Briefing on the situation in eastern DRC and the deployment of the EAC regional force
Briefing on the situation in eastern DRC and the deployment of the EAC regional force
Date | 17 February 2023
Tomorrow (17 February), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1140th session at the Heads of State and Government level to consider the deteriorating security situation in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the deployment of the East African Community (EAC) Regional Force. The session is expected to consider the situation within the framework of the Peace, Security, and Cooperation Framework for DRC and the Region (PSCF Agreement). This month marks the tenth anniversary of the signing of the PSCF which rekindled a sense of hope for ending the recurring cycles of conflict in eastern DRC and its impacts on the stability and development of the Great Lakes region.
Matamela Cyril Ramaphosa, President of the Republic of South Africa and Chairperson of the PSC for the month is expected to deliver opening remarks to be followed with a briefing update by Moussa Faki Mahamat, Chairperson of the AU Commission. Statements are also expected from João Manuel Lourenco, President of the Republic of Angola, AU Champion for Peace and Reconciliation and Chairperson of the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) and Évariste Ndayishimiye, President of the Republic of Burundi and Chairperson of the EAC. The Chairpersons of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and Southern African Development Community (SADC) as well as António Guterres, Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN) are also expected to make statements. As countries concerned, Félix Antoine Tshisekedi, President of the DRC and Paul Kagame, President of the Republic of Rwanda will also present statements.
The last time the PSC considered the situation in eastern DRC was at its 1103rd session convened on 31 August of the previous year, where it endorsed the deployment of EAC Regional Force to eastern DRC and called on the AU Commission to facilitate coordination among efforts being deployed by the various stakeholders in the region.
Unfortunately, peace continues to elude the eastern DRC and the deterioration of the security situation is once again stoking tensions in the region. DRC happens to be the chair of the regional oversight mechanism (ROM) which is the main body that reviews the progress on the implementation of the national and regional commitments made by signatory countries under the PSC framework. DRC is expected to hand over the chairmanship to Burundi who will host the next meeting of the ROM.
Regional diplomatic efforts under the auspices of the EAC and the ICGLR, otherwise known as the Nairobi and Luanda processes, have been trying to address the growing insecurity in the eastern DRC. However, the security situation has continued to escalate worsening the already dire humanitarian situation in the region. The M23 Movement had reportedly withdrawn from some of the territories it controlled in North Kivu as a result of these regional diplomatic efforts. With the recent resumption of intense fighting with the Congolese armed forces (FARDC) and other armed groups, however, M23 reportedly took control of several villages including a strategic town, Kitshanga, cutting off the road to Goma, the regional capital. In recent days, M23 is said to have moved closer to Sake, a town west of Goma.
The EAC Facilitator of the Peace Process in the eastern DRC, former Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta, expressed deep concern about the deteriorating situation in North Kivu and called for the cessation of all hostilities and adherence to the agreements reached within the framework of the Nairobi and Luanda processes which, among other things, included the withdrawal of M23 from occupied territories, the accelerated implementation of the Demobilisation, Disarmament, Community Recovery and Stabilisation Program (P-DDRCS) and the resumption of consultations between the Congolese government and armed groups.
Although international attention is focused on the military activities of the M23, other armed groups operating in eastern DRC such as the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), the Coopérative pour le Développement du Congo (CODECO), the FDLR, and the Mai-Mai Group have also continued to cause havoc in the region. The ongoing fighting has resulted in massive displacement of people. The rise of hate speech and incitement to violence targeting minority communities in the eastern DRC is also causing significant alarm.
The escalating security situation has continued to aggravate the already tense relationship between the DRC and Rwanda. On 24 January, Rwanda said that it took defensive measures against a Congolese aircraft that violated its airspace, while DRC denied the accusation and characterized Rwanda’s actions as “a deliberate act of aggression”. Both Kinshasa and Kigali have ratcheted up the rhetoric and this has heightened fears of direct military confrontation between the two countries. Most recently, on 15 February, Rwanda released a statement accusing DRC soldiers of cross-border shooting. According to the press release, FARDC forces entered ungoverned territory between the two countries and started firing against Rwandan border post.
Clearly there is increasing risk of the situation plunging the two countries into full blown inter-state war with dire consequences including the danger of sacking other countries from the region into regional conflagration. Not any less worrisome is misinformation, disinformation and propagation of ethnic based hate speech and incitement of violence continues to deepen inter-ethnic and intercommunal tension and heightened risks of mass atrocities.
The EAC Heads of State and Government met in Bujumbura in an extraordinary summit on 4 February 2023 to discuss the deteriorating security situation in the eastern DRC. The Presidents of DRC and Rwanda as well as other regional leaders attended the summit which called for an immediate ceasefire and the withdrawal of all foreign armed groups. The summit also instructed the EAC chiefs of defense forces to meet and set new timelines for the withdrawal of these forces. The chiefs of defense forces met in Nairobi based on the EAC summit decision to assess the security situation in the eastern DRC and recommend a new course of action. As the M23 continues to advance and control more territories in North Kivu, however, public sentiment in the region is changing with protests against both the EAC regional force. The Congolese government is pushing the regional force to undertake offensive operations against the M23. Kenyatta has called on countries deploying their troops as part of the regional forces to take their positions urgently. In North Kivu, he called on the regional force to interpose itself between the warring parties in areas vacated by the M23.
Kenyatta has expressed his intentions to convene a fourth round of talks as part of the Nairobi process. He also urged all the parties to implement the outcomes of the third round of talks to build the necessary confidence in the process and called for regional and international support to ensure the success of the next round of talks. Angolan President Joao Lourenco and Burundian President Évariste Ndayishimiye, current chair of the EAC, are also reportedly planning to convene a mini-summit on 17 February in Addis Ababa ahead of the PSC Summit, which will bring together Presidents Tshisekedi and Kagame as well as EAC leaders along with ICGLR to assess the implementation of the decisions made in in the context of the Nairobi and Luanda processes.
The expected outcome of the session is a Communiqué. The PSC meeting is expected to assess developments in the eastern DRC and express serious concerns about the deteriorating security and humanitarian situation in the region. It may express support for the decision of the EAC extraordinary summit for an immediate ceasefire and the withdrawal of foreign armed groups. It may also reiterate support for the EAC regional force and its expedited deployment to carry out its mandate. The PSC may express concern about the increasing tensions between DRC and Rwanda and encourage the two countries to resolve differences through dialogue in the context of the ongoing regional initiatives. The PSC may express support to the EAC and ICGLR and commend the efforts of the Chairperson of ICGLR Angolan President Joao Lourenco and the EAC Chairperson Burundi’s President as well as the facilitator for the Nairobi process Former Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta. It may emphasize the need for the scrupulous implementation of decisions taken within the framework of the Nairobi and Luanda processes to de-escalate the situation in the eastern DRC and ease tensions between DRC and Rwanda. The PSC may take the opportunity to reflect on the 10th anniversary of the PSCF and call on the convening of a summit level meeting on the reinvigorating of the various mechanisms of the PSCF and for countries of the region to reaffirm their commitments and the guarantors in this regard. It may also underscore the need to reinvigorate the mechanisms under the PSCF to address the prevailing peace and security challenges and build the necessary trust and confidence between and among countries of the region. The PSC may express concern on the widespread misinformation, disinformation, ethnic based hate speech and incitement of violence and the associated risks of mass atrocities in the region and may request the AU Commission to put in place a mechanism for addressing these grave threats. It may finally call on the relevant regional economic communities and regional mechanisms (RECS/RMs) to convene a joint summit for ensuring harmonization and coordinated action with a view to avoid any misunderstanding and divergence of policy actions among them.
AU summit: Family photo and participation
The 42nd Ordinary Session of the Extraordinary Session of the Executive Council started earlier today. In a matter of a few days, the 36th Ordinary Session of the African Union Assembly will be on. In this new contribution to ‘Ideas Indaba’, Solomon Ayele Dersso shares his reflections on how Agenda 2063, the Africa We Want could and should change the Family Photo of the AU Assembly and the level and nature of participation in the AU summit in the way the AU norm banning military coups changed the Family Photo from the OAU times.
AU summit: Family photo and participation
Date | 15 February 2023
Solomon Ayele Dersso, PhD
Founding Director, Amani Africa
It is that time of the year when Addis Ababa plays host to the Heads of State and Government of African Union (AU) member States. Foreign Ministers making up the Executive Council of the AU are first to congregate in Addis Ababa on 15 and 16 February. They have kicked off their meeting earlier today with the opening session.
In a push to assert African agency, the Chairperson of the Executive Council, Senegal’s foreign Minister told participants during the opening session earlier today that Africa expects to ‘be heard, consulted and, most of all, respected in the choices it makes’.
The leaders of AU member states are set to descend on Addis Ababa on 17 February and hold the ordinary session of the Assembly of the AU on 18 and 19 February. The composition of the leaders of the continent which is reflected in the family photo they take after the opening session of the Assembly show that nearly all of them are men. It is only the presence of Tanzanian President restrains observers from concluding that the Assembly is an ‘only men’ club, as former Liberian President Ellon Johnson Sirleaf’s presence did previously.
I don’t know whether to say bless the Tanzanians or praise to God or perhaps both that made possible the ascent of Samia Suluhu Hassan to Tanzania’s presidency that now will shone bright light on the long road ahead to transform the AU Assembly from remaining a ‘men’s only’ club.
I have a dream that one day, hopefully in the time of my daughter’s generation, we will have a family picture of the leaders of the continent that is female dominated and reflective of the average age of people on the continent!
This is not to say that Africa has not made progress. I was at a dinner recently where I was reminded in a conversation about the OAU times and the progress made under the AU. Unlike the OAU times when it was not uncommon for some leaders to pitch at the summit wearing their military uniforms, today all of them smile in front of the camera wearing their suits, curtesy of AU norm banning coups and other unconstitutional changes of government. Indeed, even those who are military leaders who seized power militarily will show up wearing suit rather than their military uniform.
Of course, all five leaders except one who seized power by military coup during 2021/22 are barred from participating at this upcoming summit, they are ostracized for breaching AU’s norm banning coups and other unconstitutional changes of government (to which we should return some other time). This was completely unthinkable during OAU times.
Curious to know the one military strongman who is accorded a privileged treatment of attending the summit despite seizing power unconstitutionally? If you don’t know, are you sure that you are interested in African affairs?
In addition to the gender inclusivity of the AU Assembly, which is of course a function of the gender inclusivity or lack thereof of national politics, attendance in AU summit continues to be a topic of discussion. For example, this is first and foremost an issue for African civil society organizations, who would have liked to seize the occasion for championing specific issues of concern for the wider African public by having a slot for a representative of CSOs to make a statement at the opening session and have interactions with leaders on the corridors of the AU.
I hope that in the slow and challenging but steady progress to achieve agenda 2063, the Africa We Want, we will one day see a representative of African citizens bringing in the voice of African people to Mandela Hall during the opening of the Assembly session. And allow me to also dream that we will also make, as part of the journey to realize agenda 2063, the AU a union also of peoples of Africa and African decent not just that of states and governments!
Access to the AU during the summit is also a subject of discussion among AU partner countries. More so this year. The AU sent a note inviting partner countries to attend the opening session of the summit on the basis of 1+0 representation, signaling to partners not to bother with bringing to Addis Ababa high-level representatives from their capitals. While this means that partner countries would not be able to have interaction with as many leaders as they could around the summit, for the AU this ensures that it spares the leaders from attending the summit with divided attention. Yet, it remains an issue for which workable formula is yet to be found.
It is also curious if this 1+0 invitation has been extended to Israel whose AU observer status has been in dispute, triggering a heads of state and government taskforce for which there is so far no record of any convening since its establishment. In the meantime, the lobbying from Israel is in full swing in Addis Ababa. Come this weekend, we may know if there is any resolution to this dispute, although the AU should not have been put in this situation in the first place considering the many continental issues that it should invest its time and attention on.
The other issue of attendance concerns which of the African leaders will make their pilgrimage to Addis Ababa or delegate it to their minister. This summit is billed to be one that will attract the attendance of large number of African leaders. Even if this were to happen, barring any intervening factors, you should not hold your breath that we will have as many African leaders as those who attended the EU-AU, China-Africa, US-Africa etc summits.
I dearly wish that they all come for their summit, demonstrate their pan-African commitment to the AU and its ideals. And prove me wrong.
The content of this article does not represent the views of Amani Africa and reflect only the personal views of the authors who contribute to ‘Ideas Indaba’
A New Dawn for AU's Role in Humanitarian Action?
As we continue to profile some of the key items for the 36th AU summit, the latest from ‘Ideas Indaba’ focuses on engagements around humanitarian issues. While these engagements include submission of a report to the Assembly on the state of the humanitarian situation and a ministerial side event, today’s ‘Ideas Indaba’ features the AU Humanitarian Agency, whose Statute is expected to be adopted by the Assembly. This also offers analysis on why this matters.
A New Dawn for AU's Role in Humanitarian Action?
Date | 13 February 2023
Tsion Hagos
Researcher, Amani Africa
In the face of the dire humanitarian crises affecting parts of the continent induced mainly by violent conflicts and in some cases by extreme weather events, one of the highly anticipated events is the expected adoption by 36th African Union (AU) Summit of the Statute of the AU Humanitarian Agency (AHA). This will bring to a close the establishment of the AUHA that was in the making for a number of years. Other activities on humanitarian issues around the summit include the presentation of a report to the summit on the state of the humanitarian situation in Africa, which according to the report has gone worse, and the ministerial side-event on ‘Towards a new humanitarian agenda in Africa’ by Rwanda and Sierra Leone in partnership with Norway, OCHA and IFRC, with a focus on the AU 10 Year Humanitarian Plan of Action taking place on 16 February, ahead of the opening of the Executive Council Session.
While the establishment of an African mechanism charged with undertaking humanitarian activities officially formed part of AU’s agenda in 2016 at the 26th AU Summit, the need to mobilise African capacity to address growing humanitarian needs in the continent was already one of the concerning issues at the forefront of discussions among AU Heads of State and Government, in earlier years. For instance, the Executive Council’s decision in 2010 at its 17th Ordinary Session, to increase member States’ contributions to the Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) fund from 2% to 4% [EX.CL/ /Dec.556-599(XVII)] was in recognition of the growing deterioration of humanitarian crises Africa. Similarly, at its 14th Ordinary Session convened in the same year, the AU Assembly noted the need for an African body that can ensure coordination and harmonisation of humanitarian action in the continent [Assembly/AU/Dec.268 – 288 (XIV)].
Experiences in recent years, including the worrying deterioration of the humanitarian situation on the continent, have made it clear that Africa ill affords to deal with the humanitarian situation in a business-as-usual fashion. In an initiative that seeks to shift Africa’s place from being a mere object of global humanitarian action to being an actor in responding to the plight of Africans caught up in humanitarian crises, in 2016, at its 26th Ordinary Session, the AU Assembly decided to ‘establish an African Humanitarian Agency which should be anchored on regional and national mechanisms and funded with Africa’s own resources’ and requested the AU Commission to ‘embark on the process for the establishment of such an architecture anchored on principles of pan-Africanism and African shared values’ [Assembly/AU/Dec.588-604(XXVI)].
The process for translating this ambition into reality through establishing the AUHA has since been underway. A critical milestone achieved in this regard has been the development of the Draft Statutes of the AUHA articulating the objectives, mandates, functions, operational modalities and overall structure of the agency. After a few years of work and rounds of revisions, the final consideration of the Statute before submission to the Assembly for adoption was during the 8th ordinary session of the Specialized Technical Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs of the AU held on 11 December 2022. While the meeting adopted the Statute, a major proposed change concerned the naming of the entity. The proposal was to change ‘Agency’ to ‘Institution’. In the text of the Statute for presentation to the Executive Council before its consideration for adoption by the Assembly, this change is not reflected.
The rationale for establishing a humanitarian agency of the Union has in fact been an important aspect of the discussions around operationalisation of the AUHA. As emphasised in a 2019 study conducted on the operationalisation of the agency, one critical factor which justifies the need for the establishment of the AUHA is the coordination void faced in the existing humanitarian response framework. For instance, while the AU has already instituted various structures such as the Africa Centres for Disease Control (Africa CDC) that can and are playing major role to respond to natural disaster and crises, there is absence of clear modalities for coordination between these mechanisms.
Similarly, implementation of normative standards on humanitarian issues including the OAU Refugee Convention, the Kampala Convention and the AU Humanitarian Policy Framework can benefit from a more organised and coordinated approach in order to be more impactful. The need to respond to humanitarian disasters in a coordinated manner also becomes more apparent as the nature of crises in the continent growingly turns to be more complex and compounded, adding impetus to the operationalisation of the AUHA. In addition to advancing coordination of existing mechanisms and normative standards, the agency is also expected to allow a well synchronised humanitarian response at the national, regional and continental levels through harmonisation of efforts between member States, Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) and the AU.
Further to playing a critical role in ensuring coordination, the AUHA would also contribute considerably towards supporting the global humanitarian system which is often regarded as being ‘over-stretched’. Not only that, but having an agency which is founded upon continental policy and legal frameworks and which is ‘anchored on principles of pan-Africanism, solidarity and African shared values’ is also crucial to boost sense of ownership and commitment among African stakeholders. The war in Ukraine which broke out in February 2022 showed how humanitarian operations in Africa can easily suffer due to shifting of aid budget among major contributing countries.
In addition to filling in these gaps, the AUHA can also be deployed towards approaching humanitarian assistance in a manner that is both preventive and responsive. For the most part, humanitarian efforts in the continent are deployed in reaction to full-scale disasters and suffering, most of which could, at the very least, be minimised, if not averted, if timely and effective early warning and preventive action is taken. This applies in cases of both manmade and natural disasters and further to minimising the human cost, environmental damage and collapse of economies, a proactive preventive approach based on effective early warning system is also less costly than responding to an already aggravated humanitarian crisis.
It is against this background that a significant preventive role is assigned to the AUHA in the Statute for instance be the development and implementation of anticipatory tools for crisis preparedness and early action. Indeed, the first of the objectives of AUHA is to ‘prevent humanitarian crises through early warning for timely response to situations that may result in humanitarian crises’. In terms of armed conflicts which continue to cause the greatest humanitarian crises on the continent, the agency, in close coordination with the continental early warning system (CEWS), could for example take on the role of actively anticipating hotspots expected to experience highest loss of human life and damage to property in countries that show clear signs of looming full-blown conflicts. In case of climate change and natural disasters too, the agency can undertake a similar preparedness and early action role in collaboration with pre-existing mechanisms.
Another area of major value addition of the agency could be in advancing humanitarian diplomacy. As we have argued in our policy brief on the AU humanitarian summit in May 2022, one of the gaps in responding to conflicts relates to the use of humanitarian diplomacy as part of the tool box for responding to conflicts in Africa. The leadership of AUHA on humanitarian diplomacy would fill in a major gap and can contribute hugely to mitigating suffering by facilitating early negotiations with conflicting parties on unhindered humanitarian access, full observation and compliance with international humanitarian law and human rights principles.
While its importance therefore remains beyond doubt, the effective operation and functioning of the AUHA is more than likely to face considerable challenges when it comes to securing sustainable and sufficient funds. As specified in the Draft Statutes and in accord with the central objective of creating an African owned humanitarian agency, the AUHA’s budget is to be borne by the AU. This means the agency’s main source of financing comes from member States’ contributions. While emphasizing contribution from member states, the Draft Statutes already acknowledge the need for securing funding from outside sources, through voluntary contributions from member States, private sector contributions and contributions from AU partners. Also worth considering is as further resourceful African base to explore for funding the agency could be the African diaspora community.
No doubt it is better to resolve the main source of humanitarian crises on the continent than invest in deploying humanitarian action. Yet, while working on such long-term structural solutions such as the effective operationalization of the African Continental Free Trade Area, which is the thematic focus of the AU for 2023, the establishment of this agency is a demonstration of responsibility by the AU. With the AU in its report to this upcoming summit indicating that Africa alone accounts for 11.6 million newly Internally Displaced People (IDPs) in the world triggered by conflict and violence- the highest figure ever recorded, the need for this agency, if anything, is long overdue. One hopes that it will prove its value.
The content of this article does not represent the views of Amani Africa and reflect only the personal views of the authors who contribute to ‘Ideas Indaba’
Is the AU addressing the challenges to effective enforcement of its norm banning Unconstitutional Changes of government?
The 36th Ordinary Session of the African Union Assembly will be held on 18-19 February preceded by the 42nd Ordinary Session of the Executive Council on 15-16. As part of covering this years summit, we profile some key issues and events around the summit. In the light of the democratic regression the continent, like other parts of the world, is experiencing, one event we wish to profile is the 2023 Africa Governance Report expected to be tabled and adopted by the Assembly. The thematic focus of the 2023 African Governance Report by the African Peer Review Mechanism is unconstitutional changes of government. The think piece below seeks to offer reflection on an aspect of this theme.
Is the AU addressing the challenges to effective enforcement of its norm banning unconstitutional changes of government?
Date | 10 February 2023
Part I
Solomon Ayele Dersso, PhD
Founding Director, Amani Africa
Tsion Hagos
Researcher, Amani Africa
In 2021, Africa experienced what the UN Secretary General termed ‘epidemic of coups’. It was in 2021 for the first time in the 20 years of operation of the AU that the AU suspended four of its member states in one calendar year. During 2021-2022, Africa has experienced six instances of military seizure of power. If one adds to the list attempted coups or plots of coups reported by states, there were a total of 14 instances of successful coups, attempted coups and plots of coups on the continent during 2021 and 2022.
While there are a number of factors that account for this ‘epidemic of coups’ as discussed in fair details (here and here), some of these are specific to the gaps in both the AU norm banning unconstitutional changes of government (UCG) and in its enforcement.
One major gap in the norm is the lack of criteria and mechanism for determining the occurrence of one of the instances of unconstitutional changes of government stipulated in Article 23(5) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) – ‘any amendment or revision of the constitution or legal instruments, which is an infringement on the principles of democratic change of government’ manipulation of term limits or ‘constitutional coups’. This is critical considering that the Peace and Security Council, AU’s highest standing decision-making body on matters of peace and security and constitutional governance, deemed ‘manipulation of national constitutions to extend term limits’ as one of the issues threatening peace and security on the continent. The other gap is the absence of clear criteria on conditions that should be met for the lifting of suspension of a country from the AU for UCG.
The lacunae in enforcement of the ban on UCG involves both the predictability of the process for applying suspension from AU and/or the consistency of the PSC in applying suspension and AU member states commitment to fully uphold the principle of zero tolerance to UCG and the application of suspension against states where UCG takes place without distinction.
It is to be recalled that this epidemic of coups triggered a plethora of policy actions on the part of the AU. While the PSC has been the main site of such actions, it has also led to actions at the level also of AU’s highest decision making body, the Assembly of the AU. Following its decision in January 2022 for convening a continental forum on UCG, the PSC convened the Accra Forum on UCG in March 2022. This continental forum, which brought together AU member States, AU organs, Regional Economic Communities/Mechanisms, constitutional experts and CSOs including research organizations, produced the Accra Declaration on UCG, which the PSC adopted in one of its sessions subsequently.
At the level of the AU Assembly, it took a decision in February 2022 that it would convene an extraordinary summit which would have as one of its focus this upsurge of UCG on the continent. Accordingly, on 28 May 2022, the Assembly held its 16th extraordinary summit which as part of its declaration addressed the spike in the incidents of UCG, which, among others, endorsed the Accra Declaration.
The review of the plethora of policy activities shows that the AU has started to address the gaps in the enforcement of AU’s norm banning UCG, albeit progress remains uneven, slow and partially adequate.
The Accra Declaration, as endorsed by the AU Assembly, for example expresses the commitment to comprehensively address factors which lead to UCG, including manipulation of democratic processes to tamper with constitutions and effecting amendments to electoral laws within a short span before the elections and without the consent of the majority of political actors and in violation of the stipulated national democratic principles, rules and procedures for constitutional amendment.’ In this respect beyond appealing ‘to Member States to respect their respective Constitutions, especially adherence to presidential term limits and to organize free, fair, transparent and credible elections in line with national laws and international norms, as well as respecting the outcomes of election,’ the Accra Declaration, stressed the need for the AU to finalise and adopt the AU guidelines on the amendment of constitutions in Africa based on the AU’s existing laws, policies and practice relating to constitutionalism and rule of law.’
Considering the continuing challenge of manipulation of constitutional amendments for extending term limits or removing constitutional term limits, the process towards the adoption of the guidelines on amendment of constitutions remains slow. While the development and eventual adoption of the guidelines helps towards addressing manipulation of constitutional amendments for extending or removing term limits, the effectiveness of these guidelines in this respect depends on whether they provide the PSC with clear and implementable criteria for determining the occurrence of UCG under Article 23(5) of the ACDEG.
In terms of the Malabo Declaration, apart from the endorsement of the Accra Declaration, the most important element relates to what the Assembly outcome document said about commitment of member states to the norm banning UCG. As advocated in Amani Africa’s various works including the policy brief published ahead of and targeting the Malabo summit, the Declaration not only ‘unequivocally condemn all forms of unconstitutional changes of government’ and reiterated member states ‘zero tolerance’ in this respect but also recommitted member states to total adherence to ACDEG and the Lomé Declaration. This is particularly important given that the lack of strong consensus and support for AU norms by member states are among the factors for the weakening of the efficacy of the sanctions in 2021.
The translation of this reaffirmation of zero tolerance to any form of UCG into action by applying the rule consistently is the litmus test for demonstrating the firmness of the commitment of states. After all, as the old saying holds, the test of the pudding is in the eating!
The content of this article does not represent the views of Amani Africa and reflect only the personal views of the authors who contribute to ‘Ideas Indaba’
Briefing by CISSA on the Peace and Security Outlook on the Continent for the Year 2023
Briefing by CISSA on the Peace and Security Outlook on the Continent for the Year 2023
Date | 8 February 2023
Tomorrow (8 February) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will hold its 1138th session to receive a briefing on the peace and security outlook on the continent for the year 2023.
The session commences with the opening remark of Edward Xolisa Edward, Permanent Representative of South Africa and Chairperson of the PSC for the month of February. The AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, is expected to make statement presenting reflections from the PAPS department on the peace and security outlook of the continent. The main briefing on the theme of the session is expected to be delivered by a representative of the Committee of Intelligence and Security Service of Africa (CISSA).
Tomorrow’s session is taking place in line with PSC’s decision adopted at its 1073rd session held on 6 April 2022 that requested the Commission to facilitate quarterly briefings to enhance conflict prevention. In line with this decision, the PSC in its annual indicative program of activities for 2023 has scheduled to receive such briefings in February, June, October and December.
When the PSC convened its 1073rd session on the same theme, it expressed grave concern over the ‘persistence of a myriad of threat to peace, security and stability and socio-economic development on the continent.’ In the session, a number of security threats were highlighted including political instability and electoral disputes, unconstitutional changes of government, human rights violation, violent extremism and terrorism and cybercrime.
During tomorrow’s session, the briefing by CISSA may highlight the continuation or worsening of the security threats that were witnessed in 2022. The first of such threat that is sure to receive particular attention is the persistence of conflicts involving terrorist groups and the threat of their expansion into new areas. In terms of the persistence of conflicts involving terrorism, various parts of the continent experienced more incidents of violence in 2022. Out of the 699 terrorist attacks that the African Center for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) documented for the first half of 2022, the Sahel region recorded 179 attacks that resulted in 1,909 deaths while the Lake Chad Basin recorded 153 attacks that caused 1,229 deaths. On the other hand, the Great Lakes region accounted for 96 attacks and 1,013 deaths, and Horn of Africa region accounted for 71 attacks that resulted in 504 deaths during the period. According to the latest report from United Nations (UN) Development Programme (UNDP) on the spread of terrorism, human rights violations and abuses have become triggers of instability including in relation to the emergence and expansion of conflicts involving terrorism.
In terms of the threat of expansion of conflicts involving terrorist groups, the most worrying is the threat of expansion of conflicts involving terrorism from the Sahel to the littoral states of West Africa. In this respect, Ghana’s President warned in a meeting last November that the ‘worsening situation …threatens to engulf the entire West Africa’.
The other major source of threat to peace and security on the continent is the worsening of democratic governance deficit on the continent and the discontent and grievances this continues to breed. In countries that have not experienced change of leadership or have been dominated by one party for a long period of time, the worsening of the democratic governance deficit in the context of expanding socio-economic challenges is sure to become a fertile ground for political instability. These may take various forms including mass protests, riots and in worst case scenario, the emergence of armed militias or insurgent groups.
On the socio-economic sources of threat in 2023, attention may be drawn to the fact that the vast majority of the 50 countries in the world that are at risk of debt crisis are in Africa. This debt crisis is compounded by high levels of inflation and fast-growing rise in the price of consumer goods, including basic necessities, with the IMF reporting that consumer prices have increased in Africa by more than 20 percent on average in 2022. These severe economic pressures can have dire consequences in terms of stability not only for fragile and conflict affected countries on the continent but also for those less fragile and not affected by conflict. Accordingly, one aspect of the peace and security outlook of the continent for 2023 that requires proactive policy action relate to the threats of instability that arises from these dire socio-economic trends.
Another site of threat to stability and peace in Africa in 2023, as in the past years, involves elections. Close to twenty countries will be holding presidential, parliamentary and local elections in 2023. Some of the countries, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Guinea Bissau, will be holding their elections in fragile political and security contexts. In others countries, such as Madagascar, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, trust deficit in electoral institutions and processes combined with disinformation and rising cost of living and food insecurity could create flashpoints for electoral dispute and violence taking various forms including political protests, mass demonstrations, strikes and riots which are met with heavy-handed responses by security forces.
Source: Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EiSA) and Amani Africa Tracking
Developments in 2022 also suggest that the management of complex political transitions, peace processes and conflict hot spots will continue to be sites of geopolitical rivalry that in some cases may lead to reversal of progress towards resolution. As the influence and meddling of external actors on the continent intensifies in 2023, existing geopolitical rivalries over transitions and conflict settings such as in Central African Republic (CAR), Mali, Libya and Sudan are expected to persist and such rivalries could become prominent in others such as the DRC. An important consideration for the PSC in the attempt to prevent relapse of transitions into conflict or crisis or further deterioration of existing conflicts due to the impact of geopolitical rivalries, is the question of the measures that should be devised and implemented to mitigate to the minimum possible, the adverse impact of such deepening geopolitical rivalry on Africa.
Aside from the impact of geopolitical rivalry, tomorrow’s session may focus on the challenges around protracted and complex political transitions and the difficult path towards the restoration of constitutional order in these countries and the way forward. Other complex transitions are related to the slow implementation of peace agreements as witnessed in the case of South Sudan, CAR and Libya.
The threat of coups or attempted coups and other forms of unconstitutional changes of government is also expected to continue to loom large on the peace and security landscape of the continent. This may affect, as witnessed in 2022, countries that are in political transition induced by military coups, and other countries facing political, socio-economic and security challenges.
Tomorrow’s PSC session also comes after the conclusion of the 18th ordinary session of CISSA held between 29 January and 4 February under the theme ‘Food security, conflict and peace in Africa’. Hence one aspect that CISSA will likely highlight in its briefing is the link between conflict and hunger. There has been a concerning trend witnessed in the various conflicts in the continent of the use of starvation and the destruction of agricultural products and infrastructure as a tactic of war. On the other hand, the impact of drought on food and nutrition has also been devastating. In Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia, an estimated of 22 million people are now acutely food insecure because of drought.
The mismatch between humanitarian needs and assistance is expected to exacerbate the dire situation. While there is an expected reduction in humanitarian assistance in Somalia starting from the second quarter of 2023, more than eight million people across Somalia are expected to face Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse acute food insecurity outcomes between April and June 2023. This is due to the five consecutive seasons of reduced rainfall, a possible sixth season of below-average rainfall from March to June 2023, and exceptionally high food prices, further exacerbated by insecurity. Similarly, the number of people affected by hunger in West and Central Africa is projected to reach an all-time high of 48 million people (including 9 million children) in 2023.
A related challenge that will be particularly relevant for tomorrow’s briefing is the interplay between climate change and insecurity. Various parts of the continent particularly the Sahel and Horn of Africa have been susceptible to climate shocks including recurrent droughts and floods. Extreme whether events operate as risk multipliers in conflict affected countries. Fierce inter-communal competition and violence over depleting resources have led to deadly clashes. Climate change induced displacement has also created tension between host and displaced communities.
Tomorrow’s session may also serve as an opportunity to follow up on the status of the requests made to the AU Commission by the PSC, including on the need to convene a meeting between the AU Commission and PSC Committee of Experts on early warning, provision of support to member states, establishment of clear communication channel with the PSC and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and elaboration of trigger mechanism.
The PSC may also reflect on how to ensure effective use of available early warning and response tools in the Continental Structural Conflict Prevention Framework (CSCPF) and its tools of the Country Structural Vulnerability and Resilience Assessment (CSVRA) and Country Structural Vulnerability Mitigations Strategies (CSVMS) which are critical to enhance the early warning role of the PSC. There is also the issue of more effective use of other pillars of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) particularly the Panel of the Wise, notably for enhancing preventive diplomacy.
The expected outcome is a communique. The PSC may welcome the briefing presented by CISSA. The PSC may express concern over the deteriorating peace and security, governance and humanitarian landscape of the continent. It may underline the importance of receiving regular and institutionalized briefings on peace and security outlook to enhance its early warning capacity. The PSC may express its readiness to continue and enhance its engagement with the various bodies including the Panel of the Wise for a strengthened preventive diplomacy and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) to address the structural governance challenges that continue to drive insecurity in the continent. Given the concerning trends witnessed in the continent, the PSC may underline the importance of deliberating on all countries that require PSC’s attention without facing opposition on the inclusion of any item in the agenda of the PSC. The PSC may also consider to have dedicated deliberation on how to address the issue of denialism by member states on the existence of risks and the invocation of sovereignty.
Updated briefing on the situation in Sudan
Updated briefing on the situation in Sudan
Date | 6 February 2023
Tomorrow (6 February), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1137th session at a ministerial level to receive updated briefing on the situation in Sudan.
Opening remarks are expected by Dr. Grace Naledi Mandisa Pandor, Minister of International Relations and Cooperation of South Africa and Chairperson of the PSC for the month of February, followed by a statement from Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). The representative of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) as well as the representative of the United Nations (UN) are also expected to make statements.
The last time PSC met to discuss Sudan was during its 1117th session, held on 2 November last year. In that session, PSC took note of the draft constitutional document initiated by the Sudan Bar Association (SBA) and urged stakeholders that were not part of the SBA’s constitutional document to join the process and for the document to serve as basis for negotiations. PSC further stressed the need to ensure the inclusiveness of the political process for full ownership and legitimacy of the outcome by every segment of the Sudanese society.
Since then, encouraging progress has been made towards resolving the confrontation between the military that staged the 25 October military coup and the various sectors of the civilian population who led and took active part in the mobilization of mass peaceful protests demanding the end of military rule and establishment of a civilian transitional authority. On 5 December 2022, the military and the section of the civilian population organized under the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) signed a Political Framework Agreement (PFA). The Agreement was signed by more than 50 political and civil groups, including Sudan’s military leader General Abdel Fattah Al Burhan, his deputy and commander of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) and non-FFC professional associations and civil society groups, as well as Malik Agar, an ex-rebel and former governor of Blue Nile State.
The signing of the PFA has been lauded by many partners including the AU, IGAD, and UN as a critical first step towards the restoration of a constitutional order and the formation of a credible civil, democratic, and accountable government. In a communique issued on 5 December 2022, the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Moussa Faki Mahamat, welcomed the agreement while calling upon ‘the signatory parties to remain open to the political forces that have not signed the said Agreement’. The 8 December press statement by the UN Security Council also highlighted the singing of the Agreement as ‘an essential step towards the forming of a civilian-led Government and defining constitutional arrangements to guide the Sudan though a transitional period culminating in elections.’
Not withstanding the progress, the PFA marks towards achieving agreement on civilian led transitional process among Sudanese actors and the warm reception it attracted on the part of regional and international actors, it did not garner the support of all the major stakeholders. Most notably, it was greeted with opposition from the resistance committees, who organized successful protests campaigning for a civilian led transitional process and a democratic dispensation in which the military is reformed and under civilian control. The core of their grievance lies in the lack
of consultation and transparency on the part of the FFC who negotiated the PFA with the military. Additionally, some of the key former rebel leaders signatories to the Juba Peace Agreement did not extend their support to and were not also part of the PFA.
The PFA however was the framework agreement that came out of the first phase of a two phase negotiation process. The second phase of the process started on 8 January 2023 with the facilitation of the AU-IGAD-UN Trilateral Mechanism. As this second phase, which deals with very delicate issues, presents an opportunity for building on PFA and avoid the pitfalls of the first phase of the negotiations. If the PSC’s decision for ensuring inclusiveness of the process and legitimacy of the outcome by every segment of Sudanese society is to be realized as key guarantee to avoid recurrence of the collapse of the previous transition, the second phase needs to galvanise broader consensus among the key national forces and bringing non-signatories to the PFA on board. Without such consensus and full participation of non-signatories, the outcomes resulting from the process such as the creation of a new civilian government would face a legitimacy crisis and raise risk of collapse of another transitional process.
The focus of the second phase of the negotiations is the five contentious issues: the reinstatement of the Dismantling Committee (a committee established by the government of Abdallah Hamdok at the end of 2019 – with the aim to dismantle the June 30, 1989 regime and retrieve public funds – but was suspended after the 25 October military coup), security sector reform, transitional justice, implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement, and the question of Eastern Sudan. In that context, different workshops and conferences are taking place with the participation of both signatory and non-signatory parties to the PFA under the facilitation of the Trilateral Mechanism. The recommendations emerging from these engagements are expected to feed into the direct negotiations between different stakeholders to reach a final deal, which leads to the formation of a civilian government.
One of the issues for the PSC is accordingly how to support the ongoing negotiation process. Building on its decision from the November session on inclusiveness and wider public legitimacy of the outcome, the PSC may seek to find out from the briefers on what needs to be done to consolidate the gains from the PFA and expand wider public buy in the second phase of the process. This is not simply about the resumption of financial and economic support by bilateral and multilateral bodies but it is also about lifting of sanctions currently imposed on Sudan.
The other issue that would be of interest for members of the PSC to properly examine is how to mobilize organized regional and international support towards ensuring an agreement with sufficiently wide public buy in and able to produce a sustainable civilian led transitional process. Related to this is also the threat of the negotiations being entangled into regional and global geo-political rivalries and how to avoid ongoing contestations among various powers vying for dominant influence in Sudan from impeding or frustrating the negotiation process. It is thus important for PSC members to know the implications – on the willingness of the military actors to handover to the civilian led government the level of authority for it to make decisions without threat of eviction by the military – of recent initiatives such as the announcement by Israel after meeting President of the Sovereign Council Burhan that the two sides have agreed to normalise relationships between Sudan and Israel.
Regarding PSC’s sanction on Sudan, the lack of clarity and consistency in AU’s norm over the conditions that need to be fulfilled for the lifting of sanctions poses a challenge. In this connection, it is worth noting that Mali also made the request for the lifting of sanction during the 3rd meeting of the Monitoring and Support Group for the Transition in Mali (GST-Mali) last September after reaching an agreement on acceptable transition timeline. In the absence of consistent practices and lack of clarity on conditions for the lifting of sanction, developing clear benchmarks and guidelines on the matter is of strategic importance instead of responding to the requests on a case-by-case basis, that may open the PSC to inconsistency and accompany legitimate charges of double standards.
With specific reference to Sudan, it is to be recalled from the 2019 experience that at the promise of progress towards achieving agreement on establishment of a civilian led transitional authority is not enough. Even the signing of such agreement would not be enough. At a minimum and in fulfilment of PSC’s various relevant decisions since the 25 October 2021 coup, the signing of such agreement needs to be accompanied by the establishment of the civilian transitional authority that enjoys wide public support before the lifting of the suspension. Pending the establishment of common criteria on lifting of suspension from the AU, having such a minimum progress also helps to ensure consistency in how PSC deals with the transitional processes in Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso & Chad.
The expected outcome is a communique. PSC is expected to welcome the 5 December 2022 Political Framework Agreement signed between the military and some political and civil groups including the FFC as the first critical step towards the establishment of a civilian transition government and ultimately the restoration of constitutional order. While also welcoming the launch of the second phase of the political process, PSC is likely to emphasize the importance of ensuring the participation of non-signatories of the PFA in the process that is aimed at reaching consensus around the five key national issues. In that regard, PSC may urge those parties that were not part of the PFA to join the second phase of the process and ensure that their concerns are fully taken on-board. In relation to the facilitation role being played by the AU-IGAD-UN Trilateral Mechanism, the PSC may once again express its strong support to the Mechanism as the lead facilitator of the political process. It may further call up on the international community to back the Trilateral Mechanism’s facilitation role and to refrain from undertaking parallel initiatives that could undermine the negotiation process. Regarding its engagement on Sudan, it may reiterate its decision, agreed at the 1041st session, to receive a monthly update on the evolution of the situation in Sudan. Further to that it may also reiterate its decision to undertake a field mission to the country with the view to expressing its solidarity with the people of Sudan in their quest for a successful transition towards democratic, stable, and prosperous country as well as encouraging Sudanese stakeholders to successfully complete the efforts towards the restoration of constitutional order so as to pave the way for country’s reinstalment of its membership in the AU. In light of lack of clarity on conditions for the lifting of sanctions imposed by the PSC in relation to unconstitutional changes of government, PSC may take the opportunity to request the AU Commission to prepare standard guideline on the lifting of sanctions imposed on Member States that have experienced unconstitutional changes of government. The PSC may also express its wish to see the second phase succeed and culminate in the establishment of a civilian led transitional authority in order to enable it to consider the lifting of the suspension of Sudan and to mobilize support for the transitional process under popularly supported civilian led government.
