Briefing by African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE) on the implementation of Pelindaba Treaty
Amani Africa
Date | 31 March 2022
Tomorrow (31 March), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1071st session to receive a briefing by the African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE) on the implementation of the Pelindaba Treaty.
Permanent Representative of Lesotho to the AU and the Chairperson of the PSC for the month of March, Mafa M. Sejanamane, is expected to make an opening remark. AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, is also scheduled to make presentation. A briefing by the representative of AFCONE will follow the presentation. The representatives of the United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) are also expected to deliver their remarks.
This session is convened within the context of PSC’s request of the AU Commission and the AFCONE, at its 763rd meeting held on 10 April 2018, to annually brief the Council on the ‘status of the implementation of the Pelindaba Treaty and the activities of AFCONE’. The last time Council considered the Treaty was during its 837th session that took place on 4 April 2019 while addressing the broader theme of ‘international disarmament’ with a focus on Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW).
Tomorrow’s session takes place at a critical time given the current global crisis and the mounting tension between powers that possess nuclear weapons. Even before the outbreak of the war, the global nuclear dynamics has worsened in recent years as global powers arms race has intensified. At its 763rd session, the PSC also noted the ‘slow pace of nuclear disarmament and the rising tensions among nuclear-weapon possessor states’ and its impact in undermining confidence over the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT). Coming within this global context, members of the Council may reflect on how the Pelindaba Treaty could contribute in advancing global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation agenda, thereby promote international peace and security.
It is to be recalled that the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty Treaty—commonly referred to as the Pelindaba Treaty which is named after South Africa’s central nuclear research complex—is one of the five Treaties on regional Nuclear-Weapons Free-Zones that came within the broader context of global initiative to strengthen the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation norms. The main objective of this Treaty is to enhance peace and security through the prohibition of the possession and stationing of nuclear weapons across the continent while it encourages the peaceful use of nuclear science and technology. The Treaty was opened for signature in Cairo on 11 April 1996 and entered into force on 15 July 2009 after the deposit of 28th instrument of ratification by Burundi. Three other protocols are also attached to the Treaty to ensure respect of the Treaty by non-African states, notably the Nuclear-Weapon States (NWS).
One of the challenges towards the full implementation of the Treaty likely to be raised in tomorrow’s session is that considerable number of Member States are not still state parties to the Pelindaba Treaty. According to an information note prepared for the session, 11 African countries, namely Central African Republic, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Liberia, Morocco, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sao Tome and Principe, Sudan and Uganda, are not party to the Treaty. South Sudan is yet to accede to the Treaty. The rest 43 African countries have become state parties to the Treaty.
Another issue likely to be highlighted in tomorrow’s session is the synergy and complementarity between the Pelindaba Treaty and other international disarmament and non-proliferation regime most notably the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Treaty on Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), as well as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). ICRC’s statement is likely to focus on this issue. As State Parties to some of the treaties that form disarmament and non-proliferation regime will convene during second and third quarters of the year (5th Conference of State Parties to the Pelindaba Treaty in April; 1st Meeting of the State Parties to the TPNW in July; and 10th Review Conference of the NPT in August), this session is an opportune moment to remind Member States to join these instruments.
The other aspect that AFCONE’s briefing may highlight is the use of nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes including power generation, human health, agriculture, industrial uses and scientific research. The Pelindaba Treaty encourages such peaceful use of nuclear power, but under strict non-proliferation measures. The Council, during its 763rd session also affirmed the ‘inalienable right of all parties to apply chemical, biological and nuclear science and technology for peaceful civilian purposes’. In this regard, nuclear energy is particularly important in Africa where more than 640 million of its 1.2 billion population have no access to electricity and electricity access rate stands just over 40 percent, the lowest in the world, according to African Development Bank report. Addressing this deficit in the continent may require the inclusion of nuclear power as an alternative source of energy.
Given that nuclear power is regarded as clean, reliable and cost-effective source of energy, it is considered to be an attractive option for Africa in its effort to tackle the twin challenges of energy poverty and climate change. It also plays critical role in realizing the developmental aspirations enshrined under Agenda 2063 and UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which in turn enhance the peace and stability of the continent. Despite the enormous benefit that nuclear energy offers, it is only South Africa that has been able to harness the potential through its Koeberg nuclear power plant. Promoting the use of nuclear energy in Africa therefore leaves a lot to be desired.
It is also imperative for Africa to take a more coordinated approach that would strengthen nuclear infrastructure and enhance nuclear expertise and knowledge. In this respect relevant international and regional bodies such as the AFCONE, the African Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training related to Nuclear Science and Technology (AFRA), and IAEA play critical role in providing the required technical support particularly in the areas of developing regulatory frameworks and the human resources, as well as nuclear research and training activities. In its briefing, AFCONE is expected to highlight the activities undertaken in this regard and the challenges faced.
Although key milestones have been achieved paving the way for AFCONE Secretariat to function fully, limited finance has become a major challenge affecting the effectiveness of the institution in discharging its envisaged mandate. This was flagged up by the AFCONE Vice Chairperson, Hadjaro Adam Senoussi, where he stated that ‘significant operationalization of the Secretariat AFCONE, which is critical for the Treaty of Pelindaba to achieve its objective, has not progressed with required speed and efficiency for the reasons explained in the AFCONE reports, particularly the critical budget issue’. The Vice Chairperson further asserted that without the ‘urgent integration of the AFCONE to the AU Institutional Reform Process’ and the ‘designation of a Permanent Executive Secretary and facilitate the appropriate staffing of the Secretariat’, AFCONE cannot sustain its function.
The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communiqué. Among others, Council is expected to express its concern over the nuclear escalation and may call upon all parties not to undermine the objectives and spirit of disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Council may stress the complementarity between the Pelindaba Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) their relevancy to the African Peace and Security Architecture. The Council may further encourage Member States to participate in the upcoming meetings of State Parties to Pelindaba Treaty, NPT and TPNW, and urge them to join the Treaties. Regarding the use of nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes, Council may encourage Member States to include nuclear power as an option of energy source and fully harness its benefits. Council may re-emphasize the need for the speedy operationalization of AFCONE Secretariat based in South Africa, given its role in the implementation of the Pelindaba Treaty and the promotion of the peaceful application of nuclear science and technology. In this respect, the Council may particularly call on State Parties to the Treaty to fulfil their financial obligations to address the budget challenge.
Consideration of Policies on Child Protection in AU PSOs and Mainstreaming Child Protection in APSA
Amani Africa
Date | 29 March 2022
Tomorrow (29 March 2022) the African Union (AU) Peace Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1070th session to consider two policies aimed at ensuring protection of children affected by armed conflicts – the draft policy on child protection in AU Peace Support Operations (PSOs) and the draft policy on mainstreaming child protection in the African peace and Security Architecture (APSA).
Following opening remarks by Mafa M. Sejanamane, Permanent Representative of Lesotho to the AU and the Chairperson of the PSC for the month of March, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to make a statement. Cessouma Minata Samate, Commissioner of Health, Humanitarian Affairs and Social Development (HHS) is also expected to make remarks. Other expected participants include representatives of AU Member States, Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) and invited members of the international community and partners represented in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
Tomorrow’s session forms part of Council’s annual agenda item on the theme of protection of children affected by armed conflicts (CAAC). While Council has been addressing the issue of children affected by conflict and crises situations since 2010, CAAC was institutionalised and regularised within Council’s agenda following the decision of its 420th session held in 2014, where Council undertook to dedicate annual sessions on the theme.
It is to be recalled that at its 994th session on CAAC, Council requested the AU Commission to “institutionalize a child protection architecture within the Africa Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and develop a policy aimed at mainstreaming child protection in all phases of intervention from conflict prevention and mediation to conflict management”. Tomorrow’s session is expected to be a follow up of this decision and an opportunity for Council to be updated on the status of the draft policy on child protection in AU PSOs and the draft policy on mainstreaming child protection in APSA.
The policy on mainstreaming child protection in APSA is drafted with the main purpose of outlining the process through which child protection should be integrated into the various policies, procedures and practices of APSA Pillars and how it should be implemented throughout all areas of APSA, from conflict prevention, to management and resolution and post-conflict recovery and reconstruction. The policy was drafted as part of efforts geared towards the development of a child protection architecture within APSA, in line with Assembly/AU/Dec.718(XXXII). The Assembly, at its 32nd Ordinary Session, mandated the AU Commission to “develop a child protection architecture for the Continent as a sub-aspect of APSA, to be considered and adopted by the PSC”. The Assembly’s decision was informed by and represented endorsement of the PSC’s recommendation at its 706th session, for the establishment of a child protection architecture within the AU Commission. The establishment of such architecture is mainly aimed at enhancing coordination and complementarity between various normative frameworks, institutions and mechanisms of the AU which are relevant for protecting and promoting the rights and welfare of children in situations of armed conflicts.
The drafting of the policy on child protection in AU PSOs was initiated upon the request of the AU Assembly at its 33rd Ordinary Session, for the AU Commission to “develop a comprehensive policy on child protection in AU peace support operations” (Assembly/AU/Dec.753(XXXIII)). The Assembly’s request for the development of a policy tailored specifically to AU PSOs was aimed at addressing the existing lack of guiding rules and principles for PSOs, in their interactions with children they encounter under various circumstances in situations of armed conflicts. Such encounters may vary from confrontations with child soldiers to coming across unaccompanied minors or children victimised by sexual abuse. The central purpose of the policy on child protection in AU PSOs is therefore to ensure that AU PSOs are trained and capacitated both pre-deployment and in-mission, on how to contribute to the prevention, response and remedy of violations against the rights and wellbeing of children in conflict situations. To that end, the policy is guided by regional and international human rights and humanitarian law standards on the protection of children at times of armed conflicts.
Through its multiple sessions convened over the years on the CAAC theme, the PSC has contributed significantly for the development of these two important policies. Mainly, the Council has played a critical role in identifying the need for such policies by drawing attention at its various sessions, to the areas of AU’s peace and security efforts which require to adopt approaches that take into consideration the specific needs of children in conflict settings. For instance, at its 491st session convened on 9 March 2015, the PSC stressed the need for both pre-deployment and in-mission trainings for AU PSO personnel, on prevention and combating of sexual exploitation and abuse of children in conflict situations. At its 757th session held on 13 March 2018 Council further pointed out the importance of ensuring that protection of children is addressed systematically throughout the “design and mandate implementation stages of AU PSOs”. It further emphasised at that session, the need of mainstreaming the wellbeing of children into relevant components of AU peacekeeping policies, strategies, training and briefing programmes.
Once adopted, both policies are intended to require mandatory compliance. This would be essential to ensure that all personnel of AU authorised, mandated or endorsed PSOs and those deployed within regional arrangements of the various RECs/RMs, as well as policy and decision makers within the structure of APSA are well sensitised, trained and capacitated to carefully assess and take into account, the specific circumstances of children in conflict situations while discharging their various duties. By doing so, the two policies will not only ensure the protection of the rights and welfare of children affected by conflicts, but also contribute to building sustainable and intergenerational peace and security on the continent.
The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communique. The PSC is expected to consider and reflect on the adoption of the two instruments. Council is expected to commend the AU Commission for collaborating with relevant stakeholders in the development of the policies. In addition to discussing the two policies on child protection, Council may also follow up on the status of implementation of some of the other key decisions of its 994th session, including its call for the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACERWC) to work towards establishing a “child protection situation room” which would allow timely and coordinated response to the plight of children in conflict settings. It may reiterate its call for the Chairperson of the AU Commission to appoint a Special Envoy on Children, Peace and Security. Council may also welcome the formation of the Africa Platform on Children Affected by Armed Conflicts (AP-CAAC) and commend the AU Commission for setting up this mechanism which is intended to strengthen advocacy and development of policies aimed at addressing the plight of children in conflict situations. It may also urge member States to sign, ratify and implement regional and international instruments relevant for the protection of children both in peace time and during armed conflicts.
Africa and the International Order at a Time of the Current Global Crisis
Amani Africa
Seminar Report
On 11 March 2022, the Embassy of Kenya in Addis Ababa and Amani Africa jointly convened a high-level panel on how the war on Ukraine affects the international system and Africa’s role and interests in the system. Moderated by the Founding Director of Amani Africa, Dr Solomon Ayele Dersso, the panel was made up of key policy makers: H.E. Hanna Tetteh Special Representative of the Secretary General to the AU and Head of United Nations Office to the AU (UNOAU), H.E Amb. Mafa Sejanamane Permanent Representative of Lesotho to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for the month of March 2022, H.E. Amb. Jean Kamau Permanent Representative of Kenya to the AU and the immediate past Chairpersonof the PSC, Ambassador William Awinador Kanyirige, Special Advisor to AU’s Commissioner of Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) and Bitania Tadesse, Director of Programs of Amani Africa.
The joint event was convened against the background of Russian military assault on Ukraine. As pointed out in the concept note for the high-level panel, this convening is premised on the recognition that Africa, as other parts of the world will not escape the consequences of the global crises that this war and the reactions to it set in motion and that Africa, on account of existing vulnerabilities, may bear the brunt of the crises.
The convening sought not only to appraise the nature and import of this dramatic development as well the responses it triggered. As the interventions of the panelists of the event and the ensuing discussions revealed, although this is a war involving Russian troops fighting Ukraine in breach of fundamental UN principles, the war and the unprecedented nature of the responses it elicited particularly from Western governments are not without global consequences. The discussions centered on the implications of this crisis to multilateralism, the socio-economic and security impacts of this situation on Africa and on Africa’s humanitarian, development and peace and security cooperation and how best African states position themselves.
At one level, there is a question about what this war means for Africa’s interest in and reliance on multilateralism. While there was no agreement on the scale of the damage this war inflicted on multilateralism, there was consensus that multilateralism suffered a major blow. As the SRSG Hanna Tetteh observed multilateralism, although not on its death bed, is fragile. It was observed that the world has witnessed the failure of diplomacy. Panelists also highlighted how this war represents one of manifestation of the total disregard of fundamental rules of international law by the powerful, including violation of inviolability of borders witnessed in the post-Cold war era. In the words of Amb Sejanamane, what we are observing in Ukraine is ‘the consequence of failed international system.’ In underscoring the gravity of the crisis facing multilateralism, Amb Kanyirige underscored that ‘if multilateralism is in retreat, humanity is also in retreat.’ Without the necessary reform of the multilateral system, Amb Sejanamane warned that what comes next could be graver than the war on Ukraine.
From the perspective of Africa’s role in multilateralism, the high-level panel identified at least four areas of concern. First, the damage this war and the accompanying polarization it triggered have inflicted on multilateralism threatens the interest of the weak regions of the world, including most notably Africa, who heavily depend on multilateral cooperation and rules to fend off overt interference by the powerful in their affairs.
Second, the division in the UNSC that this war accentuated threatens to result in complete paralysis, depriving UNSC of the consensus that is key for it to address effectively peace and security issues in Africa. It was pointed out that ‘we are in for difficult times’, although it remains to be seen how this would also affect AU-UN partnership on peace and security.
Third, with the war in Ukraine attracting all the international attention, as Amb Kamau aptly observed, African issues risk being de-prioritized and multilateral cooperation on humanitarian support, development and peace and security in Africa will be weakened. As an immediate area of concern and illustrative case, Amb Kanyirige observed the emerging worry that this crisis may divert resources in the EU that might have been channeled to support the on-going process for the transition of the AU Mission in Somalia, although the EU Ambassador to the AU reaffirmed EU’s commitment to support.
Fourth, the confrontation between Russia and the West that the war brought to the open threatens to accentuate a Cold War type major power rivalry in Africa, with African States facing the specter of being forced to choose between rival camps. The serious impact of both the war and the responses it elicited on the global economy including the power realignment that seems to be in the making is sure to have particular reverberation on the continent. Amb Kamau thus observed ‘depending on the power realignment that is going on we will be pulled into those realignments and almost forced, under the pretext of ongoing investment opportunities, to align ourselves with certain realignment’. One manifestation of this expectation and demand for Africa to align is the simplistic interpretation of the pattern of votes of African states on the UN General Assembly resolution on Ukraine that those who voted for the resolution are on one side of the geo-political divide and those who abstained or did not vote are on the other side. Thus, Amb Kanyirige advised that the voting pattern needs to be considered not just from a legal but also from the pragmatic. He further said that it is not the African way ‘that because country A, country B and C have voted in a particular way that is against the way friends may have voted therefore they are against’.
In terms of Africa’s engagement in this crisis, panelists pointed out the necessity for Africa to assert its voice to shape the future global order and must continue its rightful place in the international arena. One way of doing this, as Amb Kamau observed, is, in the context of this crisis, for Africa to support and push for the ongoing effort of the reform of the UN. This echoes the view expressed by the current Chairperson of the Africa Group in New York that ‘failure of the global security architecture to uphold UN Charter is currently in full display. Africa must turn this moment to galvanize the call for the requisite reform of the UNSC.’ Indeed, all panelists agree that the structures of the UN are (over)due for reform. Africa can build on the Ezuliweni consensus on the reform of the UN Security Council. While pushing for reform, attention was drawn to the imperative of Africa standing up for the fundamental principles of the UN Charter when they are violated as AU member states rightly protest when those principles are not applied to Africa fairly. In the words of Amb Sejanamane, given that this is a product of the failed multilateral system of the post-Cold War period, the most important issue for Africa is ‘the recreation of the multilateral system and institutions.’ Given that global order refers to international system of rule-making, decision-making and compliance enforcement primarily but not restricted by the UN Security Council, Amb Kamau also rightly asked whether international order exists and why any member of the UN system should not respect international law. She stressed the importance of legitimacy in maintaining international order.
The panel also highlighted the importance for Africa advocating for dialogue and diplomacy to be the basis for ending the ongoing crisis. The importance of this could not be underestimated given that diplomacy seems to be on a retreat or taking the backseat in the context of the current war in Ukraine, as observed during the question-and-answer session. But for Africa to play such role, there is a need for the AU to deliberate on and formulate a common Africa approach for ending the war and resolving the structural flaws of the multilateral system that was unable to prevent it. The importance of the 54 African states members of the UN harmonizing their positions instead of going it alone was also underscored. There is a minimum basis for African states to achieve such a harmonized position and this minimum basis is the fact that no African country would support the invasion of Ukraine. Underscoring the foundational importance of respect for inviolability of borders for international peace and security, Amd Sejanamane stated ‘African states are weak. They know that if the situation of unliteral change of borders takes place, none of them can have peace.’
Two approaches have been identified. The first is the legal approach which is based on the principles of the UN Charter. Emphasizing the importance of this for Africa, SRSG Tetteh observed that it ‘is important for us as Africans…to ensure that the principles that we expect to be respected with respect to the African continent should also be respected when they happen anywhere else.’ The second is what Amb Kanyirige called the pragmatic approach. While the first approach confines the war on Ukraine to a question of law, the second approach treats it as not just a legal issue but also importantly as geo-political issue as well. Accordingly, Amb Sejanamane suggested that it is inaccurate to consider that the current global crisis started with the invasion of Ukraine. The parameters of the analysis of the current global crisis properly defined suggest that this crisis started much earlier. Amb Kanyirige thus stressed that the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) serves as a standard platform for Africans to put forward their common agendas. On the continued and contemporary importance of NAM for protecting the interest of ‘third world’ countries, reference was made to the fact that the structure of the international system that emerged from the ashes of WWII remain unchanged and the world is in a new form of Cold War. Similarly, speaking on the experience of African states Amb Sejanamane reiterated the importance of Africa pursuing its own interest without aligning with any global power.
Beyond the strategic ramifications of the combination of this war and the confrontation it brought to the open between Russia and the West, there are also issues of immediate concern for Africa. The first of these relate to the disruption the war causes on the supply of agricultural products such as wheat and the resultant food price hike and lack of access to edible oil. The other involves the oil and gas price hike that this war and the ensuing confrontation particularly between the West and Russia brought about and the impact of this on the finances of oil importing African countries. At a time when African economies are as yet to recover from the impacts of COVID19, the spike in cost of living that these developments are expected to accentuate existing economic woes of African countries, weaken further state-society relations and heighten risks of political instability.
In terms of measures that African states should adopt to limit the adverse impacts of this crisis, Amb Sejanamane counseled that there is need for ensuring that the goods necessary for maintenance of life such as food and energy resources are made available. Similarly, SRSG Tetteh underscored the need for blocking revenue leakages and improvement of governance structures and using the saved revenues to cushion citizens. Additionally, as COVID19, the disruptions that this crisis causes in trade of agricultural products and oil and gas once again affirms the need for building intra-African supply chains, a further validation of the critical importance of the AfCFTA for Africa in a time of global crisis. Given that it is unknown how long this crisis will last, SRSG Tetteh observed that this crisis may be used as an opportunity ‘to move towards that energy transition’ away from the unsustainable dependency in fossil fuel as source of energy. Further, Amb Kanyirige remarked that, strengthening the quality of governance, managing continental and regional crisis and seeking opportunity in crisis to build resilience in the global arena should be key priorities at the present time. The necessity of African states putting their house in order and coordinating meaningfully to multiply the weight of their collective voice. In addition, continental and regional integration is vital to sustain and influence at a time of global crisis.
From a peace and security perspective, the situation is set to have immediate impacts. First is the withdrawal of peacekeepers and peacekeeping assets by Ukraine and the resultant gap this would create on peace keeping operations in Africa. For example, Ukraine is withdrawing 250 peacekeepers from MONUSCO. In the words of SRSG Tetteh, ‘abrupt departures of such peacekeepers are likely to negatively impact the balance of forces on the ground in such missions at the risk of reversing the gains made by those missions.’ The second is the risk of disruption of support for AU peace and security work and the danger of this creating security vacuum, threatening to reverse gains that have been made in places such as Somalia. The third relates to the impact of big power confrontation on aggravating existing conflicts and impeding the search for and implementation of peace agreements. The Special Research Report whose main themes were presented by Tadesse, among others, highlight how, even before the eruption of the Ukraine war, Cold War type rivalries on the continent negatively affect peace and security on the continent, which would only be aggravated in the context of the confrontation that the war on Ukraine brought to the open. The final is the disregard of African interests in the global arena and the diversion of attention away from African conflicts and humanitarian needs as well as development cooperation.
The panel concluded that the nature of the global crisis relating to the War on Ukraine has both direct and indirect impacts on Africa. It thus warrants further and wider reflections as well as consideration at the level of the continental policy structures. It became clear that the AU may need to convene Assembly meeting similar to that the OAU convened in 1991 in the context of the end of the Cold War. On the peace and security aspect of the crisis, participants as well as panelists indicated on the importance of the Peace and Security Council of the AU convening a session to consider the impact of this crisis on Africa in the manner it did with respect to the global COVID19 pandemic.
It also emerged from the interventions of the distinguished panelists and from the inputs from participants that no African country supports the war against Ukraine and the blatant breach of the principle of the inviolability of borders. Thus, given the danger that such acts pose to global order and peace and security, it is in the interest of Africa to defend the fundamental principles of the international system. From the perspective of the geo-strategic dimension of the crisis, while condemning the invasion of Ukraine, African states are advised to avoid aligning themselves with any block in the geo-strategic confrontation between global powers. In the short term, Africa has to work on addressing the immediate socio-economic impacts of the disruption in trade in agricultural products and oil and gas on Africa and the peace and security ramifications of the crisis in Africa, including by enhancing intra-African trade in these goods. With respect to the war, Africa’s contribution would be in avoiding the retreat of diplomacy to the backseat in the current effort to address the war and advocating for making diplomacy the main avenue in the effort for ending the war. In the medium term and at strategic levels, this crisis should give impetus for aggressively pushing for the reform of the global order. As the moderator of the panel pointed out, it is not clear what would catalyze the reform of the reform of the global order if not this current crisis. This current crisis aptly demonstrated that it is too dangerous to allow the status quo of the failed and deeply flawed current structure of the global order as that would mean condemning the world for further calamities.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Amani Africa wishes to express its gratitude to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the support in convening the high-level event. We also thank the Embassy of Ireland, the Government of Switzerland and Open Society Foundations for the additional support.
