Ministerial session on access to Covid-19 vaccines
Amani Africa
Date | 22 May, 2021
Tomorrow (22 May) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 998th session, at the ministerial level, under the theme ‘Access to vaccines against COVID19 pandemic in Africa: Challenge to human security’.
Algeria’s Foreign Minister, Sabri BouKadoum, chairperson of the ministerial PSC session, is scheduled to make the opening remark. Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Chritophe Lutundula, representing the Chairperson of the AU for 2021, Minister of International Relations and Cooperation of South Africa, Naledi Pandor, representing the AU Champion on COVID-19 response, and the AU Commission Chairperson, Moussa Faki Mahamat will deliver remarks. Commissioner for Health, Humanitarian Affairs and Social Development is expected to brief the Council. Others expected to make statements during the session include Michel Sidibé, the AU Special Envoy for the African Medicines Agency, John N Nkengasong, Director of the Africa Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Director General of the World Health Organization (WHO).
This session focuses on the most pressing issue of this moment with respect to the COVID-19 pandemic in Africa, namely the threat that Africa’s lack of access to the COVID-19 vaccines presents to human security on the continent.
Since its outbreak in Africa early last year, the virus has so far claimed the lives of over 126,000 people, while the number of cases is currently over 4.6 million, according to the data from Africa-CDC. And of the five regions, southern and northern Africa have respectively recorded the highest number of cases by far. While the death toll and number of cases related to COVID-19 have been far worse in most western countries as compared to Africa, the spread of the virus and the rate of infection remains to be a serious concern. There continue to be AU member states recording increasing incidents of COVID-19 cases. 21 AU member states have reported fatality ratios higher than the global fatality ratio of 2.1 %. Significant number of African countries have also reported the presence of new variants of the COVID-19 pandemic.
For Africa, President Cyril Ramaphosa cautioned in his opening address during the 34th AU Assembly in February 2020 that COVID-19 ‘is not only a severe health emergency, it is also a grave economic and social crisis’. Indeed, in the African context the devastating socio- economic impacts of the pandemic is feared to outweigh its impacts on health and safety of people. In one of its first sessions on the virus, the PSC, in its communique of the 918th session, noted ‘with deep concern the profound socio-economic consequences of COVID-19 within Africa.’ According to United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), the far-reaching economic impacts of the pandemic include “falling demand for Africa’s commodities; capital flight from Africa; a virtual collapse of tourism and air transport associated with lockdowns and border closures; and depreciation of local currencies as a result of a deterioration in the current account balance”. In terms of the socio-economic wellbeing of the peoples of the continent, this would entail disruption of access to basic necessities, loss of jobs and livelihoods, rising food insecurity and falling of millions of people into extreme poverty.
The health and the socio-economic consequences of the pandemic is not without consequences for the stability and peace and security of the countries of the continent. Arresting the spread of the virus and instituting measures for the social and economic recovery of the countries of the continent is not only an African but also a global imperative. Unless the pandemic is contained, there is a risk of its continuing spread and even more worryingly its mutation into more contagious and more deadly variants.
The AU report on COVID-19 pandemic in Africa presented to the AU summit in February 2021 pointed out that ‘the only way in which we can prevent COVID-19 transmission and deaths while at the same time protecting African economies and societies is to successfully immunise a critical mass of the African population with safe and efficacious COVID-19 vaccines.’ Africa will need 1.5 billion doses of vaccine in order to vaccinate 60% of its population—the estimated minimum requirement for achieving ‘herd’ immunity. Yet, Africa’s path to access COVID-19 vaccines is very narrow. There are four challenges militating against Africa’s access to vaccines against the COVID-19 pandemic.
The first of this is the phenomenon of vaccine nationalism. Predictably, rich countries have been purchasing and hoarding supplies of the vaccine for the prior utilisation of their own communities. As South Africa’s Foreign Affairs Minister Naledi Pandor pointed out in her opening address to the Minister’s meeting during the AU summit, the economically well-off countries of the north ‘has purchased the largest stock, while we in Africa are struggling to get our fair share.’ Thus, these countries with only 16 percent of the world population have bought up 60 percent of the world’s vaccine supply. Restrictions of exports, pre-production commitment of COVID-19 vaccine supplies by the few manufacturers and the hoarding by wealthy countries of excess supplies have left countries in the global south, including those in Africa, with very limited access. Not surprisingly, only less than 2% of the world COVID-19 vaccines have been administered in Africa.
The COVAX facility is a major avenue for access to the COVID-19 vaccines for many countries in Africa, although it can only supply 20 % of the required doses for achieving ‘herd immunity’. With much of the existing supply enlisted to meet the request of wealthy countries and the eruption of a new variant of the COVID-19 pandemic leading India into suspending export of vaccines for meeting pressing domestic needs, there is now a risk of the COVAX facility not being able to deliver the second round of shipment of the vaccine. This situation has led the WHO to warn that ‘trickle down vaccination is not an effective strategy for fighting a deadly respiratory virus.’
The second challenge is, what is the market-based approach to the production and procurement of the COVID-19 vaccines? While the world is facing an extraordinary pandemic, the production and procurement of vaccines is based on the ordinary mechanisms of the market. The monopolistic protection that the few pharmaceutical companies enjoy means that they control not only the scale of production of the vaccine but also who accesses such limited supply, when and with what price, thereby accentuating existing inequalities between various regions of the world. This has resulted in what the WHO Chief called ‘artificial scarcity’. As the WHO Regional Director for Africa aptly put it, the resultant limited stocks and supply bottlenecks are putting COVID-19 vaccines out of the reach of many people in Africa.
The third challenge for access to the vaccine is the absence of the requisite strategic infrastructure on the continent for producing and manufacturing COVID-19 vaccines. It is this structural condition that has exposed Africa to be completely dependent on outside sources for strategic medical supplies, hence for it to be left behind in access to the COVID-19 pandemic. In the two-day access to vaccine virtual summit that Africa CDC and the AU convened on 12-13 April 2021 that attracted the participation of some 44,000 people, it was reported that Africa, a continent of 55 AU member states and 1.2 billion people, produces only 1% of the vaccines it administers. The remaining 99% is imported, highlighting the hitherto policy failure of governments and the extreme vulnerability of the continent.
The fourth challenge is that of logistical capacity for rolling out the vaccines. So far, about 37.8 million vaccines have been supplied to multiple member States, through the Africa-CDC. Of these, over 24 million have been administered, indicating that there are member States who, having been supplied with the vaccine, fail to administer them in time. This is also indicative of the lack of preparations on the side of some member States to effectively and efficiently administer the vaccine as soon as they receive it.
There have been efforts, as part of Africa’s response to the pandemic, to address some of these challenges. The AU had established the COVID-19 African Vaccine Acquisition Task Team (AVATT) to accelerate access to funds for the procurement and delivery of the vaccine doses and promote access to vaccines. AVATT has been engaged in mobilizing sources of funding and presented financing options in order to meet the $6.1 billion funding gap for the procurement and administration of the required number of doses in Africa.
In an important development, in its decision (Doc. Assembly/AU/5(XXXIV)) on the 2020 AU Chairperson’s report on the response to COVID-19, the AU Assembly acknowledged ‘the need for equitable and timely, access to the COVID-19 vaccine to all AU Member States which will require additional mechanisms to ensure at least 60% of the Continent’s population is vaccinated.’ This is a clear acknowledgement of the inadequacy of the pre-existing strategy that was premised on a market-based approach focusing on procurement of vaccines manufactured by the existing limited number of monopolistic pharmaceutical companies. Accordingly, the AU Assembly, noting that ‘exceptional circumstances exist justifying a waiver from the obligations of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) specifically for the prevention, containment and treatment of COVID-19, decided to support the proposed WTO Waiver from certain provisions of the TRIPS Agreement for the Prevention, Containment and Treatment of COVID-19 as contained in WTO document IP/C/W/669.’ Underscoring the strategic importance of this, Pandor told her counterparts during the AU summit, the temporary waiver by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) of specific IP obligations related to prevention and treatment of COVID-19 ‘would enable countries in Africa and elsewhere to access active pharmaceutical ingredients and benefit from technology transfer, including the know- how to manufacture vaccines in Africa at a cheaper cost.’
In terms of expanding sources of supply, apart from the limited number of major manufacturers that currently dominate the supply chain, it would be of interest for tomorrow’s session to explore how African countries may establish, within the AU COVID-19 pandemic response framework, partnerships for securing access from the various types of COVID-19 vaccine producers. Doing so within the AU COVID-19 pandemic response framework would ensure standardized contracting and safe supply of vaccines produced in China, Russia and India.
Given the centrality of addressing the structural vulnerability of the continent for human security by building capacities for manufacturing strategic medical supplies within the continent, the issue of addressing the structural lacunae in Africa’s capacity would be of major significance for tomorrow’s session. As highlighted during the April 12-13 AU summit on vaccine, there is a need for Africa to prioritize the mobilization of the required financial resources, expand medical research capacities, secure policy commitment of states for domestic purchasing of vaccines and the establishment of the requisite regulatory mechanisms that meet international standards. In this regard, the session may serve as an opportunity for calling on member States to ratify the treaty on the African Medicine Agency. Similarly, African countries need to deliver on the commitments that they have made under the 2001 Abuja Declaration, particularly as it relates to allocation of 15% of their annual budget to the health sector.
Finally, in addition to efforts aimed at ensuring access, more work needs to be done by member States in terms of putting in place plans for the rolling out of the vaccines and capacitating their public health institutions to administer the vaccine timely to avoid non-use and expiry of the vaccines.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to reiterate its previous pronouncements relating to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on Africa. It may also reiterate the AU summit’s decision that access to COVID-19 vaccines is the most effective avenue for not only containing the spread of the virus but also preventing further mutation of the virus and limiting the devasting costs to the socio-economic wellbeing of people in Africa and the world. In this regard, the PSC may call for the WHO to declare the COVID-19 vaccine as global public goods. The PSC may call on members of the international community to heed the appeal of the WHO for sharing their excess stock to African countries through the COVAX and AVATT. Council may also encourage African scientific research institutes to persevere in their efforts to produce COVID- 19 vaccines and urge member States as well as the private sector to support the efforts of such institutions. The PSC may reiterate the support of the AU Assembly to the call for the temporary waiver by the WTO of specific IP obligations related to prevention and treatment of COVID- 19 as the most critical avenue for overcoming the current limitations for generic and more accessible production of the vaccines. The PSC may also call for international cooperation and solidarity particularly through openly sharing vaccine manufacturing technology, intellectual property, and know-how through the COVID-19 Technology Access Pool. The PSC may also call on Africa CDC to expand its engagement on access to vaccine with a view to establish partnership with all vaccine producers both for procuring speedy access and for purposes of technology transfer and sharing of know-how. The PSC may also welcome the conclusions of the summit on access to vaccines and the proposed plan for Africa to build and expand its vaccine manufacturing capacity from the current 1% to 60%. The PSC may also call on AU member states to ratify the treaty establishing the African Medicine Agency and urge member states to meet the Abuja Declaration target of allocating at least 15% of their budget for improving the health sector.
Ministerial session on the situation in Libya
Amani Africa
Date | 18 May, 2021
Tomorrow (18 May) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) convenes its 997th session on the situation in Libya. The session is set to be held at the level of ministers.
Algeria’s Foreign Minister, Sabri BouKadoum, who will preside over the session, will make the opening remark. The AU Commission Chairperson, Moussa Faki Mahamat will deliver a remark, while the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, Bankole Adeoye, is expected to present a briefing to the Council. The representatives of the Democratic Republic of Congo, as Chairperson of the AU for 2020, and the Republic of Congo, as Chair of the AU High Level Committee, are also expected to make statement during the partially open segment of the session. As the country concerned, Libya’s Foreign Minister, Najla Mangouch, is also expected to provide update on the peace process and the transitional government. The Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Wahida Ayari, the Head of United Nation (UN) Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), M. Jan Kubis, and a representative of the League of Arab States are also expected to deliver a statement.
PSC’s last session on Libya was held on 3 November 2020 following the breakthrough in the Libya peace process which resulted in the signing by the 5+5 Joint Military Commission (5+5 JMC)—consisting of five representatives each from the internationally recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) and the self- styled Libyan National Army (LNA) – of a permanent ceasefire on 23 October 2020. The agreement envisaged the immediate identification and categorization of armed groups to carry out a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), as well as for urgent opening of three main roads joining the East to the West and the North to the South of the Country. It also provided for the withdrawal of all foreign fighters and mercenaries operating in Libya.
The communique of the 961st session of the PSC endorsed the permanent ceasefire agreement of 23 October 2020, and emphasised the importance of supporting the full implementation of the agreement including through the participation of AU in the applicable monitoring mechanisms. It also demanded the ‘immediate and unconditional’ departure of foreign fighters within the timeframe envisaged in the ceasefire agreement; called for the ‘unconditional and urgent closure of all illegal detention centres housing African migrants connected to the trafficking of migrants’.
Since then, Libya has registered additional major milestones towards the restoration of peace and stability in the country. In the political front, UNSMIL successfully convened the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF)- composed of 75 participants representing all regions and main political and social constituencies in Libya- from 9 to 15 November 2020 in Tunisia. The LPDF adopted a political roadmap that provided for the convening of parliamentary and presidential elections on 24 December 2021. They also agreed on the formation of a transitional government with a reformed executive authority having a three-member Presidency Council and a separate Prime Minister with two deputies.
On 6 February 2021, delegates of the LPDF elected members of the new executive authority, resulting in the election of Mohammad Younes Menfi to head the three- member Presidency Council and Abdul Hamid Mohammed Dbeibah as a Prime Minister of the Government of National Unity. A new cabinet composed of 35 members submitted by the Prime Minister was approved by the House of Representatives convened in Sirte on 10 March. The Parliament reconvened a session on 15 March in Tobruk for the swearing-in ceremony of the new government, followed by power handover ceremony in Tripoli.
Despite these major developments, the political process is not firmly secure. One illustration of remaining challenges is the postponement of a planned cabinet meeting scheduled to take place in Benghazi following prevention by civilians and armed men affiliated with LNA of an advance team for Prime Minister Dbeibah from leaving the airport following their arrival. As the Permanent Representative of Libya to the UN rightly asserted during his statement to the UN Security Council in February this year, all the tracks that Libya has been following for years are ‘essentially fragile’ in the absence of a dialogue of national reconciliation, which would ensure the sustainability of any outcome.
The legal frameworks for the convening of parliamentary and presidential elections are not yet in place. In its recent resolution on Libya (2570), UN Security Council made its expectation clear that the parliament and relevant authorities need to ‘clarify the constitutional basis for elections and the enactment of legislations’ by 1 July 2021 to allow an orderly preparation by the High National Elections Commission. Given that the time left before the 24 December date for the election is only seven months, there is a need for finalizing the outstanding legal and constitutional issues and equip the High National Elections Commission with the requisite institutional and financial resources to make the necessary preparations.
As far as the implementation of the permanent ceasefire agreement is concerned, it is worth noting that the ceasefire is holding. It is also to be recalled that initially the 5+5 JMC unanimously decided to establish a ‘Libyan- led and Libyan-owned ceasefire monitoring mechanism’ in November 2020. Subsequently, the JMC requested that the ceasefire monitoring is undertaken through the deployment of international monitors under the auspices of UNSMIL. Against this background, last month on 16 April the UN Security Council unanimously adopted 2570 on UN support for the Libyan Ceasefire Monitoring Mechanism. As highlighted in resolution 2570, one possible avenue for AU to support the monitoring mechanism is through the provision of individual monitors under the auspices of UNSMIL.
In respect of the ceasefire agreement as well, challenges abound. First, despite the fact that the three-month deadline for the withdrawal of foreign fighters ended on 23 January, foreign fighters and mercenaries continue to be present in the country. It is to be recalled that the PSC, during its 957th and 961st sessions, requested ‘immediate and unconditional’ withdrawal of all foreign fighters and further warned to ‘name and shame’ all those that are sponsoring foreign fighters. Second, illicit flow of arms in breach of the UNSC arms embargo remains a major problem. As a recent report of the UN Panel of Experts on violations of the UN arms embargo observed, the continuing flouting the embargo has rendered it ‘totally ineffective’. PSC members are expected to deliberate on this issue from the perspective of the serious ramifications of the continuing presence of foreign fighters and the illicit flow of arms to the peace and stability of the region against the backdrop of recent developments in Chad.
Third, the different armed groups and militias that the conflict generated still keep a tight grip over the areas they control; and it remains unclear how far the new government could assert control over them. The recent brief seizure by militias in Tripoli of a hotel that serves as headquarter for the interim government, allegedly because of their unhappiness with the choice of a new chief of intelligence agency, is illustrative of the threat that militia groups continue to pose for the transitional government and the peace process in Libya. Finally, the reopening of the coastal roads is not yet fully realized.
The economic front also showed a steady progress as well, benefiting from successes registered in the security and political sector. Libya’s oil production continues to surge. The output has significantly risen to 1.3 million barrels per day from the low of 228,000 prior to September 2020. It is expected that production capacity would increase to reach a target of 1.45 million b/d at the end of this year. This is critical in reviving Libya’s shattered economy given the importance of the sector to the economy which accounts for 60 percent of aggregate economic output. Further economic reforms including the unification of the Board of Directors of the Libyan Central Bank, the unification of exchange rate, devaluation of the Libyan dinar, the presentation of a unified 2021 budget for the interim government have been also undertaken.
The PSC is also expected to deliberate on the human rights and humanitarian conditions in Libya, particularly in the context of African migrants and refugees. The death of African migrants while crossing the Mediterranean continued unabated. In the latest tragedy, more than 130 migrants lost their lives after a shipwreck off the Libyan coast. According to the UN migration agency (IOM), 557 deaths were recorded on the Central Mediterranean Sea route this year, which nearly tripled compared to the same period last year. Alarmed by the spike of deaths in this route, the two UN agencies (IOM and UNHCR) recently called on the international community to take urgent steps including the ‘reactivation of search and rescue operation in the Mediterranean, enhanced coordination with all rescue actors, ending returns to unsafe ports, and establishing a safe and predictable disembarkation mechanism’ to avoid further loss of life.
In tomorrow’s session, the PSC is also expected to follow up on its request at its 961st session for the ‘unconditional and urgent closure of all illegal detention centres’. Migrants and refugees are held in captives both at official and unofficial detention centres in harsh and life- threatening conditions, subjecting them to serious human right violations including torture, rape, sexual exploitation, and forced labour. They are also targeted by trafficking organizations, armed groups and militias operating in Libya as part of their criminal networks to generate income through engaging in human trafficking. In the light of these persisting challenges, the PSC is expected to receive update from the AU Commission on the outcome of the conclusion of a two-day working visit to Libya by the AU Commission Chairperson along with the Commissioner of Political Affairs, Peace and Security and the Commissioner of Health, Humanitarian Affairs and Social Development in April last month.
The expected outcome of the session is a communique. The PSC is expected to congratulate Mohammad Menfi and Abdul Hamid Dbeiba for their appointment as President and Prime Minister, respectively, and hail the smooth transfer of power to the new interim government as set out in the political roadmap adopted by the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum. As far as the political process is concerned, the PSC is likely to avail the support of the AU for facilitating and supporting a national reconciliation process in Libya. On the preparation for elections slated for 24 December, the PSC may urge relevant authorities to take action regarding outstanding legal and constitutional issues and the provision of institutional and financial resources to the Elections Commission necessary for the convening of the elections on time and to this end may request the AU Commission to initiate electoral support to enable the Libyan authorities finalize relevant legal and institutional preparations for the convening of the elections. On illegal detention centres and the treatment of migrants, apart from reiterating its call for the closure of these illegal centres that expose migrants to grave violations, the PSC may welcome the agreement the AU delegation of the recent visit to Libya reached with the interim government to reactivate the process of dignified and voluntary repatriation and resettlement of African migrants. On the implementation of the ceasefire agreement, the PSC may welcome the adoption of resolution 2570 by the UN Security Council on the Ceasefire monitoring arrangements in Libya, and express its readiness to support the Ceasefire monitoring mechanism including through the provision of individual monitors under the auspice of UNSMIL. With respect to the continuing presence of foreign fighters and mercenaries, the PSC may express its deep concern about the lack of progress for their withdrawal and reiterate its demand for their immediate and unconditional withdrawal. In this respect, the PSC may call on the AU Commission to initiate the establishment of a joint mechanism that oversees and verifies the speedy withdrawal of all foreign fighters and mercenaries from Libya. The PSC may also call on the UNSC to ensure the enforcement of the arms embargo and institute sanctions against those flouting the embargo. The PSC may also endorse the call, in the joint statement of the recent meeting of the Libyan Quartet, for the ‘sustained implementation of measures to fully identify and dismantle’ armed groups and militias, and ‘ensure the subsequent reintegration of those individuals meeting the requirements into national institutions’.
PSC Session on Protection of Children in Conflict Situations in Africa
Amani Africa
Date | 11 May, 2021
Tomorrow (11 May) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 995th session virtually, to discuss on the theme ‘protection of children in conflict situations in Africa’. The session is to be convened in the context of Council’s decision at its 420th meeting to hold annual sessions dedicated to children affected by armed conflicts (CAAC), as well as its decision at its 956th meeting to dedicate two sessions per year, to receive briefings on the situation of children affected by conflict situations, from the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACERWC) and related partners. As indicated in its information note, the main objective of the session is for Council to receive updates on the state of children’s rights in conflict situations and to reflect on how well protection of such children is integrated in AU conflict prevention, management and resolution architecture.
The session is set to start with the opening remark of the PSC Chairperson of the month and Permanent Representative of People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria, Salah Francis Elhamdi. Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, Bankole Adeoye and Commissioner of Health, Humanitarian Affairs and Social Development, Amira El Fadil will also make key remarks. Presentations are also expected from invited participants including ACERWC Special Rapporteur on CAAC, Save the Children, and United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF).
Tomorrow’s session is expected to highlight recent trends about how ongoing conflicts are affecting children in conflict affected areas. Various reports indicate that in the various conflict settings civilians bear much of the brunt of conflicts and crises. Children are among those most affected. This is the case whether in situations of armed conflict such as those in the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes regions or in situations of terrorist violence in the Sahel, Lake Chad Basin, Somalia and Cabo Delgado province of Mozambique.
Children are affected by violence both as indirect victims and direct targets of the violence. They end up sustaining physical violence, forced into displacement and fleeing into neighbouring countries as refugees as recent events in Cabo Delgado province of Mozambique and Tigray region of Ethiopia have highlighted. They also suffer the most, as the situation in South Sudan attest, from conflict induced hunger and malnutrition in conflict situations. Children are among the main victims of recruitment, use, sexual abuse and exploitation in conflict situations. The recurrent incidents of abduction of school girls and boys by Boko Haram has put spotlight on children as direct targets of terrorist attacks and abductions. Similar incidents of attacks on school have also been reported in conflict affected parts of Cameroon.
Even when children survive the physical effects of conflicts and terrorist violence, they are not spared from being deprived of access to basic necessities such as health care and lose opportunities due to disruption of their access to education. For instance, UN reports show that in Central Sahel alone, 4,000 schools were forced to cease function in early 2020 due to direct attacks and insecurity, leaving about 650,000 students out of education.
The rate of displacement of children has also been most concerning in recent months. By end of April this year, the UN has reported that 168,000 children were forced to flee their homes due to the widespread violence which broke out in Central African Republic (CAR) in the run- up to the elections of December 2020. In addition to the spike in displacement of children, the Covid-19 pandemic has further compounded the situation. Particularly, internally displaced (IDP) and refugee children continue to be excessively affected as a result of the outbreak of the pandemic. With that in mind, Council has emphasised at its 921st session, that part of the AU Covid-19 Response Fund should be directed towards provision of humanitarian assistance to refugees and IDPs among other vulnerable parts of society. Having regard to the accelerating rate of the pandemic in some parts of the continent and the potential impact on IDP and refugee children there, Council may reiterate this point and call on Member States to mobilise more support to those countries that have high numbers of IDP and refugee populations.
The first issue that these various issues affecting children in armed conflict raise is how to ensure protection of children during conflicts. This is not about the deployment of security measures only. In this respect, it is of significance that measures are taken to ensure that conflict actors observe human rights and international humanitarian law (IHL) standards. This necessitates not only urging the actors to abide by these standards and reminding them of the responsibility they bear for violations of those standards but also putting in place mechanisms for monitoring, investigating and reporting incidents of violations. Additionally, it is incumbent on governments to facilitate humanitarian access and initiatives for protecting and supporting civilians and children affected by violence. The situation of displaced and refugee children not only in recent conflict situations but also those from frozen conflicts also deserves particular attention. Recurring incidents of attacks on schools also underscore the importance of and the need for upholding such frameworks as the ‘Safe School Declaration’, aimed at ensuring children in conflict situations continue to enjoy their right to education.
The second issue relates to the settlement of the conditions of conflict and terrorist violence, including the resolution of the underlying causes. In this respect, the issues requiring attention include absence of good governance and democratic inclusion, weak presence of state institutions and public services in areas far from urban centres, depleting resources on which communities depend for their livelihoods, marginalization and inequality and lack of respect for and protection of fundamental rights of affected people. Given the consequences of violence, there is also a need for initiating measures for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of conflict affected regions.
Tomorrow’s session also presents the chance for the PSC to follow up on its request at previous sessions, for the AU Commission to implement Assembly/AU/Dec.718 (XXXII), adopted at the 32nd Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly, convened on 10-11 February 2019. Assembly/AU/Dec.718 (XXXII) underscores four strategic resolutions essential to child protection, which are: the establishment of an accountability, monitoring and reporting mechanism; the development of a child protection architecture for the AU; the establishment of child focal points in all AU missions; and the establishment of an office of Special Envoy on children in situations of conflict. In this respect, the address from the two Commissioners’ remarks is expected to provide update on these four areas relating to AU’s role.
It is also to be recalled that at its previous session, Council was presented with the final ‘Policy on Integration of Child Protection into the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)’, developed by the AU Peace and Security Department (PSD). Tomorrow’s session presents the opportunity to examine the level of implementation of decisions related to child protection, within the framework of APSA, including relevant organs of Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs).
The form that the expected outcome of the session takes remains unknown. It is expected that the PSC will express its concern about the plight of children in conflict affected countries in Africa. The PSC may call on all parties to armed conflicts to comply with international, regional and national instruments applicable to the protection of children in conflict situations, including international human rights law and IHL. It may also call on the AU Commission to ensure the full operationalization and implementation of the AU mechanisms for protection of children in conflict situations. To ensure that children in armed conflicts continue to enjoy their basic rights, Council may urge all relevant actors to strive for ensuring that access to humanitarian assistance is guaranteed to enable children to get access to life saving services including food, health care and education. Council may also underscore the importance for Member States, the AU Commission, RECs/RMs and the international community to enhance their child protection capacity in conflict situations at the national, regional and continental levels. In this regard, the PSC may urge the international community to enhance its support for humanitarian assistance particularly for displaced and refugee children.