Provisional Programme of Work for the month of March 2023
Provisional Programme of Work for the month of March 2023
Date | March 2023
In March, Tanzania takes over the role of chairing the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC). As envisaged in the provisional programme of work, the PSC will convene six substantive sessions. Of these one will have two agenda items. All sessions except one will take place at ambassadorial level. Of the total agenda items, three will address country specific situations. The remaining four will be focusing on various thematic issues. Additionally, the PSC is also set to conduct of a field mission. The PSC Committee of Experts (CoE) and the Military Staff Committee (MSC) will also be meeting during the month.
The first session of the month is scheduled to take place on 01 March. The PSC will consider the status report on the implementation of the Continental Structural Conflict Prevention Framework (CSCPF): Country Structural Vulnerability Resilience Assessment (CSVRA) and Country Structural Vulnerability Mitigation Strategies (CSVMS) at this session. The CSCPF was developed by the AU as a strategy aimed at addressing structural issues. It aims to deploy preventive measures through operational and direct interventions before structural weaknesses turn into large-scale violence. Within the framework of the CSCPF, the CSVRA is designed to facilitate identification of a member State’s vulnerabilities to conflict at an early stage while the CSVMS explores the best avenues to enable appropriate actions by the AU and concerned regional economic communities and regional mechanisms (RECs/RMs) to address structural root causes of violent conflicts in member States.
The second session of the month which will contribute considerably to the PSC’s preventive role will be a briefing by the Panel of the Wise, planned to take place on 03 March. This will be the first briefing of the panel to be delivered since 2017 which was the last time it updated the PSC on its activities. The coming session serves the PSC to welcome the new members of the fifth Panel of the Wise appointed for a three-year term by the AU Assembly at its 35th Ordinary Session [Assembly/AU/Dec. 815(XXXV)] and to receive updates on the engagements of the Panel in the areas of conflict prevention, mediation, reconciliation and dialogue since its previous briefing.
An updated briefing on the situation in Somalia and operations of the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) forms the third session of the month. Scheduled to be held on 07 March, the session is expected to assess key developments since PSC’s 1121st session when it considered and approved the request of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) to extend Phase 1 of ATMIS operational timelines, from 31 December 2022 to 30 June 2023. In addition to reviewing the security situation including the operations against Al Shabaab, the session is expected to assess the status of force generation and integration process and efforts underway to ensure the extended deadline of 30 June 2023 will be met for ATMIS Phase 1 drawdown.
The fourth session is planned to take place on 09 March and will be committed to a briefing on the conduct of a Continental Maritime Command Post Exercise. It is to be recalled that at its 1128th session, the PSC called on the AU Commission to conduct the ‘First Regional Maritime Command Post Exercise in order to increase preparedness and synergy of the Navies of the region to respond to the threats in the Gulf of Guinea, within the framework of the ASF’. In its other previous decisions, particularly the 1012th session, the PSC has also emphasised the importance of capacitating the African Standby Force (ASF) with the required naval capacity. The briefing during this session could provide important highlights on efforts being deployed to enhance the ASF’s naval capacity both at regional and continental levels.
On 10 March, the PSC will consider and adopt the provisional programme of work for the month of April 2023.
From 10 to 13 March, the CoE will convene to consider key highlights of the 2023 Africa Governance Report (AGR) which assesses the state of governance in Africa, with the aim to provide relevant and accurate information on governance issues in all AU member States.
The fifth session of the month expected to be held on 14 March will be an open session dedicated to the annual meeting on the women, peace and security (WPS) agenda. The session will be convened in line with PSC’s 223rd Communiqué of 30 March 2010, in which the PSC agreed to devote an annual open session to the WPS theme. Following up on the decisions of its previous session on the theme – the 1109th meeting – the PSC may seek updates regarding efforts being made to ‘establish a forum for knowledge sharing amongst the AU Member States and partners to leverage experience, lessons learnt and good practices in addressing sexual violence against women in conflicts and crises’.
From 15 to 18 March, there will be a training of the MSC to be conducted in Tanzania.
From 20 to 23 March, the PSC will undertake a filed mission to the DRC. It is to be recalled that the PSC’s field mission to Burundi which took place from 20 to 22 June 2022 was conducted in the context of the PSC’s engagement on the Great Lakes Region and was supposed to extend to DRC. However, increasing tensions due to the situation in eastern DRC limited the PSC’s visit to Bujumbura, Burundi. Although the situation in eastern DRC largely remains the same and has even shown signs of deterioration, the planned PSC visit highlights the importance of PSC’s engagement through undertaking field visits to the conflict settings that it addresses.
The sixth and final session of the month planned to take place on 31 March will have two agenda items. The first one of these will be an updated briefing on the situation in Mozambique and operations of the South African Development Community (SADC) Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM). In addition to reflecting on on-going insecurity experienced in Cabo Delgado Province of northern Mozambique due to continued terrorist activities, the session could serve the PSC to follow-up on the decision of its 1119th session which drew specific attention to the logistical and financial challenges that face SAMIM and directed the AU Commission to ‘explore all options to facilitate additional support to SAMIM’.
The second agenda item will be consideration and adoption of the report on the outcomes of PSC’s field mission to the DRC.
Is the AU addressing the challenges to effective enforcement of its norm banning Unconstitutional Changes of government?
The 36th Ordinary Session of the African Union Assembly was held on 18-19 February preceded by the 42nd Ordinary Session of the Executive Council on 15-16. As part of covering this year’s summit, we profile some key issues and events around the summit. In the light of the democratic regression the continent, like other parts of the world, is experiencing, one event we wish to profile is the 2023 Africa Governance Report presented to the Assembly. The thematic focus of the 2023 African Governance Report by the African Peer Review Mechanism is unconstitutional changes of government. In this second and last part, we provide further analysis on where progress is being made and where it is lacking.
Is the AU addressing the challenges to effective enforcement of its norm banning unconstitutional changes of government?
Date | 24 February 2023
Part II
Solomon Ayele Dersso, PhD
Founding Director, Amani Africa
Tsion Hagos
Researcher, Amani Africa
In a clear admission that the AU norm banning coups faced serious enforcement challenges, the Peace and Security Council (PSC), African Union’s (AU) highest standing decision making body on matters peace and security, convened one of its important sessions on the subject on 15th August 2022. Convened under the theme ‘Sanctions and enforcement capacities: deterrence against unconstitutional changes of government (UCG)’, the session served as a follow-up to the outcome of the 16th Extraordinary session of the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government held on 28 May 2022 in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea. Notably, the session aimed at assessing the effectiveness of sanctions in deterring UCGs in Africa, as well as the capacities of the existing enforcement mechanisms.
The range of policy issues for consideration in this session are canvased in full detail in the analysis we produced ahead of the session. As highlighted in Amani Africa’s Policy Brief produced ahead of the Malabo summit, the fact that sanctions imposed on Mali in April 2021 did not deter subsequent coups in four other cases, has brought into sharp focus the efficacy of the responses of the AU and Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) involving suspension and other forms of sanctions.
In the Communique it adopted on the session, the PSC admitted with concern ‘the challenges facing the implementation of AU sanctions regime against unconstitutional changes of government.’ This, according to the PSC, is due, among others, to ‘lack of coordination between the AU and RECs/RMs, partners as well as the actions of external actors.’ Indeed, as pointed out in our analysis, on the normative plane, not all RECs/RMs have comparable standards making military coups illegal. In the absence of all RECs/RMs having standards banning UCG comparable to the AU norm, the AU and RECs/RMs face the unavoidable challenge of adopting complementary positions. That is why, for example, it is difficult to coordinate between IGAD and AU in respect to the coup in Sudan. Accordingly, the PSC should have called on RECs/RMs lacking such norms and authority to sanction UCG, to adopt legal instrument authorizing them to sanction their occurrence. Instead, the PSC ‘underscored the need to improve coordination of efforts to achieve wider buy-in of AU sanctions by other international actors, as well as to ensure synergies between AU sanctions and sanctions imposed by similar intergovernmental organizations, particularly the RECs and UN.’ It also reiterated the need ‘for full implementation of the commitments of the Accra Declaration on Unconstitutional Changes of Government and the Assembly Decision and Declaration on Terrorism and Unconstitutional Chances of Government.’
Another issue that arose during the session of the PSC and highlighted in our analysis was the absence of a common framework on a) what kind of sanctions (beyond suspension) to be applied, b) under what circumstances, c) the mechanism for monitoring and d) the criteria for the lifting of such sanctions. In this respect, the PSC underlined ‘the importance of refining existing sanctions pronouncements into consistent frameworks that are aligned with the current evolution of the challenges they are meant to address.’
To this end, it requested ‘the AU Commission, in collaboration with the UN stakeholders and relevant African research institutions and think tanks including the African Members of the UN Security Council (A3) and UN Security Council Permanent Members, to explore and to develop an effective mechanism for the strengthening of the AU sanctions regime and providing appropriate technical capacities to the PSC Committee of Experts and the Military Staff Committee.’ As a follow up to this request, the AU Commission convened a workshop in Ghana in September 2022. The work for developing such effective sanctions framework has since been underway.
Of course, the development of this framework needs to build on the existing norms of the AU which in various ways present in a skeletal form the sanction for UCG. These AU norms include: the AU Constitutive Act, the Lomé Declaration, the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance (ACDEG). In particular, Chapter 8 of the ACDEG specifically outlines ‘Sanctions in Cases of Unconstitutional Changes of Government’. It defines UCGs in Article (23); it empowers the PSC with powers to impose sanctions against Member States (Article 24); and it details the types of sanctions that could be imposed against the Member States and perpetrators (Article 25).
African Peer Review Forum of Heads of State and Government, High-Level Validation of the Africa Governance Report 2023 (AGR2023) on UCG, 07 February 2023
Source: Office of the Presidency, Republic of Sierra Leone
In terms of strengthening the structures and processes for enhancement of the effectiveness of sanctions, the PSC called for the operationalization of the PSC Sub-Committee on Sanctions, the development of the requisite technical capacities to ensure its effectiveness and directed the PSC Committee of Experts to draw up the terms of reference of the Sub-Committee.
Most notably, the PSC went further and provided for the establishment of both ‘a solid sanctions infrastructure… that will effectively support the work of the PSC Sub-Committee on Sanctions’ and ‘a monitoring and evaluation group, to assess the implementation of the sanctions imposed against the Member States.’ While the development of such institutional structures for the AU sanctions is a welcome development, the form that such structures take is yet to be seen. Of particular significance is also the provision for the establishment of the monitoring and evaluation group.
It is worth recalling that our analysis also underscored the need for ‘an expert body (which) could play an instrumental role in monitoring implementation of sanctions imposed by the Council and in assessing fulfilment of conditions for their lifting thereof.’ Depending on the terms of reference of the expert group and the criteria that is used for the group to develop the technical assessment on the occurrence of UCG to propose the type of combination of response measures for adoption by the PSC and to monitor the implementation of the measures, this stands to contribute to the credibility and predictability of PSC’s responses to UCG.
There were a few things that did not receive the level of adequate attention that they deserved. The first is the need for strengthening the support of member states for the AU policy of zero tolerance to coups. This is particularly important given that the lack of strong consensus and support for AU norms banning coups by member states is one of the factors for the weakening of the efficacy of the sanctions in 2021. The other issue not addressed in the PSC communiqué is the lack of consistency in how the PSC applies its power under Article 7(1)(g). As we pointed out in our analysis, the failure of the PSC to apply (on Chad) the same measures it applied on Mali has led to legitimate charges of ‘selective application’. The PSC also missed an opportunity to address the lack of established criteria for applying Article 23(5) of the ACDEG that enables the AU to sanction not only coups but also unconstitutional extension of presidential terms.
On further strengthening the nature and scope of the response to UCGs, the PSC called for ‘a new strategic approach that will simultaneously employ mediation and peace-building to prevent and resolve conflicts.’ Both in the policy brief we published to inform the Extraordinary AU Assembly Session in Malabo and the edition of Insights on the PSC for this session, our analysis underscored the need for the response of the AU and RECs/RMs to go beyond adopting sanctions. It emphasized the imperative for the deployment of robust diplomatic initiative as critical measure for ensuring that relevant reform measures that guarantee sustainable restoration of constitutional order are pursued as part of the transitional process.
Ultimately, effective application of the AU norm banning coups depends on AU’s firmness and consistency in applying the relevant provisions as well as the reversal of the unfolding democratic regression and the accompanying lack of commitment to constitutionalism on the continent.
The content of this article does not represent the views of Amani Africa and reflect only the personal views of the authors who contribute to ‘Ideas Indaba’
Address by H.E. Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwahn on ‘Africa and the reform of the multilateral system’
On the occasion of the signature event on the sidelines of the 36th AU Summit jointly held by the Republic of Namibia and Amani Africa on ‘Africa and the reform of the multilateral system’ and as part of our coverage of some of the key events around the summit, we present in our ‘Ideas Indaba’ the Keynote Address by H.E. Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of International Relations and Cooperation of Namibia.
Date | 20 February 2023
Keynote Address by
H.E. Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of International Relations and Cooperation,
Delivered on her behalf by Ambassador Jerobeam Shaanika, Deputy Executive Director of Multilateral Relations and Cooperation, Ministry of International Relations and Cooperation
Director of Ceremonies
Distinguished members of high-level panel of experts
Distiguished invited guest
Members of the media
Ladies and gentlemen
It is a great honour and pleasure for me to address this gathering which, I believe, offers an excellent opportunity to reflect on the new agenda for peace and the reform of the multilateral system, in order to assess whether it reflects present day reality and to determine whether the multilateral system is able to respond appropriately to geopolitical challenges in a fair and balanced manner.
The multilateral system has evolved since the First World War. Each time institutions have been created to respond to the challenges of the time. It should therefore be noted that these institutional reforms have been necessitated by a number of factors such as the increase in the number of Member States and the increase demands for equitable participation. Therefore, it is essential that we continue to scrutinize multilateral institutions and pose critical questions about their future relevance.
Distinguished invited guests
Multilateralism has demonstrated to be a cornerstone of global harmony and uniting nations large and small in advancing issues of common values and confronting threats to humanity.
It is worth noting that the responsibility of maintaining peace and security cannot be solely left to one member state or particular region. The indispensability of the multilateral system, lies in unity and global solidarity. The outbreak of Covid-19 has unearthed the urgent need of unity of purpose, in working together in solving common problems, as no nation large and small was speared by COVID -19.
Ladies and Gentlemen
COVID-19 has demonstrated that humanity can face a common threat to our way of life. Thus, the pandemic has left a dent in all health systems throughout the world.
COVID-19 taught us useful lessons and the urgency of reforming the multilateral system. So that it speaks to the upholding of the dignity and worth of the human person in all nations, so that we do not speak divisive language, such as “them and us” when facing a common threat. Because no one is safe until everybody else is safe.
It started as a health emergency that quickly evolved into also a socio-economic crisis which disrupted socioeconomic and lives of peoples of the world. Despite good intentions, there were acts of discrimination perpetuated by some member states, in the form of vaccine hoarding, towards developing countries and Africa in particular. Instead of the pandemic to soothe geopolitical tensions and bring countries together, we witnessed inward looking policies being implemented by some of the multilateral institutions.
Yet, the multilateral system, with all its flaws and limitations, remains the only framework for imagining and working towards collective action in the face of this global threat. In one way or another, it is what we continue to and should rally around. Because, a safe world without multilateralism is difficult to imagine. Therefore, African Union and its members states must remain firmly committed to advancing the reforms of the multilateral system including the reform of the United Nations Security Council.
Distinguished invited guests
Africa as a continent has abundant resources that can be harnessed for the benefits of the continent. Likewise, Africa has enormous human capital that can develop the continent and propel its economic growth. Our Fauna and Flora attracts tourist from the rest of the world.
Therefore, there is no doubt that Africa’s resources contribute enormously to global development, however there is a negative perception towards Africa viewed as a mere supplier of raw materials and all negative things. Therefore, there is a need to reflect on how the African resources are used to develop other nations to the determent of the African continent. If we were to examine critically the composition of international soccer players and best performing athletes, majority of them are of African origin. The raw material from Africa are propelling the 4th Industrial revolution, the interesting question, is that not an African contribution to the development of the world?.
While Africa has all these abundances of resources, it has no say or little control in the global financial systems, hence there is a compelling need to reform the global economic trading and financial systems, to level playing field.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
While reform in this area is without a doubt challenging, the imperative for making the multilateral system to live up to its lofty ideals, in the face of difficulties facing many parts of the world, and, indeed our capacities as peoples of the world, are such that these challenges are not insurmountable.
With imagination and commitment, it is actually possible to inject reform to the governance of the global trading, economic and financial systems for unleashing the huge potential of the global order to deliver better and more equitably for all with enormous benefits for all social, economic and political actors.
Distinguished invited guest
This is also an era when we have, on top of the health pandemic and the ensuing economic crises and further accentuating the foregoing challenges, the existential threat posed by climate change. This threat is not something that will come in the future. It is a clear and present danger for today and now. We see this from
- the drought affecting parts of Southern Africa, and the longest drought that led to the perishing of cattle that is a source of livelihood for millions of people in the Horn of Africa
- the flooding in South Sudan and Sudan and in Nigeria, Niger and Chad
- And further afield the flooding that left tens of millions of people homeless and claimed the lives of thousand in Pakistan
- The heat waves, wildfires in Europe, the US and Australia
While the world has made good progress in establishing commitments and some instruments including financial arrangements to deal with this climate emergency, the pace with which commitments are implemented and the ways in which the instruments operate leaves a lot to be desired.
Ladies and gentlemen,
Herein respect to the climate crisis, we have a case that illustrates that the operation of the multilateral system in a business-as-usual fashion is inadequate to meet the needs of those bearing the brunt of this crisis and the imperative for saving humanity.
As if all of these are not enough, wars and conflicts are adding further fuel to the multiple challenges facing the multilateral system. One such case that drives home the deep fragility of the multilateral system is the inability to solve the problem and response to genuine call for people to exercise their inalienable rights to self-determination particularly in Palestine and Western Sahara, as well as imposition of unilateral sanctions meant to change governance systems in certain countries.
Distinguished invited guest
Namibia was one of those countries whose people were denied rights to self- determination. The people of Namibia fought to gain their independence, with the help of international community, they managed to get their independence. Therefore, Namibia understands too well, what is like to be denied the rights to freedom.
The constitution of Namibia commits the state to pursue the policy that encourages the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means. This out of our experience, having waged a long and bitter war of liberation struggle and to say, not again a generation will endure a scourge of war. Of course, it worth emphasizing that this is but one, of major, example of how the promise of the multilateral system, as encapsulated in the UN Charter, to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war. Prime Minister Mia Mottley of Barbados last September put it rightly that ‘A survey of the global security situation, notably in eastern Europe and the Middle East, but in many other places as well, reminds us daily of the tragic inability of the international system to deliver more peace and more security to the many vulnerable people of the world.’
Ladies and Gentlemen
For us in Africa, partly it was this realization that prompted us to transition from the OAU to the AU and establish the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) for complementing and reinforcing, through regional collective action, the multilateral collective security system was founded on the provision of the UN Charter. Our conviction has been that, as we pursue the reform of the UN Security Council to address the historic injustice imposed on Africa by its exclusion from permanent membership and veto power, we also have brought our efforts together to share the burden of the multilateral system and contribute to the global public good of international peace and security through the APSA.
Alongside the contribution from regional bodies like the AU, the urgency of the need for reform of the multilateral peace and security system has been highlighted, by ongoing wars and conflicts. Although the multilateral collective security system has not ceased to function in the face of these grave security challenges, it is clear that it is seriously battered.
Distinguished invited Guest,
This means that it is in need of intensive critical care which may require a wide range of interventions from surgery to blood fusion. Nothing less than such reform will suffice to revive multilateralism to its full health.
It is in this context and having regard to our contribution to the global public good of international peace and security through the APSA that we support the UN Secretary General’s initiative for articulating a New Agenda for Peace. In addition to the foregoing, we believe that this effort needs to also tackle new forms of challenges to peace and security, not only existing ones relating to conflicts involving terrorist groups to emerging ones such as those that arose with new technology including in the cyberspace and in the use of automated machine systems in wars.
Ladies and gentlemen,
Each of the foregoing major global challenges on their own present serious challenge to multilateralism. Unfortunately, we don’t have the luxury of facing them one after the other.
Indeed, while many of these challenges are not completely new, it is clear that they are bigger in scale, unfold in the same timeline and tend to reinforce each other. They are also taking place at a time of major global power shifts and worrying geopolitical rivalries not only along old ideological divides but also rivalries pitting old against new powers and major powers against middle powers.
In this context, it may all seem for us in Africa that there is little we can do to change. All that we have to do is to try to mitigate the consequences of these multi-crises. We have to remained ourselves that moments of crisis are also opportune moments for changing existing conditions for the better. And that change should not necessarily come from the powerful only. In any case, power is also a matter of how one masters the use of one’s resources and on this we are endowed with not only huge natural resources but also being the largest block in the UN, which gives us, if we speak with one voice, an unparalleled influence in the process for the reform of the system.
For the continent of Africa, this would mean that our collective effort should go beyond presenting a good case for securing the interest of Africa. It should also include articulating proposals on how to reform the multilateral system in a way that also meets the just expectations and needs of the whole of humanity. This challenges us to harness ways of thinking that both attends to and transcends existing faultiness and divisions in the world.
I believe that we are capable of going beyond the usual and mobilizing such a bold thinking. This particular gathering and the process we are launching is meant to help us rise to this challenge and articulate perspectives from the people of Africa on how humanity can achieve the multilateral system and a world that we all want and deserve.
Our founding President Sam Nujoma, has taught that “a united people striving to achieve a common good for all members of the society will always emerge victorious”
I thank you for your attention and wish us all a successful deliberation and follow up high-level process.
The content of this article does not represent the views of Amani Africa and reflect only the personal views of the authors who contribute to ‘Ideas Indaba’
The Peace and Security Council in 2022: The Year in Review
Amani Africa
Date | 18 February 2023
INTRODUCTION
The focus of this review is the presentation of analysis of the work of the PSC in 2022 drawing on the data and research work carried out on the PSC in 2022. This review is however set within the overall context of the prevailing peace and security landscape of the continent. Accordingly, our review of 2022 additionally presents overview of the state of peace and security highlighting the major issues of concern in Africa in the year and the trends and dynamics arising from these issues.
Address by Ambassador Tekeda Alemu on ‘Africa and the reform of the multilateral system’
One of the signature events on the sidelines of the 36th AU Summit jointly held by the Republic of Namibia and Amani Africa is on ‘Africa and the reform of the multilateral system’. As part of our coverage of some of the key events around the summit, we present in our ‘Ideas Indaba’ the address by Ambassador Tekeda Alemu on the theme of this high-level side-event and its importance. Among others, he argues that ‘it would not make sense to seek those (permanent) two seats for Africa unless member states of the AU have the capacity for a common position on critical international and regional peace and security issues.’
Address by Ambassador Tekeda Alemu on ‘Africa and the reform of the multilateral system’
Date | 17 February 2023
Dr Tekeda Alemu
Former State Minister of Ethiopia and Permanent Representative to the UN Security Council during the joint high-level side-event to the 36th AU Summit on ‘Africa and reform of the multilateral system’
Thanks Prof Murithi, our moderator. I recognize my old friend Basso Sanqu, who in New York was very dynamic and set the tone in the UN Security Council.
I would like to first of all to thank Ambassador Jeobeam Shaanika, who delivered, the very rich and excellent keynote address of the Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation of Namibia. I have taken to heart the contents of the address.
There is little doubt in my mind that at no time in the past has the theme of this meeting – Africa, the new agenda for peace and the reform of the multilateral system – been as urgent as it is today. I believe the statement delivered by Shaanika has risen to the occasion and set the tone for the presentation that will follow.
Let me also take this opportunity to thank our AU colleague Ambassador Fred Ngoga for the opening remark made on behalf of the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, H.E. Ambassador Bankole Adeoye. It was very rich and I must say very educative for me.
I must also express appreciation to Dr Solomon for organizing this event with the Republic of Namibia and for the great effort he has been making to highlight how much the reform of the multilateral system has become so urgent as to become almost an existential imperative for Africa. I have a very deep appreciation for Amani Africa of which he is the founding director.
I must also express with great deal of gratitude and appreciation the dignified and principled manner with which Namibia has been carrying out its pan-Africanist obligation.
Excellency, Dear Moderator,
As I already said, the reform of the multilateral system which is also being prioritized by the UN Secretary-General, as underlined in his Our Common Agenda, is an objective which has increasingly become an urgent matter which can no longer be postponed.
It should be admitted that multilateral governance has placed Africa, more or less, outside of its purview. Nowhere is this more vivid than with respect to international cooperation. One recalls how much the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals were unanimously adopted with great fanfare in 2015. Now, we are at mid-point of the implementation of that agenda which has failed to deliver on the promises made in a number of areas extremely meaningful for Africa and others in the same situation.
One cannot, of course, afford to despair. It is in that light one ought to look at the proposals contained in the UN Secretary General’s Our Common Agenda, all the more since it is said that the eleven policy briefs would offer concrete ideas to advance the work.
Now, we are told that the first brief will ‘address the New Agenda for Peace and Security.’ And it is said, this ‘for a world in transition and a new era of geopolitical competition.’ Equally important is what the brief will be adopting as an approach which will be holistic in the sense of focusing on the peace continuum, from prevention, conflict resolution and peacekeeping to peacebuilding and sustainable long-term development.
It is indeed encouraging, though it is not entirely a novel idea, to put the issue of sustainable long-term development within the peace and security continuum. In the same vein, two other policy briefs seem to encourage hope that perhaps at the level of the UN, there is a more robust realization that multilateralism is losing credibility. The two policy briefs on finance, one focusing on metrics that go beyond GDP, and the second proposal for reform of the global financial architecture seem to show perhaps a new determination to try to repair the damage caused by the failure sustained by the 2030 SDGs.
Coming to the issue of Africa’s longstanding demand for the reform of the UN system with respect to which the reform of the Security Council is the most critical, it has been apparent that not even a small progress has been made since the Ezulweni consensus was formulated by Africa in 2005.
It seems to me there is a great need for Africa to address the challenge in two ways. One is within our domain and it has to do with our own effort to achieve real and tangible unity in pursuing the acceptance by others of the two seats as permanent members and the 5 non-permanent seats by Africa. There is no doubt that there is a feeling among member states, particularly among the permanent members, that, when the chips are down, they could prevail upon some African members to give in.
It is therefore critical that everything possible is done to ensure that Africa stands together on all critical international issues. Of course, it would not make sense to seek those two seats for Africa unless member states of the AU have the capacity for a common position on critical international and regional peace and security issues. That would be the litmus test for our capacity to occupy those seats.
The second is more problematic and requires a lot of diplomatic foot work on the part of both member states and the Commission. It must be clear, and this is not a new discovery, that all countries are driven by their respective national interests, and this is even more true in the case of the permanent members.
Though it may not always be the case, it is nonetheless very wise to be skeptical about the promises of support for the African position. It is critical to analyze the implication of the expansion of the membership of the UN Security Council for each (permanent) member of the body.
From that point of view, it is possible that those who wish for a stalemate might be supportive of the African position from conviction that doing so would discourage movement forward in the intergovernmental negotiation. This would mean that there is a lot of work to be done by member states of the AU as well as by the (AU) Commission with a view for an objective assessment of the position on the matter of the permanent members of the Council.
I have no doubt that the body that (Namibia and Amani Africa) has been trying to create might contribute greatly to this exercise.
I wish us all a most productive conversation.
I thank you.
The content of this article does not represent the views of Amani Africa and reflect only the personal views of the authors who contribute to ‘Ideas Indaba’
