CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF THE AGENDA OF SILENCING THE GUNS IN AFRICA

Amani Africa

Date | December, 2020

INTRODUCTION

Silencing the Guns is one of the flagship projects of Africa’s development blue print of Agenda 2063 of the African Union (AU). It provides the overarching objective guiding the efforts of the organization towards achieving a peaceful and secure Africa which is the foundation for the implementation the development and regional integration plans of the continent.

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Briefing on the situation in Somalia

Amani Africa

Date | 22 April, 2021

Tomorrow (22 April) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene virtually its 993rd session to consider the situation in Somalia. The session was not originally part of Council’s monthly programme of work. However, following some of worrying developments which have been unfolding in Somalia recently, Council has been prompted to convene a meeting in order to address these developments. Particularly, Council will be addressing the recent adoption of a bill by the Lower House of the Parliament of Somalia, extending the term of the current President and in effect, postponing the election for another two years.

Opening remarks are expected to be delivered by the PSC Chairperson of the month and Permanent Representative of the Republic of Djibouti, Mohammed Idriss Farah. Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, Bankole Adeoye is also expected to address the PSC. The Council is expecting to receive a briefing on the recent developments from Francisco Madeira, the Special Representative of the AU Commission Chairperson (SRCC) and Head of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). As per the practice of the Council, it is expected that the representative of Somalia, as the country concerned, and Sudan, as Chairperson of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) will also make a statement during the partially open segment of the session.

It is to be recalled that after intense negotiation between the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and Federal Member States (FMS) during the course of 2020, a compromise was reached on switching from the initial plan of one person one vote model to that of a revised national election model known as the “Electoral Constituency Caucuses”. This 17 September 2020 political agreement envisaged that the parliamentary and presidential elections would be held on the basis of a modified form of the previous clan based electoral system in which clan delegates would choose members of the lower house of parliament, who would have in turn chosen the president. The agreement also envisioned that legislative and presidential elections were to be held in December 2020 and February 2021, respectively.

The failure of Somalia political leaders to reach consensus on the modalities for the implementation of the 17 September political agreement has precipitated a level of political tension unprecedented in recent electoral processes in Somalia. It is to be recalled that the expiry of the terms of parliament and the president in December 2020 and February 2021 respectively, without any political consensus on the time and modality of elections plunged Somalia into a constitutional crisis and political uncertainty. Various rounds of talks were held between the relevant stakeholders notably the FGS, FMS and Council of Presidential Candidates (CPC) in February, March and April. Lack of agreement from these rounds of talks has continued to heighten the risk of triggering the unravelling of the delicate political arrangement and the relative stability that country achieved in recent years. For the AU and the troop contributing states of AMISOM, the situation risks the progress that have been achieved through the sacrifice of many made through their lives or limbs while serving the mission.

The constitutional crisis and the political tension witnessed further deterioration following the decision of the lower house of Somalia Parliament to extend its own term of office and that of the president for a further period of two years. President Farmaajo’s assent to the bill into a ‘Special Election Law’ purporting to return Somalia to a one-person one-vote electoral model, which also allows him to delay the election by two years and hence extend his term for two additional years, has exacerbated an already increasingly volatile and tense situation in the country. This has put Somalia in an unchartered constitutional, political and security waters.

The upper house of parliament rejected the term extension as unconstitutional. Beyond the constitutionality that arises from the expiry of the 4-year constitutional term of office of the President, legal experts question the constitutionality of the process adopted for extension of the term of office for a further two-year period without the support of the upper house of parliament. The term extension also implied the end of the 17 September 2020 agreement on the electoral model and timeline.

For tomorrow’s PSC session, this raises the question of the applicability of the AU norm banning unconstitutional changes of government, on the basis of unconstitutional extension of terms within the framework of Article 23 (5) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance.

Politically, this term has been received with opposition from a wide range of Somalia stakeholders as well. Not surprisingly, for many this constituted not only a usurpation of power by the President with the conniving of the lower house, but also a unilateral act that shunned all other political actors. While Puntland and Jubaland announced their rejection of the term extension, the CPC is calling for handover of power by the President to a transitional government headed by the Prime Minister. Various opinion makers and civil society actors also deemed the two-year extension of the term of office of the lower house and the president dangerous and unacceptable. Similarly, members of the international community also criticized the term extension and the delay in planning the elections. Both the US and the EU condemned the term extension, with the US Secretary of State expressing ‘deep disappointment’ and warning that ‘the implementation of this bill will pose serious obstacles to dialogue and further undermine peace and security in Somalia.’ Various international organizations (AMISOM, IGAD, EU, UN) and individual states supporting the stabilization of Somalia in a statement they issued on 14 April were categorical in rejecting any ‘parallel political process, partial elections, or new initiatives leading to an extension of prior mandates.’

Given this policy position that the AU shares with others, the issue for the PSC during its session tomorrow is communicating the position that the AU does not accept or support any attempt at changing the electoral process set in the 17 September Agreement and the need for resolving all the outstanding issues relating to the electoral process through dialogue.

In security terms as well, this situation has led to the emergence of deepening rifts within the security institutions of Somalia as well as among the FMS. In apparent attempt to thwart what he considered to be an illegal term extension, a police commander in Mogadishu, General Sadiq Omar Hassan “John,” ordered his forces to prevent parliamentarians from attending the parliamentary session. Although he was dismissed by the Somalia Police Commissioner, it is reported that he has relocated with his forces to the northern part of Mogadishu, raising fears of risk of fracturing of the security forces of Somalia. It was also reported that a number of soldiers from Somalia’s elite Turkish-trained Gorgor army units have since abandoned base and retreated to their clan strongholds.

While the opposition alliance under the CPC seems to be working with the leaders of Puntland and Jubaland, President Farmaajo continues to enjoy the support of Galmudug, Hirshabelle and South West States’ leaders. This form of division therefore intensifies the risk of clan- based conflict within the country and could further intensify the type of political violence which unfolded during the demonstrations which took place following 8 February – when President Farmaajo’s four years term expired – where protesters were met with brutal police response, which left reportedly eight people dead.

With the political instability having such manifest impact on the country’s security situation and with Al-Shabaab still constituting a major security threat to the country, the continuing implementation of the Somalia Transitional Plan (STP) as well as the drawdown of AMISOM troops and smooth handover of responsibilities to the Somali National Army (SNA) is now put in serious peril.

At its 978th meeting which was its previous session on Somalia, the PSC underscored the need for all relevant stakeholder including FGS, FMS, AU and UN to commit to ongoing dialogue in order to address the impasses on election, political & security issues. In addition, Council also stressed that all concerned actors should avoid taking unilateral or non-consensual measures which may further deepen the existing political stalemates. It is expected that the PSC will reiterate this position, and urge that the unilateral measures threatening the country’s fragile political and security situation are reversed and that the Somalia stakeholders return back to the negotiating table for resolving their differences consensually.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to express its grave concern about the recent developments that pushed the country into deeper constitutional, political and security crises with major risk of the deepening divisions erupting into violence and creating opportunities for Al Shabaab to gain militarily. It may also call on all Somali actors from taking any actions that may aggravate the instability in the country. The PSC may remind the government of Somalia, AU’s rejection of unconstitutional changes of government as well as actions that involve unconstitutional term extension and jeopardize electoral processes and peace and stability. The PSC may call on IGAD, as well as the international community including the UN and EU, to work in collaboration with the AU towards initiating and organising fresh talks which could bring the parties back to negotiation and strive to find a compromise solution. Council in this regard may also expresses AU’s readiness to support Somalia within the framework of the 17 September 2020 agreement and the announcement that President Formajo made, following his meeting with AU’s 2021 Chairperson, President Felix-Antoine Tshisekedi of the DRC on 19 April in Kinshasa, that he welcomes the role of the AU in facilitating a dialogue. Council may also highlight the continued critical role of AMISOM in ensuring stability within the country and contributing towards avoiding the fragmentation among Somalia security forces.


Emergency session on the situation in Chad

Amani Africa

Date | 22 April, 2021

Tomorrow (22 April) afternoon the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene an emergency session on the situation in Chad. It is expected that the PSC Chairperson for the Month, Djibouti’s Permanent Representative to the AU and UNECA, Idriss Farah will make an opening remark. The AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, Bankole Adeoye, who was passing through Chad from a visit to Libya, is also expected to brief the PSC based on information from the ground. The representative of Chad, as the concerned country and the current chairperson of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) are also expected to deliver statements.

The session was called following the announcement of the passing of President Idriss Deby and the political developments that followed this unexpected incident. It is to be recalled that Chadians went to the polls for the national elections on 11 April 2021 in which President Deby was seeking re-election for a sixth term. The death of President Deby came only a day after the electoral commission declared provisional results giving him victory with 79.32% of the votes.

While the details of the circumstances surrounding his death remains unknown, it was on 20 April that the spokesperson of the Chadian army announced on television that President Deby died of wounds he sustained after being shot during a visit of troops on the frontlines fighting armed rebel groups. On 17 April, the US issued a statement announcing that non-essential US government employees have been ordered to leave Chad. This came following the speedy march of armed non-governmental groups in North Chad towards the capital city N’Djamena. Similarly, the UK, which also urged its nationals to leave Chad, reported that a group of Libya-based rebels, the Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT) was heading towards N’Djamena and a separate convoy was seen approaching a town 220 kilometers (137 miles) north of the capital. According to media reports, FACT grew out of rebel groups that were based in Darfur but established their base in the last few years in Libya in the Tibesti mountains, which straddle northern Chad and part of southern Libya.

According to the Constitution of Chad, in the event of the death of the President Article 81 stipulates that the President of the National Assembly takes over power. However, this constitutionally envisaged succession of power was not followed. Instead the military seized power. It closed Chad’s borders and imposed overnight curfew.

The announcement of the death of Deby was followed by a decree declaring the formation of a military transitional council taking over power and designating Deby’s son Mahamat Idriss Deby as head of the Council that seized power. The military spokesperson also announced the dissolution of the government and parliament and the suspension of the Constitution of Chad. According to the military spokesperson, the military council will lead the country on the basis of a transitional charter for 18 months until the organization of election.

The situation has raised alarms about the stability of Chad and its implications for the region. In a short period of time, a country that convened national elections has plunged into an armed conflict and a constitutional crisis that resulted in a major political and social volatility and uncertainty. It is reported that opposition politicians have rejected the military’s move. One of the major opposition leaders Saleh Kebzabo, whose UNDR party boycotted the recent election, told reporters that ‘we must follow the constitution, invite the AU and the UN to help solve our problem’. Another opposition figure proclaimed that this ‘is a coup d’état …and is not acceptable to the people of Chad.’ FACT rebels, who have been leading an offensive against the Chadian regime for nine days, on their part have promised to march on N’Djamena and “categorically” rejected this military council.

In this fast-moving situation, various countries with close ties with Chad have been making statements. In a statement that it issued on 20 April, the US State Department extending its condolences on Deby’s death expressed support for ‘peaceful transfer of power in accordance with the Chadian Constitution’. By contrast and in an announcement that ignores the Constitution of Chad and seems to be in support of the military council, French diplomatic chief Jean-Yves Le Drian called for a military transition of limited duration.

For the PSC, this situation in Chad raises both the need to avoid further deterioration of the security and political situation and the equally critical legal requirement for upholding constitutional rule in Chad. The dynamics in the PSC are such that there is no clarity whether PSC members would automatically apply Article 7(1)(g) of the PSC Protocol on instituting sanctions in the event of an unconstitutional change of government.

The AU legal instruments including the Lomé Declaration of 2000, the AU Constitutive Act, the PSC Protocol and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance ban military coup d’état. Article 7 (1)(g) of the PSC Protocol requires the PSC to ‘institute sanctions whenever an unconstitutional change of government takes place in a member state, as provided for in the Lomé Declaration.’

Over the years, the PSC has developed relatively consistent practice of enforcing this ban on unconstitutional changes of government. This has been particularly the case with respect to military coups. In a similar case that took place in Togo in which, after the death of Togo’s then President Gnassingbé Eyadéma, the country’s military, supported by the ruling party, announced Faure Gnassingbé as the successor to the deceased president, in contravention of the clear provisions of the Constitution of the Togo, on succession to the presidency in the event of the death of the president, the PSC at its 25th session held on 25 February 2005, expressing AU’s strong condemnation of the military coup and suspending the de facto authorities and their representatives from participation in all AU activities, called for return of the country to constitutional legality. In the most recent such incident, it is to be recalled that the PSC at its 941st session, condemning the military takeover of power in Mali and suspending the country from participating in the activities of the AU, called for the transfer of power by the military to a civilian authority. Similarly, in April 2019, at its 840th session, the PSC, rejecting the military seizure of power in Sudan after the incumbent president was overthrown by popular protest and deploring the suspension of the Constitution and dissolution of the National Assembly, which it deemed to constitute a military coup d’état, demanded the military to step aside and hand over power to a transitional civilian political authority within a maximum period of 15 days. This approach itself was based on the earlier decision of the PSC on the case of Burkina Faso in November 2014 when the PSC instead of suspending Burkina Faso immediately gave 15 days for the military to hand over power to a civilian transitional authority.

The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communique. The PSC is expected to pay tribute to President Deby for the contributions he made for peace and security in Africa and affirm its commitment for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and stability of Chad. The PSC is expected to express AU’s condemnation and total rejection of any military seizure of power in accordance with the various AU instruments and the announcement of the suspension of the Constitution and the dissolution of the national assembly. It may further underscore the need for a civilian based political authority and urge the military council to step aside and hand over power to such civilian based political authority. Depending on the information from the ground, the PSC, if it were not to opt for automatic application of the Lomé Declaration and Article 7(1)(g) of the PSC Protocol, may, following the examples of Sudan and Burkina Faso, give the military 15 days from the date of adoption of its decision for handing over power to civilian based political authority, failing which, PSC will automatically apply Article 7(1)(g) of its Protocol. The PSC may also call on ECCAS and the UN to work closely with the AU and initiate a process to facilitate the resolution of the situation in a way that does not endanger the stability and peace of Chad on the basis of AU principles and instruments.


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