Briefing on the situation in The Comoros
Amani Africa
Date | 01 June, 2021
Tomorrow (01 June) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is set to convene the first session of the month to receive. The session will be on the situation in the Comoros.
The session is set to commence with the opening remarks of the PSC Chairperson of the month, Burundi’s Permanent Representative to the AU, Joel Nkurbagaya. The AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, Bankole Adeoye, is also expected to deliver a remark. The AU High Representative for Silencing the Guns, Ramtana Lamamra, who served as envoy, may also brief the Council. The Representative of Comoros is also expected to make a statement as the country concerned.
This session comes amid heightened political tension in the Union of Comoros (UoC) after opposition groups called for nationwide protests this May. At the heart of the protests is frustrations about the change that the incumbent president, Azali Assoumani, unleashed to reconstitute the political system. Opposition groups reportedly demanded the restoration of the rotating presidential system- a power sharing formula that alternate power every five years among the three islands making the UoC and to that end the resignation of the president. The rotating presidential system, scraped under the 2018 constitution adopted in a referendum boycotted by the opposition, had been in place since 2001.
The UoC has not featured in the agenda of the Council since the last time it considered the situation in the country in September 2015, although it has remained under AU’s watch. Since July 2018, the AU Commission Chairperson issued at least three statements (29 July 2018, 16 October 2018, and 29 March 2019) in light of deteriorating political situations. Based on the report of the PSC on its activities and the state of peace and security in Africa, the AU Assembly also considered the Comoros during its 33rd Ordinary Session held from 9-10 February 2020. At that session, the Assembly expressed the readiness of AU to ‘continue its facilitation role in the Comoros, with a view to strengthening and consolidating social cohesion’; and in this respect, the Assembly encouraged the PSC and the AU Commission to ‘continue to support the Comoros in its efforts to advance political dialogue’.
As the demand of protesters highlight, the resurgence of the crisis in the Comoros is not an isolated event but recurrence of longstanding institutional crisis and political polarization. At the roots of the crisis is a contestation over centralization and greater autonomy for the islands that make up the UoC. The archipelago consists of three main islands: Grande Comere, Anjouan, and Moheli plus Mayotte, an island that France considers as its oversee territory, although Comoros lays claim over it.
The political instability in the Comoros, which resulted in about 20 coupe or attempted coups since the archipelago’s independence from France and the emergence of separatism in the islands of Anjouan and Moheli, has been contained through the 2001 OAU facilitated Fomboni Framework Agreement. The rotational presidential system that the agreement established, entrenched in the 2001 Constitution, helped address the demands for autonomy while preserving the territorial integrity of the Union. This political arrangement is credited for the relative stability that reigned in the Comoros over the years. It is worth noting that the AU Summit in Noukchott in July 2018 attributes the ‘peaceful environment enjoyed by the Comorian people’ after 2001 to the Fomboni Agreement and the 2001 constitution, hence underscoring the need for upholding them.
For the forces of centralization (particularly political elites from Grande Comore), the rotational system of presidency creates discontinuities in policies and practice. More importantly, the rotational system gives equal opportunity to the three islands to lead the Union despite a significant variation of population size among the islands.
In 2018, President Azali Assoumani, who came to power in 2016, sought to implement changes to the political system. Despite the political tension that this move reignited, President Assoumani unveiled a controversial constitution, removing the single term limit and the rotating presidency, for referendum. Political oppositions boycotted the referendum and tension flared up in Comoros as Assoumani’s move was not only viewed as unconstitutional power grab but also considered as a reversal to the political settlements reached in 2001. On 29 July 2018, just a day before the planned referendum, the Chairperson of AU Commission issued a statement expressing his concerns over the ‘prevailing tension and differences among political stakeholders’ and urged for inclusive dialogue.
The abolition of the rotating presidential system has stocked anger among Anjouan natives who were the next in line to take the helm by 2021. It is against the background of the contested process of the change of the Constitution and the expectation of the Anjouan to hold the Presidency under the 2001 constitution that the recent protests and political tension erupted. It is worth recalling that the PSC, at its 545th session held on 21 September 2015, warned that any attempt to ‘call into question the principle of the rotating presidency’ is likely to ‘raise tension’.
Another aspect of the situation in Comoros expected to attract tomorrow’s session relate to the elections held in 2019 and 2020. Based on the 2018 constitution, whose legitimacy is contested on the part of the opposition, Comoros held presidential and legislative elections in March 2019 and January 2020, respectively. Against the background of simmering tension and wide-ranging crackdown following the 2018 referendum, the first round of presidential election was held on 24 March 2019. Although electoral officials announced a provisional result declaring Assoumani a winner with 60% vote on 26 March, the result was immediately rejected by 12 opposition candidates on the ground of widespread irregularity and fraud, and violent protest erupted. International election observers from the AU, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), and the East Africa Standby Force (EASF) reported irregularities that marred the credibility of the elections. The post-election violence prompted the Chairperson of the Commission to issue a statement on 29 March of the same year, calling for restraint as well as urging all political actors to quickly engage in an inclusive dialogue.
Assoumani’s party, Convention for the Renewal of the Comoros (CRC), also achieved a landslide victory in the legislative and municipal elections, which took place in January 2020 under intense political climate. The AU Observer Mission, in its preliminary statement on 21 January 2020, indicated that the election was marked by lack of excitement among voters because of the opposition boycott.
The constitutional referendum as well as the general elections, instead of leading the Comoros to a durable peace, raised the spectre of instability in that country. As power is consolidating in the hands of the incumbent President who is from the Grande Comore, it is also feared that this may revive the separatist sentiment in the Islands of Anjouan and Moheli.
The socioeconomic conditions prevailing in the Comoros may also interest members of the Council. The low economic performance over the past few years, mainly due to the 2019 Tropical Cyclone (TC) Kenneth and COVID-19 outbreak, are likely to compound the political situation. In April 2019, Tropical Cyclone struck the archipelago, which left the country devastated. According to one report, more than 345,000 out of its total population of 800,000 were affected by the passage of the cyclone, also resulting in the contraction of the economy from 3.2% in 2018 to 2.0% in 2019. In tomorrow’s session, the statement from the representative of the Comorian government is likely to touch upon the government’s initiative to address economic challenges, notably the 2030 Emerging Comoros Plan—a national strategy that aspire to move the archipelago into the ranks of upper middle-income countries by 2030.
With these worrying developments in the background, the PSC is expected to deliberate on ways and means that would prevent further escalation and bring political actors back to the negotiating table. In this respect, one avenue worth considering for the Council is the reactivation of an inclusive Inter-Comorian dialogue with the view to help Comorians resolve all pending issues peacefully. It is to be recalled that AU sent its High Representative Ramtane Lamamra in 2018 to facilitate the inter-Comorian dialogue, which came to a halt in October of that year after few weeks of talk.
The expected outcome is a communique. The Council is expected to express its concern over the deteriorating political situation, recalling concerns that it expressed previously about the risks of tampering with the power sharing system of governance that helped Comoros achieve relative stability. The Council is likely to urge both the government and political stakeholders to refrain from acts that may escalate tension, and further call for the immediate resumption of the inter-Comorian dialogue to find a negotiated solution to their differences and preserve the hard-won gains achieved over the years. Beyond expressing its readiness to facilitate the dialogue, the Council may request the Chairperson of the AU Commission to use all the available tools to help Comorian return back to the negotiating table, building on the earlier intervention of High Representative Lamamra. As part of revamping its escalation prevention and conflict resolution efforts as a follow up to the AU Assembly decision of February 2020, the PSC may request the AU Commission to establish an AU Support political mission for the Comoros. On the socio-economic developments, the Council is expected to take note and welcome the government’s 2030 Emerging Comoros Plan which intends to address the economic challenges, as well as the convening of the 2019 Paris Conference of Partners for the Development of the Comoros with the view to supporting government’s economic plan. In this regard, the Council may further call on donors and partners to honour their pledges made at the conference.
Session on the 17 years journey of the PSC on the occasion of its 1000th session
Amani Africa
Date | 25 May, 2021
Tomorrow (25 May) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council will convene its 1000th session dedicated to an appraisal of the 17 years journey of the Council. While the Council came into operation in March 2004, it was during its 10th session held for first time at the level of Heads of State and Government that the PSC was officially launched on the occasion of the celebration of Africa Day on 25 May 2004.
In marking the 17th years anniversary of the launch of the PSC and its 1000th session during tomorrow’s session, the PSC will conduct the session in a hybrid form combining a physical meeting with participation virtually. For the occasion, the PSC has invited all the former AU Commissioners for Peace and Security, Said Djinnit, Ramtane Lamamra & Smail Chergui and Directors of the Peace and Security Department, El-Ghassim wane and Kambudzi Ademore Mupoki.
Highlighting the level of institutionalization of the PSC and its working methods, the number of PSC meetings between 2004 and 2021 shows a fourfold increase from the 21 meetings that the PSC held during its first year of operation. Since 2015, the PSC meets on a monthly basis for an average not less than six times. While its Rules of Procedure came into operation when the PSC became operational and served, together with the PSC Protocol, as the framework for guiding the work of the PSC, the PSC elaborated the specifics of its working methods through the Conclusions of the Dakar Retreat of the PSC held in August 2007. In 2019, the PSC consolidated the Conclusions of the Dakar Retreat and the conclusions of the subsequent 11 retreats on its working methods into the Manual on the Working Methods of the PSC. The PSC Secretariat has become not only the technical arm for the standardized conduct of the business of the PSC but also the custodian of its institutional memory. The two main subsidiary bodies of the PSC, the Committee of Experts and the Military Staff Committee, have achieved full operationalization, availing the PSC useful support despite capacity limitations.
As at the end of December 2020, 52 of the 55 member States of the AU are parties to the PSC Protocol. The three countries that are not yet parties to the Protocol are Cabo Verde, Democratic Republic of Congo and South Sudan. Following the elections held in February 2020, out of the 52 States Parties to the PSC Protocol, the number of States that served as members of the PSC reached 40. The States Parties to the PSC Protocol that never served on the PSC include the Central African Republic, Comoros, Eritrea, Guinea Bissau, Madagascar, Mauritius, Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles and Somalia.
Disaggregating the 1000 sessions of the PSC offers useful insights about how the PSC deployed its very finite time and resources over the years. Of the total number of PSC sessions, about 70% have been on country/region specific situations. The PSC used the remaining 30% of its sessions for thematic issues, consultative meetings with other AU organs and institutions, the UN Security Council, the Peacebuilding Commission, the EU, LAS and the ICRC.
Although situations from all parts of the continent featured on the agenda of the PSC, the regional distribution of the sessions of the PSC shows notable variations in terms of PSC engagements across the five regions of the continent. 46% or nearly half of the sessions of the PSC dedicated to county/regional situations dealt with situations in the East Africa region. Much of the focus of these sessions focusing on this region have been on Somalia and the two Sudans. Both Somalia and Sudan have been on the agenda of the PSC since its establishment in 2004. And regardless of progress achieved over the years in relation to the situations in both countries, they continue to face major political and security challenges and are therefore still in the agenda of the Council. South Sudan, which has been on Council’s agenda since 2012 has also been considered at a relatively high frequency, although Mali and Sahel and Guinea Bissua featured more on the agenda of the PSC than other situations in this region.
After East Africa, West Africa featured most regularly on the agenda of the PSC, accounting for more than 25% of the sessions of the PSC. Compared to East Africa, where Somalia and the Sudans account for more than 2/3 of the activities of the PSC in the region, more countries in West Africa were on the agenda of the PSC more regularly. The political instability and ever-increasing terrorist threat in Mali and the Sahel region continue to be one of the major security concerns for the PSC. Central Africa, with 19% of sessions, comes next in place. Central African Republic (CAR), Burundi and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have all been on Council’s agenda since the early days of its establishment. CAR and DRC, which make the highest number of PSC’s sessions in the region respectively, are still part of Council’s agenda.
In comparison to the three regions, there are fewer number of PSC sessions on the situations in Northern and Southern Africa. Of the two, northern Africa takes the lead with 9% of the total sessions. From the northern region, the situation that dominates the agenda of the PSC is that of Libya. Other situations that featured on the agenda of the PSC include those of Western Sahara, Egypt and Tunisia. Sothern Africa is the region with the least number of situations on the agenda of the PSC making up only about 1 % of the total country/region specific sessions. Mozambique, Lesotho and Zimbabwe have all at some point been considered by Council although none have continuously featured on its agenda. South Africa has also been addressed by the PSC in the context of the 2019 xenophobic attacks in the country.
Though the peace and security framework of the AU anchored on the PSC is still relatively young, the foregoing shows that it has come a long way both in terms of its institutionalization and in initiating efforts for maintaining peace and security on the continent. Its 17 years of journey make the PSC well positioned to become the leading platform for peace and security decision- making on the continent. As its engagement witnessed huge expansion and acquired increasing, though sometimes challenged, authority, the PSC has come to significantly affect the politics of AU member States, the relations between them and ultimately Africa’s relations with the wider international community and the latter’s engagement on peace and security issues on the continent.
Perhaps more than the successes registered, tomorrow’s session is of particular importance for reflecting on the challenges facing the PSC and the gap between the ambitions of the PSC protocol and the practice of the PSC. Indeed, as the PSC marks its 1000th session, increasing number of questions are emerging on the effectiveness of the work of the PSC and the way it conducts its business and the adequacy of some of its tools. The relapse of countries in transition back to conflict, the persistence of existing conflicts and the eruption of new conflicts and crises as well as the violence and insecurity from the spread of terrorism have put a spotlight on the effectiveness of the PSC conflict prevention, peacebuilding and conflict management and resolution activities.
Despite the decline witnessed in the number and scale of conflicts during 2000s, there has been notable increase in the number and nature of conflicts in the conflict from around 2011. The changes in the nature of conflicts and the challenges arising from emerging security threats call for response mechanisms that are prompt, agile and robust. These raise major questions on a) the security instruments that best fit for responding to changing security challenges, b) the adequacy of the political and institutional frameworks of the AU and c) the provision of the required level of leadership and resources by member States.
Addressing both the persistence of violent conflicts & crises and the enormous gap between the ambitions of the PSC Protocol and the actual practice of the PSC requires that the PSC addresses the various issues undermining its effectiveness.
The first set of challenges relate to the uneven implementation of the mandate of the PSC. This has two dimensions. The first relates to the fact that the level of implementation of the conflict prevention, management, resolution and peacebuilding functions of the PSC. The PSC has predominantly operated like a ‘fire-brigade’. Hence, fire-fighting – dealing with conflicts after they have erupted – has become the dominant feature of the work of the PSC. As a result, other dimensions of the mandate of the PSC, notably conflict prevention, have been poorly implemented. Second, the PSC has not been consistent in its approach of putting conflict situations on its agenda. The PSC faces a charge of applying a double standard by intervening in some conflicts and failing to do so in other conflicts of similar, or even more serious, gravity.
The second set of challenges relate to capacity issues. In terms of diplomatic resources and technical expertise, despite the requirements of the PSC Protocol for member States to be in good standing and to have the capacity to shoulder the responsibilities of membership, a number of states still lack the required staff complement and technical expertise at the AU headquarters and the material capacity to effectively support the implementation of the decisions of the PSC. A number of member States also lack the required technical expertise that provide dedicated analysis for and follow up on the activities of the PSC. Similarly, the size and technical capacity of the AU Commission (AUC) is inadequate to support the PSC in all aspects of its mandate. Additionally, there are several subsidiary bodies of the PSC that are not operationalized. There is also the perennial issue of the mismatch between the diplomatic, logistic, technical and financial resources that the AU and its member States are willing to commit and what the implementation of the decisions of the PSC requires.
The PSC also faces political challenges. Despite the fact that member States of the AU made commitments under various AU instruments including the AU Constitutive Act and the Protocol Establishing the PSC, on various occasions the pursuit of national policy interests in member States engagement on peace and security issues without due regard to AU policy and normative requirements undermined PSC’s efforts and frustrated the emergence of timely and robust response. Recently, this has led to major retrogression when the PSC failed to uphold its zero tolerance policy for military seizure of power, severely denting its credibility as far as the application of AU’s norm banning unconstitutional changes of government is concerned. Additionally, there is a trend of States invoking sovereignty for blocking or resisting the role of the PSC as witnessed during the previous few years and in the course of this year.
The other set of challenges lie in the realm of policy and operational coordination between the PSC and regional economic communities and/or mechanisms (RECs/RMs). The AU and RECs/RMs have experienced increasing interaction punctuated by tension over the leadership of, and division of responsibility in, the management of various crises.
As it did during the 10th anniversary of the PSC, it is anticipated that the PSC will issue a communique. The communique is expected to acknowledge the progress registered in the execution of the mandate of the PSC. It is also expected to set out proposals for addressing the challenges that the PSC faces in dealing with the peace and security challenges of the continent, including those outlined above.
Ministerial session on the situation in Mali
Amani Africa
Date | 24 May, 2021
Tomorrow (24 May) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 999th session at the Ministerial level to consider the situation in Mali.
Algeria’s Foreign Minister, Sabri BouKadoum, chairperson of the ministerial PSC session, is scheduled to make the opening remark. Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Mali, Zeyni Moulaye, representing Mali as the country concerned, and Minister of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration of Ghana, as Chair of ECOWAS, will deliver statements. Others scheduled to address the PSC include Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, Bankole Adeoye, the new Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission (SRCC) for Mali and Head of the AU Mission for Mali and the Sahel (MISAHEL), Maman Sidikou and the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Mali and Head of United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), El Ghassim Wane.
The last time the PSC considered the situation in Mali was during its 954th session convened on 9 October 2020, following the issuance of a Transitional Charter and the establishment of a transitional governmentinvolving civilian leadership in October last year, as prescribed by ECOWAS and the PSC. The Prime Minister announced his 25-member cabinet in October. High-ranking military officials including those who took part in the August coup, members of the Movement of June 5-Rally of Patriotic Forces (M5-RFP) who led the protest against Keita’s regime, representatives of civil society, as well as four representatives of the signatory movements to the 2015 peace agreement formed the interim government. Against the background of these developments, during that session the PSC lifted the suspension of Mali from participation in AU activities.
For purposes of tomorrow’s session, it would be of interest for PSC members to follow up on the Council’s call for the interim government to expedite the implementation of the outstanding provisions of the Transitional Charter including the establishment of the National Transitional Council and to work towards the conclusion of the transitional process for holding national elections at the end of the 18-month transitional period. The PSC also recognized the importance of the implementation of the 2015 peace agreement in order to comprehensively address political, security and socio-economic challenges facing the Republic of Mali. In this context, tomorrow’s session presents the Council with the opportunity to receive updates on the progress made in respect of all these various areas.
Those providing update to the PSC, including the representative of Mali, are expected to highlight a number of developments. The first of this is the establishment of the Transitional National Council (TNC), as requested in the communique of the 954th session of the PSC. Established on the basis of a decree that the interim President, Bah N’Daw, issued last November, the 121 seats of the TNC were allocated to Defense and Security Forces, representatives of M5-RFP, signatory movements of the 2015 Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, political parties and other groups. Major political actors including the M5-RFP strongly criticized the arrangement over the perceived unfair representation of the military in the Council who were able to secure 22 seats. The inaugural session of the transitional council elected one of the leaders of the Coup, Malick Diaw, as the President of the Council with overwhelming majority early in December. Second, in February, the Transitional Council considered and approved the action plan of the interim government, setting out six priority areas and 275 specific actions. Of particular interest for the PSC is ensuring the implementation of the action plan within the transitional period focusing on the major milestones for convening national elections.
Despite these positive developments, the recent resignation of interim Prime Minister Moctar Ouane on 14 May and his immediate reinstatement to pave the way for ‘new broad-based’ government illustrates not only the fragility of the transition but also thesimmering tension between the military and civilian elements of the transitional government, due to the dominant role taken by the military leadership in the transition. The report of the ECOWAS mediator and special envoy to Mali, former President of Nigeria Goodluck Jonathan, also flagged the concerns of stakeholders stating that ‘the mission encourages the government to ensure greater inclusivity of the main socio-political actors…’ This was further echoed by the authority of Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS during its fifty-eighth ordinary session held on 23 January 2021, which underscored the ‘need for the timely implementation of the various decisions relating to the Transition, in a more consultative and inclusive approach with all stakeholders’.
With respect to the preparations for national elections, on 15 April 2021, the Minister of Territorial Administration announced an electoral calendar. Accordingly, a constitutional referendum is slated for October 2021. The parliamentary election and the first round of presidential voting will take place on 27 February 2022, with the runoff presidential election envisaged to take place in March 2022. Local and regional elections are also set to take place in December this year. As UN Secretary- General noted in his last quarterly report, the government is taking positive steps in engaging political parties, civil society organizations and signatories of the 2015 peace agreement to map out agreeable legal and institutional framework for the upcoming elections.
On the implementation of the 2015 Peace and Reconciliation Agreement resulting from the Algiers process, one notable development was the holding of the fifth ministerial session of the Agreement Monitoring Committee on 11 February in Kidal, for the first time since 2015. Six Malian ministers and the leadership of the signatory armed groups and international mediators took part in that session, with Algeria’s Foreign Minister, the Chairperson of tomorrow’s PSC session, as Chair of the Monitoring Committee. Apart from allocation of seats for signatory armed groups in the transitional institutions, progress is also being made with respect to the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process, which forms key part of the peace agreement. A worrying development worth highlighting is the killing of the President of one of the signatory armed groups (Coordination of Azawad Movements), Ould Sidati, in Bamako last month.
Despite the positive political atmosphere from the transitional process and the 2015 agreement, the security situation remains dire. A terrorist attacks in Kidal on 2 April 2020 led to the death of 10 peacekeepers and one UN contractor. In a deadliest attack since August 2020 on a security post in the norther region of Gao in March 2020, 33 Malian soldiers were killed and 14 were injured.
On the humanitarian and socioeconomic front, the situation remains dire causing frustrations on thepart of the population. A nationwide strike was called by the prominent National Workers’ Union of Mali (UNTM), starting on 17 May to demand a better living and working conditions to their members. It is to be recalled that the PSC, during its last session on Mali, requested the Chairperson of the Commission, through the Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Centre, to ‘engage the Transitional Government of Mali with the view to identifying priority areas that should contribute towards the restoration of national socio-economic development to more effectively prevent relapse to conflict’. In this respect, the Council is likely to follow up on this decision during tomorrow’s session.
In tomorrow’s session, the PSC may also follow up on the tools it agreed to put in place with the view to support the transition in Mali. One of such mechanisms is the ‘follow-up and support committee’, which the PSC requested the Chairperson of the Commission to ‘urgently activate’ at its 954th session to ensure the appropriate participation and contribution of AU to the transitional government. Accordingly, the inaugural meeting of the committee- co-chaired by the AU, ECOWAS, and the UN- was held on 30 November 2020 in Bamako, followed by its second meeting convened on 8 March 2021 in Lome, Togo.
The expected outcome is a communique. The PSC is expected to welcome the progress made in the implementation of the Transitional Charter since its last session on Mali held on 9October 2020. The Council is however expected to share the concerns of different stakeholders in the lack of proper consultation and inclusivity in the transition process, and in this respect, it may echo the fifty-eighth ordinary session of the Authority of Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS in stressing ‘the need for the timely implementation of the various decisions relating to the Transition, in a more consultative and inclusive approach with stakeholders’. On the election, the Council is expected to welcome the announcement of the electoral calendar by the Government and urge Malian authorities to work on the outstanding legal and institutional frameworks in consultation with all stakeholders and create a conducive environment that would enable the conduct of the constitutional referendum and a free, fair and credible elections. In this regard, the Council may request the Chairperson of the Commission to initiate electoral support to Malian authorities. The Council may welcome the adoption of the Interim Government’s action plan by the National Council that outlined six priority areas, and may, in this respect, request the Chairperson of the Commission to continue its engagement with Malian authorities with the view to support them in translating this action plan into a reality.
In relation to the 2015 Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, the PSC is likely to welcome the progress registered and call on the parties to expedite the redeployment of reconstituted forces to the regions that continue to experience armed violence. In relation to the security situation, the Council is expected to condemn the continued terrorist attacks and intercommunal violence pervasive in central and northern part of the country, including the attacks on MINUSMA. On the socioeconomic condition, the Council is also likely to express its concern over the continued disagreement between Malian authorities and labor unions in light of the recent nation-wide strike called by UNTM. In this respect, it may call on all parties to resolve their differences through dialogue to avoid a further damage to the struggling economy. In relation to the ‘follow-up and support committee’, the Council is expected to welcome theactivation of the Committee and the meetings it held, and the plan for the convening of its third meeting next month in Bamako. The Council is also expected to pay tribute to the late former President of Burundi, Paul Buyoya for his service and to welcome the appointment of Sidikou as SRCC and Head MISAHL.