Ministerial Session on the Operationalization of APSA in the Sahel
Amani Africa
Date | 27 June, 2018
Today (27 June) the PSC will hold a ministerial session on the role of Africa in the Harmonization of Initiatives and Operationalization of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in the Sahel’. It is expected that the ministerial meeting will receive a briefing report of the AU Commission Chairperson. Apart from its transnational character, the crisis in the Sahel presents particular challenges to the region and the continent for a number of factors. First, the crisis has multiple dimensions including terrorism, trafficking, porous borders, identity based conflicts and weak state institutions. Second, rather than being confined to a particular region, the Sahel crisis transcends regional boundaries covering parts of North Africa and of West Africa. Third and related to this is the fact that there is no one regional mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution on which the response to the crisis can be anchored. Fourth, the crisis intersects with the conflict in Libya and the conflict involving Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin. Fifth, the final factor relate to multiplicity of initiatives and divergence of roles and concerns over both
preponderance of external influence and significantly risks of fragmentation or weakening of the implementation of the APSA in addressing the crisis.
The session is expected to take stock of the political, security and regional developments shaping the crisis in the Sahel. In the political front, apart from the presidential and legislative elections in Mali scheduled for July and November respectively, the session will review the status of implementation of the 2015 Algiers Accord For peace and Reconciliation in Mali. The degree of success in the convening of the elections is seen to be critical. It presents an opportunity for renewed active pursuit of the peace process in the country, key to addressing the crisis in the country. From the perspective of the implementation of the 2015 peace agreement, issues of concern for PSC members include the lack of trust between the parties, slow pace of its implementation and the impact of heavy attention on security measures associated with the G5 Sahel Joint Force on the peace process.
Perhaps of major interest for the ministerial session of the PSC is the security dimension of the situation in the Sahel. Indeed, as pointed out in the briefing report, the session would zero on ‘the efforts of Africa to take ownership of the Sahel initiatives and to see how well the overall Regional ad-hoc initiatives fall within the framework of the African Standby Force (FAA), within the APSA, in conformity with the Communiqué of the PSC of 13 November 2017, in which Council, in the face of emerging threats in the Sahel in particular, stressed the need for a better articulation of Regional and interregional initiatives within the context of APSA.’ This particular focus of the session accordingly has two diemnsions. The first of this relate to the question of enhancing the ownership of African actors, particularly countries of the region, on the sahel initiatives. This seem to particularly concern the G5 Sahel Joint Force. This is a force of 5000 military personnel, police officers, gendarmerie and border patrol officers only of five states in the Sahel: Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. The PSC mandated the deployment of the Joint Force for an initial period of one year in the communiqué of its 679th meeting of April 2017. In terms of the operationalization of the Force, the Force headquarters was set up in Sévaré, Mali at the end of 2017. On 31 October 2017, the Force undertook its first cross border operation, ‘Hawbi’, in the central sector involving Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. It has since undertaken its second operation in the same sector.
Two areas would in particular be of interest to the PSC in the operationalization of the G5 Sahel Joint Force. First is the establishment of the command and organizational structures of the Force. Related to this is also the issue of coordination between the operations of the force and the implementation of the various Sahel strategies. Second is the provision and coordination of support including funding for the Joint Mission.
With respect to the command and organizational set up of the Joint Force, the operationalization of the Central Command Post and its coordination with and setting up of sectors’ command is of interest to the PSC. It is reported that France provides organizational structure to the Force and takes part in the six monthly meeting of the military command. Another area of interest is the mechanism required for ensuring coordination between the Joint Force and the various other regional and international operations in the Sahel and significantly with other Sahel countries outside of the G5. As noted in the AU Commission Chairperson’s briefing report, ‘there is an imperative need for cooperation but especially for coordination in order to avoid any competitive approach that would only be counterproductive to the resolution of the problems identified in the Region.’
The issue for the PSC here is how the G5 Sahel can accentuate regional ownership, reinforce the peace process in Mali and facilitate international support while operating within the framework of the APSA, allaying fears of weakening of the application of APSA processes and standards. It is to be recalled that the 13 April 2017 communiqué of the PSC envisaged close cooperation with Sahel countries that are not members of the G5 Sahel within the framework of the implementation plan of the concept of operations of the G5 Sahel Joint Force. Undoubtedly, international support including notably that of France seems key for the effective operationalization of the G5 Sahel Joint Force. Perhaps, one way of addressing concerns around the application of the APSA in the Sahel is the integration of APSA processes and standards in the operationalization of the G5 Force. This can be done through enabling the AU to provide the civilian capacity that the PSC communiqué authorizing the Force stipulated, including those necessary for enhancing compliance with international human rights and international humanitarian law by the Force. The other aspect relate to the operationalization of the MoU that the G5 Sahel Secretariat and the AU Commission signed on 23 March 2018 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
While there is heavy focus on the G5 Sahel Joint Force, other initiatives such as the Nouakchott Process, which seeks to facilitate horizontal security coordination and intelligence sharing and cooperation among all countries of the Sahel, did not fare well. The forces attracted support from the European Union (€100 million), Saudi Arabia (€100 million), the United Arab Emirates (€30 million), and Rwanda and Turkey. As the Chairperson’s briefing report rightly pointed out, ‘Rwanda remains to date the only African country to have made a financial contribution to the operationalisation of the G5 Force. Surely, the AU Member States should show greater solidarity with the Sahel and Lake Chad countries.’ In terms of the preferred option for addressing the challenges of predictable funding, the briefing note states that ‘the best option for an initiative such as the G5 Joint Force would be to establish it as an autonomous brigade within MINUSMA, modeled on the MONUSCO Intervention Brigade.’ Another issue that has increasingly become a conern for AU as reflected in PSC meetings is the issue around the presence of internaitonal forces in the Sahel involving what the report called ‘a gradual militarization of the foreign intervention in the Sahel, which only partially addresses the challenges in the region.’
The expected outcome of the ministerial session is a communiqué. It is anticipated that the communiqué will welcome the progress being witnessed towards the organization of the elections in Mali, notably the presidential election expected to take place next month. It is also expected to underscore the importance of the full and timely implementation of the 2015 peace agreement for consolidating peace, while expressing concern about new conflict trends intersecting ethnicity and terrorism. In terms of coordinaiton, it is expected to reiterate the previous decision of the PSC on close cooperation with Sahel countries including those not members of the G5 Sahel within the framework of the implementation plan of the concept of operations of the G5 Sahel Joint Force. Beyond emphasizing the importance of the Nouakchott Process the communiqué expected to provide for the establishment of a high level ad hoc committee for coordination and mobilization of support for Sahel within the framework of the APSA. It is also expected to urge international partners to support the operationalization of the APSA in the Sahel in the implementation of the G5 Sahel Force both for mobilizing wider regional support and consolidating the gains registered in establishing and activating the APSA for which partner support played key part. As part of this, the communiqué is expected to provide for the provision of civilian capacity including experts in human rights and international humanitarian law by the AU within the G5 Sahel Force and the operationalization of the MoU that the AU Commission and the G5 Sahel Secretariat signed in March this year. Other issues the communiqué is anticipated to address include the need for addressing the Libyan crisis, the concern over the gradual militarization of international intervention in the Sahel and the imperative for prioritizing political solutions and the economic development and post-conflict reconstruction programmes, within the priorities determined by the Sahel states themselves.
Open session on refugee protection, migration and human rights in Africa
Amani Africa
Date | 20 June, 2018
PSC Open Session on Refugee Protection, Migration and Human Rights in Africa
Tomorrow (20 June) the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) will have an Open Session on Refugee Protection, Migration and Human Rights in Africa marking the Africa and World Refugee Day.
The session will receive a briefing from AU Department of Political Affairs on existing AU normative framework, initiatives and projects on migration, forced displacement and integration. Chair of the AU Permanent Representatives’ Committee (PRC) Sub‐Committee on Refugees, Returnees and
Internally Displaced Persons will also make statement. Representatives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the ICRC, Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs), European Union and various embassies and members of the civil society working on migration, internally displaced people (IDPs) and statelessness will also be part of the session.
The focus of this year’s theme of the world refugee day is ‘the world we want: Inclusion, empowerment. And access to services for refugees’. In this respect, the session is expected to examine the current state of the crisis of IDPs, refugees, and migrants in Africa in respect to access to services. In terms of the Africa refugee day, which coincides with the world refugee day, it is an occasion for highlighting preparations for the 50th year anniversary of the 1969 OAU Convention for Refugees in 2019. The session is accordingly expected to hear about the emerging best practices and stories of African refugees in terms particularly of inclusion, empowerment and access to services.
As outlined in the concept note for the session, some of the key issues for deliberation include the scale and trend of the flow of refugees in Africa, the factors behind the trend and the challenges arising from the rise in the flow of refugees in Africa. The 2017 UNHCR statistics show that there are 6.2 million refugees and asylum seekers in Africa, hence overwhelming majority of African refugees are hosted in African countries. As the major African countries of origin of refugees identified in the concept note indicate (Burundi, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan), the vast majority of refugees in Africa are in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa regions, highlighting that much of the refugee flow is associated with regions witnessing high level of conflicts and violence.
These features of the refugee problem in Africa raise two crucial issues for discussion for tomorrow’s session.
First, there is a case to be made from the regional concentration of refugees (Horn of Africa and Great Lakes regions) for having architecture on the protection of refugees focusing particularly on these two regions. This can be a question of operationalization of the African Humanitarian Architecture focusing on the refugee crisis in these regions. Alternatively, it can be a question of initiating coordination and response mobilization platform bringing affected countries of the two regions.
Second, the close association of refugee flows and conflicts also raises questions about the necessity of factoring in the plight of refugees in conflict management and conflict resolution processes. In this respect, one issue that needs to be addressed is the lack of mechanism for integration into and consideration within the PSC processes of the work and input of the PRC Sub-Committee on Refugees, Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons and the Special Rapporteur of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights on Refugees, Asylum Seekers and Internally Displaced Persons.
Tomorrow’s session will take place against the backdrop of the July 2017 decision of the AU’s Executive Council declaring 2019 the Year of Refugees, Returnees and IDPs. Next year also marks ten years to the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa known as the Kampala Convention. The coming year will thus see a series of commemorative events aimed at raising the visibility of the issue of forced displacements in Africa. In the briefing from the DPA, the steps being taken to operationalize the African Humanitarian Architecture as per the relevant decision of the Executive Council, AU responses to the refugee crisis in Africa and the plans for the 2019 Year of Refugees, Returnees and IDPs is expected to receive attention. With respect to response to the refugee crisis, reference would be made to the various emerging best practices that host countries are implementing and also the challenges they are facing.
The chairperson of the PRC Subcommittee is expected to highlight the activities of the committee. This is expected to draw on the report that the sub-committee presents to the PRC. Among others, this is expected to draw attention to the various field missions that the Subcommittee undertook, most notably for purposes of the PSC, to countries in conflict. These include DRC, Nigeria and South Sudan.
With respect to migration, update would be provided on efforts for addressing the plight of migrants particularly in Libya and those crossing the Mediterranean Sea. As the 12 June statement of Moussa Faki Mahamat, AU Commission Chairperson suggest, one of the issues expected to draw particular attention is the risk that 600 refugees stranded in the Mediterranean Sea faced and the reluctance European countries showed to assist them. This incident also draws attention to the efforts for addressing the plight of migrants stranded in Libya including in terms of both their repatriation and their being held in illegal detention centers where they have been held captive and auctioned for slavery. In this regard, the PSC is expected to welcome the decision of the UN Security Council imposing sanctions on six individuals accused of leading smuggling and trafficking networks of migrants in Africa.
It is also anticipated that the ten-year AU Migration Policy Framework (MPFA) Plan of Action (2018 – 2027) will inform the part of the deliberation on migration. The framework envisions coherent management of migration and harmonization of the different continental documents and initiatives on migration and movement and displacement. In terms of issues affecting the response of the AU to issues of migration, Chairperson Mahamat’s January 2018 report on the activities of the AU and its organs noted the related challenges of speaking with one voice due to varying interests and priorities of various AU actors and inadequate resources for supporting continental common positions, and the resultant donor dependency.
While representatives of AU states participating in the session would highlight their respective experiences, best practices and challenges faced including in terms of inclusion, empowerment and access to service of refugees, many are also expected to highlight not only the need for mobilizing support for the humanitarian needs of refugees and IDPs but also the imperative of addressing the root causes of forced displacement including refugee flows. In this respect, the importance of the AU Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons, Rights of Residence and Establishment and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) is expected to be underscored. The promotion of regional integration, trade and human mobility and Africa Union’s border management mechanism will be discussed through the lens of migration, and as durable solutions to the crisis.
The expected outcome of the session is a statement. Various themes are expected to be addressed in the statement.
These include the role of conflicts in Africa in precipitating forced displacement including refugees, commendation of the efforts of host countries in providing protection for refugees and calling for continental and international support for these efforts and the challenges facing migrants particularly those in Libya and the need for assistance of those crossing the Mediterranean Sea. Other areas to be addressed include the need for establishing mechanism/approach within PSC processes for ensuring that issues of refugees and IDPs are systematically integrated in conflict management and resolution initiatives (such as through preparation of quarterly/biannually special reports focusing on this theme) and the possibility of an initiative for establishing regional coordination and response architecture for the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa as the regions with the most refugees.
PSC field visits and follow up on their outcomes
Amani Africa
Date |12 June, 2018
Tomorrow (12 June) the Peace and Security Council (PSC) will have a session focusing on PSC field missions and the follow up to the outcome of the filed missions. The PSC Secretariat is expected to provide inputs. During the past two months the PSC undertook field missions to Sudan, Darfur and South Sudan.
Field visit has become part of the working methods of the PSC with the adoption of the Conclusions of the Yaoundé Retreat of the PSC held on 15-16 November 2012. The Conclusions provided that members agreed to ‘the need to undertake field missions, especially to the conflict areas’. The following year the PSC undertook field visits to a number of major conflict zones, notably Darfur in Sudan, Goma in the eastern DRC, Mogadishu in Somalia and Abyei in South Sudan, making the visits in 2013 the highest number of visits undertaken by the PSC in one calendar year.
The PSC field visits serve a wide range of purposes in terms of the effective implementation of the PSC Protocol. They provide PSC members first hand insights on the conflict parties, the nature of the conflict and indeed the security and humanitarian impact of particular conflicts. Such insights would help PSC members to have a more effective participation in the policy deliberations of the PSC on the specific conflict situations. Field visits can also play a role of supporting ongoing efforts for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts including mediation and peace-making efforts as well as peace support operations. In an ongoing conflict, field visits, if implemented effectively and are accompanied by follow up action, which can help in reducing violence.
Despite the fact that the field visits have become part of the PSC working methods, the details that could guide field visits are not elaborated in any of the subsequent retreats of the PSC. As a result, the role of field visits, the choice and timing of the places for field visits, the drafting and consideration of the reports including their publication and the mechanism for their follow up are yet to be properly clarified.
The current practice shows that PSC field visits are organized based on specific terms of reference. Often, the PSC Chair of the Month decides on the choice and inclusion of field visit in the monthly program of work of the PSC. For the field missions undertaken in the past two months, the visits were undertaken at a time different from the periods proposed in the program of the month.
In terms of best practice, the PSC Secretariat has started issuing statements on the field visits. When the PSC commenced its field visit to South Sudan, the AU issued a press statement outlining the purpose of the visit, how it relates to ongoing efforts for resolution of the conflict and the places that the PSC would travel to during its field visit in South Sudan. Even more interesting is the fact that the PSC Secretariat issued press release on PSC’s field visit to Sudan two times. The first time was on 7 May 2018 after its arrival and commencement of the filed visit. Apart from providing the itinerary of the PSC, it highlighted the various stakeholders the PSC plans to interact with. As the press statement for the field visit to South Sudan, this one also indicated the significance of the timing of the field visit.
It can also be gathered from these recent visits that timing of visits is generally tied with significant developments relating to the conflict situation. While the visit to South Sudan comes at a time when the sub-regional body the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has been trying to have the peace process back on track with its High-Level Revitalization Process, the visit to Sudan is linked to the ongoing process on the review and downsizing of the UN-AU Hybrid Mission to Darfur (UNAMID).
Another good practice is the preparation of the field visits report and its presentation to and consideration by the PSC. This is very critical. The report helps not only in documenting the information gathered during the field visit but also in informing the follow up to the field visits.
Currently, the PSC field visit reports are not made public. This is in part a result of the lack of detailed guideline on the PSC filed visits including the status of the field visit reports. Importantly however there is ongoing debate in the PSC on whether the report should include everything that the PSC gathered during its interactions with various stakeholders. There are members of the PSC who do not seem comfortable with the inclusion of certain details owing to the fact that they ring too intrusive and may undermine the sovereignty of the country concerned.
Apart from the foregoing issues on clarifying the mechanics of the organization and outcome of PSC field visits, in tomorrow’s session the PSC would also reflect on the outcome of its field visits. In this respect issues for consideration include timeline for finalizing the PSC decisions and follow up on the implementation of the decisions. Given the importance of field visits and the expanding richness of the PSC practice on field visits, the outcome of tomorrow’s session may include the formulation of the relevant practices into PSC working methods as guidelines on the conduct and outcome of PSC field visits.