Tomorrow (13 December) the African Union (AU) Peace and  Security  Council  (PSC)  is  expected  to  receive  a  briefing on conflict prevention, early warning and mediation  in  Africa.  Fred  Ngoga,  Head  of  the  Conflict  Prevention and Early Warning Division (CPEWD) of the AU  Commission  is  expected  to  brief  the  PSC.  Representatives of Regional Economic Communities (RECs)  and  Regional  Mechanisms  (RMs)  may  also  make  interventions.

The briefing is expected to focus on two main issues. The first  will  be  horizon  scanning  of  threats  to  peace  and  security in Africa. A second possible aspect of the briefing may be an update on the status of development of conflict prevention tools.

One  of  the  key  principles  that  guide  the  operationalization of the PSC mandate is ‘early response to  contain  crisis  situations  to  prevent  them  from  developing into full‐blown conflicts.’ The PSC Protocol highlights  the  Council’s  responsibility  to  ‘anticipate  and  prevent conflicts’ particularly through ‘early warning and preventive  diplomacy’.  Conflict  prevention  and  early  warning is also one of the key objectives of the AU articulated in the Constitutive Act.

However, during the last briefing on early warning, at its 669th  session  the  PSC  has  indicated  its  concern  with regards  to  the  ‘continued  cases  of  denials  to  objective/credible early warning signals of looming crises,  thereby  undermining  the  conflict  prevention  capacity of Council’.

Similarly  at  its  12th  retreat  held  in  June  2019  in  Rabat,  the PSC stressed challenges to conflict prevention including  insufficient  funding  and  resources,  lack  of  political will of member states and sensitiveness around the  categorization  of  looming  crisis.  Towards  enhancing  the capacity of the Council it has ‘decided to increase the regularity  of  briefing  sessions  with  the  AU  Commission,  on issues relating to looming crises with a view to assembling  the  relevant  information  for  appropriate  action’. Tomorrow’s session will also be an opportunity to  deliberate  on  some  of  these  challenges  that  are  preventing the scaling up of early warning mechanisms for early action.

Within this context, the horizon scanning is expected to assess the security situation in the five regions and may identify  the  major  threats  witnessed  across  the  continent. It may particularly look into the broad areas of root  causes,  structural  factors  and  drivers  of  conflict  including terrorism and radicalization, climate change, election, democratization, governance, respect of human rights  and  the  rule  of  law  as  well  socio‐economic  inequalities and marginalization.
As  part  of  its  Border  Program,  CPEWD’s  presentation  may also highlight the tension that may be arising from border demarcation and delimitation disputes.

In  terms  of  country  and  regional  focus,  it  may  pay  particular attention to situations which are experiencing not  only  looming  crisis  but  also  countries  and  regions  that may be experiencing relative stability while confronted  with  risks  of  relapse  to  violence.  In  this  regard, the briefing may shed light on the developments in  various  countries,  which  are  currently  in  political  transition or have recently signed peace agreements or are  in  mediation  processes  including  countries  such  as  Sudan, South Sudan and CAR. It may also pay particular attention  to  close  to  twenty  countries  that  will  be  holding elections in the coming year.

The  briefing  may  also  look  into  the  cross‐border  and  regional aspect of conflict prevention. It may offer an analysis  on  regions  that  are  experiencing  conflicts  and  crisis emanating from intertwined and compounded factors  affecting  multiple  countries.  The  presentation  may also provide an assessment of key trends and analysis  on  changing  dynamics  and  complexities  surrounding the causes of conflicts.

In  the  light  of  the  longstanding  challenges  of  effective  operationalization of the conflict prevention mandate of the PSC, it would be of interest for PSC members to look into  the  modalities  for  a  more  effective  engagement  in  conflict prevention. In this regard, consideration can be given  to  Article  8(11)  of  the  PSC  Protocol  that  provides  for the possibility of the PSC holding informal consultations.  As  a  meeting  format  that  has  not  been  adequately explored, informal consultation particularly at  the  level  of  Committee  of  Experts  of  the  PSC  avails useful avenue for considering early warning briefings and exploring options for preventive action.
After the overall overview of peace and security risks and threats, the presentation in its second part may look into conflict  prevention  tools  and  update  on  their  progress.  This will also be an opportunity to promote and enhance the  utilization  of  continental  and  regional  mechanisms  by policy makers.

Article 2 of the PSC protocol stipulates the need for the Council  to  be  supported  by  the  various  mechanisms  including Continental Early Warning System in fulfilling its  mandate.  CEWS  primarily  consists  of  two  components: (i) the continental observation and monitoring  center,  known  as  “The  Situation  Room”  and  (ii) the observation and monitoring units of the Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (RMs), which collect and process data and are linked directly to the Situation Room. To this end, it will be critical to deliberate on mechanism that enhance the synergy and close collaboration between the AU and RECs/RMs in providing up‐to‐date and relevant information to the PSC as well for the PSC itself to strengthen its working relations with the regional entities.

Considering the ongoing AU institutional reform process and  increased  PSC  engagement  with  RECs/RMs,  Council  members may wish to recall the commitments made during  PSC’s  12th  retreat  which  tasked  the  PSC  jointly  with RECs/RMs policy organs to establish ‘criteria for assessing  looming  crises  and  emerging  situations…  to  ensure … common understanding of parameters, benchmarks  and  principles  that  define  entry  points  for  interventions’.

The  presentation  by  the  division  may  also  provide  an  update on the activities of Panel of the Wise as a key pillar that is established for preventive diplomacy and in order to support the efforts of the PSC and those of the AUC  Chairperson,  particularly  in  the  area  of  conflict  prevention. The briefing may provide an update on the recently  concluded  annual  statutory  meeting  of  the  Panel of the Wise as well as the AU Special Envoy Representatives.  PSC  members  may  also  follow  up  further on the work of the Special Envoys considering the decision  at  its  12th  retreat  ‘to  hold  each  year  a  PSC  session during which AU Special Representatives/Envoys and AU High Representatives will provide briefings’.

The  presentation  may  also  provide  an  update  on  thematic issues related to Gender, Peace and Security Program  and  the  work  of  FemWise  as  well  as  their  harmonization with other gender centered mechanisms in  the  Commission  including  the  Office  of  the  Special  Envoy on Women, Peace and Security and the Gender Directorate.

As  part  of  the  Youth  for  Peace  program  activities  the  presentation may also raise the developments around the  ‘Study  on  the  Roles  and  Contributions  of  Youth  to  Peace and Security in Africa’, which was recently considered by the PSC.

The  expected  outcome  of  the  session  was  unknown  during the production of this ‘Insight’. The PSC may urge member states to strengthen their efforts at the national level  as  well  as  support  the  efficiency  of  early  warning  and prevention mechanisms at AU and RECs/RM level. Towards operationalizing its mandate, the PSC may also urge  for  the  strengthening  of  the  reporting  tool  of  the  Commission through enhancing of the systematic provision  of  early  warning  reports.  The  PSC  may  also  urge the Commission to provide regular briefings and horizon  scanning  to  equip  members  with  relevant  data  for effective decision‐making. To this end, the PSC may consider  adopting  informal  consultation  as  the  format  for a more regular and systematic consideration of early warning  and  conflict  prevention  sessions  including  through the convening of such informal consultations at the level of Committee of Experts.

Today (17 April) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will have a briefing session on ‘Proposals towards Practical Utilization of the AU Peace Fund (in support of Conflict Prevention and Mediation; Capacity Building and AU Peace Support Operations)’. It is expected that Ciru Marwa, the Deputy Head of the AU Institutional Reforms Unit, who also advises Donald Kaberuka, the AU High Representative on the Financing of the African Union (AU) and the Peace Fund, will brief the PSC.

In the briefing, Mrs. Marwa is expected to present to the PSC the current state of the Peace Fund and the next steps including in terms of the criteria and processes for utilizing the funds that have been mobilized from member states as their assessed contributions to the Fund. The briefing also provides an opportunity for providing update on the progress made in the operationalization of the AU Peace Fund.

In terms of the operationalization of the Fund, when the PSC met last time on the Peace Fund, work was still under way in terms of the establishment and operationalization of the structures that ensure transparent and efficient administration of the fund and the running of the day to day operations of the Peace Fund. The first of these structures is the Board of Trustees. This is the body that plays the key role in terms of the financial and administrative oversight of the Fund required to ensure high fiduciary standards and integrity and the provision of strategic coherence. In this respect, perhaps the most notable development has been the appointment of the Board of Trustees of the Fund in November 2018. The Board consists of five individuals representing the five regions of the continent and two institutions. The five individuals are Zainadine Ahmed of Nigeria, Kamel Morjane of Tunisia, Ellen Mekonen of Ethiopia, Tito Mboweni of South Africa and Anicent Dologuele of Central African Republic. The two institutions are the major partner organizations of the AU, namely the United Nations and the European Union.

Following the appointment of the Board members and the first meeting of the Board in the same month, a major milestone was registered with the official launching of the Peace Fund on 17 November 2018 on the sidelines of the 11th Extraordinary Assembly on the AU Reform. With the launch of the Fund, the next steps in the operationalization of the Fund are of paramount importance. In this respect, the first issue to be addressed is the progress in the full institutionalization of the various oversight and management structures of the Fund as well as legal instruments including financial rules governing the fund.

Within the framework of the AU, at strategic level, it is envisaged that the AUC Chairperson assisted by an Executive Management Committee oversees the operations of the Fund. At the operational level for the day to day management of the affairs of the Fund, it is envisaged that the Peace Fund would have its own secretariat. The structural proposal for the establishment of the secretariat is envisaged to be considered as part of the ongoing AU reform process. This is indeed one of the items on which this briefing is expected to shed some light in terms of where the process stands and when the secretariat is expected to be operational.

Political oversight lies with the PSC, with the support of the AU Commission Chairperson. While these structures and their roles are generally known in terms of mandating and decision-making authority, one of the issues of interest for PSC members would be how the PSC interacts with the Peace Fund and the parameters of that interaction. Against this background, an important issue that requires clarification is the decision-making roles of the various structures relating to the Fund.

Another area with respect of which the session is expected to receive update on is the status of contribution to the Fund. In its Decision Assembly/AU/Dec.605(XXVII) on the financing of the Union adopted at its 27th Ordinary Session held in July 2016 in Kigali, the AU Assembly decided to endow the AU Peace Fund with $400m by 2020. Although the expectation has been for the AU to collect at least $120 million as at the end of 2018, the contribution that member states have mobilized as at end of January 2019 is about $90 million. Within this context, one of the issues to be addressed is what the challenges are for making progress to meet the target of endowing the Fund with $400 million by 2020.

It is to be recalled that the PSC at its 30 May 2017 session decided the Peace Fund to have three (3) thematic windows, namely Mediation and Preventive Diplomacy; Institutional Capacity; and Peace Support Operations, as well as the Crisis Reserve facility provided for in Article 21 (4) of the PSC protocol and envisaged to fund rapid response to emergency crisis. Thus far one can only discern some indications of what initiatives would be covered within the framework of each of the windows.

At the time of the launch of the Peace Fund in November, it was noted that the within Window One of the Peace Fund, some of the initiatives that will be expected to draw from the Peace Fund include the Commission and Panel of the Wise peace-making missions, women in conflict prevention and mediation project anchored on FemWise, the Youth for Peace Africa Initiative, African Union Border initiatives, the Continental Conflict Prevention Framework, as well as post conflict reconstruction and development endeavours. While Window three is expected to cover, peace support operations, this will be guided by the AU Common Costs Document. The Document was developed by the Commission as part of its efforts towards efficient and effective utilization of the Peace Fund. This is also envisaged to guide the Commission in facilitating planning, rapid deployment and sustenance of AU Peace Support Operations. The Document was approved by the 10th Meeting of the AU Specialized Technical Committee on Defence, Safety and Security on 9 January 2018.

This session is accordingly expected to highlight progress made in organizing the Peace Fund around these three Windows in particular in terms of determining the scope and eligibility criteria for the windows.

Given that the Peace Fund is meant to operate alongside the funding from the UN, another issue expected to feature in tomorrow’s session is the political engagement with the UN Security Council (UNSC). This in particular concerns the adoption by the UNSC of a substantive resolution that establishes the principle that the AU mandated or authorized PSOs authorized by the UNSC should be financed through UN assessed contributions, with decisions on the financing of specific missions to be taken on a case by case basis’. From the side of the AU, AU Common Costs Document is also envisaged to guide the Commission in discussing options and categories of support that will be required from the UN in the event that the UN Security Council authorizes the use of UN Assessed Contributions for AU led Peace Support Operations.

Finally, this briefing session is expected to clarify the next steps, procedures and timelines for starting using the finances from the Peace Fund for funding AU’s peace and security efforts.
There is no expected outcome for this session.

Tomorrow (9 January) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to have a session for consideration of the report of its Military Staff Committee (MSC) on the harmonization of the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis (ACIRC) within the African Standby Force (ASF).

It is to be recalled that the PSC held a session for consideration of the summary of records of the MSC on 19 November. Following the meeting the PSC requested the MSC to submit to it a report building on the proposals outlined in the summary of records of the meeting of the MSC with inputs from member states.

ACIRC was put in place in 2013 as a gap filling measure for availing the AU a rapid response capability pending the full operationalization of the ASF. ACIRC became a reality in the following years, although it has not been used. Over the years divisions emerged over the role of ACIRC and its relationship with and implications on the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in general and the ASF in particular. While countries participating in ACIRC viewed it as availing the AU pragmatic capability for rapid response based on the concept of coalition of the willing organized around a lead nation, others came to view ACIRC as diverting attention from the operationalization of the ASF and carrying the risk of fragmenting or undermining the APSA framework. Some RECs/RMs, such as ECOWAS, ECCAS and EASFCOM, have in particular been critical of ACIRC both for lack of their participation in its establishment and for their exclusion in its operationalization and potential utilization.

The Specialized Technical Committee on Defense, Safety and Security (STCDSS), during its seventh meeting held on 14 January 2014 in Addis Ababa, recommended that both the ACIRC and the ASF RDC concepts should be harmonized to avoid duplication of efforts and ensure that the ACIRC assists in expediting the operationalization process of the RDC. In 2015, the Report of the Independent Panel of Experts’ Assessment of the African Standby Force recommended that the AU Commission ‘takes steps to harmonise and integrate the ACIRC into the ASF model, as an additional tool for further enhancing the AU’s capacity to respond rapidly to Scenario Six-type mass atrocity crimes, and that it be synchronised with the ASF’s national or stand-alone RDC (Rapid Deployment Capacity) model.’

Subsequently, the AU Assembly adopted decision 679 which called on all stakeholders to support the realization of the full operationalization of the ASF, and harmonization of the activities of ACIRC with the Framework of the ASF and enhance cooperation with all ad-hoc coalitions namely, the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram terrorist group, Group of Five Sahel Joint Force and the Regional Cooperation Initiative against the Lord’s Resistance Army (RCI-LRA), and requested the Commission to submit a plan on the harmonization of ACIRC into ASF, including steps to be taken by the AU and the Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention (RECs/RMs) to coordinate ad-hoc coalitions, within the context of Articles 13 and 16 of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union.’

Despite the policy decisions, the actual implementation of the harmonization of ACIRC within the ASF has faced challenging questions of political, legal and resource preconditions. Various institutional, technical, human and financial inputs have been put in place for putting ACIRC in place. An ACIRC Planning Element (PLANELM) within the Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) of the AU Commission in Addis Ababa has been established. Politically, it remains unclear that all ACIRC participating countries are convinced that ACIRC should merge into the ASF RDC. The legal issue pertains to the memorandum of understanding that the AU may need to sign with ACIRC members on the integration and use of their pledged capabilities within the ASF. It is also imperative that the harmonization addresses the question of what happens to the various technical, logistical and institutional resources, including the personnel making up the ACIRC PLANELM, currently servicing the ACIRC.

These were the issues that the 5 October meeting MSC considered with the Defense Attaché of the Congo chairing by virtue of the fact that Congo was the PSC chair of the month. The meeting of the MSC proposed the steps to be taken and the accompanying timeline for implementing the harmonization. The steps to be taken consist broadly of a) letter of appreciation by the AUC to ACIRC countries (for their contributions), and communication to AU member states (urging them to comply with Assembly decisions 679 and 695) and partners (notifying them of the merger of ACIRC and ASF), b) the legal process to be followed (in terms of review of existing legal frameworks between AU and ACIRC countries and reporting to the PSC in May 2019), and c) the approach to the re-deployment of the assets and resources of ACIRC into the ASF, and the measures to be taken at the level of the PSOD, RECs/RMs and finally the AU Assembly.

It has been noted during the 19 November session that the various steps are envisaged to run from November 2018 to February 2020 when the AU Assembly is expected to make final pronouncement. This has now been adjusted to reflect the time that has lapsed since November 2018. The integration of ACIRC into the ASF seems to fit the ongoing AU reform process that seeks to avoid duplication and ensure mainstreaming of efforts.

Yet, some of these issues such as the proposal on integrating the human resources of the ACIRC PLANLEM into PSOD are likely to trigger discussion from the perspective of the human resource regulations of the AU. It is however clear from the report of the MSC that the MSC ‘reached the consensus that the term ‘harmonization’, in the context of Assembly Decisions 679 and 695, means that ACIRC should be integrated within the ASF Framework.’

One of the issues that arose within the PSC has been the proposal from some member states for the ACIRC volunteering countries to put their capabilities at the disposal of the AU for use within the framework of the ASF. The emerging view that seems to be carrying weight in the PSC is that these are capabilities availed voluntarily and could not be made binding without the consent of the volunteering states.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may endorse the proposed steps in the report with a request for the AUC to report periodically on progress.

Tomorrow (19 November) the Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to have a session for considering the summary records of the meeting of its Military Staff Committee (MSC) on the harmonization of the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis (ACIRC) within the African Standby Force (ASF).

It is to be recalled that the PSC at its 795th session decided that the MSC of the PSC convenes a meeting to ‘identify and propose ways and means of fully implementing Assembly Decisions 679 and 695 and to make appropriate recommendations, including timelines and roadmap, to guide the PSC on how to overcome the challenges facing the harmonization of the ACIRC within the ASF’. Acting on this decision, the MSC held on 5 October 2018the meeting for working on the task the PSC entrusted to it.

Although it has been introduced in 2013 as a gap filling measure for availing the AU a rapid response capability pending the full operationalization of the ASF, in the years that follow divisions emerged over the role of ACIRC and its relationship with and implications on the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in general and the ASF in particular. While countries participating in ACIRC viewed it as availing the AU pragmatic capability for rapid response based on the concept of coalition of the willing organized around a lead nation, others came to view ACIRC as diverting attention from the operationalization of the ASF and carrying the risk of fragmenting or undermining the APSA framework. Some RECs/RMs, such as ECOWAS, ECCAS and EASFCOM, have in particular been critical of ACIRC both for lack of their participation in its establishment and for their exclusion in its operationalization and potential utilization. The Specialized Technical Committee on Defense, Safety and Security (STCDSS), during its seventh meeting held on 14 January 2014 in Addis Ababa, recommended that both the ACIRC and the ASF RDC concepts should be harmonized to avoid duplication of efforts and ensure that the ACIRC assists in expediting the operationalization process of the RDC. In 2015, the Report of the Independent Panel of Experts’ Assessment of the African Standby Force recommended that the AU Commission ‘takes steps to harmonise and integrate the ACIRC into the ASF model, as an additional tool for further enhancing the AU’s capacity to respond rapidly to Scenario Six-type mass atrocity crimes, and that it be synchronised with the ASF’s national or stand-alone RDC (Rapid Deployment Capacity) model.’

Subsequently, the AU Assembly adopted decision 679 which called on all stakeholders to support the realization of the full operationalization of the ASF, and harmonization of the activities of ACIRC with the Framework of the ASF and enhance cooperation with all ad-hoc coalitions namely, the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram terrorist group, Group of Five Sahel Joint Force and the Regional Cooperation Initiative against the Lord’s Resistance Army (RCI-LRA), and requested the Commission to submit a plan on the harmonization of ACIRC into ASF, including steps to be taken by the AU and the Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention (RECs/RMs) to coordinate ad-hoc the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union.’

Despite the policy decisions, the actual implementation of the harmonization of ACIRC within the ASF has faced challenging questions of political, legal and resource preconditions. Various institutional, technical, human and financial inputs have been put in place for putting ACIRC in place. An ACIRC PLANELM within the Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) of the AU Commission in Addis Ababa has been established. Politically, it remains unclear that all ACIRC participating countries are convinced that ACIRC merges into the ASF RDC. The legal issue pertains to the memorandum of understanding that the AU may need to sign with ACIRC members on the integration and use of their pledged capabilities within the ASF. It is also imperative that the harmonization addresses the question of what happens to the various technical, logistical and institutional resources, including the personnel making up the ACIRC PLANELM, currently servicing the ACIRC.

These were the issues that the 5 October meeting MSC considered with the Defense Attaché of the Congo chairing by virtue of the fact that Congo was the PSC chair of the month. Premised on the understanding that harmonization means integration of the ACIRC into the ASF, the meeting of the MSC proposed the steps to be taken and the accompanying timeline for implementing the harmonization. The steps to be taken consist broadly of a) communication by the AUC to ACIRC countries (for their contributions), AU member states (urging them to comply with Assembly decisions 679 and 695) and partners (notifying them of the merger of ACIRC and ASF), b) the legal process to be followed (in terms of review of existing legal frameworks between AU and ACIRC countries and reporting to the PSC in May 2019), the approach to the re-deployment of the assets and resources of ACIRC into the ASF, and the measures to be taken at the level of the PSOD, RECs/RMs and finally the AU Assembly.
These various steps are envisaged to run from November 2018 to February 2020 when the AU Assembly is expected to make final pronouncement. The integration of ACIRC into the ASF seems to fit the ongoing AU reform process that seeks to avoid duplication and ensure mainstreaming of efforts. Yet, some of these issues such as the proposal on integrating the human resources of the ACIRC PLANLEM into PSOD are likely to trigger discussion from the perspective of the human resource regulations of the AU.

The Defense Attaché of Congo is expected to present the summary record of the MSC meeting. The AU Peace and Security Department is also expected to make a statement. The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may endorse the proposed steps with amendments with a request for the AUC to develop and implement a roadmap based on the steps and timelines set and to report periodically on progress.

Tomorrow  (19  September)  the  Peace  and  Security  Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) will hold a briefing on the harmonization of the African Capacity for Rapid  Intervention  in  Crises  (ACRIC)  within  the  African  Standby Force (ASF) framework. Convened on the request  of  Nigeria,  the  meeting  will  examine  the  conceptual, structural and institutional harmonization of the  ASF  and  ACIRC.  The  session  will  also  evaluate  the  progress made by the two mechanisms since the last briefing  to  the  PSC.  The  meeting  will  receive  a  briefing  from the Peace and Security Department (PSD)’s Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD).

The meeting is held in line with the decision 695 of the AU  Assembly  meeting  in  Nouakchott,  which  requested  quarterly progress update on implementation of decision 679 of the 30th ordinary session of the Assembly.

The  meeting  will  also  receive  updates  from  the  Secretariat of ACRIC in PSOD on the state of the ACIRC, its  relations  with  the  ASF  mechanism  and  recent  developments in the implementation of the Maputo Strategic  Work  Plan  on  the  Enhancement  of  the  ASF  (2016‐2020). The five‐year work plan for the ASF highlighted  the  changing  security  environment  and  threats on the continent. Its recommendation for dynamism  into  the  design  and  structure  of  the  ASF  to  respond to the challenges goes in line with the initiative to  harmonize  the  ASF  with  the  ACIRC.  The  session  will  use the indicators, deliverables and timelines defined by the  five‐year  work  plan  as  a  reference  to  evaluate  the  move towards harmonization of ACRIC with ASF, particularly  its  rapid  deployment  capability  (RDC).  The  training, exercises, airlift and mission support capabilities of  the  regional  forces  and  their  progress  in  articulating  the command structure and control, and logistical capabilities  of  the  ASF  and  ACIRC  will  also  be  discussed  by the session.

The  discussion  and  debate  of  the  meeting  will  focus  on  the complex relationship between the ASF and ACRIC. Divisions still exist among the member states of the AU and  within  the  AU  Commission  on  the  relevance,  role,  interaction and the need for keeping the two as parallel initiatives.  There  is  an  opinion  that  sees  ACIRC  as  a  redundancy, an admission of failure to fully operationalize the ASF, and questions the value addition of  the  ACIRC.  This  view  sees  the  2013  initiative  as  a  project that diverts and distracts the attention, energy, resources  and  political  focus  of  the  continent  and  partners that should have been spent on realizing the ASF.  Those  participating  in  ACRIC  consider  the  mechanism as providing the mechanism for rapid mobilization and more flexibility (compared to the region based and relatively more region approach of the ASF) in cases emergency situations.

Despite  its  success  for  standardization,  training  and  mobilization of peace support mission in Africa, security challenges in the continent have revealed the weakness of the ASF in rapidly deploying troops. Harmonizing the ASF  and  ACIRC  will  primarily  focus  on  addressing  this  structural gap. The conversation on the ASF and ACIRC dynamics is taking place while the continent is witnessing a sweeping trend of relying on ad‐hoc regional coalitions and  deployment  arrangements  and  alliances  as  a  rapid  response mechanism. The meeting is expected to address  these  trend  in  the  context  of  the  effort  for  harmonization of the ASF and ACRIC.

While  peace  support  operations  serve  as  a  vital  tool  of  crisis response, changing security dynamics and trans‐regional nature of emerging security threats demand a more flexible, agile and effective missions. The possibility of an effective transfer of responsibility to local security forces and institutions, and withdrawal of missions with an extended presence and limited effectiveness still look distant.  These  conditions  and  reality  significantly  affected the reputation and effectiveness of the traditional peace support operations in Africa, and called for a revision of the existing practice and arrangements. The  threat  posed  by  transnational  terrorist  groups  and  non‐state actors need a ‘fit for purpose’ and tailor made mandated  approach,  which  is  currently  lacking  in  the  traditional African Union and UN missions in Africa.

Tomorrow’s  meeting  will  examine  the  ASF‐ACRIC  harmonization as a response to the question of effectiveness  and  sustainability  of  peace  support  operations in the continent. Reviewing the design and structure  of  the  ASF  in  a  way  that  enhances  its  deployment capabilities and mission effectiveness including the ACIRC as its component is seen by the AU as a way forward. An important aspect of this session is also  finding  a  balance  between  rapid  and  flexible  regional initiatives and overarching standards and principles developed within the framework of the ASF.
Also  important  for  tomorrow’s  session  is  tailor  made  interventions with greater emphasis on political initiatives underscoring the imperative of the primacy of political  strategy  over  military  or  security  approaches.  These include integrating and enhancing the role of preventive  diplomacy  and  mediation  mechanisms,  the  African Governance Architecture (AGA), Africa’s normative  framework  to  constitutionalism  and  inclusive  governance. Enabling national institutions is critical in the path from conflict to sustained peace, and should be part and parcel of the ASF‐ACIRC harmonization.

The expected outcome of the briefing is a communiqué. The  communiqué  may  stipulate  a  timeline  for  finalizing  the harmonization of ACRIC within the ASF and for all efforts at the levels of the AU and regions to focus on the full  operationalization  of  the  ASF  with  necessary  adjustments for flexible, rapid and effective utilization of ASF in response to emerging crisis.

Tomorrow (2 May) the PSC will hold a briefing session on the AU Peace Fund. The AU Special Envoy on the Financing of the African Union (AU) and the Peace Fund, Donald Kaberuka, will brief the PSC providing updates on the status of operationalization of the Peace Fund.

The AU Assembly at its 24th and 25th Ordinary Sessions adopted decisions expressing the agreement of AU member states to contribute 25% of the financing for AU peace and security efforts, including peace support operations. In its Decision Assembly/AU/Dec.605(XXVII) on the financing of the Union adopted at its 27th Ordinary Session held in July 2016 in Kigali, which decided to endow the AU Peace Fund with $400m by 2020.In this session the Special Envoy will update the PSC on the progress made in the contribution of member states to the Peace Fund.

Although implementation was meant to start as of 2017, the F10+ (the Committee of the 15 Finance Ministers) decided a transitional period with a target amount of $65 million for the Peace Fund for the year 2017. Of this amount, some $40 million has thus far been collected. Issues of interest for member states in this regard include when and how the amount collected would start to be used and the institutional and decision-making measures required to this end. Also of interest to PSC members is the strategy for realizing the collection of both the full initial targeted amount and the July 2016 decision to endow the Peace Fund with $400m by 2020. In this respect, the briefing session is expected to note the January 2018 summit decision that ‘member states annual contributions to the Peace Fund shall be made on the basis of the AU Scale of Assessment’. It is expected that the AU would have a new scale of assessment from 2019.

It is to be recalled that the PSC at its 30 May 2017 session decided the Peace Fund to have three (3) thematic windows, namely Mediation and Preventive Diplomacy; Institutional Capacity; and Peace Support Operations, as well as the Crisis Reserve facility provided for in Article 21 (4) of the PSC protocol and envisaged to fund rapid response to emergency crisis. As a follow up to that, this session is expected to highlight progress made in organizing the Peace Fund around these three windows in particular in terms of determining the scope and eligibility criteria for the windows.

Another area that Kaberuka’s briefing would provide update on is the progress in the establishment and operationalization of the various institutional set up and governance structures of the Peace Fund as well as legal instruments including financial rules governing the fund. In terms of the legal instruments, the briefing is expected to inform the PSC that a Peace Fund Instrument codifying the enhanced governance and management arrangements was developed and reviewed by AU Legal Counsel in August 2017 and has since been adopted in the January 2018 AU summit decision Assembly/AU/ Dec.9(XXX).

As endorsed by the May 2017 PSC session and the July 2017 Summit of the AU Assembly, the institutional set up and governance structures of the PSC envisage both political level role players and the strategic and operational governance structures of the Peace Fund.

Political oversight lies with the PSC with the support of the AU Commission Chairperson. As these structures and their roles are already in operation including in terms of mandating and decision-making authority, much of the work in terms of institutional set up and governance structures relate to the establishment and operationalization of the structures that ensure transparent and efficient administration of the fund and the running of the day to day operations of the Peace Fund. The first of these structures is the Board of Trustees.

As proposed in Kaberuka’s report on the revitalization of the Peace Fund, the Board of Trustees consist of the Chair and Deputy Chair of the AUC, the Commissioner for Peace and Security and non-executive members of eminent persons on peace and security and up to two non-African partners contributing to the peace fund. The briefing for this session is expected to inform the PSC on the progress made both in the consultations of the AU Commission Chair with the deans of the five regions of Africa on the identification of African members of the Board of Trustees and generally in elaborating the terms of reference and constituting the membership of the Board. Other structures envisaged included the independent evaluation group in respect of which the status of nomination of the group would be of interest in this session.

While at strategic level, the AUC Chairperson assisted by an Executive Management Committee oversees the operations of the Fund, at the operational level, it is envisaged that the Peace Fund would have its own secretariat. The structural proposals for the establishment of the secretariat is envisaged to be considered as part of the ongoing AU reform process during the course of this year.

This is indeed one of the items on which this briefing is expected to shed some light in terms of where the process stands and when the secretariat is expected to be operational.

There are also other areas the briefing is anticipated to touch on. One such area is the human rights and code of conduct compliance framework for AU peace operations. Related to this and particularly important is the follow up to the PSC’s request to the AUC Chair and the Special Envoy to take forward the political engagement with United Nations and relevant partners. This in particular concerns the adoption by the UN of ‘a substantive Resolution that establishes the principle that AU mandated or authorized PSOs authorized by the UN Security Council should be financed through UN assessed contributions, with decisions on the financing of specific missions to be taken on a case by case basis towards securing a substantive UNSC resolution on these issues’.

The expected outcome of the briefing session is a communiqué. Apart from endorsing items as may be proposed in the briefing such as on the utilization of funds in the Peace Fund, it would build on the 30 May 2017 communiqué on areas for further follow up not only on the operationalization of the structures of the Peace Fund but also on the substantive resolution expected from the UN.

Briefing on the ASF

Tomorrow (25 April), the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) will hold a briefing on ‘the operationalization of the African Standby Force (ASF)’. The meeting will evaluate the state of readiness of Regional Standby Forces and progress made since the last briefing to the PSC. The meeting is a follow up to the decision of the PSC and Executive Council on regular updating of the PSC on the ASF.

The Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) is also expected to provide updates to the PSC. The focus of this briefing will be on works done at the level of the AU including in respect to the implementation of the Maputo Strategic Work Plan on the Enhancement of the ASF (2016-2020). The five-year work plan for the ASF highlighted the changing security environment and threats on the continent and outlined the dynamism and changes needed into the design and structure of the ASF to respond to the challenges. The Council will examine the progress made based on the indicators, deliverables and timelines put by the work plan. It is also expected in particular to update the PSC on progress made in elaborating AU-RECs/RMs agreement on decision-making processes on the deployment of the ASF and the launch in January 2018 of the Continental Logistics Base in Cameroon.

In its last session on the ASF held on 21 July 2017, the PSC also anticipated to review the Report of the Commission on the verification, confirmation and validation of pledged capabilities of the ASF that Professor Ibrahim Gambari led. In the light of the discussion on adapting the design and structure of the ASF with an objective of enhancing its deployment capabilities and mission effectiveness, the briefing session is expected to discuss the updates in this process.

With respect to the RECs/RMs, some member states expressed the need for the RECs/RMs to update the PSC themselves on the level of preparedness of their regional forces. In the Executive Council’s Declaration on the 10th Ordinary Meeting of the Specialized Technical Committee on Defense, Safety and Security (STCDSS), RECs/RMs are urged ‘to provide regular updates to the AU Peace and Security Council on their Regional Standby Forces and attend PSC sessions as required’. The PSC Secretariat has sent out invitations to the heads of the Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs).

The main part of the briefing will be a progress report by the chairs and representatives of the five RECs/RMs. The Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), North African Regional Capability (NARC) and Southern African Development Community (SADC) are expected to make presentations on the status of the regional brigades and the training, financing, and mobilization capacities of their respective regional forces. The statements and subsequent exchanges are also expected to cover training and exercises, airlift and mission support capabilities of the regional forces. The difficult issue of command structure and control, and matters related with logistics will also be topics that will feature in the meeting.

Despite regional differences and uneven developments of regional brigades by the regional mechanisms notably NARC, the ASF proved to be a great mechanism to build a permanent infrastructure for standardization, training and mobilization of peacekeeping in Africa. The ECOWAS, EASF and SADC are regions that showed relative progress while central and northern Africa are significantly lagging.

However, the structure of the force, and its place in the APSA is a matter of ongoing conversation at the PSC. The AU member states are relying on ad-hoc regional coalitions and deployment arrangements and alliances even after the official declaration of the operationalization of the ASF. There are various issues that member states of the PSC would raise in regard to these developments. The first is the relationship of these ad hoc arrangements with the ASF framework. In its January 2018 Declaration on the meeting of the STCDSS, the Executive Council called for the harmonization enhance cooperation with all ad-hoc coalitions, namely, MNJTF, Group of Five Sahel Joint Force and RCILRA.

There is also the issue of African Capacity for Rapid Intervention in Crises (ACIRC). There are member states who see it as an initiative that diverts and distracts the attention, energy, resources and political focus of the continent from the ASF. Although the AU Commission or the RECs/RMs may not be in a position to provide full answer, a second and related issue for discussion is the harmonization of the activities of (ACIRC) with the Framework of the ASF.

Finally, there is also the issue of the mandating and deployment of the ASF for AU peace support operations including the ad hoc coalitions within the framework of the Constitutive Act and the Protocol Establishing the PSC. In this respect, the briefing in the PSC is expected to cover how new initiatives are being aliened with the processes envisaged in AU founding instruments. A recent major development has been the Memorandum of Understanding signed between Smaïl Chergui, AU Commissioner for Peace and Security and Maman Sidiko, Executive Secretary of the G5 Sahel Secretariat on 25 March 2018.

The expected outcome of the briefing is a communiqué. It is anticipated to give guidance on the follow up to the various decisions including notably the process of alignment, harmonization and coherence of decision-making and mandating process between AU and RECs/RMs and the finalization of the draft ASF Legal Framework.

Peace Support Operations in Africa

Today (13 April) at 3:30pm the Peace and Security Council (PSC) will hold a briefing session on peace support operations in Africa. The Council will receive a briefing from the Smaïl Chergui, African Union (AU) Commissioner for Peace and Security and Jean-Pierre Lacroix, the United Nations (UN) Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations.

It is expected that the briefing would have two dimensions. The first of this and the main focus of the briefing is the recent joint field visits that Chergui and Lacroix undertook including to Darfur where UN-AU have their joint mission UNAMID and the Central African Republic. As a practical manifestation of the implementation of the AU-UN partnership, it is also anticipated that the briefing session would highlight efforts at implementing enhanced partnership between the two organizations.

Chergui and Lacroix have been on a joint filed visit to Sudan with a focus on the joint UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) and in the Central African Republic (CAR) where the UN runs a mission, MINUSCA and the AU leads the African Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation in the CAR. In their joint briefing, Chergui and Lacroix are expected to explain to the PSC the current state of the peace and security situation in Sudan, Darfur and CAR, and on challenges and the next steps.

With respect to Sudan, particular attention would focus on not only the process of the withdrawal of UNAMID but also the effort for political solution to the situation. They are expected to indicate how the AU and the UN jointly support the stabilization and restoration of peace in Darfur. In terms of the visit to the CAR, the two are expected to brief the PSC on the security situation in the CAR including the recent incident of fighting that ensued when CAR and MINUSCA undertook an operation. The two arrive in Bangui while the situation on the ground was tense. On 11 April, they issued a joint statement on the situation expressing concern about persistent tensions in the PK5 neighborhood of Bangui and explaining that ‘the operations conducted by the Government and MINUSCA on 8 April were aimed at putting an end to the activities of criminal elements that endanger the lives of peaceful citizens, in a neighborhood that is also the economic hub of Bangui.’

Both the AU and the UN have each got a new leadership in the past year. Both Antonio Guterres, UN’s Secretary-General and Moussa Faki Mahamat, AU Commission Chairperson, have expressed commitment for enhancing the partnership of the two organizations on peace and security in Africa. Exactly a year ago, the two leaders signed a landmark framework agreement for enhanced partnership in peace and security envisaging coordinated engagement and joint processes throughout the cycle of conflict.

Today’s briefing session marks one year since the signing of the agreement and offers an opportunity for reviewing the progress made thus far. At the time of the signing of the agreement in April 2017, Secretary-General Guterres observed that ‘we are witnessing, in Africa, as around the world, changes …that force us to have a strategic review of the way peace support operations take place’. Both Chergui and Lacroix would inform the PSC that the joint field visit constitutes a practical manifestation of the efforts to translate the vision of elevating the partnership between the AU and the UN to a strategic level through joint strategic engagement on the ground.

In today’s session, Lacroix is expected to highlight UN’s expectation to move away from peace support operations seeking to implement wide range of tasks (with an extended presence on the ground and limited effectiveness) to operations with limited set of tasks aimed at enabling the building of national institutions and transfer responsibility to national authorities within shortest time possible.
The briefing would also highlight the importance of the search for political solutions and the value of joint strategic level engagement through joint filed visits. It is to be recalled that 2320 also envisaged UN-AU partnership ‘based on respective comparative advantage, burden sharing, consultative decision making, joint analysis and planning missions and assessment visits by the UN and AU, monitoring and evaluation, transparency and accountability.’

In translating joint approaches envisaged in this resolution and in the framework, this joint field visit is an experiment that can be developed into one tool for implementing joint approaches. It helps in achieving joint understanding of the situation on the ground. Additionally, it serves as leverage for supporting the search for political solution in the conflict-affected countries by sending a message of unity of views. Indeed, Chergui and Lacroix sought to achieve that in the CAR, thereby contributing to calming down the tense situation arising from recent incidents relating to the CAR and MINUSCA operation. In their joint statement, they underscored the ‘complete unity and common resolve of the African Union and the United Nations’.
In terms of AU-UN partnership, today’s PSC session will be informed by the long list of recommendations made by the 2015 High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO), which highlighted, among others, the need for a more responsive collaborative arrangement and partnership between UN and regional organizations, particularly the UN. Additionally, in its Resolution 2320 of 18 November 2016, the UN Security Council welcomed the AU Assembly decision in July 2016 to finance 25 per cent of the cost of AU-led peace support operations by 2020 with the understanding that the UN would cover the remaining from assessed contributions. From the side of AU PSC members, they may also recall PSC’s its communiqué of 30 May 2016 that underscored the importance of securing a substantive Security Council resolution establishing that UN assessed contributions should, on a case by case basis, finance Security Council-mandated AU peace support missions and seek update in this respect.

Next week on 18 April, Chergui and Lacroix are also expected to brief the UNSC jointly, Chergui via VCT from Addis Ababa and Lacroix in person in New York. With the field visit leading to joint briefing of both the UNSC and the PSC, it can also evolve into useful vehicle for coordinating the agenda and monthly program of work of the two Councils as well.

It is anticipated that after an analysis and review of this joint field visit, the two may explore modalities for effective institutionalization of such visit. The follow up to the visits would also explore in what ways such tools would best be implemented for leveraging the role of peace support operations and the search for the political resolution of conflicts.

While no particular outcome is expected, depending on the joint briefing and the ensuing deliberations, the PSC may both express support for such joint high-level field visit and call for its institutionalization.