Presentation of the Report of the Inaugural Meeting of the PSC Sub Committee on Sanctions
Date | 14 August 2024
Tomorrow (15 August), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1227th session to receive the report of the inaugural meeting of the PSC Sub-Committee on Sanctions.
The Permanent Representative of Botswana to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for August 2024, Tebelelo A. Boang, is expected to deliver the opening remarks, followed by statements from the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye. Michael Wamai, an expert from Uganda to the AU and Chairperson of the Sub-Committee for the month of June 2024, is anticipated to present the report of the inaugural meeting of the Sub-Committee on Sanctions.
This session is convened in line with the decision made during the inaugural meeting of the PSC Sub-Committee on Sanctions (SCS) on 12 June 2024, in which the Sub-Committee agreed that the Chairperson for June, Michael Wamai, would present the Summary Record of the meeting to the PSC for consideration.
The PSC SCS was launched in June, fifteen years after the PSC first decided to establish it during its 178th session in March 2009. This decision was made pursuant to Article 8(5) of the PSC Protocol, which empowers the Council to create subsidiary bodies to perform its functions. Despite the 2009 decision, momentum for operationalising the Sanctions Committee only accelerated in recent years, largely due to the resurgence of military coups across the continent since 2021. With six Member States currently suspended from AU activities due to unconstitutional changes of government (UCG), it appears that the AU’s anti-coup norms—once praised for reducing the occurrence of UCGs in Africa—are now facing significant challenges, raising doubts about their effectiveness.
Although the PSC has the option to impose a range of sanctions beyond suspension, the most common form of sanction that the PSC adopted over the years remains suspension. During its 15th retreat on its working methods, held in Tunis, Tunisia in November 2023, the PSC recognised various challenges in the implementation of AU sanction regimes. These include: disparities between the AU and some RECs/RMs on the application of sanctions regimes, non-compliance by some neighbouring countries in the implementation of sanctions imposed by the PSC, and lack of enforcement mechanisms. In response to these challenges, recent years have seen renewed efforts to reactivate and operationalise the PSC SCS. For instance, PSC’s 1061st session, the ACCRA Declaration on UCG in March 2022, and the 16th extraordinary session of the AU Assembly on terrorism and UCG, held in May 2022, called for the operationalisation of the Sub-Committee on sanctions. Particularly significant was PSC’s 1100th session, which directed the Committee of Experts (CoE) to develop the Terms of Reference (ToR) for the SCS.
Against the background of the repeated calls for the operationalisation of the SCS, the AU Commission organised training to enhance the capacity of the PSC CoE on sanctions in Accra in September 2022, which enabled the development of ToRs for the PSC SCS while outlining modalities for operationalising the Sub-Committee. The ToRs were further developed during the retreat of the CoE in Zanzibar held in May 2023 and were considered by the PSC during its 15th retreat on working methods in Tunis, Tunisia, in November 2023.
The SCS, comprising the fifteen expert-level members of the PSC, is envisaged to serve as a technical Sub-Committee to assist the PSC on matters relating to sanctions within the framework of Articles 7(g) and 8(5) of the PSC Protocol. According to the ToRs, the chairperson of the Sub-Committee will align with the monthly rotational chairship of the PSC and the PSC Troika to ensure continuity. While the ToRs do not specify the exact frequency of meetings, the Sub-Committee agreed during its inaugural meeting in June to convene at least once a month and additionally as needed, as determined by the PSC. The ToRs also stipulate that the Sub-Committee will provide the PSC with at least quarterly reports on its activities and the implementation of specific sanctions measures.
During tomorrow’s session, Michael Wamai is expected to brief the PSC on the key outcomes of the inaugural meeting. As noted in our policy brief, one of the critical contributions of the Sub-Committee lies in restoring some level of the lost credibility of AU’s anti-coup norm faced, due to PSC’s failure to apply the norm consistently as highlighted by the case of Chad, by ensuring consistent application by the PSC.
In this regard, a key outcome of the inaugural meeting was its emphasis on the imperative of uniformly applying AU normative instruments and measures against Member States that experience UCG, avoiding selective or case-by-case approaches. This is particularly important given the setback the PSC faced after its handling of the military takeover in Chad in April 2021, in which the Council not only failed to label the military’s seizure of power as UCG but also fell short of imposing sanctions as per its instruments and well-established practice. It was also unable to enforce its decision barring the leader of the Transitional Military Council not to take part in the 6 May 2024 Presidential elections, setting a dangerous precedent for similar situations in Mali, Burkina Faso, Gabon, Guinea, Niger, and Sudan.
Furthermore, given the lack of clarity surrounding the processes and criteria for lifting sanctions—and the potential for this ambiguity to cause policy divergence with RECs/RMS, as evidenced in the cases of Sudan and Gabon with IGAD and ECCAS, respectively calling for lifting of suspension before conditions were met—the inaugural meeting underscored the need to develop robust sanctions implementation, monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, as well as a universally applicable procedure for imposing and lifting sanctions.
Considering the uncertainties surrounding the return to constitutional order in many African countries undergoing political transitions, the inaugural meeting also emphasised the need for the Sub-Committee to devise practical measures to address situations of prolonged or stalled transitions. It also stressed the importance of continuing the practice of holding informal consultations with these countries, providing a platform to update progress toward restoring constitutional order.
Another key outcome of the inaugural meeting, likely to be highlighted during tomorrow’s session, is the Sub-Committee’s request for the AU Commission to conduct a comprehensive study on the effectiveness of sanctions as a deterrent against UCG. A follow-up on this remains crucial, given that the efficacy of AU actions against coups depends on a clear appreciation of the sources of influence and leverage of the AU. The meeting also stressed the importance of assessing the impact of sanctions on the broader public in Member States experiencing UCG and submitting the findings to the PSC.
Amani Africa’s policy brief further notes that the ‘effective functioning of the Sub-Committee also depends on the extent to which its works draws on and is informed by solid independent technical analysis and advise.’ In this context, the Sub-Committee, during its inaugural meeting, underlined the need for regular capacity-building training for its Members, and the importance of collaborating with entities such as CISSA, AFRIPOL and INTERPOL. Reactivating other PSC Sub-Committees with a complimentary mandate was also deemed essential for fulfilling its functions effectively. However, as the policy brief argues, it is imperative to accompany the Sub-Committee with an independent expert body on AU Response to UCGs for the provision of objective and in-depth technical advisory and support on the basis of independent assessment and analysis that helps the Sub-Committee to navigate the complex political dynamics relating to situations of UCG.
The SCS is now operational, with its first task—assigned during the PSC Summit on 21 June 2024—to identify external actors supporting Sudan’s warring parties and propose containment strategies within three months. However, the Sub-Committee’s success in fulfilling its mandate will largely depend on its technical capacity and the degree of political support it receives from the AU.
The session’s outcome remains uncertain, but it seems the Sub-Committee aims to have the report of its inaugural meeting adopted through a communiqué. The PSC is expected to welcome the launch of the Sub-Committee on Sanctions as a significant step in strengthening its institutional framework to address unconstitutional changes of government in the continent. In adopting the inaugural meeting report, the PSC is expected to highlight key outcomes, including a request for the AU Commission to conduct a comprehensive study on the effectiveness of the AU’s sanctions regime, the development of robust mechanisms for implementing, monitoring, and evaluating sanctions, and the establishment of a universally applicable procedure for imposing and lifting sanctions. The PSC may stress the importance of equipping the Sub-Committee with the necessary technical and financial resources to effectively fulfill its mandate, while also reminding the Sub-Committee to submit at least quarterly reports on its activities, in accordance with its Terms of Reference.