Provisional Program of Work for the Month of July 2022
Provisional Program of Work for the Month of July 2022
Date | July 2022
In July, Djibouti will be chairing the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC). Council’s provisional programme of work for the month envisages three sessions addressing four substantive agenda items. One of these will have a thematic focus while the other three will be addressing country/region specific situations. Council is also scheduled to undertake a field mission to Somalia during the month.
On 01 July, the PSC Committee of Experts (CoE) is set to convene a meeting in preparation for two upcoming consultative meetings of the Council. The first one is the 7th Informal Joint Meeting and 16th Annual Joint Consultative Meeting of the PSC and the United Nations (UN) Security Council (UNSC). The second one is the 3rd Annual Consultative Meeting between the PSC and Policy Organs of Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (RECs/RMs).
The first substantive session of the month, scheduled to take place on 05 July, is envisaged to have two agenda items. The first agenda will be committed to an updated briefing on the situation in the Horn of Africa. The AU High Representative for the Horn of Africa, Olusegun Obasanjo, is expected to brief Council, mainly on the situation in Ethiopia as he did in his earlier briefings to the Council. This will constitute the second briefing of the High Representative to Council in 2022, the first one having taken place in February. Although a briefing session was planned to take place in May at the request of High Representative Obasanjo, it was later cancelled. The coming briefing is expected to provide Council updates on the High Representative’s activities since his last briefing as well as overall developments regarding the situation.
The second agenda for Council’s session on 05 July will be a briefing on the situation in South Sudan. This session comes at a time when the end of the transitional period is fast approaching before the completion of key transitional activities envisaged in the Revitalised Agreement for the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS). The coming session is expected to assess where the transitional process stands, what to do with some of the more transitional tasks that could not be completed before the end of the transitional period and whether and how the elections envisaged to take place in early 2023 could be organized. Council may also follow up on the decisions of its previous session on South Sudan – the 1060th meeting – where among others, it mandated the AU PCRD Centre to prioritize South Sudan amongst its priority areas of focus and requested the AU Commission to dispatch a post-conflict needs-assessment mission to South Sudan. The session can also serve as an occasion for considering the conclusions of the Council’s filed mission to South Sudan that took place in February 2022. Although Council planned to convene a session in March to consider the report of its field mission, that did not take place.
On 11 July, Council will consider and adopt the draft provisional programme of work for the month of August 2022.
The third session of the month will be taking place on 21 July and will be committed to the consideration of the report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on elections in Africa. This is a session which was initially planned to take place in June but later moved into July due to changes to Council’s programme of work for the month of June. Following the previous report of the AU Commission Chairperson on elections in Africa conducted in the period from July to December 2021 – considered at Council’s 1062nd session – the coming report is expected to provide details of elections conducted during the first half of 2022 (January to June 2022).
The last session of the month is expected to take place on 25 July. The session will be committed to a briefing on the situation in the Central African Republic (CAR) and operations of the AU Observer Mission in CAR (MOUACA). It is to be recalled that MOUACA was authorised by the PSC at its 936th session held in July 2020. The mission’s main purpose is to support and monitor the implementation of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in CAR. The session will be important to draw attention to some of the key factors that continue to limit progress in the implementation of the Political Agreement and impede effective discharge of MOUACA’s mandate. The session may also serve to follow up on the status of implementation of the decisions of Council’s previous – 1011th – session, including its request for the Chairperson of the AU Commission to conduct an assessment on the illegal flow of arms in CAR and submit a detailed report to Council and for the AU Commission to undertake a technical needs assessment mission to the CAR, with a view to mapping out the priority needs of the CAR Government.
From 27 to 29 July, Council will conduct a field mission to Somalia to take stock of the political, security and humanitarian developments in the country. This filed mission comes not long after the end of the long delayed and protracted electoral process that culminated in the election of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud as President of Somalia. It is to be recalled that the PSC played an important role for the electoral process by rejecting the attempt of the former president to extend his term of office and the field mission serves as an occasion for affirming close working relationship with ATMIS and the AU for implementation of the Somalia Transitional Plan and achieve stability in Somalia.
The provisional programme of work for July also envisages in footnotes, the possibility of convening of a session to consider renewal of the mandate of G5 Sahel Joint Force, on a date to be determined. The footnotes also envisage possible PSC informal consultations with the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye as well as consultations between the PSC Chair and UNSC President for the month, also on dates to be confirmed.
Briefing on the situation in Libya
Briefing on the situation in Libya
Date | 29 June 2022
Tomorrow (29 June), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1091st session to receive a briefing on the situation in Libya.
Following opening remarks by Daniel Owassa, Permanent Representative of Congo to the AU and Chairperson of the Council for the month of June, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security is expected to deliver a statement. Wahida Ayari, Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission in Libya; the representative of the State of Libya as the country concerned and representative of the United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU) are also expected to deliver statements. Other invited guests expected to participate at the session include representatives of the immediate neighboring countries of Libya – Algeria, Chad, Egypt, Niger and Tunisia and representatives of the relevant regional economic communities and regional mechanisms (RECs/RMs) – Community of Sahel–Saharan States (CEN-SAD), North African Regional Capability (NARC) and Arab Maghreb Union (UMA).
The AU position on Libya is encapsulated in the relevant AU Assembly and PSC decisions. The 997th PSC Communique which was adopted on 18 May 2021 following the holding of a Ministerial level meeting on the situation in Libya stressed the importance of an inclusive, comprehensive national reconciliation process, as well as the need to implement confidence-building measures such as a framework to put to an end to divisions and to restore social cohesion among Libyans. Tomorrow’s meeting will afford an opportunity for PSC members to take stock of the developments in Libya since their last meeting and pronounce themselves on the deteriorating political and security situation in the country, the political consultation process in Cairo and the holding of elections to conclude the prolonged transition period which is deemed critical to respond to the needs and aspiration of the Libyan people.
After more than a decade since the Libyan revolution, the country remains mired in a protracted political crisis. There was hope that the organization of inclusive, free, fair and credible elections would have helped in ending the long transition period. Although 2.8 million people were registered to vote in the presidential and parliamentary elections which were scheduled to be held on 24 December 2021 based on the roadmap agreed within the framework of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF), the elections were postponed and the Libyan political stakeholders have yet to agree on a new timeline. The mandate of the Libyan Government of National Unity within the framework of the LPDF is set to expire by the end of this month. The transitional phase was due to expire on 22 June, according to the LPDF roadmap, had the Presidential and Parliamentary elections were held on 24 December 2021, which did not happen.
Following the postponement of the elections, the Tobruk based House of Representatives appointed Fathi Bashagha, a former minister of interior and one of the presidential candidates, as the new prime minister for the remaining transition period arguing that the incumbent prime minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh failed to organize elections. However, Debeibeh insisted that he will only handover power following the holding of elections. The political rivalry between the Dbeibeh and Bashagha has escalated tensions in Libya leading to clashes in Tripoli in May when Bashagha tried to take over the government but was met with resistance from Dbeibeh’s forces. Another round of fighting took place on 10 June between rival forces supporting Dbeibeh and Bashagha. This latest crisis is threatening to divide the country and plunge it into yet another cycle of conflict and violence. It also led to the partial blockade of Libya’s oil facilities.
UN Special Advisor Stephanie Williams has been trying to resolve the political impasse and engaged with both Dbeibeh and Bashagha to encourage them to resolve their disputes through dialogue. She is also facilitating a discussion on the constitutional basis for the holding of elections through the establishment of a Joint Committee comprising of representatives from the High State Council and the House of Representative. The Joint Committee has met three times and the latest meeting taking place in Cairo. During the two previous sessions held in April and May, the Joint Committee reached agreement on 137 of 197 articles on the form and nature of the state; basic rights and freedoms, including women rights; the structure and powers of a bicameral Parliament; and some of the prerogatives of the President and Prime Minister, including on the prerogative of president and Prime Minister”, according to the UN Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs Rosmary Dicarlo who briefed the Security Council on the matter on 26 May 2021.
There are, however, outstanding issues that need to be addressed and the hope was that during the third and final round the joint committee will finalize the constitutional arrangements for the holding of national elections. Stephanie Williams underscored the need to continue working towards building the necessary consensus on the constitutional framework to pave the way for the holding of elections. As the final round came to a close on 20 June, Stephanie Williams released a press statement stating that ‘the Joint Committee achieved a great deal of consensus on the contentious articles in the Libyan Draft Constitution’ also highlighting differences on the ‘measures governing the transitional period leading to elections’. The Special Advisor urged the Presidencies of the two Chambers ‘to meet within ten days at an agreed upon location to bridge outstanding issues’.
Some observers have been expressing concerns about the ongoing consultation process including the lack of openness to involve the wider Libyan populace. The other complication is the involvement of regional and international actors in the situation in Libya through their backing of different parties. In the meantime, Stephanie Williams is expected to leave her position as Special Advisor by the end of June. Consultations are underway to appoint a new Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL). The AU has been insisting that this post should be filled by an African and the African members have been advancing this same position in the Security Council.
The AU is part of the Libya Quartet which involves the UN, the EU and League of Arab States. The UN has been in the lead in terms of facilitating the Libyan political dialogue but it is not clear how much the AU has been involved and/or consulted within the framework of the latest UN led talks in Cairo. The AU has a Liaison Office which was based in Tunis. The 35th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly decided to relocate the office to Tripoli.
The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communique. Council is expected to express its concern over the recent flare up of tension between armed groups in support of the two rival governments. Council may further urge the rival groups to avoid any violence and resort to dialogue to reach at a consensus on a unified Libyan government that would steer the country towards the Presidential and Parliamentary elections. It may also urge all international actors to refrain from taking any actions that may re-ignite divided foreign support and engage instead in a more constructive role that will contribute to ensuring peaceful resolution of the current impasse. It may further call on the AU High-Level Committee on Libya chaired by H.E. President Denis Sassou Nguesso of the Republic of Congo, to convene a consultative meeting on the current infighting between rival parties. While noting the consultations made by the Joint Committee of the House of Representatives and High Council of State on the constitutional basis for the holding of the elections and progresses made in this regard, Council is also expected to call upon them to reach agreement over the remaining outstanding issues.
Maritime Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea
Maritime Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea
Date | 28 June 2022
Tomorrow (28 June 2022), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1090th session to discuss maritime piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.
Following opening remarks by Daniel Owassa, Permanent Representative of Congo to the AU and Chairperson of the Council for the month of June, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security is expected to deliver statement while the representative of the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GCC) is scheduled to make presentation. The representatives of Congo, Sao Tome and Principe, Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria, Gabon, and Angola will also make statements in their capacity as members of the GGC. In addition to the representatives of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the representatives of the Indian ocean Commission, United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU), and the European Union (EU) are also expected to make statements.
The last time Council considered the issue of maritime security in Africa was at its 1012th session, which was convened on 23 July 2021 under the chairship of Nigeria. In that session, Council, among others, expressed its ‘deep concern over the challenging situation in some regions and areas of Africa’s maritime security domain’. Council also condemned the ‘illegal exploitation of Africa’s maritime resources and the dumping of toxic waste in Africa’s maritime domain’. This session is expected to focus on the maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea, which has overtaken the Gulf of Aden and the Horn of Africa over the past few years, turning the region into the world’s major hotspot for piracy, armed robbery at sea and other forms of maritime crime including transnational organized crime, oil and cargo theft, illicit trafficking and diversion of arms, drug and human trafficking, illegal trade and smuggling, and illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU). As such, tomorrow’s session presents Council the opportunity to assess the maritime security situation of the Gulf of Guinea and explore ways and means to effectively respond to the situation. It is to be recalled that a resolution on maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea (S/RES/2634 (2022)) – co-sponsored by Ghana and Norway – was unanimously adopted by the UN Security Council on 31 May, a decade after its last resolution on the issue.
Stretched from Angola to Senegal and covering around 11,000 square kilometres (4,247 sq. miles), the Gulf of Guinea remains one of the world’s most important shipping routes for both Gulf of Guinea oil exports from the Niger Delta and consumer goods to and from central and southern Africa, accounting for 25 % of African maritime traffic. Piracy has continued to emerge ‘almost exclusively’ from Nigeria’s oil rich Niger Delta though attacks also take place elsewhere, according to Dryad Global.
Although it is difficult to establish the exact cost of maritime insecurity in the region, a recent report by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) revealed direct, indirect and opportunity costs to the region and beyond. One source claim that piracy in the region costs the coastal states some 2 billion USD a year. As UNODC’s study rightly pointed out, the cost will not be however limited to the coastal states but also ‘trickle along trade corridors to the heart of the continent’, highlighting the importance of the issue for countries beyond the coastal states.
The maritime security landscape of the Gulf of Guinea has been changing over the years. Maritime incidents are no longer restricted to territorial waters but increasingly occurring further offshore often outside of the Exclusive Economic Zones. The threat has spread outward from the shore with pirates operating over a vast region extending hundreds of miles from the coast, showing a worrying trend of increasing operational capability of pirates. While incidents have turned increasingly violent, kidnap for ransom has also become the most significant risk to commercial operations in the region. Moreover, a dangerous linkage between piracy and terrorism is also evolving in the region as the tentacles of terrorist groups operating in the Sahel is reaching to the Gulf of Guinea. In this connection, members of Council could be interested to know more about how piracy and armed robbery in the region interact with the expansion of terrorism and violent extremism as well as the resurgence of coups, and how these can impact the peace and security situation of the West and Central Africa regions.
Despite the grim picture however, the maritime security landscape of the region recorded a notable improvement in 2021 though the sustainability of such gain remains questionable. The 2021 annual report of Dryad Global, a maritime risk company, indicates that piracy off West Africa in 2021 declined dramatically with 56% drop from previous year. It further highlights that incidents of actual and attempted attacks and vessels being fired upon decreased by more than 85%. The number of vessels boarded throughout the region fell by 54% while incidents of crews being kidnapped declined by 60%.
Many attributes the decline in piracy in the region with Nigeria’s 195 million USD Integrated National Security and Waterways Protection Infrastructure, otherwise known as the Deep Blue Project (DBP), though some like the Dryad Global doubts this. On the other hand, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, United Representative at the UN, during UN Security Council meeting on maritime security in May associated the crimes decrease with enhanced international collaboration. The blue project of Nigeria, initiated in 2017 but officially launched this month, brings together a mix of special mission vessels, fast interceptor boats, special mission aircraft, helicopters, and drones to patrol the shipping lanes off Nigeria’s coast. It is to be recalled that the country passed an anti-piracy bill, the Suppression of Piracy and Other Maritime Offences Act in 2019, to stem the rising trend of piracy in the region. During the launch ceremony on 10 June, President Muhammadu Buhari stated that the Deep Blue would ‘advance the security architecture and ensure greater enforcement action in Nigerian waters and beyond’, particularly in the prosecution of suspects under the Suppression of Piracy and other Maritime Offences Act.
While the project is a significant positive development to tackle the immediate maritime security concerns in the region, the long-term success of this initiative in turning the tide against piracy is not guaranteed nor the gains of last year remain sustainable without addressing the underlying causes of piracy and armed robbery. The absence of economic opportunities and governance deficit have become major drivers of piracy and other criminal activities in the region. It is imperative that the security measures are complimented with addressing such underlying conditions if the threat is to be resolved sustainably. On a related note, it is worth noting that the UN Security Council resolution 2634 (2022) requested the Secretary-General to report on the situation of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea and its underlying causes, including any possible and potential linkages with terrorism in West and Central Africa and the Sahel.
Another important factor to stem maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea is the need to strengthening the existing frameworks and institutions created to address the security challenges in the Gulf of Guinea, as well as enhancing cooperation and coordination between the plethora of structures. In this respect, the Yaoundé Architecture for Maritime Security and Safety, a culmination of a meeting between ECOWAS, ECCAS and GGC in Yaoundé, Cameroon, in 2013, is at the centre of such mechanisms designed to address the maritime insecurity in the region. While significant progress has been made towards its operationalization and strengthening cooperation with international partners, limited capacity continues to remain a challenge for the effectiveness of the architecture. Yaoundé Code of Conduct, Africa Integrated Maritime Strategy (AIMS) 2050, African Charter on Maritime Security and Safety and Development in Africa (Lomé Charter) are also relevant instruments available at regional and continental level.
The presence of different structures and initiatives at national, regional, and international levels to address maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea also raises the question of coordination. One notable development of interest to the Council in this respect is the establishment of the Gulf of Guinea Maritime Collaboration Forum and Shared Awareness and De-Confliction (GoG-MCF/SHADE) last year. The platform was created by Nigeria and the Inter-Regional Coordination Centre (ICC) – representing 21 countries in the Gulf of Guinea – to serve as a platform for navies, industry partners and other relevant stakeholders from across the Gulf of Guinea and beyond with the view to harmonising counter-piracy efforts and communication in the region. International partners such as the G7++ Friends of the Gulf of Guinea and the European Union have also stepped in to support regional efforts against piracy.
Adding to the above structures, the PSC in its last session on the theme also envisioned a naval capacity within the African Standby Force (ASF) for promoting maritime and security and safety in Africa though its practicality would remain a problem. This will be in addition to the Counter-terrorism unit which Council decided to establish within the ASF at its 960th session held on 28 October 2020.
The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communique. Among others, Council is expected to express concern over the persistent threat posed by piracy, armed robbery, and other forms of maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea. It may further express concern over the trend of the expansion of the threat posed by pirates far from the coast, as well as the economic implications of the threat on the coastal states. Council is likely to welcome the launch of Nigeria’s Deep Blue Project on 10 June 2022 and may appeal to international partners to provide the necessary support to the effective implementation of the project. It may also re-emphasize the importance of adopting a comprehensive solution to the multidimensional underlying causes and drivers of maritime insecurity in order to sustainably address the problem. Echoing UN Security Council Resolution 2634 (2022), Council may urge member states in the region to criminalize piracy and armed robbery at sea under their domestic laws, and may further call to investigate, prosecute, or extradite, in accordance with applicable international law, perpetrators of piracy and armed robbery at sea. Taking note of the decline of piracy in the region over the past year, Council may encourage coastal states to keep the momentum and sustain the gains through continued collaboration and strong coordination among states of Gulf of Guinea as well as the different initiatives and institutions including the Yaoundé Architecture, AU, ECOWAS, ECCAS, and GGC in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at the sea of Gulf of Guinea.