Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - July 2024
Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - July 2024
Date | July 2024
During Angola’s chairmanship in July, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) planned to conduct five substantive sessions, one informal consultation, and a field mission to Mozambique. There were two changes to the Provisional Programme of Work (PPoW) for the month.
Of the five sessions, two were dedicated to addressing country-specific situations. The remaining three sessions, along with the informal consultation, focused on thematic matters. During the month, except for one ministerial-level session, all the sessions were held at the ambassadorial level.
Provisional Program of Work of the PSC for the Month of September 2024
Provisional Program of Work of the PSC for the Month of September 2024
Date | September 2024
In September, the Republic of Cameroon will assume the role of Chair of the Peace and Security Council for the month. The month’s Provisional Programme of Work (PPoW) includes five substantive PSC sessions and two field missions. Four substantive sessions will occur on thematic issues while one substantive session and two field missions will address country-specific situations. In addition to its field mission, members of the Council will partake in several bilateral and multilateral engagements for the month, most notably the 79th United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) where the major highlight is the Summit of the Future.
The first session of the month, scheduled for 2 September, will focus on the Protection of Journalists in Conflict Situations in Africa. This session marks the Council’s inaugural endeavour to address the protection of journalists in conflict situations. The session is prompted by the rising number of journalists trapped in war which is exemplified in the case of the war in Sudan where reports on the targeting and attacks on journalists by both of the conflict actors are ostensible. The session is an opportune moment for the Council to address the needs of journalists in the context of conflict.
During the second week of September, the Council will undertake a field mission to the Central Africa Republic (CAR) between 9-11 September. The field mission will commemorate African Amnesty Month, which has taken place every September since 2017 as part of AU’s flagship project on Silencing the Guns. During the last commemoration, the Council undertook a field mission to Maputo, Mozambique which focused on lessons learned from Mozambique on Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR). In addition to the commemoration of Amnesty Month, the Council will also undertake consultations with the CAR government as a follow-up to its recent session held in July where the Council deliberated on the status of the implementation of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in CAR (PAPR-CAR) and the preparation for local elections. It may be beneficial for the Council to use this engagement as an opportunity to identify dedicated support to the CAR for bridging the gap and facilitating the minimum consensus necessary for an inclusive and participatory electoral process for local elections.
Upon completing a field mission to the Central African Republic (CAR), the Council will conduct another field visit to Gabon. During this visit, the Council will engage with the transitional government to discuss the process of returning to constitutional order. This session is particularly important as it coincides with the one-year anniversary of the military coup in Gabon on August 30, 2023. The transitional government has taken some measures to facilitate a return to constitutional order, such as launching the National Dialogue process in April 2024 and establishing a transitional timeline. Additionally, the Council will consult with the regional decision-making body of ECCAS. This is similar to the consultation the PSC held in April with the ECOWAS Council.
On 16 September Civil-Military Relations and Conflict Management in Africa. The PSC over the past two years has consistently scheduled a session on civil-military relations as a factor for peace and security in Africa’ in 2022 and a session on Code of Conduct on the Civil-Military-Relations in Africa at the Military Staff Committee in 2023, although the session in the end did not materialise despite having been scheduled. The session will provide an opportunity for the Council to have dedicated attention to this crucial matter.
On 18 September, the PSC will host an open ambassadorial-level session on ‘Disaster Management in Africa: Nexus between Climate Change, Peace, and Security in Africa’. This session comes at a time when African member states are increasingly engaged in discussions about the impact of climate change and the rising number of disasters on the continent over the past decade. There has been a noticeable increase in natural disasters across Africa, ranging from the devastating impact of Storm Daniel in Libya, which resulted in the deaths of over 4,000 civilians, to the consistent occurrence of cyclones in southern Africa, particularly Mozambique, as well as an increasing number of floods in East Africa. These events highlight the growing concern around natural disasters in Africa. It is crucial for the Council to address the root causes and find sustainable solutions to the challenges posed by natural disasters. The Council has not yet requested the identification of mitigation strategies, which is an essential step towards addressing this issue. During the PSC’s 1043rd session on ‘Addressing Disaster Management Issues in Africa: Challenges and Perspectives for Human Security’, concrete measures were not taken to address the impact of natural disasters on human security. Considering the increasing number of natural disasters since the last session, it is vital for the Council to use this session as an opportunity to identify mitigation measures that member states can take to protect their citizens in the face of the growing likelihood of natural disasters.
On the margins of the Summit of the Futures, on 25 September, the PSC will have a session on new security threats in Africa and the future of the PSC at the ministerial level, as part of the anniversary of the PSC @20. This will take forward the issues identified during the summit level 20th anniversary of the PSC held in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania on 25 May and build on the Dar es Salaam Declaration on the anniversary.
As the last session of the month, the PSC will receive an update on the situation in South Sudan on 30 September. Over this year, the PSC has engaged the situation in South Sudan by undertaking a field mission and holding its 1219th session to consider the adoption of the Report of its field mission to South Sudan. Key elements that may be relevant for the PSC to consider during its session include the PSC’s request for the AUC Chair to support South Sudan in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and Security Sector Reform (SSR); the training deployment of Necessary United Force (NUF) and the Councils request for the AUC to provide technical support and coordinate with relevant actors in mobilising technical and financial assistance as South Sudan as it prepares for its upcoming elections.
In addition to the substantive sessions and activities of the PSC, the program of work for the month also encompasses the meetings of the PSC subsidiary bodies. The Committee of Experts (CoE) is expected to continue their preparatory meeting on the 18th Annual Joint Consultation between the PSC and UNSC, which has been consecutively tabled on the PSC agenda since July. The Military Staff Committee will also convene on 5 September to engage with the African Peace Support Trainers Association.
Inclusive Education in Conflict Situations
Inclusive Education in Conflict Situations
Date | 20 August 2024
Tomorrow (21 August), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1229th session focusing on inclusive education in conflict situations.
The Permanent Representative of Botswana to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for the month of August 2024, Tebelelo Boang, will deliver opening remarks followed by Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). Professor Mohammed Belhocine, AU Commissioner for Education, Science, Technology and Innovation will brief the PSC. Bruce Mokaya Orina, Head of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Delegation to the AU is also expected to make a presentation alongside a representative of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO).
Tomorrow’s session is being convened as one of the follow-up commitments by AU member states during the High-Level Side Event on “Transforming Education in Africa” held at the margins of the global Transforming Education Summit (TES) and the 77th United Nations General Assembly, on 20 September 2022. It is also being held within the framework of the AU theme of 2024 which is ‘Educate an African fit for the 21st Century: Building resilient education systems for increased access to inclusive, lifelong, quality and relevant learning in Africa.’ Given Africa’s ongoing and widespread conflicts, addressing the devastating effects on education is crucial for minimising the impacts of conflicts and break the cycle of violence.
The open session is expected to address at least three inter-related issues. The first of these concerns the kind of challenges that arise for education in conflict situations. The second set of issues concerns the different manifestations of the impact of conflicts on education in territories affected by conflict in various parts of the continent. The third set of issues addresses what these challenges and manifestations of the impact of conflicts on education mean for the mandate of the PSC and how the PSC may build on and take forward its previous engagements on the issue.
The challenges to education arising in conflict situations can be categorised into four categories. The first category relates to the impact on the students and teachers as they become victims of violence and are forced into displacement due to the conflict and into joining the ranks of fighters as well as due to the disruption that the conflict causes to essential services and access to basic necessities. The second category is a manifestation of breaches of international humanitarian law as the education system including education facilities are damaged and destroyed. Third, there is the practice of the occupation of education facilities by armed groups and their use for military purposes. Finally, it is worth highlighting that women and girls in the education system are disproportionately affected by the adverse consequences of conflicts on education.
Recently, Sudan has become the world’s largest child displacement crisis, with over 4 million children forced from their homes, since April 2023, including nearly 1 million children crossing into neighbouring countries. This has led to the country having one of the worst education crises in the world, with more than 90% of the country’s 19 million school-age children having no access to formal education. On 14 August 2024, at least five children were reportedly killed and 20 injured in shelling of a school and market in El Obeid city. To date, most schools remain closed for the second school year in a row. More than 17 million, of the 19 million school-aged children, are out of school. More than 110 schools and hospitals have been attacked since the beginning of the conflict and hundreds of schools are used as shelters for the internally displaced, constraining access to education in areas where schools have been partially opened. Thousands have been killed or injured and many more have suffered grave violations including sexual violence, forced recruitment and other horrific abuses. The number of these grave violations against children has increased dramatically from 2022 to 2023, and, sad to say, the problem continues to worsen.
In the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), about 900,000 children aged 6 to 17 are out of school due to armed conflicts in the region. This contributed to the 1.3 million children being out of school in the country. North Kivu province, for instance, has been particularly affected with nearly 1,000 primary schools closed in the first quarter of 2024.
In the Central African Republic Children continue to suffer greatly from ongoing violence, displacement and natural disasters. The country has been engulfed in a decade-long cycle of violence and instability. A brutal conflict erupted in the capital, Bangui, in late 2013, and despite brief periods of calm, widespread fighting continued, with civilians bearing the impetus of the attacks. A peace agreement signed in 2019, however, failed to bring lasting peace. While the intensity of violence has eased somewhat since the height of the 2021 crisis, the country remains in a dire humanitarian situation. Even though there has been some improvement in security, nearly half the country’s population, including 1.3 million children, still needs humanitarian aid. Ongoing conflict, displacement and natural disasters continue to devastate families, especially those in the most vulnerable communities. UNICEF data reveals a dire humanitarian situation with 1.4 million children in urgent need of assistance. In addition, around 514,000 people are internally displaced, while a total of 3.4 million people are requiring humanitarian aid.
In Ethiopia on the other hand, recent statistics show that ‘approximately 17 million children, spanning pre-primary, primary and junior secondary levels, are currently out of school with nearly half of them being girls. Additionally, an estimated 3.5 million children at primary and secondary levels are at risk of dropping out, further exacerbating the education crisis.’ In various parts of the country, school disruptions due to conflict and insecurity have resulted in numerous challenges, including increased school dropout rates and a rise in child marriage.
In Mali, according to the 2024 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan (HNRP), an estimated 7.1 million people need humanitarian assistance, 54% of them being children. In the context of the ongoing conflict involving terrorist groups, a staggering 1,024 grave violations were documented in 2022 alone. The escalating violence, as evidenced by a 76% increase in violent events between 2020 and 2023, has severely disrupted education. Over 1,700 schools have been closed, denying over half a million children access to learning and impacting thousands of teachers. This educational disruption has put children at heightened risk of exploitation and abuse. The convergence of conflict and climate change has created a humanitarian catastrophe with devastating consequences for children, leading to an increase in out-of-school children.
In northern Mozambique, recent attacks and the ensuing fear in Cabo Delgado, have caused a humanitarian crisis, displacing nearly 100,000 people, including over 60,000 children. This mass displacement has left children extremely vulnerable to violence, exploitation and recruitment by armed groups. Over 100 schools have been forced to close due to insecurity in Cabo Delgado and Nampula provinces, disrupting the education of more than 50,000 children. The crisis has also cut off essential services, including healthcare, nutrition and sanitation, for countless families.
In Somalia, decades of conflict have ravaged the country’s health and education systems, leaving them severely underfunded, inaccessible and ineffective. As a consequence, the vast majority of children – nearly 85% – are not enrolled in school.
The foregoing highlights of the impacts of conflict on education show the necessity for paying particular attention to promoting inclusive education in conflict-affected areas. This can be done through enhancing the protection of education facilities, supporting the continuing operation of schools and educational activities, prioritising support for education, particularly for female students and teachers, in designing and implementing humanitarian assistance for internally displaced people (IDPs), refugees and asylum seekers. Thus, apart from the challenges and the various manifestations of the impact of conflicts on education, the open session is also expected to highlight some of the successful models of inclusive education in conflict situations. In this regard, it is expected to explore effective strategies and initiatives that have promoted inclusive education in conflict-affected regions of Africa. A specific example is in the Eastern DRC region where an alternative learning opportunity for displaced children has been introduced. The radio education program, launched in January 2024 has enabled children, by participating in listening clubs organised at displacement sites, to continue to learn and acquire the knowledge and skills necessary to pursue their education as soon as possible.
In terms of addressing critical issues, the PSC may follow up on its 597th session that called on all Member States in conflict situations to comply with international humanitarian law and to ensure that schools are not used for military purposes and its support for the ‘Safe Schools Guidelines,’ and urged all the other AU Member States, which have not yet done so, also to endorse these Guidelines. Going beyond the issue of protection of education facilities, the PSC during its 661st meeting underlined the ‘need for governments to institutionalise the protection of children within their disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR) programmes, as well as to include rehabilitation and opportunities for education to former child soldiers, particularly in countries emerging from conflicts.’ The PSC could also build on its 706th session, which, expressing ‘deep concern at the high number of out-of-school children in Africa, particularly in countries affected by armed conflict and the resultant effect of extreme poverty’, underscored the need to have an ‘enhanced coordination by the AU Commission Departments of Social Affairs, Political Affairs, Science and Technology and Peace and Security, amongst others, to address issues pertaining to child soldiers and out-of-school children, in particular, their education, health and security.’ In the same vein, the PSC ‘underscored the need for the AU to establish a comprehensive child protection architecture within the AU Commission, with a view to ensure the full implementation of various instruments adopted at the continental and international level to this effect.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué or a press statement. The PSC may express concern over the scale and dire state of the impact of conflicts on education and the implications of the high-level disruption of access to education to the attainment of the objectives of Agenda 2063. The PSC may call for the imperative for ensuring respect for and full compliance with the rules of international humanitarian law and, reiterating its previous sessions, urge all member states to endorse and promote the Safe School Declaration. Council may welcome the initiatives some Member States have taken to promote and protect the right of children to education and to facilitate the continuation of education in situations of armed conflicts. It may also call on humanitarian actors and states to prioritise the provision of education to IDPs, refugees and asylum seekers in their planning of the provision of humanitarian assistance. The PSC may also reiterate its call for ‘enhanced coordination by the AU Commission Departments of Social Affairs, Political Affairs, Science and Technology and Peace and Security, amongst others, to address issues pertaining to child soldiers and out-of-school children, in particular, their education, health and security.’ The PSC may also underscore the need for mainstreaming of measures for the protection of education facilities and creating conditions for enabling the provision of education in conflict settings in all AU peace and security initiatives as part of its role in promoting the protection of Civilians. It may also underscore the need for provision of unhindered humanitarian access as a key mechanism for facilitating opportunities for the provision of education opportunities for children affected by conflicts and psycho-social support. The PSC may also further underscore the need for prioritising enhanced support for the rehabilitation and speedy resumption of normal education processes as part of post-conflict reconstruction and development measures.
Briefing on the situation in Sudan
Briefing on the situation in Sudan
Date | 18 August 2024
Tomorrow (19 August), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1228th session to discuss the situation in Sudan.
The Permanent Representative of Botswana to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for the month of August 2024, Tebelelo A. Boang will deliver opening remarks. Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) is also expected to make a statement. Mohamed Ibn Chambas, Chairperson of the AU High-Level Panel on Sudan and AU High Representative for Silencing the Guns in Africa will also deliver a briefing which will be followed by a statement by the representative of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD).
The last time the PSC discussed Sudan was at its 1218th meeting on 21 June held at the Heads of State and Government level in which it directed the AU Commission Chairperson to urgently set up a PSC Ad–hoc Presidential Committee comprising one Head of State and Government from each region of the continent led by Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, President of Uganda and PSC Chairperson for June 2024. The establishment of the Ad–hoc Presidential Committee aims to bring the weight of the wider AU membership to bear on the leaders of the warring parties towards facilitating a face-to-face engagement between them. Apart from following up on the implementation of the outcome of its 1218th session, tomorrow’s session is expected to review the state of the diplomatic efforts towards peace in Sudan. An important aspect of the focus of the session would be on the work of the AU High-Level Panel on Sudan.
In his update, it is expected that the Chair of the AU High-Level Panel, Chambas, will provide an update on the work done thus far. Following the listening tour of the Panel for engaging Sudanese actors and neighbouring countries, the focus of the Panel has been on preparing for an inclusive inter-Sudanese political dialogue. It is to be recalled that the PSC at its 1209th session tasked the Panel as part of the process for the convening of the political dialogue to convene ‘the preparatory/planning process’ in collaboration with IGAD and neighbouring states.
Since then, the Panel together with the IGAD Special Envoy for Sudan convened the preparatory meeting for an Inter-Sudanese Political Dialogue in Addis Ababa from 10-15 July 2024. While the plan was to engage Sudanese political and civilian actors on principles to guide the dialogue, the agenda or issues to be on the agenda of the political dialogue, criteria for participation/or representation in the political dialogue and the venue of the inter-Sudanese political dialogue. A significant portion of Sudanese political and civilian forces, who expressed reservations about the inadequacy of consultations in preparing the preparatory meeting and the lack of transparency about the list of participants, boycotted the meeting. Despite this setback, the meeting was conducted with those present at the AU headquarters. Upon the conclusion of the meeting, the participants submitted their recommendations on the convening of the inter-Sudanese dialogue. Recognising the need for engaging other Sudanese stakeholders, Chambas in his remark at the closing of the meeting noted that ‘this particular meeting is one in a series of consultations’ rather than the one preparatory meeting initially expected. Explaining further, he indicated that ‘this will be followed by consultations with Taqqdum, SLM Abdul Wahid, SPLM-North Al Hilu, the Radical Block and others.’
As a follow-up to the foregoing and following the consultations, another round of preparatory meeting was convened from 9-12 August. This round brought together Sudanese civil and political actors that did not participate in the initial convening including representatives of Taqadum, SPLM-North Al Hilu, SLM Abdul Wahid, Ba’ath Party, DUP, and PCP. Following three days of meeting, Tagadum, the DUP and the PCP prepared and submitted a joint document containing their recommendations on the agenda, participation/representation, the phases of the dialogue and the role of the mediator and the international community in the inter-Sudanese dialogue. The armed movements SPLM-North Al Hilu and SLM Abdul Wahid did not sign this joint document.
At the conclusion of the second preparatory meeting, Chambas indicated that the outcome document from this consultation would be synthesised with the outcomes of other consultations to develop the guiding principles, possible agenda and criteria of representation. Considering the differences between the group that participated in the initial meeting and the group in the latest preparatory meeting, there is an expectation on the Panel from some of the participants that the Panel would put forward a bridging proposal to the civilian and political actors based on a synthesis of the proposals presented to it from the two rounds.
Apart from the activities of the AU High-Level Panel, it would also be of interest for members of the PSC to be updated on the status of other diplomatic efforts including those led by the Personal Envoy of the UN Secretary-General and the ceasefire talks being held in Geneva. The UN Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy for Sudan Ramtane Lamamra convened the Sudanese warring parties for proximity talks in Geneva from 11 and 19 July 2024. According to a press release on 19 July 2024, the Personal Envoy and his team had around 20 sessions with the parties, including technical and plenary meetings. Lamamra characterised the meeting as an encouraging initial step in what is likely to be a longer and more complex mediation process. He expressed his intentions to remain in close contact with them to follow up on the implementation of commitments made and address critical issues.
In addition to Lamamra’s ongoing efforts, the US invited the Sudanese parties to participate in ceasefire talks scheduled for 14 August in Geneva. This followed the apparent suspension of the US-Saudi facilitated talks in Jeddah in December 2023 apparently because of the failure of the parties to implement the commitments made as part of the talks, including confidence-building measures and the withdrawal of military forces from key cities.
The US-led Geneva talks, which will be co-sponsored by Saudi Arabia and Switzerland and involve the African Union, the United Nations, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates as observers, intend to facilitate a nationwide cessation of violence to allow humanitarian access to all those in need and develop a robust monitoring and verification mechanism to ensure the implementation of any agreement. The leader of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemeti) welcomed the invitation and expressed his commitment to participate constructively in the talks. The leader of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) Abdel Fettah al-Burhan had also accepted the invitation on the condition that ‘any negotiations before … full withdrawal and an end to expansion (by the RSF) will not be acceptable to the Sudanese people,’ according to media reports. Later on, however, he appears to have backtracked on this after surviving a drone strike while on a military graduation ceremony at the Sudanese army base in eastern Sudan that reportedly left at least five people killed. The US Secretary of State Antony Blinken spoke to Al-Burhan on the phone on 5 August 2024 and urged him to attend the talks. Al-Burhan subsequently sent his delegations to Jeddah for consultations with the US but the meeting reportedly ended without any agreement on SAF’s participation at the Geneva talks. On 14 August, it was reported that Burhan ruled out ceasefire talks until the withdrawal of RSF from the cities it occupies. Despite sending delegations and declaring this as a testament to its commitment, the RSF delegation was not present at the start of the talks on 14 August. One significant development during the Geneva engagement is the announcement made on 17 August regarding the decision by the Sovereign Council of Sudan and commitments made by the RSF concerning humanitarian access. A joint statement by the international delegation highlighted the recent decision by the Sovereign Council of Sudan to open a border crossing from Chad to Nonn Danur via Adre for the next three months and the commitments made by the RSF to allow for humanitarian delivery through Dabbah, providing aid to Darfur and Kordofan. This marks progress in addressing the needs of the 25 million Sudanese requiring humanitarian assistance.
The setbacks that the Geneva talks faced underscores the importance of the role of the AU ad hoc Committee of Heads of State and Government on Sudan and the imperative for its activation. It would therefore be of particular interest for the PSC to be updated on the next steps towards the activation of the Committee for leveraging the voice and diplomatic weight of AU members from the five regions of the continent towards peace in Sudan.
As the PSC pointed out in its 1218th session, the proliferation of various mediation initiatives to resolve the Sudanese conflict has been an ongoing issue in the Sudanese peace process underscoring the need to ensure the necessary coordination and harmonisation of efforts. On 27 May 2023, the PSC adopted its roadmap for the resolution of the conflict in Sudan which, among other things, outlined the need for the establishment of a coordination mechanism to ensure all efforts by the regional and global actors are harmonised and impactful. In this regard, the importance of a single, inclusive, and consolidated peace process for Sudan, coordinated under the joint auspices of the AU, IGAD, League of Arab States, and UN, along with like-minded partners was emphasised. The AU Commission Chairperson established the expanded mechanism on Sudan and its Core Group as an inclusive platform for regional, continental, and global actors and institutions to ensure broad-based, coordinated engagement aimed at fostering political consensus and unified global support for Sudan. However, the lack of periodicity and shared plan as well as a common strategy that anchors it, the role and effectiveness of the expanded mechanism are surrounded by a cloud of uncertainty.
On 12 June, the League of Arab States convened a consultative group meeting in Cairo to facilitate an exchange of views among the various stakeholders engaged in the Sudanese peace process and draw lessons from different peace initiatives, good offices, and mediation efforts. On 24 July, Djibouti hosted the second consultative group meeting which was followed by the Mediators Planning Retreat on Sudan on 25 and 26 July. The retreat, which was proposed by Ramtane Lamamra, emphasised the need for a more coordinated and collaborative multilateral approach to move toward ending the Sudanese conflict. It also stressed the shared and differentiated responsibilities of existing multilateral coordination mechanisms and the recognition of their continued role and comparative advantages.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to commend the High-Level Panel for the convening of the preparatory meetings towards the holding of the inter-Sudanese political dialogue. It may underscore the need for sustaining the momentum by investing in consultations to achieve consensus on the key elements of the convening of the political dialogue and mobilise wider support and engagement by all Sudanese civilian and political actors. It may request that the necessary technical backstopping for the effective conduct of the political dialogue including the development of the mediation process and strategy for the dialogue are put in place. The PSC may take note of the mediation initiatives deployed by various stakeholders, commend these efforts and urge for their fortified coordination and harmonisation to enhance their impact. In light of recent events, the Council may welcome the announcement of the opening up of borders to allow for humanitarian access. It may also reiterate the need for enhanced coordination and to this end may call for the revitalisation of the expanded mechanism. The PSC may request that the ad hoc committee of heads of state and government be activated to harness its political weight to address the lack of progress in talks between the warring parties. The PSC is also expected to express grave concern over the continuingly deteriorating humanitarian situation and urge the conflicting parties and all relevant actors to prioritise addressing the pressing humanitarian needs, including mainly through securing and enabling humanitarian access to affected populations for containing the famine that was declared in Darfur and preventing the emergence of famine in other areas.
Sierra Leone leverages its presidency for Africa’s seat at the Security Council
Sierra Leone leverages its presidency for Africa’s seat at the Security Council
Date | 14 August 2024
Solomon Ayele Dersso, PhD
Founding Director, Amani Africa
Affirming that the ‘time for half-measures and incremental progress is over…(Africa’s) demands for justice and equity must be met,’ Sierra Leone made the most masterful and timely case for securing support for Africa’s common position on the reform of the UNSC.
Led by none other than President Julius Maada Bio, Sierra Leone communicated Africa’s position forcefully during the signature event of its presidency of the UN Security Council held on 12 August 2023. Dubbed by the UN as a historic debate, this was ‘the first ever debate’ as President Bio told the press during the joint stakeout after the session. Coming a month before the UN’s Summit of the Future, the timing of the debate would not have been more perfect.
Characterising the theme of the high-level debate – the maintenance of international peace and security through the reform of the Security Council – ‘a matter of grave importance’, Bio told the Council that ‘[n]early 80 years after its creation, the Council has been stuck in time.’ In her very vivid depiction of a UNSC that is stuck in time, Sithembile Mbete of the University of Pretoria in her briefing delivered during the debate, observed ‘while Africa was on the menu, it still does not have a permanent seat at the table.’ UN Secretary-General agrees that ‘the composition of the council… has not kept pace.’
It was a stroke of genius of those who conceptualised the debate that it put a spotlight on and made the central focus of the attention of the world’s preeminent peace and security body at the highest levels the historic injustice of Africa’s non-representation in the permanent category and under-representation in the non-permanent category. It became evident from Bio’s address and the briefings from both the UN Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, and Mbete that this injustice was a direct outcome and continuing legacy of the wrongs of slavery and colonialism.
The placement of this injustice in this historical context makes it unequivocally clear that Africa’s exclusion was wrong at the time of the constitution of the UN and its perpetuation after eight decades is more wrong. Thus, noting that ‘most of today’s African countries were still under colonial rule and had no voice in international affairs’ in 1945, Guterres called Africa’s non-representation in the permanent category and underrepresentation in the elected category ‘a glaring omission that has remained unresolved until now.’
Bio was spot on in highlighting how Africa’s exclusion is a glaring omission and even more when he noted that it ‘is not merely an anomaly of statistics, it is a profound historic injustice that must be addressed.’ In elucidating this, Mbete located this injustice ‘in the four centuries of European slave trade starting in 1450 and devastating Africa’s population, culture, and economies, as well as the 1884 Berlin Conference that imposed colonial States.’
This echoes the emphasis that Guterres put in his New Agenda for Peace that ‘[i]f the purposes of the Charter are to be achieved, redressing the pervasive historical imbalances that characterise the international system – from the legacies of colonialism and slavery to the deeply unjust global financial architecture and anachronistic peace and security structures of today – must be a priority.’ As argued in Amani Africa’s special research report, for the African continent, reform of the UNSC ‘is particularly important not only for reasons of justice but also because it has been on the receiving end of the injunctions of the Council without having any effective say.’
As aptly captured in Bio’s address, the pathway for achieving this redressing of the historical injustice is through the Common African Position (CAP) encapsulated in the Ezulwini consensus. This calls for the allocation of two seats in the permanent veto-holding category and two additional seats in the non-permanent category, with the AU deciding the African countries to take the permanent seats.
There is consensus, as captured in the elements paper of the Co-Chairs of the UN General Assembly’s Inter-Governmental Negotiation on UNSC reform, on the need for addressing the historic injustice Africa is enduring. On how to achieve this, Sierra Leone, as the Chair of the African Union’s Committee of Ten on the Reform of the UNSC, affirmed with compelling clarity that Africa’s case is ‘treated as a special case and priority’ and that this is reflected in the Pact for the Future expected to be adopted during the Summit of the Future next month.
It is widely accepted as the speeches during the debate demonstrated that correcting the historic injustice of Africa’s exclusion is the right thing to do. Equally important, it is also a good thing. One thus agrees with Bio that the CAP is ‘premised on the fact that by rectifying the historic injustice, the international community will not only promote greater fairness, equity and equality in global governance but also act on the imperative to ensure the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Council itself.’
The Summit of the Future, as articulated in Amani Africa’s latest special research report, is the opportunity to be seized for reforming the UNSC with the special case of addressing Africa’s historic injustice. In the words of President Bio ‘[it] is absurd for the UN to enter into its eighth decade of existence with the scar of injustice against Africa’. Guterres agreed that ‘it is unacceptable that the world’s pre-eminent peace and security body lacks a permanent voice for a continent of well over a billion people…making up 28 per cent of the membership of the UN.’
Sierra Leone demonstrated why its role of Chairing the Committee of Ten is so deserved and how Africa did the right thing in endorsing its candidacy and supporting its election to the UNSC. Africa could not have asked for a better representation of its case at this material time in point at the highest level in the world’s most powerful body of the UN. It is now incumbent on the Africa Group in New York to throw its full weight forcefully to ensure that the proposition of correcting Africa’s historical injustice ‘as a special case and priority’ in UNSC reform is reflected in the Pact for the Future.
The content of this article does not represent the views of Amani Africa and reflect only the personal views of the authors who contribute to ‘Ideas Indaba’
Presentation of the Report of the Inaugural Meeting of the PSC Sub Committee on Sanctions
Presentation of the Report of the Inaugural Meeting of the PSC Sub Committee on Sanctions
Date | 14 August 2024
Tomorrow (15 August), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1227th session to receive the report of the inaugural meeting of the PSC Sub-Committee on Sanctions.
The Permanent Representative of Botswana to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for August 2024, Tebelelo A. Boang, is expected to deliver the opening remarks, followed by statements from the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye. Michael Wamai, an expert from Uganda to the AU and Chairperson of the Sub-Committee for the month of June 2024, is anticipated to present the report of the inaugural meeting of the Sub-Committee on Sanctions.
This session is convened in line with the decision made during the inaugural meeting of the PSC Sub-Committee on Sanctions (SCS) on 12 June 2024, in which the Sub-Committee agreed that the Chairperson for June, Michael Wamai, would present the Summary Record of the meeting to the PSC for consideration.
The PSC SCS was launched in June, fifteen years after the PSC first decided to establish it during its 178th session in March 2009. This decision was made pursuant to Article 8(5) of the PSC Protocol, which empowers the Council to create subsidiary bodies to perform its functions. Despite the 2009 decision, momentum for operationalising the Sanctions Committee only accelerated in recent years, largely due to the resurgence of military coups across the continent since 2021. With six Member States currently suspended from AU activities due to unconstitutional changes of government (UCG), it appears that the AU’s anti-coup norms—once praised for reducing the occurrence of UCGs in Africa—are now facing significant challenges, raising doubts about their effectiveness.
Although the PSC has the option to impose a range of sanctions beyond suspension, the most common form of sanction that the PSC adopted over the years remains suspension. During its 15th retreat on its working methods, held in Tunis, Tunisia in November 2023, the PSC recognised various challenges in the implementation of AU sanction regimes. These include: disparities between the AU and some RECs/RMs on the application of sanctions regimes, non-compliance by some neighbouring countries in the implementation of sanctions imposed by the PSC, and lack of enforcement mechanisms. In response to these challenges, recent years have seen renewed efforts to reactivate and operationalise the PSC SCS. For instance, PSC’s 1061st session, the ACCRA Declaration on UCG in March 2022, and the 16th extraordinary session of the AU Assembly on terrorism and UCG, held in May 2022, called for the operationalisation of the Sub-Committee on sanctions. Particularly significant was PSC’s 1100th session, which directed the Committee of Experts (CoE) to develop the Terms of Reference (ToR) for the SCS.
Against the background of the repeated calls for the operationalisation of the SCS, the AU Commission organised training to enhance the capacity of the PSC CoE on sanctions in Accra in September 2022, which enabled the development of ToRs for the PSC SCS while outlining modalities for operationalising the Sub-Committee. The ToRs were further developed during the retreat of the CoE in Zanzibar held in May 2023 and were considered by the PSC during its 15th retreat on working methods in Tunis, Tunisia, in November 2023.
The SCS, comprising the fifteen expert-level members of the PSC, is envisaged to serve as a technical Sub-Committee to assist the PSC on matters relating to sanctions within the framework of Articles 7(g) and 8(5) of the PSC Protocol. According to the ToRs, the chairperson of the Sub-Committee will align with the monthly rotational chairship of the PSC and the PSC Troika to ensure continuity. While the ToRs do not specify the exact frequency of meetings, the Sub-Committee agreed during its inaugural meeting in June to convene at least once a month and additionally as needed, as determined by the PSC. The ToRs also stipulate that the Sub-Committee will provide the PSC with at least quarterly reports on its activities and the implementation of specific sanctions measures.
During tomorrow’s session, Michael Wamai is expected to brief the PSC on the key outcomes of the inaugural meeting. As noted in our policy brief, one of the critical contributions of the Sub-Committee lies in restoring some level of the lost credibility of AU’s anti-coup norm faced, due to PSC’s failure to apply the norm consistently as highlighted by the case of Chad, by ensuring consistent application by the PSC.
In this regard, a key outcome of the inaugural meeting was its emphasis on the imperative of uniformly applying AU normative instruments and measures against Member States that experience UCG, avoiding selective or case-by-case approaches. This is particularly important given the setback the PSC faced after its handling of the military takeover in Chad in April 2021, in which the Council not only failed to label the military’s seizure of power as UCG but also fell short of imposing sanctions as per its instruments and well-established practice. It was also unable to enforce its decision barring the leader of the Transitional Military Council not to take part in the 6 May 2024 Presidential elections, setting a dangerous precedent for similar situations in Mali, Burkina Faso, Gabon, Guinea, Niger, and Sudan.
Furthermore, given the lack of clarity surrounding the processes and criteria for lifting sanctions—and the potential for this ambiguity to cause policy divergence with RECs/RMS, as evidenced in the cases of Sudan and Gabon with IGAD and ECCAS, respectively calling for lifting of suspension before conditions were met—the inaugural meeting underscored the need to develop robust sanctions implementation, monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, as well as a universally applicable procedure for imposing and lifting sanctions.
Considering the uncertainties surrounding the return to constitutional order in many African countries undergoing political transitions, the inaugural meeting also emphasised the need for the Sub-Committee to devise practical measures to address situations of prolonged or stalled transitions. It also stressed the importance of continuing the practice of holding informal consultations with these countries, providing a platform to update progress toward restoring constitutional order.
Another key outcome of the inaugural meeting, likely to be highlighted during tomorrow’s session, is the Sub-Committee’s request for the AU Commission to conduct a comprehensive study on the effectiveness of sanctions as a deterrent against UCG. A follow-up on this remains crucial, given that the efficacy of AU actions against coups depends on a clear appreciation of the sources of influence and leverage of the AU. The meeting also stressed the importance of assessing the impact of sanctions on the broader public in Member States experiencing UCG and submitting the findings to the PSC.
Amani Africa’s policy brief further notes that the ‘effective functioning of the Sub-Committee also depends on the extent to which its works draws on and is informed by solid independent technical analysis and advise.’ In this context, the Sub-Committee, during its inaugural meeting, underlined the need for regular capacity-building training for its Members, and the importance of collaborating with entities such as CISSA, AFRIPOL and INTERPOL. Reactivating other PSC Sub-Committees with a complimentary mandate was also deemed essential for fulfilling its functions effectively. However, as the policy brief argues, it is imperative to accompany the Sub-Committee with an independent expert body on AU Response to UCGs for the provision of objective and in-depth technical advisory and support on the basis of independent assessment and analysis that helps the Sub-Committee to navigate the complex political dynamics relating to situations of UCG.
The SCS is now operational, with its first task—assigned during the PSC Summit on 21 June 2024—to identify external actors supporting Sudan’s warring parties and propose containment strategies within three months. However, the Sub-Committee’s success in fulfilling its mandate will largely depend on its technical capacity and the degree of political support it receives from the AU.
The session’s outcome remains uncertain, but it seems the Sub-Committee aims to have the report of its inaugural meeting adopted through a communiqué. The PSC is expected to welcome the launch of the Sub-Committee on Sanctions as a significant step in strengthening its institutional framework to address unconstitutional changes of government in the continent. In adopting the inaugural meeting report, the PSC is expected to highlight key outcomes, including a request for the AU Commission to conduct a comprehensive study on the effectiveness of the AU’s sanctions regime, the development of robust mechanisms for implementing, monitoring, and evaluating sanctions, and the establishment of a universally applicable procedure for imposing and lifting sanctions. The PSC may stress the importance of equipping the Sub-Committee with the necessary technical and financial resources to effectively fulfill its mandate, while also reminding the Sub-Committee to submit at least quarterly reports on its activities, in accordance with its Terms of Reference.
