The new AU Somalia mission (AUSSOM) is ATMIS by another name but with more problems
Date | 5 February 2025
A month after the ‘new’ African Union (AU) Mission to Somalia, the AU Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) became de jure operational effective 1 January 2025, following the 27 December 2024 adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2767, a number of issues critical to the mission remain unresolved.
Despite being declared de jure operational, for all practical purposes AUSSOM is actually AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) by other name. What took place on 1 January is nothing more than change of name. AUSSOM inherited all the problems of ATMIS. Importantly, it also faces more dire challenges.
ATMIS came into being and lived through major financial woes. As the PSC’s report to the February 2024 AU summit noted, the financial shortfall facing ATMIS, including as a result of the extension of the drawdown of troops, was estimated to be ‘over $100 million by the time the ATMIS forces exit on 31 December 2024.’ AUSSOM comes into a de jure operation with a major financial shortfall. The financing of the mission remains unsettled, and it is far from clear if it would find a satisfactory resolution unless the UN Security Council decides to use AUSSOM as a test case for implementing Resolution 2719.
As with ATMIS, the exit strategy for the post-ATMIS mission is predicated on
- the achievement by Somalia Security Forces (SSF) of a level of capability good enough for taking over security responsibility from the AU mission,
- the erosion of Al Shabaab’s capacity to a point where it no longer poses serious threats, and
- most notably, the consolidation of national political cohesion and settlement and the expansion of state authority through enhanced legitimate local governance structures that deliver public services.
All of these considerations depend on the capacity of first and foremost the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and generally the wider Somalia political and social forces to shoulder effectively their part of the responsibility much better than they have done in recent years.
In terms of force generation and building effective capabilities of the SSF, progress remains slow. It is this lack of progress that led the FGS to requesting severally the postponement of the exit of designated size of ATMIS troops at various phases of the mission’s drawdown.
Politically, the state of relations between FGS and Federal Member States continues to face serious strains. Since January 2023, Puntland declared that it would act independently of Mogadishu. Jubaland also severed ties with Mogadishu following mounting tensions with the federal government. The situation subsequently led to an armed confrontation between the federal government forces and the Jubaland regional forces in Ras Kamboni, the southernmost tip of Somalia in lower Juba bordering Kenya. In other words, the lack of political consensus and cohesion remains the major missing link for meeting the benchmarks set for AUSSOM, as was the case for ATMIS. The initial joint AU-UN strategic assessment report on post-ATMIS security arrangements – (prepared and submitted in May 2024 but could not be considered by the PSC due to objection by the Somalia Government due to the politically unpalatable candidness of the technical assessment about the security situation) – thus pointed out that ‘[unless there is political consensus, on the implementation of major decisions agreed at the national level, capacity generation and integration will not be achieved in the short, medium and long term after 2024.’ (own emphasis)
The phased implementation of AUSSOM was initially envisaged to have a pre-mission/transitional phase, involving the completion of ATMIS phases and the parallel preparation of the reorganisation of the areas of operations and troop deployments of AUSSOM. As such, this transitional phase was meant to run for the duration of the last two phases of ATMIS, namely Phase III and Phase IV, concluding on 31 December 2024.
However, as with ATMIS, the implementation of the pre-mission phase of AUSSOM did not proceed as planned. The lack of progress in some of the activities concerning the pre-mission phase meant that AUSSOM was declared operational on 1 January merely by a force of legal determination, with the pre-mission phase becoming phase I of the ‘new’ mission as depicted above.
As if all of these issues are not enough, AUSSOM faces new challenges, additional to those ATMIS encountered. First, if the lack of consensus between Somalia and Burundi persists and Burundi over troop allocation persists and Burundi leaves, AUSSOM will lose the operational knowledge and experience that Burundi built (with heavy price) owing to its participation in the AU mission in Somalia since 2007. This departure of experience may mean increased vulnerability of the mission.
Second, AUSSOM got entangled in a geopolitical tussle that arose from the tension that erupted between Somalia and Ethiopia over the Memorandum of Understanding the latter signed with Somaliland for securing access to the sea. The ensuing disagreement over the continuation of Ethiopia as a troop contributing country meant that AUSSOM was declared operational without settling the question of troop contributors. It was also in this context that Egypt emerged into the scene proposed to be the new troop contributor to AUSSOM, raising fears of this injecting the tension over the Nile into the AUSSOM ecosystem.
Third, uncertainty over the size and location of pending troop contribution means that there is also lack of clarity on operational set up and mission design and command and control of AUSSOM. As a result and as Paul Williams explained, the kind of mission capabilities that AUSSOM requires and the kind of logistics support to be availed for the mission from the UN also remains uncertain.
Fourth, on the composition and contribution of troops for AMISOM/ATMIS, the AU, as the mandating authority responsible for the mission, was in the lead in the negotiations over troop contribution and mission design. This has helped to minimise the exposure of the mission to Somalia’s internal and external political contestations. For AUSSOM, AU took a backseat. In its place, the host country, Somalia, took the lead in negotiating ‘bilaterally’ contribution of troops to AUSSOM. The result is that the process of operationalisation of AUSSOM has become much more politicised than AMISOM/ATMIS, thereby creating the risk of reduction of the effectiveness of AUSSOM. During its 1238th session, the PSC directed ‘Chairperson of the African Union Commission to liaise with the Federal Government of Somalia, as the host country, on the composition of the Mission.’ It was only on 23 January that the AU Commission convened the meeting of states that expressed interest to contribute troops to AUSSOM, namely Burundi, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda.
It remains unclear whether the outcome of this meeting would change what transpired thus far in terms of the allocation by Somalia of troops for troop contributors, including, most notably, the participation of Burundi.
The combination of the old and relatively new challenges means that AUSSOM emerges not only into a more difficult beginning but also faces a more uncertain prospect than ATMIS. It is in the interest of international peace and security and Somalia that the AU is allowed to assume its full responsibility and lead on the negotiations for resolving the outstanding issues concerning AUSSOM. Leaving such a critical process to the dictates of the host country, which is entangled in competing interests from various actors, jeopardises the mission’s effectiveness while risking reversal of hard-won gains.
