Considering this grave state of the situation, PSC’s response not exceeding the expression of concern once again shows the persistence of the holding of meetings that are nothing more than performative. It also manifests the resultant lack of action that the peace and security conditions warrant and hence, AU’s increasing irrelevance to the situations in the Sahel. It is remarkable that in making a generalised call towards supporting affected countries, the PSC directed the target of the support to the consequences rather than the terrorist insurgency precipitating those consequences. It thus called upon ‘the Commission, the international community and the Member States in a position to do so, to support the efforts of the Governments in the countries in transition through the provision of humanitarian assistance.’ (emphasis added) At the same time, the PSC emphasised the need for holistic solutions toward addressing structural root causes and drivers of terrorism in the region. Yet, it did not articulate what these solutions would entail nor did it proposed how the AU can support the deployment of such ‘holistic solutions.’

The other area of concern raised in PSC sessions including its 1212^th session relates to the duration for the conclusion of the transition in each of these countries. It is to be recalled that 2024 marked the year during which Burkina Faso, Mali, and Guinea were expected to conduct elections to end their transition periods. However, the dialogue or consultation processes in all three countries have extended the transition period, delaying elections, indicating that election is not a priority, particularly for the countries in the Sahel. Yet, the PSC called on the transition authorities in countries ‘to ensure the strict implementation of their respective transition roadmaps, within the agreed timelines.’ With respect to Niger, the PSC tasked the AU Commission to ‘[e]xpeditiously take requisite steps in ensuring the deployment of a high-level mediation mission to Niger, to engage with the Transitional Authorities, with a view to establishing a transition roadmap in line with national and regional dispositions.’ On Mali, the PSC requested the Commission ‘to urgently organise a fact-finding mission to Mali to discuss the conclusions of the inter-Malian dialogue, and work with the transitional authorities to identify opportunities for collaboration and implementation.’  With respect to the transition process in Gabon, noting that ‘the setting of the duration of the transition for a period of 24 months and the intention to hold elections in August 2025’, the PSC expressed its rejection of ‘any further extension of the transition period’ and renewed its ‘call for a speedy return to constitutional order within the prescribed timeframe.’ It remains unclear whether the PSC communicated its rejection of the extension of the transition period in it engagement with the transition authorities during its mission to Gabon.

The third area of concern highlighted in the session was what the PSC called ‘the shrinking political and civic spaces within some countries in political transition, especially the ban on the activities of political parties, associations, civil society organisations and repression of media activities.’ In this respect, the PSC encouraged the authorities in Burkina Faso ‘to create favourable conditions for political and democratic discourses towards promoting inclusivity’, called on Guinean authorities ‘to pursue inclusive dialogue with the participation of all political, socio-economic and civil society stakeholders,’ and Malian authorities to reconsider the decision (suspending ‘political parties and activities of political associations’).’

The other area of concern involved the issue of AU’s effective role in facilitating conditions for the implementation of reform measures for successful transition and restoration of constitutional order. As the outcome of the 1212^th session revealed, AU neither deployed effective mechanisms nor ensured the effective functioning of existing ones. It is on account of these deficiencies that the PSC reiterated its request for the AU Commission ‘to appoint a High-Level Facilitator at the level of sitting or former Head of State to engage with the Transitional Authorities.’ Additionally, taking note of ‘the leadership vacuum within the African Union Mission for Mali and Sahel (MISAHEL),’ the PSC requested ‘the Chairperson of the AU Commission to ensure the nomination of a High Representative, which remains a crucial interface in ensuring collective oversight between the Commission, Council, and the Countries in transition.’ The position has been vacant since the departure of Maman Sambo Sidikou in August 2023.

There is also the threat of a breakdown of the regional order in West Africa with the three central Sahelian states deciding to withdraw from ECOWAS. Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger established their own grouping called the Alliance of Sahelian States, which was recently upgraded into a confederation of Sahel States in a treaty the three states signed during a summit held early in July 2024 in Niamey, Niger.

Expressing concern and encouraging the three countries to reconsider their decision, the PSC called for ‘the resumption of dialogue and mediation between ECOWAS and Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger.’ Such generic calls without assigning a mechanism for undertaking such dialogue and mediation seem to suggest a lack of adequate appreciation of the gravity of the risk of breakdown of the regional order that this situation poses.

The other and key area of concern is the possibility of those involved in the perpetration of unconstitutional change of government becoming candidates for election. While it reiterated its ‘position regarding the ineligibility of the members of the Transitional Authorities in the election process to mark the end of the Transitions, in line with the provisions of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG),’ PSC’s deafening silence on Chad’s breach of this prohibition deals a major blow for its credibility and this reiteration of its position. Indeed, this lack of action on the part of the PSC on the election of members of the Chadian transitional government, particularly in view of its own clear decision on the matter, has come to be seen as setting a precedent for military leaders in the other countries in transition.

The AU is now faced with a situation in which leaders of the transitions are set to seek the same treatment as Chad. Mali and Burkina Faso have already made a decision on that end.  Following the template set by the Chadian transition, last May the national dialogue in Mali concluded to extend the transition period by three more years and, similar to the 2022 national dialogue in Chad, to allow Assimi Goita to stand in the eventual election. Around the same time, a new in Burkina Faso a new Charter, adopted following consultations and extending the transition period for five years, envisages that junta leader Ibrahim Traore will be able to stand for election at the end of the five-year transition period.

As the PSC concluded its mission to Gabon undertaken during 11-13 September 2024, it would be very fitting if the PSC leveraged its engagement with the leadership of the transition authority in Gabon to dissuade the junta leader from running for election at the end of the transition process.

The foregoing analysis of the various areas of concern drawn from one of PSC’s recent sessions on countries in transition highlights the need for a complete rethinking of AU’s approach. Otherwise, AU’s role faces an increasing lack of relevance and credibility in many of these situations. AU also faces charges of failing people in the Sahel for not taking actions that go beyond expressing concern about the grave terrorist threat that created the conditions for institutional fragility and unconstitutionality.