Annual Consultative Meeting between the Peace and Security Council (PSC) and Pan-African Parliament (PAP)
Annual Consultative Meeting between the Peace and Security Council (PSC) and Pan-African Parliament (PAP)
Date | 29 June 2023
Tomorrow (29 June) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1161st Session that is dedicated to an annual consultative meeting of the PSC with the Pan-African Parliament (PAP).
The PSC Chair for the month and Permanent Representative of Zimbabwe to the AU, Sophia Nyamudeza will be delivering the opening remarks. The Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, is also expected to make a statement. The President of the PAP, Fortune Charumbira is also expected to deliver a statement.
The convening of this session is grounded upon two legal bases. Firstly, the mandates of the PAP and the PSC are intertwined. One of the core objectives of the PAP, as stated in the 2001 Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to the PAP, is the promotion of peace, security and stability. Thus, PAP’s mandate has a component that overlaps with that of the PSC, although the PSC holds primacy on matters of peace and security.
Second and most importantly, tomorrow’s session is also convened within the framework of Article 18 of the PSC Protocol. This article provides for the establishment of a close working relationship between the PSC and the PAP, recognizing the complementary nature of their respective roles in the promotion of peace, security, and stability on the continent.
Despite this, the working relationship between the two in advancing peace and security has not been institutionalized. To-date, only two interactive sessions have taken place within the framework of Article 18 of the PSC Protocol. The first consultative meeting with the PAP was the 148th session that was held in August 2008, and the second and the last meeting was the 344th session held in November 2012. At the 344th session, a delegation from PAP’s Committee on Cooperation, International Relations, and Conflict Resolution (CCIRCR) engaged with the PSC on the relations between the two organs. The outcomes of those two sessions in 2008 and 2012 were a press statement.
The PAP’s general mandate, which is to ensure the full participation of the African people in the economic development and integration of the continent is stipulated under the Abuja Treaty, the Constitutive Act of the AU, and the Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to the PAP. Additionally, the PAP is invested with the role of receiving report from the PSC. Article 18 (2) and (3) of the PSC Protocol, the PSC is required to submit reports to the PAP through the AU Commission Chairperson whenever requested. The Chairperson also has the responsibility to present an annual report on the state of peace and security in the continent.
Yet, these mechanisms are as yet to be fully institutionalized. The lack of interaction between the PSC and PAP has been observed in the previous years, with the exception of statements delivered by the PSC Chairs during the Parliament’s Ordinary Sessions. During a debate on the status of peace and security in Africa on the second day of the First Ordinary Session of the Sixth Parliament in Midrand last November, the Chairperson of PAP’s CCIRCR has expressed concern that the relationship between the PSC and PAP has not developed as it should.
The above concern is true. The last time the PSC held a consultative meeting with PAP through CCIRCR at its 344th session, it commended the CCIRCR for the proposal it put forward at that session and ‘agreed to look in-depth into these proposals and other modalities for strengthening its relations with the PAP and to meet in due course to review the issue. Indeed, next steps towards addressing these concerns would require the elaboration of modalities for the operationalization of Article 18 of the PSC Protocol on close working relationship. The PSC may also invite PAP to update the proposal made during the last meeting in the light of developments since that meeting. Indeed, if the experience of the PSC with other AU bodies like the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights under Article 19 of the PSC Protocol is useful guide, it would become most useful if proposal on how to operationalize Article 18 comes from PAP having regard to its mandate and how best the mandate can be leveraged in the implementation of the objectives of the PSC Protocol.
There are also institutional challenges that affect the effective operationalization of the relationship. One such challenge relates to the management issues afflicting the PAP over the past years, which tarnished the image of the institution and led to loss of confidence in the execution of its mandate. There is also the issue of the lack of ratification of the 2014 Protocol to the Constitutive Act of the AU Relating to the Pan-African Parliament (the 2014 PAP Protocol), which designates the PAP as the legislative body of the AU. As of 28 June 2023, 22 Member States had signed and 14 had deposited the instrument of ratification for the 2014 PAP Protocol. It is worth noting that only four of the current rotating chairs of the PSC have ratified the Protocol. This leaves the Protocol with half of the required member states to ratify the instrument for it to enter into force and for the Parliament to start implementing its legislative role. This continues to limit the substantive role of PAP, which in its current mandate is largely advisory. These should not however impede enhancing close working relations for leveraging the role of PAP.
For purposes of the peace and security component of its mandate, PAP has the CCIRCR, which is one of the ten (10) Permanent Committees of the PAP. Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 26(d) of the Rules of Procedure of PAP, the CCIRCR has the specific responsibility of introducing issues of peace and security in Africa for consideration of the Chamber.
In its consultative\advisory role, the PAP has since its earlier years sent various fact-finding missions to different conflict areas across the continent, including Cote d’Ivoire, Darfur/Sudan, Libya, Rwanda, Mauritania and Chad. These missions have produced reports, which are used to provide recommendations. It has also adopted resolutions for conflict resolution. Despite its mandate to forward these recommendations to all relevant bodies, including the PSC, there is no established means of communication for the PAP to transmit its recommendations. As a result, there is no record of the interaction between the PAP and the PSC regarding its recommendations on peace and security issues. Therefore, it is difficult to assert that the recommendations of the Parliament have been reflected in the decisions of the PSC.
In the earlier years of its establishment, the PAP also conducted election observation missions in various countries such as Kenya, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Zimbabwe for election observation. However, these election observation missions of the PAP have been discontinued since 2008. In a recent visit to the Parliament’s Headquarters in Midrand, South Africa, Commissioner Bankole Adeoye reaffirmed the decision taken by the Executive Council in February 2010. The decision stipulates that both the PAP and the AU Commission, through the Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security, should collaborate in a joint AU Election Observation Mission (AUEOM). Furthermore, it allowed the PAP to contribute 40% of the observers to the mission. Tomorrow’s session may reflect on the follow up on this plan and whether PAP can best contribute to promoting free and fair elections other than through being part of AU election monitoring. This latter part is particularly important as PAP could deploy ahead of the convening of elections and share its observations on measures that need to be taken for enhancing credibility of elections in countries planning to have elections.
Although the outcome of the session is uncertain, the expressed need for collaboration between the two organs by Ambassador Emilia Ndinelao Mkusa, the PSC Chair for the month of November 2022, and the readiness to work together by Commissioner Adeoye, creates an expectation that the PSC adopts modalities for enhancing close working relationship with the PAP.
Irrespective of the format of the outcome of the consultative meeting, the PSC is expected to welcome updates from the PAP on the activities undertaken in relation to peace and security and to continue cooperation through the annual consultative meeting within the framework of Article 18. In addition, the PSC may call for modalities to operationalize Article 18 and in this respect invite PAP to update and present for PSC’s consideration the proposal it made at the 344th session of the PSC. The PSC may indicate that such proposal consider establishing a mechanism for the communication of decisions and recommendations of PAP on peace and security in order to ensure coherence and complementarity in decision-making processes. Furthermore, the PSC may decide to hold regular interactions between the PSC Chairperson and the Chairperson of the PAP. The PSC may also welcome the engagement of PAP in peace and security issues including through the issuance of statements on peace and security developments and indicate the importance of coordination to enhance effectiveness and coherence. Lastly, the PSC may urge Member States to ratify the 2014 PAP Protocol to fully operationalize the Parliament.
Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - May 2023
Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - May 2023
Date | May 2023
In May, Uganda chaired the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC). In total, the PSC held seven meetings. For the first time, the PSC also held an informal engagement with the Chairperson of the AU, President Azali Assoumani of the Comoros. In early May, the PSC held the annual consultative meeting with its European Union (EU) counterpart, the European Political and Security Committee (EU PSC).
On why Darfur deserves a special attention
On why Darfur deserves a special attention
Date | 22 June 2023
Solomon Ayele Dersso, PhD
Founding Director, Amani Africa
Tsion Hagos
Senior Researcher, Amani Africa
Zekarias Beshah Abebe
Senior Researcher, Amani Africa
Since the outbreak of fighting in Sudan on 15 April 2023, the part of the country that has come to experience the most violence is Darfur. Outside Khartoum, Darfur is the one region where the fighting affected most parts of the region. It is in Darfur that the fighting has taken worrying levels of intercommunal dimension. It is also here that the fighting not only endangers to tear apart the already fragile and violence ridden relations between various communities, but also to result in mass atrocities. This is accordingly a situation that warrants special attention of the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC).
It is in Darfur that the fighting has taken worrying levels of intercommunal dimension. It is also here that the fighting not only endangers to tear apart the already fragile and violence ridden relations between various communities, but also to result in mass atrocities.
Although the signing of local peace agreements led by local leaders and committees initially sought to minimize the degeneration of the fighting between the Sudanese Armed Force (SAF) and the Rapid Support Force (RSF) into widespread inter-communal violence, it was unable to forestall it.
El Geneina, capital of West Darfur and a city close to the border with Chad, is perhaps the most affected by the violence. It reportedly witnessed the killing of significant number of people, widespread damage and destruction of both public and private property and lootings. According to OCHA’s Humanitarian update for 22 June, ‘[t]here are also reports of ethnically-motivated targeted killings, sexual violence, widespread burning of homes and mass displacement of non-Arab residents–particularly in and around the city of Ag Geneina (sic)–by the RSF and allied Arab militias.’
According to various reports, the violence in West Darfur taking the form of ethnic cleansing turns out to be one of, if not the, deadliest thus far and most atrocious. According to Sudan’s Doctors Union, the conflict in El Geneina has led to the death of over 1000 people. It has also forced tens of thousands into internal displacement or into crossing to Chad to seek refuge.
It is the fact that the outbreak of fighting between the RSF and SAF has come to intersect with existing conflict dynamics that makes the situation in Darfur particular and deserving of its own special attention. Despite some improvement in the overall conflict situation, Darfur did not recover peace fully. Not only that the conditions that led to the outbreak of war in 2003 have not been fully resolved but the war and most importantly the atrocities committed along ethnic lines targeting in particular non-Arab communities also created new grievances.
It is the fact that the outbreak of fighting between the RSF and SAF has come to intersect with existing conflict dynamics that makes the situation in Darfur particular and deserving of its own special attention.
In recent years and particularly since the ouster of Bashir and with new recruitment drives and the deepening of ties between the RSF and Arab militias, these conflict issues have become more acute and induced recurring incidents of violence. This is most notable in Western Darfur. According to the 2022 report of the UN Sanctions Committee, ‘[t]he city of El Geneina and neighboring areas of West Darfur have experienced regular and significant outbreaks of violence since 2019. In April 2021, the upsurge of violence had reached catastrophic dimension.’ It went on to report that ‘[l]ocal sources argued that the events took the form of ethnic cleansing, directed against the Masalit and other non-Arab communities.’
The fighting between the RSF and the SAF therefore seems to affect Darfur in two ways. First, it has adda a new axis of conflict in Darfur between entities that previously fought against Darfur armed groups jointly. Perhaps, most importantly, this fighting has made the resurgent conflict dynamics in Darfur much more violent and destructive. Media reports indicate that the attacks in El Geneina are largely by Arab militias and the RSF and they mainly targeted non-Arab groups, particularly the Masalit.
On 14 June, West Darfur’s Governor, Khamis Abdullah Abbaker, was killed in El Geneina shortly after he implicated the RSF for the atrocities being committed in the town. Reports attributed the killing to Arab militias and the RSF, although the paramilitary group denied the assertions. Following this killing, the OCHA update reported that ‘at least 15,000 people, including Sudanese refugees and 3,000 Chadian returnees have reportedly crossed into Chad.’
Other parts of Darfur are also experiencing increasing levels of violence. It is reported that the RSF has stepped up attacks elsewhere in Darfur in attempt to ascertain its dominance in Darfur. The outbreak of clashes in North Darfur, in Tawila town on 16 June, led to killing and injury of civilians, including internally displaced people and widespread displacement.
While much of the diplomatic attention is focused on the fighting between SAF and RSF generally, this should not lead to overlooking the specificities of the conflict dynamics in Darfur that warrant its own attention and intervention.
The nature and the scale of the violence as well as its impact on civilians of the targeted communities raises risks of a repeat of the genocidal violence of the previous Darfur war. What makes the situation particularly dangerous is that those being attacked are not receiving any protection from the SAF, which reportedly withdrew from El Geneina. On 13 June, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Sudan and Head of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS), Volker Perthes, released a statement warning that the violence in El Geneina could amount to crimes against humanity. He indicated an ‘emerging pattern of large-scale targeted attacks against civilians based on their ethnic identities, allegedly committed by Arab militias and some armed men in Rapid Support Force (RSF)’s uniform.’
The PSC has both a legal and historical responsibility. The situation in Sudan, involving the war in Darfur and the north-South conflict, has attracted the most attention from the PSC. Since 2004, the PSC dedicated the largest number of sessions to Sudan pursuant to Amani Africa’s database.
Nearly 2/3 of PSC sessions on Sudan were tied to Darfur. Darfur was the first of conflict situations that featured on the agenda of the PSC when the PSC became operational in March 2004. It is also here with respect to the conflict in Darfur that PSC deployed various conflict management and resolution tools.
The first peace support operation that the PSC deployed was the AU Mission to Sudan (AMIS) that provided the first international presence in Darfur, contributing to reduction of violence against civilians. It is also here that the PSC for the first time established a high-level panel, the AU High-Level Panel on Darfur (AUPD) which later became AU High-level Panel on Sudan (AUHIP), setting an example for the high-level panel as a model of AU’s diplomatic action for mediation and peacemaking.
The nature of the violence in Darfur involving mass atrocities including those that may amount to crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing legally implicate PSC’s action. Additionally, the role the PSC played with respect to the Darfur war also places historical responsibility for it to pay special attention to Darfur. Urgent action by the PSC can contribute towards averting the situation in Darfur from spiraling completely out of control. This the PSC can accomplish at the very least through convening a dedicated session for mobilizing diplomatic and humanitarian attention and action the situation in Darfur demands.
The content of this article does not represent the views of Amani Africa and reflect only the personal views of the authors who contribute to ‘Ideas Indaba’
Briefing on status of implementation of the Common African Defence and Security Policy and the operationalization of the African Standby Force (ASF)
Briefing on status of implementation of the Common African Defence and Security Policy and the operationalization of the African Standby Force (ASF)
Date | 22 June 2023
Tomorrow (22 June), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1159th session at a ministerial level to receive briefing on the status of implementation of the Common African Defence and Security Policy and other relevant instruments on defence and security on the continent with Special focus on: Update on the Operationalisation of the Africa Standby Force (ASF).
Frederick Shava, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade of Zimbabwe and chair of the PSC for the month of June, is expected to preside over the session. Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) is expected to brief PSC members on the progress made and pending issues in the full operationalization of the ASF, while the various Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) are expected to provide update on their respective efforts to attain full operational capability of their Regional Standby Brigades.
The last time PSC met to follow up on the operationalization of the ASF was during its 1069th session held on 10 March 2022. In that session, which adopted a Summary Record as its outcome, the PSC discussed capacity gaps that continue to constrain the deployment and employment of the ASF. During its 1124th session, convened on 1 December 2022, PSC also considered the outcome of the inaugural lessons learned forum on AU Peace Support Operations (PSOs) and the ASF, which was held in November of last year in Abuja, Nigeria. The 1124th session tasked the Military Staff Committee of the PSC to review and submit for its adoption. The conclusions of the inaugural forum was accordingly submitted to and adopted at PSC’s 1129th session. Apart from adopting the conclusions, a key decision taken in that meeting was the direction given by the PSC for the AU Commission to ‘utilize the ASF framework in the mandating, implementation, management, and oversight of all AU PSOs’.
This decision is against the context that the RECs/RMs are deploying regional forces outside of, and even without making references to, the ASF framework except for SADC, which has so far made three deployments (in Lesotho (SAPMIL), Mozambique (SAMIM), and most recently in Eastern DRC) purportedly within the ASF framework. This obviously raises the question of coordination and harmonization of decision-making and mandating process between the AU and RECs/RMs. Beyond coordination, even SADC’s claim of these deployments as ASF deployments could not be considered as ASF deployments to the extent that their deployments were made without the authorization of the PSC. When they were referred to the PSC, it was post-facto. The ASF, as the peacekeeping and intervention outfit of the AU, is established under the PSC Protocol and is envisaged under the Protocol to be deployed in pursuit of a decision of the PSC for the promotion of peace and security. The purported use of ASF outside this framework envisaged in the PSC framework or the resort to ad hoc coalitions constitute an aberration that endangers the fragmentation and erosion of AU’s peace and security order. Such fragmentation creates vacuum that encourages the use of all manners of external security arrangements on the continent that are not necessarily for a multilateral-based peace and security interest of the continent as envisaged in the PSC Protocol.
The purported use of ASF outside this framework envisaged in the PSC framework or the resort to ad hoc coalitions constitute an aberration that endangers the fragmentation and erosion of AU’s peace and security order. Such fragmentation creates vacuum that encourages the use of all manners of external security arrangements on the continent that are not necessarily for a multilateral-based peace and security interest of the continent as envisaged in the PSC Protocol.
Infographic 1: PSC sessions on the ASF and key outcomes
Moreover, as highlighted during the inaugural lessons learned forum, there is also a need for ‘reconceptualization and alignment of the ASF with the current PSO practices and realities’ on account of two main grounds. The first is that the ASF was envisaged to be a continental force coordinated and utilized by the AU. Yet, contrary to the PSC Protocol’s conception of the ASF, the prevalent practice is that it has been regionally facilitated and the forces raised by the regions are claimed to be ‘owned’ by the RECs/RMs. The second is the current security dynamics of the continent taking trans-regional character going beyond one REC/RM and requiring speedy and robust deployment necessitates the ASF is both well resourced and equipped and equally flexibility in the deployment of ASF capabilities without the need for such deployment being tied to a particular region but within the multilateral and continental framework of the AU.
One of the milestones achieved since 1069th session is the adoption of the draft Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the AU and RECs/RMs on the ASF during the Ministerial meeting of the 15th Specialized Technical Committee of Defence, Safety and Security (STCDSS) that took place on 12 May in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The MoU clarifies the roles and responsibilities of the AU and RECs/RMs in the preparation, employment, deployment, and post-employment of the ASF. Considering that the issue of the operationalization of the ASF as envisaged in the PSC Protocol is in significant part a political issues, it would be of interest for members of the PSC to explore whether the attempt made in the MoU to clarify the modalities of use of the ASF and respective roles of RECs/RMs would be enough to effect the much discussed full operationalization of the ASF in practice.
Considering that the issue of the operationalization of the ASF as envisaged in the PSC Protocol is in significant part a political issues, it would be of interest for members of the PSC to explore whether the attempt made in the MoU to clarify the modalities of use of the ASF and respective roles of RECs/RMs would be enough to effect the much discussed full operationalization of the ASF in practice.
An important aspect of tomorrow’s briefing will be the reception of update from the RECs/RMs on capability generation. AU has been complaining over the ‘hesitancy and reluctance’ by the RECs/RMs to confirm capabilities pledged and how they are to be made available as this would be critical to assess readiness for rapid deployment. At its 1069th session, the Commission informed the PSC that it was only the Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF) Secretariat that had provided a verification report pursuant to the request of the AU Commission in July 2021 for RECs/RMs to verify their pledged capabilities using the 2019 ASF Pledged Capabilities Verification Guidelines. PSC members are likely to be interested to hear which of the regional brigades other than the EASF were able to submit the verification report and what specific challenges are hindering the rest from submitting the reports. Of interest to the PSC in this regard is the recent request during the 15th STCDSS meeting to declare that the North Africa Regional Capability (NARC) is operationally ready for deployment as part of the ASF. Based on this request, the Commission is expected to undertake a verification for the declaration of NARC’s readiness for deployment.
PSC members are likely to be interested to hear which of the regional brigades other than the EASF were able to submit the verification report and what specific challenges are hindering the rest from submitting the reports.
Infographic 2: Declarations on the ASF’s full operationalization
PSC may also receive update on the status of the utilization of the AU Continental Logistics Base (CLB) in Doula, Cameroon. The CLB has been put to use for storing and managing equipment for PSOs including some donated to SAMIM and to the Multinational Joint Task Force against the Boko Haram (MNJTF). Despite its important utility, the CLB faces challenges, including shortage of funding for the recruitment of substantive staff because of which the CLB has been functioning through officers seconded by AU Member States. On a positive note, the 36th Ordinary Session of the Assembly, held in February of this year, approved structures with an estimated cost of USD$ 4,717,606.45 for 2024. The recruitment for the approved structured is however conditioned on the availability of fund. In addition to the funding, lack of capacity in the continent to airlift equipment donated from the CLB in Doula to their intended place of use has been the other challenge. This was apparent from AU and SADC’s struggle to airlift the donated equipment to Mozambique for the use of SAMIM.
The expected outcome of the session is a communique. PSC is expected to welcome the Ministerial meeting of the 15th STCDSS and its outcomes, including the adoption of then MoU between the AU and RECs/RMs on the ASF and express its expectations of the contribution of this in advancing the operationalization of the ASF and addressing some of the challenges arising between AU and RECs/RMs in relation to decision-making and mandate processes for the deployment of ASF. On capability generation, PSC may note the request made during the 15th STCDSS meeting to declare operational readiness of NARC for deployment, and it may request the AU Commission to conduct a verification in that regard. Furthermore, PSC may urge RECs/RMs that have not yet done so, to submit reports verifying their pledged capabilities and ensure that their deployments are conducted within the ASF framework. It may also commend RECs/RMs that have attained their full operational capability (FOC) and encourage those RECs/RMs that are yet to achieve FOC, to scale up the capabilities of their Regional Standby Brigades and work towards operationalizing their respective Regional Logistic Depots. On the reconceptualization of the ASF, PSC may echo the 15th STCDSS meeting and request the AU Commission to conduct a strategic review of the ASF and report to the 16th meeting of the STCDSS for consideration. The PSC may in this regard underscore the imperative of adapting the ASF concept to the prevailing realities of conflict dynamics that are not tied to one region and hence could not be addressed under one Regional Standby Force but through the use of the ASF under the AU as envisaged in the PSC Protocol. Taking its earlier decision of the 1129th session calling for all AU PSOs to be deployed under the ASF to the next level, the PSC may assert the need for all deployments under the ASF to be authorized by the PSC in accordance with the PSC Protocol. On the Continental Logistics Base, while welcoming the structures approved by the 36th ordinary session of the Assembly, PSC may appeal to Member States to support the efforts for the mobilization of the required budget of USD$ 4,717,606.45 for the approved structures.
