Update on the activities of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) and consideration of the Regional Strategy for Stabilisation, Recovery, and Resilience (RS-SRR)
Update on the activities of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) and consideration of the Regional Strategy for Stabilisation, Recovery, and Resilience (RS-SRR)
Date | 9 June 2025
Tomorrow (10 June) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1282nd session to receive an update on the activities of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) and review the implementation of the Regional Strategy for Stabilisation, Recovery, and Resilience (RS-SRR) in the Lake Chad Basin.
Following opening remarks by Innocent Shiyo, Permanent Representative of Tanzania to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for June, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to deliver remarks. Statements are also expected from Hycinth Banseka, Technical Director of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) on behalf of the Executive Secretary of the LCBC and Godwin Michael MUTKUT, Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) Commander.
Tomorrow’s session follows the PSC’s 1254th meeting on 13 January 2025, convened to consider the AUC Chairpersons report on the activities of the MNJTF against Boko Haram where the Council renewed the MNJTF’s mandate for an additional 12 months and requested the AU Commission and the LCBC Secretariat to regularly report to the Council on the activities of the Force. The session emphasised enhanced diplomatic engagement, particularly with Niger, to strengthen regional counter-terrorism efforts. It also brought attention to the need for strengthening coordination and effective participation of MNJTF contributing countries and in this respect, it tasked the Lake Chad Basin Commission to continue engaging Niger to ensure its full return and cooperation with the Force and to promote a comprehensive, multi-sectoral and inclusive approach and civil-military cooperation for creating conditions for return of displaced persons. Tomorrow’s session is expected to build on these priorities, with a particular focus on operational developments, prevailing security dynamics, and the status of the implementation of the RS-SRR, notably the review and updating of the strategy.
The Lake Chad Basin, encompassing Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria, remains a region of complex security, humanitarian, and developmental challenges, largely driven by the activities of Boko Haram and its factions, including the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS). The MNJTF, comprising troops from the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) member states and Benin, remains a critical regional coalition serving as the security instrument in countering the threats posed by these groups. The Force has reportedly facilitated the return of over 3,800 internally displaced persons (IDPs) and 2,306 refugees in 2024 alone.
However, despite significant military successes by the MNJTF, the terror groups continue to pose a threat through asymmetric tactics such as the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), suicide attacks, abductions and attacks on civilian and military targets. In one such recent major attack, on 25 March, Boko Haram is reported to have killed at least 20 Cameroonian soldiers in an attack on a military base in the Nigerian border town of Wulgo.
One of the issues expected to feature during tomorrow’s session concerns the operational challenges facing MNJTF. Despite ongoing support from the AU and partners, the MNJTF continues to face capability gaps that undermine the effectiveness of its counterterrorism operations, such as a lack of appropriate counter-IED equipment. IEDs, particularly those placed along main supply routes, accounted for approximately 60% of MNJTF casualties in 2024. The unavailability of sophisticated IED detectors has delayed troop movements and places both civilian convoys and military convoys at risk. The absence of a dedicated attack aircraft has also left the force reliant on TCCs national air forces, delaying approvals and undermining the force’s ability to mount coordinated air-ground operations. Considering that terrorist forces have begun using surveillance drones to monitor MNJTF movements, the Force’s lack of anti-drone technology or jamming systems reduces its operational advantage and leaves it vulnerable to enemy intelligence.
As highlighted in respect to the PSC’s 1254th session, another major challenge for the MNJTF is the continued presence of terrorist groups on the islands of Lake Chad. As reported back then, the 4th Lake Chad Basin Governors’ Forum identified as a major challenge the need ‘to clear remnants of Boko Haram fighters from their bases on the Tumbuns (islands on the fringes of the Lake Chad) from which they continue to launch attacks on the surrounding areas and beyond. The Tumbuns serve as their logistics hub, secure havens, and staging grounds. Their occupation of these islands also facilitates their generation of funds through illegal fishing and farming activities.’ In this respect, the 5th Lake Chad Basin Governors’ Forum held late in January 2025 called for ensuring that ‘member states effectively occupy the Lake Chad islands as a means of strengthening transboundary security, with a focus on securing and controlling waterways.’
Another issue is the follow up on PSC’s decision on ensuring the participation of Niger in the MNJTF. Although the initial interruption of Niger’s participation in MNJTF following the coup of June 2023 was restored owing to engagement from Nigeria, in March 2025 Niger announced its withdrawal from MNJTF. Apart from political dynamics, it appears that withdrawal of support for Niger might have played a role. The Communique of the Lake Chad Basin 5th Governors Forum for the Regional Cooperation on Stabilisation, Peacebuilding and Sustainable Development, thus ‘noted with concern the suspension of donor support for Niger’s National Window of the Regional Stabilisaiton Facility (RSF), which could negatively impact progress across the region.’
It is feared that Niger’s withdrawal will weaken the MNJTF and create a security vacuum that the terrorist groups operating in Lake Chad could take advantage of. The void from Niger’s withdrawal coupled with the influx of militants and weapons from the Sahel and ISIS networks in North Africa, poses threat to the gains made under the MNJTF. It is also worth recalling that the death of 40 Chadian soldiers in a terrorist attack on a military base in Chad’s border region with Nigeria last December prompted Chad’s President Mahamat Idriss Déby to threaten possible withdrawal from the MNJTF as well. During tomorrow’s session, it would be of interest for PSC members to get clarity on the implications of Niger’s withdrawal for the MNJTF and how any adverse impact of the withdrawal can be mitigated.
The other issue that the PSC is expected to discuss during tomorrow’s session is the regional stabilisation strategy. The RS-SRR, endorsed by the PSC during the 816th session held on 5 December 2018 and entered its second phase in 2024, complements the MNJTF’s military efforts by addressing the structural drivers of conflict through addressing broader governance, humanitarian, and development challenges. The strategy, implemented across eight targeted territories in the four LCBC states, has facilitated community reconstruction, market reactivation, and the reintegration of former combatants. Following the revision of the RS-SRR for 2025 – 2030 at the 5th steering committee meeting on 20 September 2024, with updated Territorial Action Plans (TAPs) and a Community-based Reconciliation and Reintegration Policy to enhance its effectiveness, the 70th Ordinary Session of the LCBC Council of Ministers held in Niamey, Republic of Niger on 27 February 2025 adopted the revised strategy. The revised strategy seeks to shift focus from stabilisation efforts to sustained stability and puts greater emphasis on socio-economic development on the basis of the security, humanitarian and development nexus approach. The LCBC Council of Ministers also directed the Executive Secretariat to revise the Territorial Action Plans (TAPs) and develop a Regional Transitional Justice Policy.
The communiqué of the 5th Lake Chad Basin Governors’ Forum, among others, encouraged the PSC to endorse the adjusted RS-SRR. Tomorrow’s session will thus provide an opportunity for the PSC to assess progress on the implementation of the strategy and consider the updated RS-SRR for endorsement. The PSC is also likely to reiterate its 1207th session call for the states to develop National Action Plans in line with UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 2250 and 2419, and to operationalise these two UNSC Resolutions through the revised TAPs, in order to ensure that the implementation of the revised RS SRR effectively addresses the structural root causes of the conflict.
Sustained reintegration of returnees and fighters that deserted the terror groups requires stronger investment in infrastructure, education and livelihoods. In the report to the PSC in January 2025, the AU Commission Chairperson noted that ‘[w]hile the number of resettled populations have continued to rise, most of these communities received little or no form of humanitarian assistance, and there is a need for urgent actions to enhance the livelihoods of these resettled communities.’ Environmental degradation, exacerbated by climate change, compounds these challenges and increases community vulnerability.
The expected outcome of the session is a communique. The Council is expected to endorse the revised RS–SRR and call on member states to align their national plans with the revised strategy. The PSC may underscore the need for enhancing close coordination and commitment of MNJTF member states and for continuing to engage in Niger on collaboration in addressing the collective threat posed by terrorist groups in the region. The PSC may also call for fortifying the capabilities of the MNJTF, including by equipping the mission with anti-drone technology or jamming systems to address the threat posed by the deployment of drones from terrorist groups. The Council may also wish to follow up on its 1207th decision to undertake a solidarity field mission to the Lake Chad Basin. The PSC may call on AU and LCBC to mobilise additional support to the MNJTF, particularly in terms of enhancing its anti-IED and amphibious and naval capabilities. The PSC may underscore the need for climate change sensitive programming and provision of rehabilitation support for affected regions and communities. The PSC may emphasise the importance of enhancing collaboration between the MNJTF and Regional Economic Communities, particularly ECOWAS, to facilitate more coherent cross-border responses and address the transnational nature of the threats posed by Boko Haram and the ISWAP. The PSC may also task the AU Commission and the LCBC to undertake an assessment of the impact of the withdrawal of Niger from the MNJTF and develop strategy for mitigating adverse impacts.
PSC shaping a new maritime security architecture in the Gulf of Guinea
PSC shaping a new maritime security architecture in the Gulf of Guinea
Date | 5 June 2025
Tefesehet Hailu
Researcher, Amani Africa
On 23 April, the PSC held its 1275th session to discuss the imperatives of the Combined Maritime Task Force in addressing piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. The outcome of the meeting was adopted as a communiqué.
The session included a series of presentations and statements from key regional and continental stakeholders. However, despite the importance of receiving an update from the AU Political Affairs, Peace and Security Department, the department was not represented and therefore did not provide a briefing on the implementation of previous decisions.
One of the key outcomes of the session was the PSC’s endorsement of the Combined Maritime Task Force (CMTF) for the Gulf of Guinea as a standing, ready-to-deploy force, capable of delivering rapid and coordinated maritime security responses across the region. In addition to endorsing the CMTF, the PSC also affirmed the CMTF’s vision of a united, secure, safe, and resilient region, free from transnational organised crime.
Beyond expressing its endorsement, in an effort to set up the institutional backbone of the Task Force, the PSC requested the AU Commission to facilitate the further development of the Task Force, welcomed the adoption of the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) by additional member states, and encouraged others to consider joining the initiative. The Council also emphasised the need to advance the Task Force’s operational instruments and urged Member States of the Gulf of Guinea Commission to extend their political backing for its effective operationalisation. Furthermore, the PSC emphasised the need for the Military Staff Committee to visit the CMTF headquarters in Lagos to gather direct insights and advise the PSC on advancing its operationalisation. While this political commitment provides essential legitimacy and momentum, it must be accompanied by concrete resource mobilisation and inclusive engagement, ensuring that less-resourced littoral states are not left behind in the implementation process. Additionally, translating these institutional arrangements into a tangible maritime presence and effectiveness will require adequate funding, logistical support and coordination.
The outcome also reflects a growing momentum in developing institutional and operational frameworks for advancing maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, deserving of sustained support from the AU. Additionally, symbolic steps, like the proposed flag-off ceremony and Nigeria’s readiness to host the CMTF headquarters, highlight political will on both sides of the AU and Member States. Institutionally, the PSC retreated its call for the AU Commission to take concrete measures to ensure inclusive stakeholder engagement, including the formal inauguration of the Committee of African Heads of Navies and Coast Guards (CHANS), as outlined in the AIMS 2050 framework.
The emphasis on coordinated maritime deployments and readiness to establish permanent headquarters suggests growing interest and commitment. However, the reliance on individual states for leadership and hosting functions, in the absence of a clear burden-sharing framework, also raises concerns about long-term sustainability and inclusivity.
On capacity building, the Council recognised the importance of intelligence sharing, joint operations, and strategic partners to support the Gulf of Guinea Commission in planning and conducting the AMANI Africa III Command Post Maritime Exercise. It rightly emphasised the need for tailored support—logistical, financial, and technical—for coastal Member States, and encouraged international partnerships for sustainable capacity development.
Concerning coordination and interoperability, the Council’s call for harmonising efforts between the CMTF and the Yaoundé Architecture reflects an increasing awareness of the fragmentation across regional efforts. Again, operationalising such structures will require not just institutional mandates but clarity on the division of labour among AU organs, RECs/RMs, and regional mechanisms.
Importantly, the emphasis on addressing the root causes of maritime crime, such as poverty, weak governance, and limited economic alternatives, signals a welcome and necessary shift toward a more holistic and preventive approach to maritime security. This broader perspective acknowledges that sustainable security cannot be achieved solely through military and law enforcement responses, but must also tackle the socio-economic and structural drivers that make maritime crime attractive or viable in coastal territories. By focusing on development deficits, corruption, youth unemployment, and lack of livelihoods, the approach has the potential to generate long-term stability and resilience in coastal communities. But without concrete interventions to address these conditions, the reference to dealing with root causes will remain hollow.
The inclusion of environmental protection discussions and the call for strategic environmental assessments (SEAs) to safeguard marine ecosystems marks a significant and commendable departure from earlier sessions where such concerns were often overlooked. This shift reflects a recognition of the interlinkages between maritime security and environmental sustainability, particularly as climate change, pollution, and unsustainable exploitation of marine resources increasingly contribute to insecurity in coastal regions. However, there is a need for clarifying the practical implications of conducting SEAs and the institutional and policy framework for anchoring such an exercise and the follow-up to it. Without defined implementation mechanisms and integration into existing regional frameworks, such as the African Blue Economy Strategy and 2050 AIMs, the commitment risks becoming a token gesture.
Lastly, although the meeting primarily focused on maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, the PSC demonstrated a broader continental outlook by urging Member States to actively support the operationalisation of the Maritime Coordination Centre. This move is aimed at enhancing the coordination and governance of maritime safety and security across all five regions of the continent, reflecting the Council’s growing recognition of the interconnected nature of Africa’s maritime security challenges. Furthermore, the PSC acknowledged the Indian Ocean Commission’s participation in Gulf of Guinea Commission meetings and called for a consultative engagement with the Commission, signalling an effort to bridge regional maritime security efforts.
In the absence of updates from the Department of PAPS on the implementation of its previous decisions, the PSC reiterated its September 2023 decision, adopted during its 1174th session. The Council renewed its request for the Commission to expedite the establishment and operationalisation of a Coordination Mechanism—or Maritime Security Unit—within the AU Commission.
The content of this article does not represent the views of Amani Africa and reflect only the personal views of the authors who contribute to ‘Ideas Indaba’
Briefing on the synergy between the Global Framework Ammunition (GFA) Management and the Regional Arms and Ammunition Control Instruments
Briefing on the synergy between the Global Framework Ammunition (GFA) Management and the Regional Arms and Ammunition Control Instruments
Date | 3 June 2025
Tomorrow (4 June), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to convene its 1281st meeting for a briefing on the synergy between the Global Framework Ammunition (GFA) Management and the Regional Arms and Ammunition Control Instruments.
Following opening remarks by Ambassador Innocent Shiyo, Permanent Representative of Tanzania to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for June, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to deliver a statement. Eric Kayiranga, Weapon and Ammunition Senior Advisor representing the Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA) in the Great Lakes Region, is also expected to make a presentation, followed by statements from representatives of the RECs/RMs. A representative of the UN is also expected to make a statement during the session.
This meeting is convened to explore the synergies and implementation of regional instruments on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) adopted by AU Member States, alongside the Global Framework for Through-life Conventional Ammunition Management (GFA), in alignment with the Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP). It is worth recalling that the CADSP is a strategic framework adopted by Member States to promote a shared understanding of security needs, common defence and security threats and the necessity for collective action to address these challenges. It serves as a vital tool for AU Member States to coordinate their defence and security initiatives, advancing continental stability in alignment with Africa’s Agenda 2063 for sustainable development and peace. Furthermore, the AU Master Roadmap of Practical Steps to Silence the Guns in Africa by 2030 emphasises the importance of addressing the illicit proliferation and circulation of arms, with a specific focus on controlling the flow of ammunition into conflict zones. The GFA, on the other hand, serves as a comprehensive political framework encompassing fifteen objectives and eighty-five measures designed to prevent the diversion, illicit trafficking, and misuse of conventional ammunition. It also seeks to mitigate the risks of unplanned explosions and promote the safe and secure management of ammunition across its entire lifecycle, from production to final disposal. The framework addresses a broad spectrum of ammunition, including both small-calibre and large conventional types. Of particular relevance to Africa, the GFA aligns with the continent’s pressing peace and security challenges, especially the widespread proliferation of SALW and their associated ammunition. This proliferation significantly contributes to the escalation of armed conflict, terrorism, and transnational organised crime across the region.
Regional arms and ammunition control instruments, on the other hand, are critical frameworks, agreements and protocols established by regional organisations to regulate the production, transfer, storage and use of conventional arms, including SALW and their ammunition. These instruments are designed to address the pressing challenges of illicit proliferation, trafficking and misuse, which often fuel armed conflict, violence and regional instability. Their primary objectives include preventing unauthorised manufacturing, trafficking and diversion of arms and ammunition, enhancing security by reducing armed violence, terrorism and conflict through improved stockpile management and promoting regional collaboration, information-sharing and joint action to tackle cross-border challenges. On the continent, several key instruments exemplify these efforts. The ECOWAS Convention on SALW, their Ammunition and other Related Materials, adopted in 2006, is a legally binding agreement that replaced a 1998 moratorium. It focuses on controlling SALW, ammunition and related materials through transfer controls, stockpile management and tracing, while encouraging Member States to ratify the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). The Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of SALW, established in 2004, on the other hand, targets the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and bordering states. Coordinated by the RECSA, it mandates training, destruction of surplus firearms and cross-border cooperation to curb trafficking. The Central African Convention/Kinshasa Convention, adopted in 2010 by ECCAS, is legally binding and entered into force in 2017, covering SALW, ammunition and components for manufacture, repair and assembly, with a broader scope than other regional protocols.
At the continental level, there are no legally binding continent-wide instruments, but there are frameworks. The Bamako Declaration of 2000, a political Africa-wide instrument, establishes a common African position on illicit SALW proliferation, circulation and trafficking, strengthening regional and international cooperation. The AU is also guided by the AU Strategy on the Control of Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of SALW. The AU Commission also embarked on a process of coordination and alignment of the implementation of the GFA. A study titled ‘Synergies Between African Regional Instruments and Global Framework for Through-life Conventional Ammunition Management’ was conducted. This analysis explored the alignment between the four key African regional instruments highlighted above and the fifteen objectives of the GFA. Following a workshop held on 6 and 7 May 2025 in the AU Commission, gathering experts from RECs/RMs and RECSA, the zero-draft report of the study sets the stage for dialogue, reflection and a unified path forward.
Beyond mere assessment, the study illuminated gaps in the framework and proposed thoughtful areas for improvement, aiming to strengthen the execution of both regional instruments and the GFA itself. In terms of alignment and differences, it was noted that African regional instruments, with the exception of the Bamako Declaration, hold legal force, obligating their signatories, while the GFA operates on a voluntary basis, its guidelines backed only by political commitment, just like the Bamako Declaration. Additionally, the GFA addresses all types of conventional ammunition, from small-calibre rounds to artillery shells, whereas regional instruments limit their scope to ammunition for SALW. Consequently, the study’s comparison and analysis account for the binding legal responsibilities of State Parties to the regional instruments, but focus exclusively on SALW ammunition. At the same time, the GFA’s prioritisation of international cooperation and technical assistance, facilitated through mechanisms such as the United Nations SaferGuard Programme and the Ammunition Management Advisory Team (AMAT), presents valuable opportunities for supporting AU Member States and RECs in strengthening stockpile security.
Tomorrow’s session will therefore provide an opportunity for the PSC to engage in a focused discussion on the challenges associated with aligning and coordinating the GFA with existing regional arms control instruments, as emerged from the aforementioned study. In terms of challenges, one major concern is the limited financial and technical capacity of many Member States, which may be further strained by the introduction of new frameworks such as the GFA. Council may also consider the imperative of updating regional instruments to incorporate standards like the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATGs), enhance risk reduction, improve inventory and tracing systems and strengthen gender mainstreaming and stakeholder cooperation.
Although the establishment of such legal frameworks at sub-regional levels helps respond to challenges specific to those regions and is a positive step, it has resulted in parallel legal regimes and has made responses fragmented. Even in regions that have instruments, implementation is still lacking. The fragmented response has also left regions such as the Sahel without an established instrument. As such, the PSC may follow up on the outcome of its 1085th meeting. First, it called for the integration of arms control and Weapons and Ammunition Management (WAM) programmes into the broader framework of Africa’s peace, security, and sustainable development agenda. Second, the Council requested the elaboration of a continental strategy to combat the proliferation of illicit firearms, including emerging categories of weaponry.
The Council may use this session to brainstorm on practical and sustainable measures to effectively bolster arms control and promote peace across the continent, drawing on the GFA. It is recalled that the 860th PSC session previously highlighted the persistent lack of reliable data on national stockpiles as a critical challenge. In response, the GFA’s call for transparency and systematic information-sharing—such as through the UN Register of Conventional Arms—can serve to enhance regional monitoring and auditing practices. Moreover, the PSC may revisit the conclusions of its 776th session, which drew a direct connection between illicit arms flows and broader threats such as transnational organised crime and terrorism. In this light, the GFA’s holistic and lifecycle-based approach to ammunition management offers a valuable framework for advancing regional strategies that address these underlying security drivers, while simultaneously aligning with the objectives of Sustainable Development Goal 16.4, which seeks to significantly reduce illicit arms flows.
It is also worth noting that tomorrow’s meeting is also being convened just few weeks before the convening of the preparatory meeting of States on the ‘Global Framework for Through-life Conventional Ammunition Management’ which will be held from 23 to 27 June 2025 at the UN Headquarters, as communicated by the UNODA in January 2025. A meeting expected to ‘explore possible options for the development of the process to ‘prevent diversion, illicit trafficking and misuse of ammunition; mitigate and prevent unplanned explosions at munition sites; ensure the safety and security of conventional ammunition throughout its life-cycle from the point of manufacture; and contribute to lasting peace, security and sustainable development.’
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may express deep concern over the growing illicit flow of SALW in Africa. The PSC is also likely to reiterate the imperative of Member States and RECs/RMs to scale up efforts towards the full implementation of the regional SALW instruments. The PSC may underscore the operational role of RECs and the RECSA in supporting the implementation of regional arms control instruments and advancing alignment between these instruments and the GFA. The PSC may also call for the establishment of systematic stockpile audits, improved coordination among regional mechanisms and the development of specialised training programmes. The Council may, in particular, propose the establishment of regional training initiatives grounded in the regional instruments, the AU frameworks and the IATG and the International Small Arms Control Standards (ISACS), in order to build capacity for effective weapons and ammunition management. The Council may call for leveraging the GFA’s provisions on export controls and risk assessments related to diversion to mitigate external illicit arms transfers, which remain a persistent threat to peace and security across the continent. PSC could urge the AU Commission, Member States, and RECs/RMs to engage in the preparatory meeting at the UN Headquarters in New York, scheduled for 23 to 27 June 2025, by sharing valuable experiences and best practices on the safe and secure through-life management of ammunition. The Council may also encourage Member States to use the key findings and recommendations from the study conducted by the Commission in close collaboration with the four regions as a reference in making their interventions during the preparatory meeting. The PSC may encourage Member States to integrate the objectives of the GFA into national and SALW strategies, in alignment with the AU Master Roadmap for Silencing the Guns by 2030. The Council may request technical assistance from the UNODA, the AMAT, and the UNREC to support national authorities in implementing regional and continental instruments on marking, tracing, and stockpile management, based on the IATG and the ISACS. The PSC may request the AU Commission, in collaboration with RECs, to develop a comprehensive monitoring and evaluation framework to track progress in GFA implementation, emphasising evidence-based interventions and sustained institutional coordination. The PSC may also reiterate its request from its 1085th session and call on the AU Commission to follow up and report to the Council.
AU expresses deep concern as Africa faces growing challenges for mine action
AU expresses deep concern as Africa faces growing challenges for mine action
Date | 2 June 2025
The African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council’s (PSC) 1271st session, on 1 April, dedicated to the International Day for Mine Awareness and Assistance in Mine Action, highlighted growing challenges for mine action in Africa. The session served as an occasion to review the state of affairs around anti-personnel landmines, Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) on the continent as well as to highlight the threats posed by Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas (EWIPA). A communiqué was adopted as the outcome of the session.
2025 marks the final year to meet the deadline set by the 1997 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (Ottawa Convention) and the 2014 Declaration of State Parties to the Convention and the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines (Maputo Declaration) for a mine-free world, now extended to 2029 following the 5th Review Conference in Siem Reap, Cambodia last year. According to the latest 2024 Landmines Monitor Report, offering a comprehensive global overview of developments in mine ban and action since 1999, as of October 2024, 33 States Parties have yet to fulfil their mine clearance obligations under Article 5. Of these 14 are AU Member States: Angola, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Zimbabwe.
This session came against the background of global setbacks facing the Ottawa Convention, including the use of anti-personnel landmines in some conflicts and the announcement by some European countries of a plan of withdrawal, citing the deteriorating security situation in the region, marked by military threats to States bordering Russia and Belarus. At the continental level, the re-emergence of landmines in some countries previously declared mine-free—including Nigeria, Guinea-Bissau, and Mauritania—has raised alarm. Mozambique, which was declared mine-free in 2015, also faces renewed threats due to the use of improvised mines by insurgents in the Cabo Delgado province. Ethiopia also reported massive antipersonnel landmine contamination in 2023, with over 100 km² affected, while Angola, Chad, Eritrea, and Mauritania reported contamination levels ranging from 20 to 99 km².
As one of the regions of the world affected by landmines and increasingly by the use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas, the issues highlighted in this session are of significance for the safety and well-being of civilians on the continent. The human toll of landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) remains high. In 2023, at least 5,757 casualties were recorded globally, with civilians bearing the brunt of the impact. Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Ethiopia were among the ten countries with the highest casualty rates, pursuant to the Landmines Monitor Report.
In view of the foregoing, the PSC expressed deep concern over the persistent threat posed by anti-personnel mines, ERW and the growing danger of IEDs, which have become the weapon of choice for non-state armed groups, including terrorist organisations, across the continent.
Funding was one of the critical issues with respect to which the PSC voiced deep concern. It noted that dwindling financial support for Mine Action severely hampers demining efforts in Member States affected by landmines and ERW. This funding shortfall is compelling nations to significantly scale back their Land Mine Action Programmes and clearance operations. There are concerns that shifts in policy and funding priorities of major funding countries, notably the U.S., could have severe repercussions for demining efforts in more than 14 AU Member States reported to be contaminated by landmines. At the same time, despite the increase in international funding for mine action, which surpassed $1 billion in 2023, no African country was among the top ten recipients of international support. Ukraine alone received $308 million—39% of all international donor funds—while African countries, including Chad, Ethiopia, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal, received a combined total of just $19 million over five years (2019–2023), representing less than 1% of global mine action funding.
In addition to a general appeal to the international partners to increase support for Africa’s efforts to eradicate landmines and ERW, the PSC focused on two other supplementary measures. First was the need for national ownership and the primary responsibility of states, including in mobilising resources for mine action. Second, and notably, it called for ‘the establishment of a continental mechanism for mine action.’ What is missing in this respect is how to source and mobilise the requisite funds for supporting member states and for the continental mechanism to play the role of filling in the growing gaps in mine action.
This year’s session additionally put a spotlight on the issue of the use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas (EWIPA), in light of the increasing urbanisation of armed conflicts and the use of explosive weapons, as recently observed in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The use of such weapons in populated areas has been documented to have devastating impacts on civilians and civilian infrastructure.
Instead of mobilising political commitment for ending the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, the PSC resorted to a less ambitious policy position. It thus encouraged member states to urgently review and adapt their military policies and practices, and to adopt policy measures that limit the use of explosive weapons with wide-area effects in populated areas—unless adequate mitigation measures are in place to reduce their broad impact and the risk of civilian harm.’ It was a missed opportunity that the use of the words ‘encourage’ and ‘limit’ watered down the force of the policy course of action to be adopted by member states. Not only are member states encouraged only to ‘limit’, but also such limitation can be put aside if ‘adequate mitigation measures’ for reducing the broad impact of the use of explosive weapons are taken. Despite the significance of the formulation of the PSC’s request as a negotiated compromise, the qualifications can additionally undermine effective implementation.
Regarding the Political Declaration on Strengthening the Protection of Civilians from the Humanitarian Consequences Arising from the Use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas—formally endorsed by 83 states in November 2022—the PSC requested the AU Commission to continue sensitising Member States on the humanitarian impacts of such weapons and the importance of the Declaration. The PSC also urged those Member States that have not yet done so to endorse the Declaration, given that only 11 AU Member States have done so to date. In view of the upcoming Second International Conference on the Political Declaration, scheduled for November 2025 in Costa Rica, the PSC encouraged AU Member States to actively participate in preparations, including through the drafting of a Common Plan of Action outlining steps in support of the Declaration.
Despite these growing challenges, the policy response and review by the AU shows no progress. Accordingly, in terms of the PSC’s long-standing request for the review of the AU Mine Action and Explosive Remnants of War Strategic Framework (2014–2017) and the development of a Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IED) Strategy, the session underscored the urgent need for the AU Commission to share the draft of these documents with Member States for review and validation. Although Regional Economic Communities (RECs) are not explicitly mentioned in this context, their engagement in the review and validation process will be important before their submission to the Council for consideration.
The content of this article does not represent the views of Amani Africa and reflect only the personal views of the authors who contribute to ‘Ideas Indaba’
Provisional Programme of Work of the Peace and Security Council for June 2025
Provisional Programme of Work of the Peace and Security Council for June 2025
Date | June 2025
In June 2025, the United Republic of Tanzania assumes the role of chairing the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC). The Council’s Provisional Programme of Work for the month envisages six substantive sessions. Of these, three are dedicated to thematic issues, while the remaining three will address conflict/region-specific issues. All sessions are expected to be at an ambassadorial level.
The first session of the month, scheduled for 4 June, will feature a briefing on the synergies between the Global Framework for Through-life Conventional Ammunition Management and existing regional arms and ammunition control instruments. Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in December 2023 through Resolution 78/47, the framework complements key continental agreements, such as the Nairobi Protocol, the ECOWAS Convention, and the Kinshasa Convention. Previous PSC communiqués, notably the 788th session in August 2018, convened in preparation for Africa Amnesty Month and the 1029th session marking the 2021 commemoration, have emphasised the need to align the framework’s objectives with regional mechanisms. This alignment is essential to effectively address the continued illicit proliferation, diversion, and misuse of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and ammunition, which remain key drivers of conflict, terrorism, and violent extremism across the continent. A critical focus for the session is expected to be the need to enhance national and regional capacities for stockpile management. As previously highlighted during the 14 March 2019 briefing on SALW proliferation, this requires harmonising the framework’s focus on safety, security, and sustainability with regional initiatives in order to prevent unplanned explosions and the diversion of weapons to unauthorised actors. The session is also expected to explore how to better integrate gender mainstreaming into regional arms control strategies, in accordance with Objective 14 of the framework.
On 10 June, the second session will focus on an update regarding the activities of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) and a review of the Regional Strategy for the Stabilisation, Recovery, and Resilience (RSS) of Boko Haram-affected areas in the Lake Chad Basin (RS-SRR) of the Lake Chad Basin. The last time the PSC discussed the MNJTF was during its 1254th session in January 2025, where it renewed the Force’s mandate for an additional 12 months. Furthermore, it urged the LCBC to step up diplomatic engagement with Niger to ensure its full reintegration into the MNJTF, while advocating for a comprehensive, inclusive, and multi-sectoral approach to stabilisation—particularly through strengthened civil-military cooperation to enable the return of displaced communities. The PSC also requested regular progress updates from the AU Commission and the LCBC Secretariat to maintain oversight and ensure accountability. Apart from following up on these issues and the review of the security and operational situation of the MNJTF, the session is expected to receive an update on the revised regional stabilisation strategy. It is to be recalled that on 20 September 2024, the 5th meeting of the Steering Committee for the implementation of this regional strategy took place virtually. The meeting approved the adjusted Regional Strategy and Community-based Reconciliation and Reintegration Policy for 2025-2030.
The PSC is expected to convene its third substantive session on 12 June, dedicated to an update on the Situation in South Sudan, marking the third time it has convened on the matter since the outbreak of violence triggered by the 4 March attack on the South Sudan People’s Defence Force base in Nasir. The political and security environment in South Sudan is notably deteriorating, further compounded by the arrest and continued detention of First Vice President Dr. Riek Machar Teny on 26 March 2025 in Juba. This upcoming session is expected to build on key decisions and challenges highlighted in PSC’s Press Statement that was adopted by the 1270th meeting held on 31 March 2025 and the communiqué of the 1265th meeting, held on 18 March 2025. In its Press Statement adopted at the 1270th session, the PSC urged the AU Commission Chairperson to urgently deploy a high-level delegation to South Sudan, led by the Panel of the Wise, and called on the C5 to enhance its engagement with all actors in support of AU and IGAD efforts toward lasting peace and stability. In response, the Chairperson, Mahmoud Youssouf Ali, promptly deployed a high-level delegation from the Panel of the Wise to Juba to help ease tensions and encourage dialogue. In addition to the deployment of the Panel of the Wise, the Chairperson of the AU Commission conducted an official visit to Juba, in coordination with the IGAD, from 5 to 6 May 2025 to engage South Sudanese leadership on the evolving political and security landscape. During the visit, the Chairperson held high-level talks with President Salva Kiir Mayardit and senior officials, focusing on protecting the gains of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan, advancing inclusive national dialogue, ensuring the credible and timely implementation of the transitional roadmap, and strengthening governance institutions. The upcoming session is expected to revisit these priorities in line with ongoing efforts by regional and continental actors, including the AU High-Level Ad Hoc Committee on South Sudan (C5). It is also expected that the PSC will consider the report of the Panel of the Wise.
On 17 June, the PSC will hold its fourth session, which will focus on a briefing on the status of the implementation of the Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP) and other relevant AU instruments related to continental defence and security. This session is being held in line with the 1159th PSC communique that requested the AU Commission Chairperson to regularly brief the PSC on the status of the implementation of the policy and other relevant AU instruments on defence and security on the Continent. Although the CADSP has been in existence for two decades, it only received focused attention from the PSC for the first time during its 1159th session held on 22 June 2023. That session included a briefing not only on the CADSP’s implementation but also on the operationalisation of the African Standby Force (ASF). During the discussion, the CADSP was underscored as the ‘bedrock of Africa’s collective defence and security,’ and the PSC stressed the urgent need to reinvigorate and operationalise all pillars of the continental peace and security architecture, including the ASF. The CADSP, which complements the AU Peace and Security Protocol, sets out objectives, principles and frameworks aimed at advancing a collective security approach for the continent. Gaps in the implementation of key CADSP pillars, including conflict prevention, peacebuilding, and the integration of regional defence mechanisms, as well as foreign military activities on the continent, remain unattained. Therefore, this upcoming session presents an opportunity to assess progress, identify gaps, and reaffirm commitments in the implementation of CADSP.
The PSC will have consultations with the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) on 19 June. The consultative meeting is being held in accordance with Article 19 of the PSC Protocol, which envisions close collaboration between the PSC and the ACHPR in the promotion of peace, security, and stability across the continent. In addition to the provision of the Protocol, during the 866th session, the PSC, as a means to enhance and institutionalise its collaboration with the ACHPR, decided to hold annual joint consultative meetings between the two organs. The last such consultation took place in August 2021. During that 1019th session, the communique on the consultation, among others, underscored ‘the importance of mainstreaming human rights throughout conflict prevention, management, stabilisation, resolution to post-conflict reconstruction and development.’ Despite the absence of formal consultations in recent years, the PSC has continued to adopt decisions relevant to the ACHPR’s mandate. Notably, during its 1213th session in May 2024, the PSC requested the ACHPR for an investigation into the human rights situation in El Fasher and other areas of Darfur, and requested a report with recommendations to ensure accountability for perpetrators. As such, an update on the status and progress of this investigation is expected to feature in the upcoming discussions. The discussion will likely address pressing concerns such as impunity, gender-based violence, and widespread human rights violations in conflict-affected regions, including the DRC, South Sudan, Sudan, and the Sahel. The PSC is also anticipated to engage with ACHPR reports on abuses linked to terrorism and unconstitutional changes of government, and may urge Member States to implement key instruments such as ACHPR Resolution 448 (2020), which outlines the human rights dimensions of conflict situations. Further emphasis may be placed on enhancing early warning systems through closer collaboration with ACHPR’s monitoring and reporting frameworks.
The last session for the month, which is scheduled for 25 June, will focus on providing an update on ‘the implementation of the PSC and EAC/SADC decisions on the situation in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).’ Since the beginning of the year, the conflict in the DRC has intensified as a result of the renewed violence involving the Mouvement du 23 Mars (M23) rebel group, its seizure of Goma, and mounting diplomatic tensions between the DRC and Rwanda. In response to the deteriorating situation, the PSC, EAC and SADC have undertaken diplomatic efforts resulting in several key decisions. Among these is the Communique issued at the Joint EAC and SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government held on 8 February 2025 in Dar es Salaam, which called for an immediate ceasefire, the withdrawal of foreign forces, and the merger of the Luanda and Nairobi Processes. It also proposed the inclusion of additional facilitators to enhance the peace process and urged the resumption of direct dialogue with all armed groups, including M23, under the unified framework. The PSC, for its part, convened the 1256th emergency ministerial session on 28 January 2025 and its 1261st session on 14 February 2025. During the 1261st session, the Council endorsed the outcomes of the Joint EAC-SADC Summit of 8 February 2024, the Extraordinary SADC Summit of 31 January 2025, and the 24th Extraordinary EAC Summit of 29 January 2025—each of which addressed the worsening crisis in eastern DRC. To further strengthen coordination, the PSC also decided to establish a Joint AU/EAC/SADC Coordination Mechanism to provide technical support, foster collaboration with other Regional Economic Communities and mechanisms and ensure the harmonisation of implementation of peace initiatives. Subsequently, during the 2nd Joint EAC-SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government held on 24 March 2025, the joint summit appointed the facilitators of the merged Luanda-Nairobi peace process, which is composed of five former Presidents. On the other side, the AU designated the President of Togo, Faure Gnassingbé, as the AU Mediator, taking over from the President of Angola. Apart from the convening in Lome, Togo, of the Mediator and the EAC-SADC Facilitators on 17 May, the US launched talks between Rwanda and DRC as well. It is anticipated that the session will take stock of the conflict situation and the state of peace efforts both within the AU, EAC-SADC frameworks and the alignment of other initiatives with the regional efforts. Furthermore, given the situation that has been further exacerbated by a deepening humanitarian crisis marked by mass displacement and increasing incidents of sexual and gender-based violence, which underscores the critical need for unimpeded humanitarian access, it is expected that the session will discuss mechanisms for a coordinated response.
The PSC Committee of Sanctions is also scheduled to meet on 24 June to provide updates on the activities of the Committee.
Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - April 2025
Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - April 2025
Date | April 2025
In April, under the stand-in chairship of the Republic of Uganda, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) had a Provisional Programme of Work (PPoW) which anticipated six substantive sessions and the PSC’s 4th Annual Joint Retreat with the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM).
Will the possible end of the AU Mission in Somalia open new opportunities for peace?
Will the possible end of the AU Mission in Somalia open new opportunities for peace?
Date | 23 May 2025
Zekarias Beshah
Senior Researcher, Amani Africa
Solomon Ayele Dersso, PhD
Founding Director, Amani Africa
The African Union (AU) Support and Stabilisation Mission (AUSSOM) became de jure operational on 1 January 2025 under huge financial deficits and without a clear financing modality. The timing of AUSSOM becoming operational also coincided with the surge in the attacks and territorial gains of Al Shabaab in recent months. While the changing security dynamics prompted the summit of troop contributing countries (TCCs) hosted by Uganda on 25 April 2025 to call for the mobilisation of an additional 8000 troops, the growing financial deficit of the mission and the lack of its financing model remain unchanged.
The financing hole facing AUSSOM
The estimated budget for AUSSOM from July 2025 to June 2026 stands at $166.5 million, based on the troop reimbursement rate of $828, according to the UN Secretary-General’s report to the Security Council dated 7 May 2025. However, the funding challenge extends beyond this figure—it includes the substantial debt inherited from its predecessor, ATMIS. The total urgent cash requirement to settle ATMIS liabilities for the period January to June 2025 is reported at $92 million. In addition, outstanding arrears owed to TCCs from 2022 to 2024 amount to $93.9 million, including Uganda ($34.5 million), Kenya ($15.7 million), Ethiopia ($17.2 million), Djibouti ($8.3 million), and Burundi ($18.1 million).
So far, committed funding amounts to only $16.7 million, comprising contributions from China ($1 million), Japan ($3 million), the Republic of Korea ($1.6 million), and the AU Peace Fund’s Crisis Reserve Facility ($10 million). With Resolution 2719 now off the table as a viable funding option, the AU faces the daunting task of mobilising the needed funds from alternative sources. The European Union (EU), which has been the single largest direct contributor to AU mission in Somalia, providing nearly €2.7 billion since 2007, shows little appetite to sustain its past commitments, given shifting geopolitical priorities. While the EU may still commit some funds, it is unlikely to fill the gap. Contributions from non-traditional donors also appear limited, as seen from the modest pledges by China, Japan, and South Korea. (For further analysis of AUSSOM’s funding challenges and related discussions, see Amani Africa’s ‘Insights on the PSC’ here and here.)
The promise that failed to materialise
Despite the decision of the UN Security Council (UNSC) in its Resolution 2767 that Resolution 2719 could be used as the main source of predictable financing of AUSSOM upon UNSC authorisation on 15 May 2025, the UNSC meeting held on 12 May was unable to adopt the resolution authorising the use of Resolution 2719. This has shattered AU’s preferred funding model as the only viable path for sustaining AUSSOM, putting the very continuity of the mission in its current form in serious question.
Since the adoption of Resolution 2719, the AU has consistently advocated for the resolution’s first activation in support of the post-ATMIS security arrangements, which eventually took shape as AUSSOM. Indeed, the AU-UN joint report submitted to the UNSC on 26 November 2024 proposed the hybrid implementation of resolution 2719 as the only solution for AUSSOM. However, this effort faced opposition from the United States from the outset, with Washington arguing that Somalia was not a suitable test case for the application of the resolution. It was in this context that the Security Council held closed consultations on 12 May 2025. With the U.S. maintaining its position that Somalia is not the best place to trigger resolution 2719, the Council was unable to confirm the Secretary-General’s request as envisaged under paragraph 39 of UNSC Resolution 2767.
A search for alternative funding?
No doubt, much of the attention would now shift to finding alternative sources of funding. Indeed, efforts are underway to convene an international donor pledging conference in Doha, Qatar, by the end of this month to rally support for AUSSOM and Somalia. The conference, initially planned for late April, has already been postponed to the end of May. With no confirmed date, it remains uncertain whether there is genuine interest in convening the event, and even if it does happen, whether it will yield the kind of sustainable funding the mission desperately needs.
Though it may be possible to cobble together enough funding to keep AUSSOM running for a few more months, doing so in dribs and drabs is not sustainable. This approach has already plunged the AU into a perpetual financial crisis with serious implications for the mission’s effectiveness and credibility. Indeed, it is not clear if a success in finding such alternative sources can do more than postpone the inevitable for a few months. After more than 18 years of deploying its longest, most expensive, and deadliest mission in Somalia, the time may have come to consider an exit. This apparent inevitability presents a much-needed opportunity for thinking about other options than an AUSSOM model of pursuing peace in Somalia, with Somalia’s political and social actors forced to take their acts together for mobilising the requisite level of collective leadership and responsibility for tackling the security challenge facing Somalia.
Also, a search for a different approach to peace in Somalia?
While ending AUSSOM is not risk free, it is not totally bad either. It could open the door to two possible security arrangements: bilateral security partnerships or an ad hoc regional military alliance to counter Al-Shabaab—something akin to the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in the Lake Chad Basin.
Whatever shape post-AUSSOM security takes in Somalia, ending the mission can also have an upside in terms of ensuring the primacy of political and diplomatic strategy. Two aspects in particular deserve attention.
First, in the military and political dimensions of the equation for finding a lasting solution to the security crisis facing Somalia, the weakest link remains to be the political dimension of the equation. Rather than enabling Somalia’s political and social forces to assume greater agency and responsibility in adopting a political roadmap backed by all sectors of society for resolving the conflict, the perpetual presence of AU missions created dependency and externalisation of this responsibility. Despite some progress registered over the years in this respect, Somali political actors remain locked in protracted infighting both at the Federal level and between the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and the Federal Member States (FMS). The fracturing of the political landscape continues to deepen, with the National Consultative Council members turned into members of a new political party of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. Ending the mission could inject much-needed pressure on Somali political leaders to end their complacency and focus their attention to working collectively and achieve political cohesion.
Second, it may pave the way to imagine the resolution of Al-Shabaab’s insurgency beyond and above military solutions underwritten by AU peace support operations. The ultimate objective of any peace operation is to create the space for a political solution. Over the last 18 years since the first deployment of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in March 2007, the AU’s military engagement in the country has made significant security gains over Al-Shabaab, but these gains cannot be sustained with indefinite peace operations. As argued by the UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Jean-Pierre Lacroix, ‘…whatever form a peace operation takes, to be effective in the long run it must be anchored in and contribute to an overarching political solution.’ Such a political solution continues to delude Somalia. Eighteen years of AU mission in Somalia played critical role in liberating territories under Al Shabbab control and in expanding the space for the operation of Somalia’s fledgling institutions. It was pointed out in 2010 that rather than being an instrument for advancing the implementation of a political process, the AU mission became ‘the primary means of international engagement in Somalia, taking the place of an absent political process.’ Whatever progress that has been made in the political front remains inadequate and AU’s mission continues to be used as the primary instrument in the quest for peace. The result is that the military approach has come to take primacy and the prolonged presence of AU missions being used to perpetually short change the investment in a political strategy.
The end of ASUSSOM could force a much-needed rethinking for shifting the focus towards ensuring the primacy of politics in the search for resolving the crisis in Somalia. It could force Somalia’s political and social forces to take far greater interest in and invest more resolutely in prioritizing national reconciliation and inclusive political settlement, thereby shifting away from the protracted infighting that characterizes the Somalia political landscape. Similarly, it could give the international community the opportunity to play a more supportive role by seizing the space AUSSOM’s exit creates for prioritizing its investment in such a political process.
While the risk associated with AUSSOM’s end should be managed carefully, this also seems to be an opportune moment to change course and try new approaches rather than clinging to a model whose role is for managing rather than resolving the crisis facing Somalia.
The content of this article does not represent the views of Amani Africa and reflect only the personal views of the authors who contribute to ‘Ideas Indaba’
Consideration of the Emergency Situation in Libya
Consideration of the Emergency Situation in Libya
Date | 22 May 2025
Tomorrow (23 May), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to convene its 1280th session on the situation in Libya.
Following opening remarks by Ambassador Harold Saffa, Permanent Representative of Sierra Leone to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for May, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to deliver a statement. The Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission for Libya, Ambassador Wahida Ayari, is also likely to make a statement. If previous practice is guidance, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General and the Head of the UN Mission in Libya, Hannah Tetteh, may also address the PSC.
The last time the PSC considered this agenda item was in November 2024, during its 1244th meeting. The PSC reiterated ‘AU’s full support for the Permanent Ceasefire Agreement of 23 October 2020’ and reaffirmed ‘the resolute commitment and readiness of the AU to continue to support Libya in addressing its crisis, in line with AU’s principles and instruments.’ Other than this session, the only engagement of the AU involved a high-level visit in October 2024 by a delegation comprising Mauritanian President and AU Chairperson for 2024, Mohamed Ould Ghazouani, the then AU Commission Chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat and Congo’s Foreign Minister Jean-Claude Gakosso. The visit aimed to revive efforts to convene Libya’s long-delayed national reconciliation conference, which was initially scheduled for April 2024 but did not take place. Beyond the occasional effort focusing on the convening of national reconciliation, the attention given to the situation in Libya has been waning, with the PSC convening only one session. The field mission to Libya, envisaged in the PSC’s annual indicative programme, did not take place in 2024, just as it did not in 2023.
Tomorrow’s meeting comes following the assassination of a key militia leader, which has reignited violence in Tripoli, threatening the fragile 2020 ceasefire. The assassination of Abdel Ghani al-Kikli (aka ‘Gheniwa’) on 12 May 2025, a prominent militia leader of the Stability Support Apparatus (SSA), sparked intense clashes in Tripoli. The fighting involved rival militias, including the 444th Combat Brigade, with gunfire, drones and anti-aircraft weapons reported. The Interior Ministry declared a state of emergency, urging residents to stay indoors.
Such violent eruptions are not inseparable from the state of political and security division afflicting Libya. The country remains fractured by a relentless political division, its people caught in the crossfire of two rival administrations vying for power. In Libya’s capital, Tripoli, the UN-recognised Government of National Unity (GNU), led by Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, holds sway, striving to assert its legitimacy on the global stage. Meanwhile, in eastern Libya in Benghazi, the Government of National Stability (GNS) commands influence, bolstered by the House of Representatives (HoR) and Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA). This division, rooted in years of conflict following the 2011 overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi, has left Libya in a state of recurrent political instability, institutional fragmentation and recurrent violence.
With both sides locked in a bitter struggle for dominance, the rivalry between the two sides and rival armed supporters has stifled the transitional process. Previous efforts to overcome this division have rather been unsuccessful. National elections, initially slated to bring reconciliation and a unified government, have been indefinitely postponed since 2021, mired in disputes over electoral laws and eligibility criteria. As oil fields – Libya’s economic lifeline – become ‘bargaining chips’ in the power struggle, foreign powers quietly back their preferred faction. The persistence of these conditions has deepened the nation’s woes, with ordinary Libyans bearing the brunt of economic instability, periodic violence and a fragmented state.
The Eastern Libya-based parliament was reported to have adopted a national reconciliation and transitional justice law in January 2025. In parallel, in February 2025, a Charter for Peace and Reconciliation was signed in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on the sidelines of the 38th AU Summit. The Libyan parties that signed the charter included representatives from the Parliament, the High State Council, and representatives of presidential candidate Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, along with other Libyan dignitaries. Reflecting the persisting division in Libya, it was the head of the Presidential Council, Mohammed al-Menfi, who was present in Addis Ababa for the AU Summit, but did not sign the Charter. The Government of National Unity also did not send a representative to sign the reconciliation accord.
The UN remains the main actor in the Libyan peace process. Cognisant of this and following the departure of Abdoulaye Bathily from UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), the PSC, in the communiqué of its 1244th Session, underscored ‘the urgent need for the United Nations Secretary-General to appoint his Special Representative for Libya.’ On 24 January 2025, the UN Secretary-General António Guterres announced the appointment of Hanna Serwaa Tetteh of Ghana as his Special Representative for Libya and Head of the UNSMIL, succeeding Abdoulaye Bathily of Senegal, who served as Special Envoy and Head of UNSMIL until May 2024. Since her appointment, UNSMIL established a 20-member Libyan Advisory Committee, a diverse group of experts tasked with untangling the contentious issues blocking the path to elections. Comprising respected Libyan figures with expertise in legal, constitutional and electoral matters, the committee was designed to propose technically sound and politically viable solutions, building on frameworks like the Libyan Political Agreement, the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) Roadmap and the 6+6 Committee’s electoral laws. By 20 May 2025, after more than 20 meetings in Tripoli and Benghazi, the committee delivered a comprehensive report to UNSMIL, outlining four options to address critical disputes, including the linkage between presidential and parliamentary elections, candidate eligibility criteria, voting rights and the electoral appeals mechanism. This report, described by UNSMIL as a ‘launching point for a country-wide conversation,’ aimed to guide the next phase of a Libyan-led political process, with public consultations planned to foster inclusivity and national consensus. However, consensus remains elusive.
On 17 May, the AU Commission Chairperson, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, issued a statement expressing deep concern over the armed clashes that broke out in Tripoli. While welcoming ‘the ceasefire and the return of cautious calm’, he emphasised the need for ‘demilitarising’ Tripoli. Calling for ‘national responsibility and engagement in a comprehensive political process to end Libya’s prolonged transition’, he urged all stakeholders to commit to ‘the National Reconciliation Charter signed in Addis Ababa.’ On the same day, the UNSC issued a Press Statement on the situation in Libya, expressing ‘deep concern at the escalation of violence in Tripoli in recent days, with reports of civilian casualties.’ The Security Council further ‘welcomed reports of agreed truces and called for these to be unconditionally respected and for a permanent ceasefire to be agreed.’
Despite the return of calm, on the political front, actions taken by the rival factions continue to escalate tension. The latest such development involved the announcement by the Head of the Presidential Council (PC) of several legislations that he said were adopted by the PC. While these legislations were rejected by some Libyan institutions, including some members of the PC and the speaker of the HoR, the Prime Minister of the GNU, Abdulhamid Debaiba, transmitted the legislations to the HoR and the High Council of State. Amid these developments, UNMSIL issued a warning against the risk of escalatory unilateral actions by political and security actors and urged them to refrain from taking steps that undermine the fragile situation in Libya.
As with previous sessions, tomorrow’s session is expected to discuss the recent armed clashes in Libya and the continuing political and institutional division impeding progress in the transitional process in the country. It is also expected that the PSC will get an update on developments around the reconciliation process and the status of and the follow-up to the Peace and Reconciliation Charter signed under the auspices of the AU. Also of interest for the PSC is receiving an update on the progress made in relocating the AU Liaison Office from Tunis to Tripoli, as directed by the AU Assembly at its 35th Ordinary Session.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may urge the various Libyan stakeholders to summon the leadership and the compromise required to end the prevailing political stalemate and instability in the country, which is undermining development and security. Council is also likely to reiterate that the Skhirat Agreement signed on 17 December 2015 remains one of the credible bases and frameworks for a lasting political solution for the Libyan crisis. Council may welcome the Libyan Reconciliation charter signed in Addis-Ababa on 14 February 2025. The PSC may request the AU to take steps to ensure that the Charter receives the support of all Libyan stakeholders and is adequately aligned with other initiatives in Libya for reconciliation and transitional justice. The PSC may call on external actors to end interference in the affairs of Libya and support the rivalry among contending Libyan actors. The PSC may also emphasise the importance of improved coordination, harmonisation and complementarity among the UN, the AU, the League of Arab States and the EU to prevent overlapping efforts and competing initiatives in support of Libyan peace.
