Monthly Digest on the AUPSC - August 2021
Amani Africa
Date | August 2021
During August, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) convened a total of eight substantive sessions under the chairship of Cameroon. Out of these, one was convened at ministerial level while the remaining were held at ambassadorial level. Of the total substantive sessions convened during the month, two addressed country specific situations whereas the remaining six focused on thematic issues.
Consideration of the Report on the Independent Assessment on the future of AMISOM
Amani Africa
Date | 30 July, 2021
Tomorrow (30 July) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1015th session to consider the report on the Independent Assessment Team (IA) on the AU’s engagement in and with Somalia post-2021. This session is expected to determine PSC’s policy decision on the form that the presence of AU Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) will take post-2021.
The session will have two segments. During the first and semi open segment, it is envisaged that following the opening remark of the Chairperson of the PSC, Victor Adekele, Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Somalia, Mohamed Abdirizak, the Chairperson of the Inter- Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the East African Standby Force (EASF), IGAD Secretariat, the Special Representative of the Secretary General to the AU and Head of the United Nations Office to the AU (UNOAU), Hanna Tetteh and Head of the European Union (EU) Delegation to the AU, Birgitte Markussen will make statements reflecting their respective policy perspectives on the agenda of the session against the background of the engagement of each in Somalia and with AMISOM. During the closed segment, the Chairperson of the Committee of Experts of the PSC and the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, Bankole Adeoye, will make presentation while the Special Representative of the AU Commission Chairperson, Francisco Madeira, will present a briefing on the situation in Somalia.
The working documents that the PSC is expected to use for this session include the report of the independent assessment team and the report of the two meetings of the PSC Committee of Experts. Other documents that the PSC Committee of Experts proposed to serve as further source of reference are the outcome documents of the recently concluded meetings of the Specialized Technical Committee on Defence, Safety and Security (STCDSS) and the meeting of the Military Operations Coordination Committee (MOCC) of the Troop and Police Contributing Countries (T/PCCs) of AMISOM.
It is to be recalled that the PSC took a decision for undertaking its own independent assessment after the UN undertook its own assessment upon the failure of the AU and the UN to conduct joint assessment. UNSC decided in March this year to renew the mandate of AMISOM until December 2021 through the adoption of resolution 2568 (2021). African members of the Security Council voiced concern over the draft process and advanced the common African position based on the PSC communique of February 2021 emphasizing the need to listen to the host country, the AU and troop contributing countries. Indeed, the AU had appealed to the UN Security Council ‘to avail the space necessary for the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), in close collaboration with the AU, to lead the discussions concerning the international engagement with Somalia post-2021, in line with the Somali Transition Plan, after undertaking its internal process and assessment’. That is why it requested the UN Security Council to refrain from pronouncing prematurely on any possible arrangements beyond 2021, including through the use of non-agreed concepts and terminologies that are beyond the existing applicable arrangements.
While the AU agreed with the ten months extension of AMISOM’s mandate, it expressed disappointment that its views were not taken into account in the UN Independent Assessment, particularly the request for joint leadership and expanded scope in undertaking the assessment. However, the UN went ahead and conducted the independent assessment on its own and recommended a reconfiguration of AMISOM post-2021.
Therefore, the AU did its own independent assessment based on the direction given by the PSC. The independent assessment team, set up pursuant to the PSC communique of 9 February 2021, was led by Major General Xolani Mankayi from South Africa. In undertaking the assessment and preparing its report, the IA interacted with troop and police contributing countries, various stakeholders in the AMISOM hosting country, concerned representatives of international organizations including the AU and the UN as well as experts on AMISOM.
During tomorrow’s session, the PSC will be briefed on the independent assessment team’s report. The issues that the team canvased to which PSC’s attention will be drawn include the political situation in Somalia, the ongoing stabilization and peacebuilding process, the security environment and the threat posed by Al-Shabaab as well as the broader regional geo-political dynamics. Most importantly, PSC will examine the four options identified in the report.
The options the independent assessment team proposed are the establishment of an AU-UN Multidimensional Stabilization Mission in Somalia (UNMIS); an AU Multidimensional Stabilization Support to Somalia (reconfigured AMISOM); the deployment of the East African Standby Force (EASF); and finally, an AMISOM Exit and assumption by the Somali Security Forces (SSF) of security responsibilities under the Somali Transition Plan post-2021. In its report, the team recommended the establishment of an AU-UN Multidimensional Stabilisation Support to Somalia as the most appropriate option for the future of AMISOM post- 2021.
The first option is similar to the UN-AU Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID). The assessment team made this recommendation based on the consideration that it will ensure sustainable and predictable financing from UN assessed contribution and address the logistical challenges facing AMISOM. This has also been the view of troop contributing countries of AMISOM. However, UNAMID was deployed under unique circumstances and the UNSC may not necessarily agree to replicate such a hybrid mission. It is also worth recalling that the UN Assessment Team opted against this option on three grounds: that the UN doctrine and guidance clearly advise against using UN peacekeeping operations for counter terrorism and enforcement actions; that this option requires the allocation of significant additional resources than are currently committed for international security assistance in Somalia; and that this complex transition to a hybrid mission would distract international attention from focusing on investing in Somali-led security and would risk delaying transferring security responsibility to Somalia Security Forces (SSF). Indications are that this is not the option that the UNSC is inclined to support.
The second option, an AU Multidimensional Stabilisation Support to Somalia (or reconfigured AMISOM) is also what the UN independent assessment recommended. This is the second preferred option that may receive AU’s support if the first option fails to work out. This option would entail change in the mandate, force size and composition of AMISOM. It would also require logistical and financial support. As such, this would entail agreement between the AU and the host state on AMISOM’s roles and parameters for transfer of security responsibilities to SSF, the adoption of new concept of operations and consultations with the UN and the EU.
The AU seems to be interested in demonstrating its commitment to the operationalization of the African Standby Force (ASF) and the third option could be looked at from that perspective. It envisages that the EASF could be deployed in Somalia in the context of a reconfigured AMISOM. This would entail a complete transition rarely tried in earlier experiences and could also limit the broad continental scale contribution to and make up of AMISOM.
The fourth and final option for an AMISOM Exit and assumption by the SSF of security responsibilities under the Somali Transition Plan post-2021 may not appear to be feasible given the actual situation on the ground and the slow pace of STP implementation. But this appears to be the option supported by the FGS.
In tomorrow’s session, the Council is likely to pay attention to the first two options (the hybrid arrangement and reconfigured AMISOM). On this, the PSC is expected to rely on the presentation of the outcome of the discussions on the IA report during the two meetings that the PSC Committee of Experts and the Military Staff Committee held on 7 & 23 July. The Chairperson of the Committee of Experts is expected to highlight the conclusions of the meetings underscoring the need for maintaining the role of the AU, preserving the legacy of AMISOM, ensuring predictable and sustainable financing, addressing the logistical as well as command and control challenges along with taking on board the views of the Somalia government.
One of the difficult issues for tomorrow’s deliberation is Somalia’s hostile position towards the independent assessment report. It is reported that the government rejected ‘the report’s finding and recommendations.’ This is indicative of the need for the AU and Somalia to agree on a realistic option that avoids any risk of reversals of the gains achieved with the support of AMISOM and guarantees smooth and successful transfer of responsibilities to SSF.
Apart from the IA report, the PSC is also expected to discuss the current state of the situation in Somalia and AMISOM, among others based on Madeira’s briefing. The last time the AUPSC met to discuss the situation in Somalia was in April 2021 against the backdrop of the political crisis in the country following the unilateral decision of the lower house of parliament extending the term of the government for two years. This led the PSC to request that Somalia actors abide by the 17 September 2020 agreement on the holding of elections and the Chairperson of the AU Commission to appoint a Special Envoy to work with the Somali stakeholders with a view to helping resolve the political impasse. Although Former President John Mahama of Ghana was appointed as Special Envoy, in unprecedented move, the FGS rejected the appointment.
Meanwhile, after months of political stalemate, the Somali political stakeholders were able to renew their commitment to the implementation of the 17 September 2020 agreement on the conduct of elections and resolve outstanding issues after having undertaken series of consultations under the leadership of Prime Minister, Mohamed Hussein Roble. They also agreed on a new electoral calendar to hold indirect parliamentary and presidential polls. Accordingly, elections were set to start on 25 July in the various regions for the election of members of the upper house but they had to be postponed, reportedly because of technical and logistical delays. It is in this context that the PSC will be meeting tomorrow. The PSC will also review the security situation including the continuing threat that Al-Shabaab poses as demonstrated by the attacks it continues to orchestrate.
The expected outcome of the session is a communique. The PSC may commend the work done by the IA team for the work done. Based on exchange views focusing on Option 1 (AU-UN joint mission) and Option 2 (reconfigured AMISOM), it is possible that the PSC may welcome the recommendation for the establishment of an AU-UN Multidimensional Stabilisation Support to Somalia as the most appropriate option. The PSC is expected to indicate next steps including reaching at common understanding with the Somalia government, the plan for engagement by the AU Commission and African members of the UNSC with members of the UNSC and the commencement of planning to implement the option finally agreed on. The PSC is expected to welcome the agreement of Somalia parties for holding the elections in accordance with the 17 September 2020 agreement and urge them to ensure the successful and peaceful conduct of the elections. It may express concern about the continuing threat that Al-Shabaab poses and commend AMISOM for its roles and the UN and the EU for their partnership.
Briefing on Early Warning and Continental Security Outlook
Amani Africa
Date | 26 July, 2021
Tomorrow (26 July) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1013th session to receive briefing on early warning and continental security outlook.
The session starts with the opening remarks of the Chairperson of the PSC for July, Victor Adekunle Adeleke. This is followed by a briefing that AU Commissioner for Political Affairs and Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye presents to the Council on the agenda of the session.
Since the adoption of its decision at its 360th meeting held in March 2013 to review (at least biannually) the state of peace and security on the continent, using horizon scanning briefing from the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the Council has dedicated some sessions on this theme, with the most recent being the 901st meeting held in December 2019. The discussion in tomorrow’s session is likely to proceed in two segments.
The first segment of the discussion is expected to focus on the continental early warning system with particular emphasis on the role of the Committee of Intelligence and Security Service of Africa (CISSA) within the context of enhancing the conflict prevention capacity of the AU Commission and the PSC. It is to be recalled that the AU Assembly Decision 62 of June 2005 endorsed the establishment of CISSA and directed that the Committee collaborate with AU and all its organs notably the Commission and the PSC.
The major value of CISSA in early warning and understanding the security outlook of the continent is the fact that it brings intelligence-based data with the potential of bolstering the information and analysis from the CEWS. However, the extent to which this potential of CISSA will enhance better understanding of threats and early response depends on intelligence sharing among CISSA members and availability of reliable way of relaying intelligence-based data for AU decision-making on peace and security. While it may not be feasible to rely on intelligence for country specific situations relating to governance related security challenges, CISSA’s intelligence based assessment can be particularly useful with respect to transnational threats involving terrorism and organized crimes.
Apart from the role of CISSA, a broader discussion is expected on the role of the CEWS in providing systematic monitoring and analysis of peace and security threats in the continent. The tracking and analysis of relevant governance and peace and security trends by CEWS is used to regularly provide tailor made updates to concerned AU Commission structures. This helps to inform whether, how and what kind of early warning the AU Commission initiates.
Despite progress made in the institutional operationalisation of the CEWS, there remain various challenges limiting its effectiveness. At the operational and institutional level, one such challenge is the disconnect between early warning and early response. At the root of the creation of the early warning system is to enable decision-makers take early measures against a looming crisis before it evolves into a full-blown conflict. Practice over the years reveals the serous limitation in translating early warning information and policy recommendations into effective early action by AU. Two main challenges can be raised in this regard.
One of the main challenges comes from member states themselves. As member states often invoke their sovereignty or deny brewing crisis, the political space is shrinking for the Council to engage at the early stage of the crisis. During its 669th meeting held on 21 March 2017, the Council expressed its ‘concern over the continued cases of denials to objective/credible early warning signals of looming crisis, thereby undermining the conflict prevention capacity of the Council’. If this challenge is left unattended, not only it compromises the mandate of the Council but also puts its credibility on the line.
The second challenge is lack of effective flow of information between the early warning mechanism and the PSC. CEWS produces variety of outputs to facilitate anticipation and prevention of conflicts and enable decision makers to develop appropriate strategies to prevent or contain conflicts. Yet, most of the outputs including the early warning report rarely reaches members of PSC. As a recent PSC document notes the Council ‘has not always worked closely with PAPS department in getting up-to-date early warning data’. In light of this challenge, the AU master roadmap calls for regular early warning briefings ‘strictly to the PSC members’ as one modality to establish a clear channel of communication on early warning reports to the PSC. In this context, building both formal and informal communication channel between CEWS and the Council that would facilitate a direct and regular engagement remains extremely important. In addition, as emphasized by the Conclusions of the Cairo Retreat of the PSC, the call for regular meetings/briefings between the PSC and the Chairperson of the Commission and the Commissioner for PAPS deserves attention. Moreover, institutionalizing the breakfast briefings and luncheons for members of the Council could be another avenue to enhance rapport and close working relationship between the Commission and the Council, which is key for facilitating conflict prevention measures.
There are also other sources of early warning and preventive action whose role stands to enhance effective early warning and response. Apart from the AU Commission Chairperson, those that the PSC Protocol contemplates to play role in this respect include the RECs/RMs, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), the Panel of the Wise and civil society organizations. It is imperative to strengthen cooperation and information sharing not only with these actors specified in the PSC Protocol but also with the CISSA and the African Peer Review Mechanism, whose roles in this regard the PSC has recognized over the years.
The other issue of interest to the Council is the implementation of the Continental Structural Conflict Prevention Framework (CSCPF) and its tools of the Country Structural Vulnerability and Resilience Assessment (CSVRA) and Country Structural Vulnerability Mitigation Strategies (CSVMS). Endorsed by the Council in 2015, the framework and its tools aim to strengthen the capacity of member states to identify and address structural vulnerabilities at an early stage and design mitigation measures. As a voluntary mechanism, it is critical that political buy-in of member states is enhanced so that more member states undertake the assessment. In this respect, the close working relationship between the CEWS and the APRM, which is assigned in facilitating conflict early warning, would be useful.
The second segment of tomorrow’s PSC session involves the reactivation of the horizon scanning briefing that presents updates on the continental security outlook. The idea behind the horizon-scanning briefing is to bridge the gap between early warning and early response by providing the Council with required periodic information and analysis for preventive measures. The horizon scanning briefing can present the overall trends in threats to peace and security on the continent and specific country situations exhibiting risks of eruption into major conflicts. The overall trends worth paying attention to include, among others, the spread of terrorism and violent extremism, deterioration in democratic governance involving election violence and unconstitutional changes of government, rising incidence of protests and riots and intercommunal violence particularly involving herders and farmers. In terms of effective use of the horizon scanning briefing, it is critical that there is clarity on how it highlights specific country situations requiring conflict prevention intervention. Previous experiences of the Council indicate that the briefing focuses on thematic issues such as emerging security threats and root causes of conflicts, but rarely discusses emerging country specific situations.
Given persisting political sensitivity and reluctance for country specific focus, it will be of interest to members of the PSC to achieve common understanding on the methodology and criteria to be used, the threshold to be met and the imperative for consistency. As custodian of the AU norms including the PSC Protocol with a responsibility for ensuring their implementation, it is also critical that the AU Commission guides PSC members in the Council’s consideration of country specific situations based on objective and verifiable analysis.
The expected outcome of the session is a communique. The Council is expected to commend the Commission for the positive steps taken towards strengthening the continental early warning system and its collaboration with RECs/RMs as well as the role of CISSA. In connection with RECs/RMs, the Council may further follow up on the AU Assembly decision during its 33rd Ordinary Session held in February 2020, which requested the PSC to take appropriate action and put in place a ‘format of interaction’ to address early warning and early response issues. On CISSA, the Council is likely to stress the importance of enhancing coordination and collaboration between CISSA and the Council, as well as between and among the national intelligence services of member states, with the view to facilitate well informed and intelligence-driven early action by the Council. In relation to early warning and early response in general, the Council may reiterate its call for the implementation of its previous decisions in bridging the huge gap between early warning and early response including through the conduct of early warning and horizon-scanning briefing at least once every six months. In addition, the Council may request the Commission to institutionalise and/or strengthen communication channels between the Commission and the Council through in particular sharing of early warning reports, Breakfast and Luncheons briefings, and regularizing the meeting between the Chairperson of the Commission, Commissioner for PAPS, and the PSC in line with article 10 of the PSC protocol. On denialism and political will of member states, the Council is likely to echo its 901st meeting where it encouraged member states to ‘guard against denialism to credible early warning signs of looming crisis’ and cooperate with the PSC and RECs/RMs in their endeavor to discharge their mandate of conflict prevention and peace making. Apart from this, the Council is also likely to call up on the Commission to operationalize the different decisions including those relating to the role of the ACHPR and the APRM as highlighted in the communiques of the 866th and 953rd sessions of the PSC. Following up on the Conclusions of the Cairo retreat, the Council may further request the Commission to ‘elaborate the mechanism and indicators for consideration by the PSC’ within the context of operationalization of the CEWS. The Council may encourage the engagement of CSOs on the basis of Article 20 of the PSC protocol and the Maseru Retreat of the PSC. The Council is likely to encourage member states to make use of the available tools of the CEWS most particularly the CSVRA and CSVMS and close coordination between CEWS and APRM in implementing CSVRA.
The state of Maritime Security in Africa
Amani Africa
Date | 23 July, 2021
Tomorrow (23 July) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is set to convene its 1012th session on the state of maritime security in Africa.
Following the opening remarks of the Chairperson of the PSC, Victor Adenkunle Adeleke, the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, is expected to make a statement.
Given the increasing maritime insecurity in the continent, tomorrow’s session presents the Council the opportunity to assess the overall maritime security situation of the continent with particular focus on the Gulf Guinea, receive update on the status in the implementation of regional and continental maritime security frameworks, as well as explore ways and means to effectively respond to maritime insecurity in the continent.
As recent data demonstrates, incidents of piracy and kidnapping for ransom of seafarers continue to be major challenges along the Gulf of Guinea. According to reports of the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), the region experienced 50% increase between 2018 and 2019, and 10% increase between 2019 and 2020 in incidents of kidnapping for ransom. In 2020 alone, there were 84 attacks on ships and 135 kidnappings of seafarers. In the first three months of 2021, the region accounted for 43% of all reported piracy incidents while over 14 crew members were abducted in three incidents of kidnappings recorded within the year so far. Currently, the region is said to account for just over 95% of all kidnappings for ransom at sea. In addition to piracy and kidnapping for ransom, the region is also highly prone to other maritime crimes including armed robbery, transnational organised crime, illegal fishing, and illegal trafficking and smuggling of goods.
In addition to the increase in maritime crimes, studies also indicate the increasingly violent nature of such incidents. For instance, the use of guns was reported in 80% of kidnappings for ransom which took place during 2020. This is a sharp shift from the nature of piracy experienced in the region a few years back, which was limited to occurrences of cargo theft. Another growing trend in the nature of maritime crimes in the Gulf of Guinea is the broadening and extension of risk zones. That is, while most cases of piracy and kidnappings initially used to take place within the territorial waters of coastal States, the more recent incidents tend to take place further from shores and within the high seas – at 200 nautical miles from the coastline according to data recorded by the IMB. These trends in turn underscore the importance of strengthening international and regional efforts and collaborations aimed at addressing the risks to maritime security in the region.
Because most of the security challenges in the Gulf of Guinea previously took place under 200 nautical miles from coastline, States in the region resisted the idea of an international presence to respond to maritime security threats which were usually categorised as armed robberies as opposed to piracy. With the distance from shorelines highly increasing and the nature of crimes also getting more volatile, the incidents in the Gulf of Guinea are nowadays prompting comparisons with piracy in the horn region, along the coastline of Somalia. Although shipping companies operating in the region are growingly showing support for international responses, it is more likely that Gulf of Guinea States would prefer continued support from the international community to boost their capacity in averting threats to maritime security instead of handing over the responsibility to outside entities.
While reflecting on possibilities of new international responses is important, it is also essential to emphasise the importance of effective implementation of existing regional frameworks such as the Yaoundé Code of Conduct and the African Charter on Maritime Security, Safety and Development in Africa (Lomé Charter) in order to effectively address maritime security challenges in the region. At its 858th session dedicated to the same theme, the PSC focused on the finalisation, signature and ratification of the draft Annexes to the Lomé Charter. The upcoming session presents Council the opportunity to follow up on the status of the draft Annexes which are basically aimed at incorporating within the Charter, all relevant AU structures, particularly those relating to economic mandate and were not involved in the development of the Charter. The pilot case of the European Union (EU)’s Coordinated Maritime Presences (CMP) concept, launched at the meeting of the Council of the EU on 25 January 2021 is also one of the most recent efforts representing international collaboration to address maritime security challenges in the Gulf of Guinea. The CMP establishes the Gulf of Guinea as a Maritime Area of Interest (MAI) and aims to support coastal States in addressing challenges which undermine maritime security and good governance in the region.
At the national level, it is also crucial to properly identify and take timely measures against the root-causes of piracy and other maritime crimes including poverty, high rate of youth unemployment, poor governance, lack of education, and weak law enforcement. In addition to locally addressing the underlying causes of maritime crimes, States in the region also need to harmonise their domestic laws with regional and international standards. In this regard, Nigeria’s anti-piracy laws (such as the Suppression of Piracy and other Maritime Offences Act of 2019 which prescribes stringent punishments against crimes committed in the maritime domain) and the initiatives such as the Deep Blue Project (launched in 2019 with the central goal of addressing insecurity and criminality in Nigeria’s territorial waters) could serve as lessons for more mobilisation of similar enterprises across the region.
It is also important to pay due regard to the economic impact of maritime insecurity and the constraints it imposes to the flow of trade and investment. As the Gulf of Guinea continues to growingly be regarded as one of the most dangerous shipping routes and insecure maritime environments in the world, the risk to economic development in the region, as well as the continent at large, also increases. Particularly with 90% of trade to west Africa coming by sea, the region’s economy is largely affected by concerns of maritime security. Not only is there a likelihood for the region’s reputation as a dangerous route to ward off potential traders, the increasing level of insecurity also inevitably results in the rise of business costs and increase in price of goods and services. While this has the potential to eventually devastate the economy of coastal States in the long-run, it also directly affects the livelihood of populations in the region. Hence, it is essential for response mechanisms crafted under any national, regional or international initiatives to take account of the economic aspect of maritime insecurity in the region.
The outcome of tomorrow’s session is expected to be a communiqué. In addition to reflecting on the security concerns along the Gulf of Guinea, Council may remark on the importance of strengthening Africa’s continental capacity to respond to security threats in the maritime domain, including through taking solid steps towards the implementation of the 2050 African Integrated Maritime Strategy. Council may also call on member States in the Gulf of Guinea to fortify their efforts through, among others, information sharing; interdicting suspicious ships; and apprehending and prosecuting suspected criminals in line with the Yaoundé Code of Conduct. It may also encourage littoral States to allocate sufficient funds for building up local and regional response mechanisms against maritime security threats. Having regard to the growing trend in further offshore incidents of maritime crimes in the Gulf of Guinea, Council may also stress the need for a more integrated regional approach towards addressing the challenges. Council may also note the low level of ratification of the Lomé Charter and urge member States that have not yet done so, to sign and ratify it (as of 2020, only two of the 35 AU member States that have signed the Charter have ratified it). The AU Commission may also be requested to take the necessary steps towards the finalisation of the draft annexes to the Lomé Charter.
Session on the Common African Position on the Financing of AU led Peace Support Operations through UN Assessed Contributions
Amani Africa
Date | 21 July, 2021
Tomorrow (21 July) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to hold a session on the common African Position on the Financing of AU led peace support operations through UN assessed contributions. The Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye is expected to brief the council on the progress and state of development of the common position.
The AU Assembly in its decision of its 14th extraordinary summit requested the PSC to articulate a common African position on financing peace support operations in Africa, to guide the African Members of the UN Security Council (A3) in championing and mobilizing support within the UNSC for adoption of a resolution that will enable Africa to access UN assessed contribution for peace support operations in the Continent.
It is also to be recalled that the PSC at its 881st session held in September 2019 took a view that ‘a better articulated and African owned common position’ before a draft resolution on financing of AU peace operations through UN assessed contributions is tabled for consideration by the UN Security Council (UNSC). This decision was taken against the background of issues that emerged as the A3 members of the UNSC were seeking during 2018 and 2019 to secure a UNSC resolution authorizing in principle under agreed upon conditions the use of UN assessed contributions for AU led UNSC authorized peace support operations on a case-by-case basis.
The A3 spearheaded by Ethiopia initiated a draft resolution on financing to be adopted in December 2018 under the Cote d’Ivoire Presidency of the Security Council. However, the US threatened to Veto the resolution. Following the introduction of a so- called compromise text proposed by France to accommodate the US, the vote on the A3 draft resolution was postponed (Please refer to the Amani insight on this issue). South Africa, who initially brought the issue of financing to the Security Council in its previous membership, made the issue one of the priorities of its tenure during 2019-2020. After holding consultations on the matter including a visit by the Permanent Representatives of the A3 to Washington, D.C. to engage with the United States, including the Congress, White House and the Department of State, South Africa introduced a new and slightly updated text from the initial A3 draft and the so-called compromise draft.
When the PSC finally reviewed the matter, it felt that the latest updated draft did not adequately reflect AU interests. The PSC opted for deferring the consideration of the draft text by the UNSC pending the holding of adequate consultation at the level of the AU leading towards a common position. This aims at providing greater clarity on various issues, including on the implementation of the 75/25 formula and on the operationalization of the AU Peace Fund and its role for burden sharing. The common African position elaborated by the Commission is expected to explain some of these issues in order to ensure greater understanding and consensus within the AU and help the discussion in the UNSC move forward.
During tomorrow’s session Commissioner for PAPS, Adeoye, who revived the process for the adoption of the common position, is expected to provide update to the PSC on steps taken towards the elaboration of the common position and the orientation of the common position that will be the basis for resuscitating the discussion on A3 sponsored resolution on financing AU peace operation through UN assessed contributions. The common position is expected to take stock of and build on the various efforts undertaken both at the level of the UN and the AU.
It is worth noting that the issue of predictable and reliable financing has been one of the longstanding subjects in the AU-UN relationships on peace and security in Africa. In 2008, the UN Panel led by former Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi on the subject recommended in its report the use of United Nations-assessed funding to support United Nations- authorized African Union peacekeeping operations for a period of no longer than six months. This was further reinforced by the UN’s 2015 High Level International Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) Report, which recommended the use of United Nations-assessed contributions on a case-by-case basis to support Security Council-authorized African Union peace support operations including the costs associated with deployed uniformed personnel to complement funding from the AU and/or African Member States.
On the part of the AU, the Policy Organs had adopted milestone decisions in 2015 and 2016 on financing of the AU and the revitalization of the AU Peace Fund. Accordingly, the A3 were called upon to champion the financing of AU led peace support operations. This paved the way for the adoption of resolution 2320 (2016), facilitated by Senegal, which stressed ‘the need to enhance the predictability, sustainability and flexibility of financing for African Union-led peace support operations authorized by the Security Council.’ The subsequent resolution 2378 (2017), whose adoption was facilitated by Ethiopia, expressed the UNSC’s intention to consider partially funding AU-led peace support operations authorized by the Council through UN-assessed contributions ‘on a case-by-case basis.’
One of the factors for the delay in adopting the common position related to the factors that impeded progress in the UNSC. In 2018, Cote D’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea and Ethiopia proposed a joint draft resolution which tried to secure a clear commitment from the Council to decide in principle to finance AU led peace support operations. The draft text had received wider support within the UNSC and the broader UN membership. However, the US under Trump administration was not willing and ready to accommodate the AU request and, in fact, threatened to exercise its veto power if the African members decide to go ahead and table the draft text for a vote.
With the Biden administration in the US and its renewed multilateral engagement, there appears to be a new window of opportunity to revive the financing issue. Both Chairperson Moussa Faki and UNSG Antonio Guterres are also expected to exert reinvigorated efforts to enhance the AU-UN partnership in their new mandate by, among others, ensuring progress on the financing issue. This will certainly unleash the potential of the partnership across the whole spectrum of peace operations. Furthermore, the EU leadership seems to be much more committed and determined to enhance its partnership with the AU and may likely pull its weight behind the AU if there is readiness to resuscitate the discussion on this issue.
This said, however, it should also be understood that the discussion on this issue would not be easy. COVID-19 has had its own impact on the discussion on peacekeeping. Increasing financial pressures, among other reasons, is forcing the UN to downsize and/or draw down peacekeeping missions in recent years. Some experts are anticipating that the tendency in the future could possibly be to prioritise affordable alternatives, such as observer missions and civilian special political missions.
Even though the Biden administration could be favorably disposed to the discussion on the issue, there is a need for serious discussion to reach a shared understanding on the way forward. This necessitates engaging the Biden administration in earnest, including the state department, National Security Council and the department of defense. It is also important for the AU to engage Congress and canvass the necessary support in the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations building on willingness of some congressmen to support the idea of financing AU led peace support operation as part of enhancing the role of the US.
The development of a common African position is indeed a step in the right direction and it is expected to facilitate a clear decision by AU, which will then pave the way for the A3 to resuscitate the file and try to secure a concrete commitment on the issue from the UNSC. The process will definitely take time and the necessary preparatory work for laying the ground work needs to be developed. The AU Commission and the UN Secretariat need to follow up on the implementation of their Joint Declaration of 6 December 2018, and work towards making tangible progress on some of the agreed issues as they relate to the financing issue, including the full operationalisation of the peace fund, reporting, oversight and accountability.
Most importantly, there is need to learn the right lessons from the experiences of 2018 and 2019. Ensuring greater clarity on the implementation of the AU Peace fund and demonstrating concrete commitment in sharing the burden would be vital. The full operationalization of the African Standby Force would go a long way in demonstrating AU’s commitment to shoulder responsibility on matters of peace and security in Africa. It would be absolutely important that the AU common position is accompanied by a solid roadmap with clear time lines for holding consultations and mobilizing support from all the relevant interlocutors on this file while ensuring close coordination of the AU Commission, the PSC and the A3 throughout the process for having a UNSC resolution that adequately reflects the common position.
While no formal outcome is expected from tomorrow’s meeting, the PSC is expected to provide input both on what is expected to be contained in the common position and the timeline for finalising the drafting for fulfilling the request of the AU Assembly, particularly the decision of its 14th extraordinary session held on 6 December 2020.
Session on the Common African Position on the Financing of AU led Peace Support Operations through UN Assessed Contributions
Amani Africa
Date | 21 July, 2021
Tomorrow (21 July) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to hold a session on the common African Position on the Financing of AU led peace support operations through UN assessed contributions. The Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye is expected to brief the council on the progress and state of development of the common position.
The AU Assembly in its decision of its 14th extraordinary summit requested the PSC to articulate a common African position on financing peace support operations in Africa, to guide the African Members of the UN Security Council (A3) in championing and mobilizing support within the UNSC for adoption of a resolution that will enable Africa to access UN assessed contribution for peace support operations in the Continent.
It is also to be recalled that the PSC at its 881st session held in September 2019 took a view that ‘a better articulated and African owned common position’ before a draft resolution on financing of AU peace operations through UN assessed contributions is tabled for consideration by the UN Security Council (UNSC). This decision was taken against the background of issues that emerged as the A3 members of the UNSC were seeking during 2018 and 2019 to secure a UNSC resolution authorizing in principle under agreed upon conditions the use of UN assessed contributions for AU led UNSC authorized peace support operations on a case-by-case basis.
The A3 spearheaded by Ethiopia initiated a draft resolution on financing to be adopted in December 2018 under the Cote d’Ivoire Presidency of the Security Council. However, the US threatened to Veto the resolution. Following the introduction of a so- called compromise text proposed by France to accommodate the US, the vote on the A3 draft resolution was postponed (Please refer to the Amani insight on this issue). South Africa, who initially brought the issue of financing to the Security Council in its previous membership, made the issue one of the priorities of its tenure during 2019-2020. After holding consultations on the matter including a visit by the Permanent Representatives of the A3 to Washington, D.C. to engage with the United States, including the Congress, White House and the Department of State, South Africa introduced a new and slightly updated text from the initial A3 draft and the so-called compromise draft.
When the PSC finally reviewed the matter, it felt that the latest updated draft did not adequately reflect AU interests. The PSC opted for deferring the consideration of the draft text by the UNSC pending the holding of adequate consultation at the level of the AU leading towards a common position. This aims at providing greater clarity on various issues, including on the implementation of the 75/25 formula and on the operationalization of the AU Peace Fund and its role for burden sharing. The common African position elaborated by the Commission is expected to explain some of these issues in order to ensure greater understanding and consensus within the AU and help the discussion in the UNSC move forward.
During tomorrow’s session Commissioner for PAPS, Adeoye, who revived the process for the adoption of the common position, is expected to provide update to the PSC on steps taken towards the elaboration of the common position and the orientation of the common position that will be the basis for resuscitating the discussion on A3 sponsored resolution on financing AU peace operation through UN assessed contributions. The common position is expected to take stock of and build on the various efforts undertaken both at the level of the UN and the AU.
It is worth noting that the issue of predictable and reliable financing has been one of the longstanding subjects in the AU-UN relationships on peace and security in Africa. In 2008, the UN Panel led by former Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi on the subject recommended in its report the use of United Nations-assessed funding to support United Nations- authorized African Union peacekeeping operations for a period of no longer than six months. This was further reinforced by the UN’s 2015 High Level International Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) Report, which recommended the use of United Nations-assessed contributions on a case-by-case basis to support Security Council-authorized African Union peace support operations including the costs associated with deployed uniformed personnel to complement funding from the AU and/or African Member States.
On the part of the AU, the Policy Organs had adopted milestone decisions in 2015 and 2016 on financing of the AU and the revitalization of the AU Peace Fund. Accordingly, the A3 were called upon to champion the financing of AU led peace support operations. This paved the way for the adoption of resolution 2320 (2016), facilitated by Senegal, which stressed ‘the need to enhance the predictability, sustainability and flexibility of financing for African Union-led peace support operations authorized by the Security Council.’ The subsequent resolution 2378 (2017), whose adoption was facilitated by Ethiopia, expressed the UNSC’s intention to consider partially funding AU-led peace support operations authorized by the Council through UN-assessed contributions ‘on a case-by-case basis.’
One of the factors for the delay in adopting the common position related to the factors that impeded progress in the UNSC. In 2018, Cote D’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea and Ethiopia proposed a joint draft resolution which tried to secure a clear commitment from the Council to decide in principle to finance AU led peace support operations. The draft text had received wider support within the UNSC and the broader UN membership. However, the US under Trump administration was not willing and ready to accommodate the AU request and, in fact, threatened to exercise its veto power if the African members decide to go ahead and table the draft text for a vote.
With the Biden administration in the US and its renewed multilateral engagement, there appears to be a new window of opportunity to revive the financing issue. Both Chairperson Moussa Faki and UNSG Antonio Guterres are also expected to exert reinvigorated efforts to enhance the AU-UN partnership in their new mandate by, among others, ensuring progress on the financing issue. This will certainly unleash the potential of the partnership across the whole spectrum of peace operations. Furthermore, the EU leadership seems to be much more committed and determined to enhance its partnership with the AU and may likely pull its weight behind the AU if there is readiness to resuscitate the discussion on this issue.
This said, however, it should also be understood that the discussion on this issue would not be easy. COVID-19 has had its own impact on the discussion on peacekeeping. Increasing financial pressures, among other reasons, is forcing the UN to downsize and/or draw down peacekeeping missions in recent years. Some experts are anticipating that the tendency in the future could possibly be to prioritise affordable alternatives, such as observer missions and civilian special political missions.
Even though the Biden administration could be favorably disposed to the discussion on the issue, there is a need for serious discussion to reach a shared understanding on the way forward. This necessitates engaging the Biden administration in earnest, including the state department, National Security Council and the department of defense. It is also important for the AU to engage Congress and canvass the necessary support in the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations building on willingness of some congressmen to support the idea of financing AU led peace support operation as part of enhancing the role of the US.
The development of a common African position is indeed a step in the right direction and it is expected to facilitate a clear decision by AU, which will then pave the way for the A3 to resuscitate the file and try to secure a concrete commitment on the issue from the UNSC. The process will definitely take time and the necessary preparatory work for laying the ground work needs to be developed. The AU Commission and the UN Secretariat need to follow up on the implementation of their Joint Declaration of 6 December 2018, and work towards making tangible progress on some of the agreed issues as they relate to the financing issue, including the full operationalisation of the peace fund, reporting, oversight and accountability.
Most importantly, there is need to learn the right lessons from the experiences of 2018 and 2019. Ensuring greater clarity on the implementation of the AU Peace fund and demonstrating concrete commitment in sharing the burden would be vital. The full operationalization of the African Standby Force would go a long way in demonstrating AU’s commitment to shoulder responsibility on matters of peace and security in Africa. It would be absolutely important that the AU common position is accompanied by a solid roadmap with clear time lines for holding consultations and mobilizing support from all the relevant interlocutors on this file while ensuring close coordination of the AU Commission, the PSC and the A3 throughout the process for having a UNSC resolution that adequately reflects the common position.
While no formal outcome is expected from tomorrow’s meeting, the PSC is expected to provide input both on what is expected to be contained in the common position and the timeline for finalising the drafting for fulfilling the request of the AU Assembly, particularly the decision of its 14th extraordinary session held on 6 December 2020.