it should not lead to bulging the Panel’s role too wide.
As if the Panel’s mandate in conflict prevention is not itself onerous enough (and has yet to be fully and effectively implemented) and the Panel has the luxury of adding further work, the PSC encouraged it to support the implementation of peace agreements on the Continent and support mediation efforts of AU High-Level Panels in their respective areas of engagement. The PSC also further muddied the role of the Panel when it envisaged ‘the critical need to utilise the Panel’s extensive expertise and influence to accompany Mali, Gabon, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Niger and Sudan to return to constitutional order, as well as processes in South Sudan and Chad.’
Instead of the Panel, these transitions each require a standing mechanism that catalyses and facilitates the initiation and implementation of relevant reforms that would ground each on a solid path for not only achieving restoration of constitutional order but also avoiding the recurrence of unconstitutional changes of government. Thus viewed, the expansion of the work areas of the Panel envisaged in the outcome of the session will not advance the effectiveness of the Panel. If anything, it would reduce the Panel’s focus on its core areas of responsibilities relating to preventive diplomacy.
Both the deliberations and the outcome of the session reflect a continuing lack of clarity about the role of the Panel. While the Panel’s mandate covers preventive diplomacy and advisory roles, it seems that there is an expectation for it to expand its role to early warming, mediation, and provision of support to countries in transition. As an essentially technical process with its own protocols and modules for tracking and measuring as well as analysing various risk factors, the provision of briefings on country situations and horizon scanning briefings should be left to the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) supported by CISSA and APRM which have early warning roles on account of their mandate and areas of work.
The best use of the role of the Panel – as per the mandate entrusted to it under the PSC Protocol and its standing as a preventive diplomacy instrument that engages in preventive or de-escalation action within the framework of APSA – would be for it to implement effective preventive diplomacy actions on the basis of a robust conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy strategy building on and as a follow up to the early warning provided by CEWS. Such a focused use of the Panel would not only provide clarity on the focus of the Panel’s mandate and areas of work but also avoid the risk of the Panel spreading thinly with little effectiveness. The most accurate formulation of the 1104th PSC session communique in this respect tasks the AU Commission to ensure that the Panel ‘receives early warning information and analyses to enable the Panel to proactively deploy preventive diplomacy efforts.’
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[i] Reference is made to the structures similar to the Panel of the Wise established at the RECs/RMs levels notably the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Council of the Wise, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) Panel of Elders, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) Committee of Elders, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Panel of Elders and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Mediation Reference Group.
The content of this article does not represent the views of Amani Africa and reflect only the personal views of the authors who contribute to ‘Ideas Indaba’
Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - March 2024
Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - March 2024
Date | March 2024
In March, under the chairship of Namibia, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) had a scheduled program of work consisting of six sessions and an informal meeting. After the revision of the programme, four sessions and two informal consultations were held.
Provisional Program of Work for the Month of May 2024
Provisional Program of Work for the Month of May 2024 *
Date | May 2024
In May 2024, the United Republic of Tanzania will assume the role of chairing the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC). Given that May 2024 marks 20 years since PSC’s operationalization, the PSC Secretariat has dedicated May and the following months of the year, to the commemoration of this body with the incorporation of ‘PSC@20’ for consideration on most of its agenda items. The provisional program of work indicates that each week will be dedicated to a particular thematic issue as part of the marking of the 20th anniversary of the PSC. Accordingly, the first week of May is dedicated to ‘mediation and dialogue’; the second to ‘humanitarian, peace and security’; the third to ‘women and youth, peace and security’; the fourth to ’child protection’; and the fifth to ‘peace support operations’.
During the month, PSC is expected to convene five substantive sessions with six agenda items, including a High-level event at the Heads of State and Government level. It will also have an exhibition day, Committee of Experts (CoE) meetings, a field mission to Tigray region in Ethiopia and the induction of the Military Staff Committee (MSC) which will be held in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. One of the sessions will be an open session.
On 13 May, the PSC is expected to convene its first substantive session on consideration of the Report of the post-ATMIS Assessment. The last convening of the PSC on ATMIS was the 1205th session on 3 April 2024 on the Briefing by the Federal Republic of Somalia on its Proposal for a Post-ATMIS Security Arrangement in Somalia, pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 2710 (2023). It is to be recalled that during this session, PSC requested the AU Commission to undertake a comprehensive and detailed planning based on the situation on the ground, including undertaking threat assessments, in consultation with the Federal Government of Somalia, the ATMIS Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs), and the UN, and report back to it by the end of April 2024. It is against the end of this timeline that the meeting is being convened for receiving this report.
On the same day (13 May), the PSC will also consider and adopt the draft provisional program of work for June 2024.
The second substantive PSC session, scheduled for 15 May, will be an open session on Stocktaking of the Implementation of the Protocol establishing the AU PSC, Article by Article – Practice, Performance and Prospects. The session is expected to take stock of the 20 years journey of the PSC and presents the occasion for identifying opportunities for sustaining achievements and areas for improvement in the functioning of AU’s premier standing peace and security decision-making body. The meeting is also expected to provide the platform for assessing how well each article of the PSC Protocol has been put into practice.
On 17 and 18 May, the PSC is expected to undertake a field mission to Tigray Region in Ethiopia. This mission is taken under the spirit of Consolidating Peace in Africa – Pretoria Peace Agreement. The Ethiopia-Tigray peace agreement (Pretoria Agreement or Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA)), signed on 2 November 2022 in Pretoria, South Africa aimed to end the war in Tigray region of Ethiopia by establishing a permanent ceasefire between the government of Ethiopia and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). During the 1158th PSC session, the PSC requested the AU Commission to undertake a needs assessment for the extension of the deployment of the Monitoring, Verification and Compliance Mechanism (MVCM) – with consideration on the timelines and funding requirements to avoid its premature withdrawal. During its 37th Ordinary Session held in February 2024, the AU Assembly endorsed the disbursement of 1 Million USD from the Crisis Reserve Fund of the AU Peace Fund to support the DDR program within the Pretoria COHA for the Tigray region. This field mission is therefore expected to give the PSC an update on the situation on the ground, including the humanitarian situation, as well as provide valuable insights that can improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the AU’s future mediation and dialogue initiatives.
On 20 May, the PSC will convene its third substantive meeting to receive an updated briefing on countries under political transitions, specifically Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, Niger and Gabon. This builds on earlier sessions of the PSC on countries in complex political transitions focusing specifically on those countries that experienced unconstitutional changes of government. This session provides an opportunity to review the state of the transitional process in each of these countries, the issues facing the transitional process and the ways in which the AU can enhance its role in facilitating reform processes and the implementation of transitional tasks that pave the way for return to constitutional order. If the experience thus far is anything to go by and the recent ECOWAS decision regarding some of these countries serves as guide, there is a need for the PSC to have a more realistic consideration of the situation of those countries in transition that are experiencing active fighting in conflicts involving terrorist groups in their territories. This is also important in the light of the recently concluded Inaugural Annual Joint Consultative meeting between the PSC and the Mediation and Security Council (At Ambassadorial Level) of the ECOWAS held in Abuja, Nigeria on 24 April 2024 which underlined the need to support countries in political transition in order to ensure the resilience of state institutions and to prevent their weakening.
The fourth substantive PSC session to be held on 21 May will have two agenda items. The first agenda will be on the Consideration of the Draft Common African Position on the 4th Review Conference of the United Nations (UN) Program of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its Aspects (UNPoA). The 4th Review Conference (RevCon4) of the UN Program of Action (PoA) on small arms and light weapons and the International Tracing Instrument (ITI) is expected to take place from 18 June – 28 June 2024. The conference will provide an opportunity to highlight the progress made in the implementation of the PoA to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects, as well as the review of the ITI. In this context, from 28 to 30 November 2023, the PAPS Department convened a meeting of AU Member States Experts, including experts on small arms and light weapons control from AU Member States and Regional Economic Communities (RECs), Regional Mechanisms (RMs) and Intergovernmental Regional Bodies (RBs) as well as the Chair of the Peace and Security Cluster of the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC), to develop a Common African Position on the fourth Review Conference of the UNPoA. The coming PSC meeting therefore will offer the opportunity to review and consider the draft Common African Position, prior to the conference in June.
The second agenda item expected to feature on 21 May is the Consideration of the Report of the Field Mission to Tigray Region of Ethiopia that is scheduled during the month.
The fifth PSC meeting will be taking place on 25 May, which marks the annual celebration of Africa Day, the PSC@20 Anniversary Colloquium and will be held at HoSG Level under the theme, “20 Years of the AU PSC as a Standing Decision-Making Organ: The Next 2 Decades of the Peace and Security We Want in Africa.” The event which will be held in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, will also see unveiling of the PSC Logo by the PSC Troika.
The PSC CoE is also expected to convene a meeting on 02 May to Consider the Draft Common African Position on the 4th Review Conference of the UN PoA, in preparation for the substantive PSC meeting scheduled to be held on 21 May. On 06 May, the CoE will convene a meeting in preparation for the PSC 20th Anniversary Colloquium, which will be held on 25 May.
On 27 May, there is expected to be the inaugural meeting of the PSC Sub-Committee on Sanctions. The 16th Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union held in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, in May 2022, called for the full operationalization of the PSC Sub-Committee on Sanctions and directed the PSC CoE to develop the Terms of Reference (ToRs) for the Sub-Committee. It is against the development of the latter that the PSC Sub-Committee will convene its inaugural meeting on this day on the margins of the 20th Anniversary of the PSC.
On 06 May, the PSC also envisages an exhibition day for the celebration of the 20th anniversary of the PSC at the AU Commission. The exhibition will be an opportunity to showcase the PSC’s remarkable journey over the past two decades, its accomplishments and its reinforcement role as a vital organ within the AU.
The last activity of the month will be the induction of the PSC Military Staff Committee (MSC) in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania to be held on 28-31 May. The induction’s purpose is to familiarize members of the MSC of newly elected PSC member states, with the operational procedures of the PSC and to strengthen the MSC’s assistance to the PSC, as outlined in Article 13 of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the PSC.
PSC’s provisional program of work for the month also envisages in footnote, the commemoration of the International Day of Living Together in Peace on 16 May.
*Post-script: The first revision of programme of work of the PSC effected on 3 May introduced three major changes. First, the session on consideration of the Report on the Post-ATMIS Assessment which was scheduled for 13 May has been removed from the programme and is put under footnote. The PSC may thus reinstate the session after the completion of the preparations for the meeting and the finalization of the Report. Second, the field mission to Tigray region which was scheduled to be on 17-18 May has been postponed. As a result, the PSC will not hold the meeting on the consideration of the Report of the field mission to Tigray region planned for 21 May. Finally, the inaugural meeting of the PSC sub-committee on sanctions which was slated to happen on 27 May has also been postponed.
Amani Africa wishes to express its gratitude to the Australian Embassy in Ethiopia for the support in the production of this Insight on the Monthly Programme of Work of the AU Peace and Security Council
Security situation in the Gulf of Guinea: Robust Response to combat Maritime Insecurity and Piracy
Security situation in the Gulf of Guinea: Robust Response to combat Maritime Insecurity and Piracy
Date | 17 April 2024
Tomorrow (18 April), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will consider the Security situation in the Gulf of Guinea Robust Response to combat Maritime Insecurity and Piracy, as one of the agenda items of its 1209th session.
Following opening remarks by the Permanent Representative of The Gambia and PSC Chairperson for April, Jainaba Jagne, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, is expected to deliver a statement. It is also expected that statements will be delivered by Florentina Adenike Ukonga, Executive Secretary of the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC), the Representative of the Inter-Regional Coordination Centre, Yaoundé (CRESMAO/CRESMAC), and the Coordinator of the Experts for the Establishment of the Combined Maritime Task Force (CMTF). Additionally, the representatives of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) as well as the representative of United Nations (UN) Office to the African Union (UNOAU) and European Union (EU) are expected to make statements.
Since 2013, the PSC has held various sessions addressing maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) region. The outcome documents from these sessions bear witness to the significant progress and collective efforts made by the countries in the region with the support of international partners worldwide. Therefore, tomorrow’s session will serve as an opportunity for the PSC to reflect on the positive strides made in the region, while also considering recurring challenges and emerging threats to the GoG’s maritime security.
During the last PSC session on the issue that was held on 18 September 2023 (1174th session), the PSC revisited the issue of increasing insecurities in the region, a concern that attested to the slight increase of incidents in 2023. The session was marked by the PSC’s deep concern over the threats posed by pirates and organized crime networks in the GoG region. Despite a decrease in the number of reported incidents in the GoG in 2023 there were 22 reported incidents, which shows an increase from 19 in 2022. The International Maritime Bureau reported that these waters remain perilous, as the Gulf accounted for three out of four global hijackings, all 14 reported kidnappings of crew members, and 75% of crew members held hostage in 2023. Additionally, two crew members were injured, reinforcing the GoG’s reputation as treacherous waters for seafarers.
Despite a notable decrease, remnants of hijackers and pirates continue to linger on the waters of the GoG region. This maritime threat has evolved from the looting and hijacking of oil cargos to the kidnapping of seafarers, bringing the root cause of the problem sharply into focus. The mid-2000s witnessed a surge in piracy, largely driven by the rapid expansion of the oil industry, particularly in Nigeria and Angola, which together account for approximately 3% of global oil production. The region as a whole account for more than 35% of the world’s total petroleum reserves, attracting extensive energy company presence. However, this prosperity has been accompanied by socio-economic challenges, disrupting the livelihoods of local artisanal fishers and driving youth to join militant groups as a result of environmental pollution. These groups hijack oil tankers and interfere with commercial oil extraction, perpetuating instability. In spite of a decrease in the ransom for oil tanker in the mid-2010s, the dire living conditions persist, leading to a shift towards kidnapping seafarers. In this context, it is crucial to consider the recent surge of Somali pirates in the Gulf of Eden region, which has prompted the question among observers: are the pirates truly ‘back,’ or have they simply never left? These commentators highlight the insufficient efforts to address the root causes and the inefficiency of highly militarized responses that offer only short-term relief.
In recent years, the strategies implemented in the GoG region have displayed a more collaborative approach, relying less on international partners compared to the Gulf of Eden region. However, it is crucial to consider addressing the root causes of the problem. It is therefore anticipated that tomorrow’s session will provide an opportunity for the PSC to evaluate whether the successful efforts in the GoG region are temporary fixes or the foundation for sustainable change. The PSC may consider whether these strategies are enhancing the capabilities of regional maritime agencies, investing in education, creating jobs, elevating social infrastructure in coastal communities, and establishing effective legal frameworks.
Maritime hijacking and piracy are few of the numerous threats to maritime security in the GoG region. Another significant challenge is illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, which resulted in estimated losses averaging $10 billion in the GoG region in 2023. Reports indicate that fishing vessels are frequently implicated in various other crimes. Beyond the substantial economic losses incurred, IUU fishing leads to the depletion of fisheries, driving coastal communities into poverty and often fostering their involvement in acts of piracy and other transnational crimes, including drug and human trafficking, illicit trade, and arms trafficking. As such, the PSC is expected to receive updates on efforts being implemented to address the growing threats of IUU fishing and various other maritime crimes in the region
Tomorrow’s session is also expected to address the recent spread of terrorism to littoral states like Benin and Angola, as a threat posing an additional threat to the region. In previous years, military rule has emerged in three Western African countries – Burkina Faso, Mali, and Guinea – contributing to increased insecurity and the proliferation of terrorism. Weak governance and lax security structures have created vulnerabilities that terrorist groups may exploit, posing risks to maritime trade, navigation, and safety. Additionally, the PSC may consider the threat of maritime cybersecurity as a pressing concern for the continent. While technology has greatly enhanced maritime safety and security, it also brings significant challenges. Cyber threats have the potential to disrupt not only maritime operations and infrastructure but also extend into inland internet-dependent sectors, underscoring the interconnectedness of cybersecurity across various domains. Thus, the PSC may deliberate on how to develop proactive measures to safeguard against cyber threats.
In response to these persistent insecurities and emerging threats, the upcoming session is expected to review progress on the decisions made during the 1012th session, which emphasized the importance of ensuring that the African Standby Force (ASF) possesses adequate naval capabilities to promote maritime security and safety in Africa. Additionally, the PSC expressed anticipation, during the 1174th session, for the successful organization of the inaugural maritime exercise under the ASF. However, our analysis of the 1174th session revealed a lack of mention regarding the assessment of financial, logistical, and institutional implications, potentially contributing to a lack of follow-up on organizing the exercise. Therefore, during the upcoming session, updates from the AU Commission on the planning of the maritime command post exercise, including financial, logistical, and institutional implications, are expected to be presented to the PSC.
Furthermore, in its endeavor to mitigate maritime insecurity in the GoG region, the PSC may revisit its 1128th session decision, which emphasized the importance of strengthening national navies, law enforcement, and border control agencies, alongside advocating for continuous sea presence of African naval forces. Notably, in May 2022, a gathering of African Naval Staff and Coast Guard chiefs convened in Port Harcourt, Nigeria, resulting in the adoption of the Port Harcourt Declaration. This declaration called for the establishment of a CMTF in the GoG. Subsequently, during its previous session (1174th), the PSC directed the AU Commission to engage with the CMTF and the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) to facilitate alignment of their activities, while urging expedited activation of the Committee of the Heads of African Navies and Coastguards (CHANS). Therefore, it is anticipated that the PSC will follow up on these requests to reinforce the regional mechanism for swift responses to maritime threats in the region.
Another aspect of previous requests of the PSC that requires follow-up relates to the creation of an expert panel or Task Force. This group’s role would be to synchronize efforts, disseminate knowledge, and make recommendations on maritime security. Additionally, the establishment of a Maritime Security coordination mechanism or unit within the AU Commission is also a pending matter that requires the attention of the PSC. It remains to be seen whether the AU Commission will offer an update on this matter.
Lastly, tomorrow’s session is expected to consider the recent developments in the implementation of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct and its associated security architecture, which encompasses regional, interregional, and multinational coordination centers, as well as national maritime operations centers. The notable decrease in piracy and maritime hijacking is credited to the effectiveness of the Yaoundé security architecture. Nonetheless, several challenges hinder its full implementation, notably the inadequacy of funding and varying levels of commitment among member states in the region. In this regard, the European Council in November 2023 has adopted an assistance measure under the European Peace Facility, allocating €21 million to bolster the Yaoundé Architecture and strengthen the capacities of military actors and navies in selected coastal states.
The outcome of the session is expected to be a communique. The PSC is expected to encourage further collaboration among GoG states and international partners to enhance maritime security capabilities, intelligence-sharing, and joint maritime patrols. The PSC may stress the need for Member States to devise all-encompassing solutions to the grievances driving piracy and maritime crime, including poverty, unemployment, and environmental degradation in coastal areas. In this regard, it may also underscore the need for security and military actions to be components of a holistic, well-rounded approach to tackling maritime insecurity. The PSC may further encourage Member States to invest in education, job creation, and social infrastructure in coastal communities to reduce vulnerability to recruitment by militant groups and criminal networks. The PSC may also emphasise the need to strengthen maritime governance frameworks, law enforcement capacities, and border control measures to deter illicit activities and improve maritime domain awareness. In relation to this, the PSC may encourage GoG states that have developed and enforced domestic legislation to prosecute maritime crimes, notably piracy and armed robbery and call on those states that have not done so to enact national laws that allow for the prosecution of pirates and maritime criminals. The PSC may also stress the need to develop proactive measures to safeguard maritime infrastructure and communication networks from cyber threats, ensuring the resilience of maritime operations and information systems. The PSC may call for support for the activation and operationalization of regional mechanisms such as the CMTF and the Committee of the CHANS to facilitate coordinated responses to maritime threats.
