Updated briefing on support for Somalia after the withdrawal of ATMIS
Updated briefing on support for Somalia after the withdrawal of ATMIS
Date | 20 May 2024
Tomorrow (21 May), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1213th session on the Report of the post-ATMIS Assessment. Initially scheduled for 13 May and removed from the monthly program, this session is brought back to the agenda of the PSC after the finalisation of the report due for submission by the AU Commission.
The session is expected to commence with an opening remark from Ambassador Innocent Shiyo, Permanent Representative of the United Republic of Tanzania to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for May 2024. Subsequently, Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to provide a statement to the Council, introducing the report prepared for the session. It is also expected for Souef Mohamed El-Amine, the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission for Somalia and Head of ATMIS, to provide a briefing on the report.
This is the fourth meeting of the PSC inclusive of the informal consultation it held since March on support for Somalia post-ATIMS. The most recent session was held on 4 April during its 1205th session, dedicated to the session to an analytical briefing on the strategic planning for the post-AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) Somalia. In the communique adopted on the session, the PSC requested the AU Commission ‘to undertake comprehensive and detailed planning based on the situation on the ground, including undertaking threat assessments, in consultation with the Federal Government of Somalia, ATMIS Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs), and the UN.’ Tomorrow’s session constitutes a follow-up to this specific decision.
The session focuses on the post-ATMIS Assessment report. In order to prepare the report, AU’s Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) deployed a team to Somalia from 24 to 20 April 2024 to conduct a strategic assessment, including for a possible post-ATMIS AU peace support operation in Somalia. The team engaged and canvased the views of a wide range of stakeholders involving representatives of FGS, some Federal Member States, ATMIS troop-contributing countries, UN, EU and bilateral states accredited to and based in Somalia.
The report is expected to provide an update on the security situation, including the threat assessment. Among others, this is expected to highlight the threat that Al Shabaab poses, including the balance of power between Somalia security forces and the terrorist group. In this respect, a recent analysis pointed out that while the major offensive that the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) undertook building on a wave of clan-based resistance to Al Shabaab in the Hiraan and Galmudug regions which succeeded in recovering over 200 settlements, the war stalemated again following the setback that the FGS faced in the second round of its offensive campaign. Noting the UN Monitoring Group’s January 2024 report estimation that the strength of Al Shabaab is between 7,000 and 12,000, the same analysis pointed out that the force strength of Al Shaabab shows the group’s ‘ability to withstand significant casualties and recruit new fighters, including children.’
Tomorrow’s session and report are also expected to discuss ATMIS drawdown. At the moment, there is a little over a month for the implementation of the third phase of the drawdown. In accordance with the ATMIS drawdown timeline, the third phase of drawdown envisages the withdrawal of 4,000 ATMIS troops and the generation of approximately 19000 troops by the FGS. Preparation for the drawdown of the third phase of ATMIS has been underway since February when ATMIS fulfilled the second phase drawdown a month behind schedule. Some of the preparations undertaken by ATMIS and the AU since the second phase drawdown concluded include a four-day conference that aimed to plan for the next phase of the drawdown of the additional 4000 troops in June 2024 and conduct an impact assessment of Phase 1 and Phase 2 drawdowns.
On the part of the federal government, in addition to submitting its proposal for strategic planning for post-ATMIS, the National Security Advisor also hosted the head of ATMIS and UNSOS to discuss plans for the third phase of drawdown. This was followed by two additional meetings one among the tripartite leadership (FGS, ATMIS, and UNSOS) to further discuss the drawdown in alignment with the SSF Trust Fund as well as the Post ATMIS plans and the second involving FGS, ATMIS troop contribution countries and a delegation from the AU PAPS Peace Support Operations (PSOD) to further identify post-ATMIS security plans. As the focus has been on preparation for the post-ATMIS phase and as can be discerned from the FGS proposal for strategic planning for post-ATMIS, there is little indication of a delay in the implementation of this third phase of the drawdown.
On the security front, it is worth noting that there are legitimate concerns about the emergence of a security vacuum on the departure of ATMIS at the end of December 2024. This was highlighted in the FGS document on the proposal for strategic planning for post-ATMIS. Despite the launch of a second phase of the counter-insurgency by the FGS and the most recent new phase of a military campaign against al-Shabaab with the aid of US military command, al-Shabaab has significantly increased its target towards federal and ATIMS forces. Between March and April, al-Shabaab orchestrated 26 attacks and 6 explosions targeting the Somali security force.
The other issue that will be of interest for tomorrow’s session and expected to be highlighted in the report is the political environment in Somalia. The tension surrounding the constitutional amendment undertaken by the FGS, which recently saw the approval of amendments to parts of the constitution by Parliament, has heightened tensions among various clan members. This friction plays into the hands of Al Shabaab and undermines counter-insurgency coordination. The most serious fallout from the tension that arose between the FGS and Federal Member States (FMS) is Puntland renouncing its ties with the FGS and announcing its independence. While it has not reached the breaking point as with Puntland, there are reports of discontent in other FMS such as Southwest and Jubaland. Although the FGS has attempted to neutralize the tension, these persisting and recurring tensions between FGS and FMS are indicative of recurring challenges of cohesion that undermine the consolidation of cohesive state authority necessary to narrow down the space of maneuver for Al Shabaab.
In terms of the post-ATMIS presence that the AU may have, one of the other issues expected to be highlighted is the continuity that is expected to be maintained between the end of ATMIS mandate and the start of the new mission. While there seems to be agreement on the need for avoiding the emergence of vacuum, it is far from clear whether and which of the ATMIS contingents constitute the nucleolus of or remain part of the post-ATMIS mission that Somalia has requested to have. In the light of the tension that erupted between Somalia and Ethiopia following the signing of an MoU between Ethiopia and Somalia, there is uncertainty on whether the FGS would like to see a withdrawal of ATMIS troops and their replacement by contingents from countries it may consider more friendly to it. This is not without its own ramifications for relations between FGS and some of the FMS and for avoiding the emergence of a security vacuum. The PSC may therefore underscore the need for consensus on the matter having regard to the imperative for ensuring continuity and avoiding any security vacuum.
The report is also expected to present both the options for the form that the post-ATMIS mission could take and the sources of funding for the mission. While options for the post-ATMIS mission may range from a regional mission involving troops of countries of the region along the lines of the East African deployment to Eastern DRC to another AU mission of a limited mandate and duration, the most realistic option is another AU mission, which was already hinted at in the FGS’s proposal for strategic planning for post-ATMIS presented on 27 March to the PSC.
The one issue which is of pressing concern in this context is the source of funding for this post-ATMIS mission. The funding shortfalls that ATMIS faced have created gaps in the operational capacity of ATMIS, including in effecting payment to ATMIS troops. It is thus expected that from the options that the strategic assessment report would present PSC’s decision would be informed by these experiences. As such, it is not expected that the PSC would opt for the current and AMISOM/ATMIS model of funding. Both FGS and the PSC are expected to have a shared view that the post-ATMIS mission is not as hamstrung by similar financial shortfalls as ATMIS. The option that PSC members are expected to endorse is one that ensures predictable funding of the mission for the duration of its mandate. This requires the current AMISOM/ATMIS model plus payment for troop allowance and death and disability benefits which would be sourced either from UN assessed contributions or another dedicated source that is not a trust fund.
The expected outcome of the session is a communique. The PSC is expected to commend the AU Commission for producing a Post ATMIST report promptly. In this regard, the PSC may welcome the findings of the post-ATMIS Assessment report and request the AU Commission to work closely with the FGS to ensure the post-ATIMS Security arrangements reflect the key finding of the report. As for ATMIS drawdown, the PSC may commend the preparation by the FGS and ATMIS for the third phase of drawdown. In light of the limited time ahead of the third drawdown, the PSC may in alignment with the UN recommend the third phase go hand in hand with the preparations by the FGS for a post ATMIS Security Plan as well as their capacity to produce the next set of federal forces. The PSC may also reiterate its call for adequate and sustainable financing of post-ATMIS Security arrangements and in this respect may urge the UN to give serious consideration for use of UN assessed contributions either under UN Resolution 2719 or as a special case for such funding as AU and UN finalize the necessary preparations for the implementation of Resolution 2719. In relation to the political tensions particularly between the FGS and FMS, the PSC may welcome the efforts by the Somalia to de-escalation the tension and underscore the need for maintaining political cohesion and national reconciliation as the foundation for the success of any post-ATMIS deployment. Furthermore, the PSC may reiterate the need for a coordination among key stakeholder in the region to combat the threat posed by al-Shabaab.
Briefing on political transitions in Africa
Briefing on political transitions in Africa
Date | 19 May 2024
Tomorrow (20 May), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1211th session to receive updates on countries undergoing political transitions, including Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, Niger and Gabon.
The session will commence with opening remarks by Innocent Shiyo, Permanent Representative of the United Republic of Tanzania to the AU and PSC Chairperson for May 2024. This will be followed by a statement by Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). As the concerned regional economic communities (RECs), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) may participate in the session.
The last time the PSC met to discuss political transitions was on 21 December 2023, when it engaged Guinea, Mali and Burkina Faso in an informal consultation. On 23 October 2023, the PSC also received updates on the situation in Gabon and Niger at its 1180th session. During that session, PSC members emphasized the need for informal consultations with the member states undergoing political transition, in line with the relevant provisions of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance to support them in restoring constitutional order and identifying issues that require timely interventions.
Reports indicate that the security situation in Burkina Faso worsened since the coup in 2022 with an upsurge of terrorist attacks and an increasing number of civilian casualties. Burkina Faso is facing the twin challenges of constitutional crisis induced by the coup and even more worryingly the spike in conflict involving terrorist groups. Despite the grave threat that the expansion of terrorist violence poses both to Burkina Faso and the region, it receives no meaningful AU support in its efforts to contain this menace. While it is understandable, much of the focus of the policy engagement of the AU on Burkina Faso has a singular focus on restoration of constitutional order. The lack of adequate attention to the terrorism dimension makes the engagement on restoration of constitutional order disconnected from the totality of the reality in Burkina Faso. The coup leaders had agreed on a 24-month transition period with the ECOWAS to restore constitutional order. With the end of this transitional timeline fast approaching, however, the country did not make any preparations to organize elections. It comes as no surprise that the transitional government appears to have prioritized its offensive operations against terrorist groups and decided in September 2023 to postpone the elections indefinitely.
Burkina Faso aligned itself with Mali and Niger to form the Alliance of Sahel States in October 2023. This is aimed at coordinating their efforts in the fight against the threat of terrorism in the region and defending themselves from any possible external intervention. It happened against the backdrop of an ECOWAS decision to intervene militarily in Niger following the July 2023 coup. Subsequently, the three countries notified ECOWAS of their decision to withdraw from the community. In its extraordinary summit in February, ECOWAS examined the political, security, socio-economic, and financial implications of this decision and instructed the ECOWAS Commission to engage the AU, UN, and other partners on the matter to convince the three member states to remain in the Community.
Additionally, Burkina Faso and Niger withdrew from the Group of Five for the Sahel (G-5 Sahel) joining Mali which withdrew earlier. In a joint statement they issued in December 2023, the remaining two other members, Chad and Mauritania, expressed their readiness to dissolve the G5 Sahel following the decision by Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger to withdraw from the group. According to the G5 Sahel founding document, the alliance can be dissolved at the request of at least three member states. These developments continue to unfold in the context of deepening geopolitical tussle between western powers that historically exerted enormous influence on the region and Russia that is emerging as a significant player as the military administrations reportedly wish to chart a more autonomous path. France and the US are scaling back their military presence in the region, while Russia is increasing military cooperation with the three countries.
In January, the Malian authorities ended the 2015 Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali. The decision was made after Malian forces with the support of the Wagner group, a Russian security company renamed recently as Africa Corps after the death of its leader, took over major cities and towns in northern Mali at the end of last year from Tuareg separatist groups following MINUSMA’s departure. The decision also came amid heightened diplomatic tension with Algeria, which played an important role in facilitating the Algiers agreement. Following recent attacks by Malian forces on southern Mauritanian villages pursuing Tuareg armed groups, it appears that tensions are also rising between Mali and Mauritania.
The Malian authorities replaced the peace agreement with a national dialogue to promote peace and reconciliation. The month-long dialogue process concluded on 10 May with recommendations including extending the transition period for three more years and allowing the leader of the transitional government, Colonel Assimi Goita, to run for elections. However, armed groups were not involved in the process and the Malian opposition parties and civil society groups boycotted it.
Mali was expected to hold elections in February in line with the agreement reached with ECOWAS but, in September 2023, the Malian authorities postponed the elections indefinitely. This is the second time they postponed the election after their first promise to hold an election in February 2022 prompting ECOWAS to impose sanctions on the country. In February 2024, ECOWAS decided to ease the sanctions signaling its willingness to engage with the Malian authorities. In June 2023, Mali adopted a new electoral law and conducted a referendum, but the Malian opposition and civil society expressed serious concerns about the lack of credibility of the process. In April, the military leaders suspended all political activities and clamped down on opposition figures, journalists, and human rights activists.
Following the July 2023 coup in Niger, the coup leaders had proposed a three-year transition period but did not provide further details. They did not also agree on a transitional arrangement with ECOWAS similar to the one Burkina Faso and Mali did. ECOWAS, which imposed sanctions on Niger and threatened to take military action, subsequently lifted the economic and financial sanctions imposed on Niger in February. In an admission of the inadequacy of an approach that singularly focused on the coups and explaining the need for lifting the sanctions on the three central Sahelian states, Nigeria’s President in his address to the ECOWAS summit that lifted the sanctions pointed out that ‘the complexities of the issues at hand necessitate a comprehensive and collaborative approach.’
In its last meeting on the situation in Niger in October, the PSC expressed deep concern over the lack of a clear, practical, and time-bound timetable for the implementation of the transition period in Niger, particularly the holding of a national dialogue and elections to facilitate the swift return to constitutional order. It also requested the AU Commission to appoint a High-Level Representative for Niger and deploy a high-level mission to Niger to determine the country’s needs for the return to constitutional order and assist the transitional Government in organizing national dialogue which the Nigerien authorities announced in July 2023. The AU Commission has as yet to act on this decision of the PSC.
Like Mali and Burkina Faso, Guinea’s coup leaders agreed to a 24-month transition period with ECOWAS. Based on this agreement, the country is expected to organize elections by the end of this year. However, Guinea has not made the necessary preparations to hold elections. In February, ECOWAS decided to lift the financial and economic sanctions imposed on Guinea. Nevertheless, the Guinean authorities suddenly dissolved the transitional government indicating their intention to postpone the elections until at least 2025. Guineans have been holding protests against the authorities, expressing frustration over the lack of progress in restoring constitutional order, and the main Guinean opposition coalition strongly opposed postponing the elections.
Gabon’s transitional authorities have now announced plans to hold elections in August 2025. They also convened an inclusive national dialogue in April which saw the participation of more than 600 people, including opposition and civil society representatives. The meeting reportedly concluded with several recommendations, including a two-year transition period, and a seven-year presidential term renewable once. It seems, however, that the proposal to suspend political parties until the issuance of stricter political rules was controversial.
Subsequently, a new constitution is expected to be submitted for a referendum to pave the way for elections at the end of the transition period. During the last quarter of 2023, the transitional government’s leader, General Brice Nguema was on a regional tour that took him to several ECCAS member states to seek their support for lifting the suspensions imposed by ECCAS and the PSC. In his campaign for the lifting of suspension and a clear attempt to achieve a treatment similar to that of Chad’s, the General met with the leadership in Cameroon, Chad, Central African Republic (CAR), Equatorial Guinea and the Republic of Congo, two of which are members of the PSC. In its ordinary summit held in Equatorial Guinea on 9 March, ECCAS decided to lift the suspensions imposed on Gabon and temporarily relocate the ECCAS headquarters to Malabo. The summit also instructed the President of the ECCAS Commission to undertake an advocacy mission to the AU and the UN to explain this decision.
The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to reaffirm AU’s zero tolerance of unconstitutional changes of government and urge all member states currently undergoing political transitions to pave the way for quick restoration of constitutional order, including through the adoption and proper implementation of clear transition timetables. The PSC may urge Mali to lift the ban on political activities and end repression against human rights activists. It may express concern over the repeated postponement of elections by a number of countries undergoing political transitions and call on the transitional leaders to commit to the timely conduct of elections to enable handover of power to a legitimate civilian leadership elected by citizens. It may also reiterate its call for the AU Commission to develop tailored support programs for the countries in transition, in conjunction with the relevant RECs, to provide the necessary political and diplomatic accompaniment and technical support with respect to issues related to national reconciliation, governance, security sector reform (SSR) and other relevant areas. It may further call on the AU Commission to undertake an assessment of how the fight against terrorism and the accompanying insecurity in the central Sahelian countries affects efforts for making progress towards constitutional order and submit a report outlining how the effort for restoring constitutional order can be pursued along with provision of support by the AU together with ECOWAS for the fight against terrorism.
Stocktaking of the Implementation of the Protocol establishing the AU PSC, Article by Article - Practice, Performance and Prospects
Stocktaking of the Implementation of the Protocol establishing the AU PSC, Article by Article - Practice, Performance and Prospects
Date | 14 May 2024
Tomorrow (15 May), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will be convening an open session, within the framework of the 20th anniversary of the official launch of the PSC, which aims to afford the opportunity for reflecting on the implementation of the Protocol Establishing the AU PSC (PSC Protocol).
As usual, the PSC will commence the session with opening remarks by the Chairperson for the month, Innocent Shiyo, Permanent Representative of the United Republic of Tanzania. Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is also expected to deliver introductory remarks. Professor Timothy Murithi, Head of the Peacebuilding Interventions Programme, Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR) will be facilitating tomorrow’s stocktaking PSC session and will also be delivering a presentation. Being the major research institutes engaged in the work of the PSC, Amani Africa Media and Research Services and the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) are also invited to deliver presentations.
In addition to PSC member states, tomorrow’s session is expected to bring together representatives of all other AU member states as well as representatives of the Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs).
The open session is expected to explore various issues pertaining to the implementation of the various parts of the PSC Protocol. In this respect, it is expected that the session will identify the aspects of the PSC Protocol that have not been implemented, those other areas that are poorly implemented and those parts whose implementation doesn’t align with the spirit and letters of the Protocol. It is recognised even on the part of the PSC that two decades after its operationalisation the implementation of the various parts of the Protocol is uneven. This is not completely surprising nor is it uncommon in other similar bodies.
Considering that the PSC only have very finite resources and limited institutional capacity, the issue that is of strategic importance for the credibility and effectiveness of the PSC is how it utilises its time, diplomatic resources, legal powers and moral and political authority to deliver on the core of its mandates – prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. The cases where the PSC engaged successfully indicate that the PSC is effective when it makes effective use of the key tools of conflict prevention, management and resolution. For example, in 2012 the PSC exercised its conflict prevention role successfully through a decision that articulated a robust framework for averting the descent of South Sudan and Sudan into a full-fledged war following skirmishes over the Heglig oil fields. PSC’s decision not only pulled the two countries from the brink but also provided the impetus for the peace process that led to the signing of a peace agreement on various outstanding issues post the independence of South Sudan.
Tomorrow’s session thus affords the PSC and the wider AU Member States to engage in critical reflections on how to enhance, consolidate and activate the implementation of those aspects of the PSC Protocol central to the delivery of its core mandates. The peace and security landscape of the continent is such that rather than seeking to implement all parts of the PSC Protocol particular attention should be given to rationalising the work of the PSC for prioritising the effectiveness of early warning and early response, preventive diplomacy and the mobilisation of sustained and robust conflict management and resolution strategy dedicated to each of the various hotpots on the continent with focus on the major one in the Sahel, Horn of Africa and Great Lakes regions. Such a dedicated strategy with effective follow-through is a prerequisite for containing and mitigating the spread and escalation of conflicts and creating conditions for their resolution. This underscores that while it is worthwhile to map out the gaps and inadequacies in the implementation of the various parts of the PSC, enhancing and fully implementing those aspects of the PSC Protocol central to the core mandate of the PSC merits prioritisation.
No outcome document is expected to be adopted from tomorrow’s stocktaking session.
Consideration of the Draft Common African Position on the 4th Review Conference of the United Nations (UN) Program of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its Aspects (UNPoA)
Consideration of the Draft Common African Position on the 4th Review Conference of the United Nations (UN) Program of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its Aspects (UNPoA)
Date | 12 May 2024
Tomorrow (13 May) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene to consider the draft Common African Position of the 4th Review Conference of UNPoA, which will be held in June, in New York.
Following opening remarks by Ambassador Innocent Shiyo, Permanent Representative of the United Republic of Tanzania to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for May 2024, Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) is expected to make a statement. The session is also likely to have the participation of representatives from the different Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) and a representative from the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA).
Tomorrow’s meeting is being convened pursuant to the decision made during PSC’s 1105th meeting held on 15 September 2022 during the commemoration of the 2022 Africa Amnesty Month (AAM) which took place from 4 to 7 September 2022, in Lomé, Togo. The decision directed the AU Commission “…to take steps, including convening a meeting of experts from member states, to elaborate a common African position which will provide guidance to AU member states during the 4th Review Conference of the Programme of Action on Small Arms…”. In addition, the Thirty-Sixth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union held from 18 – 19 February 2023, following the adoption of Assembly decision Assembly/AU/Dec.843(XXXVI), directed the AU Commission to “…initiate a process of elaborating a Common African position, which will provide guidance to AU member states during the 4th Review Conference of the Programme of Action on Small Arms…” Building on this, a 3-day meeting of experts on small arms and light weapons control from AU member states, RECs, RMs and Intergovernmental Regional Bodies (RBs) as well as the Chair of the Peace and Security Cluster of the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) was held in November 2023. The convening aimed to elaborate and adopt the draft Common African Position and review the progress made in the implementation of the Programme of Action to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) in all its aspects”. It is expected that the document will contain elements of consideration from the different perspectives from the national, regional and international levels.
In Africa, unregulated Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) Trade is a major driver of conflicts on the continent. The ease of access to SALW incentivises the resort to and eruption of conflicts. It is one of the factors that impede efforts for the resolution of conflicts. In countries in transition, such as South Sudan, it is a main factor that threatens and at times leads to the unravelling of vulnerable peace agreements and transitional processes. As seen in parts of West Africa and the Horn of Africa, unregulated trade and circulation of SALW are turning intercommunal clashes into deadly conflicts. Indeed, this is one of the factors that have contributed to the increase in the number of conflicts and the expansion of the geographic spread of such conflicts, particularly those involving armed terrorist groups.
As highlighted in Amani’s Insight for PSC’s 1085th meeting which was held on 18 May 2022, it was noted that there are at least three factors that exacerbate the proliferation and trafficking of illicit SALW. These factors include: 1) the challenge surrounding the availability of reliable data on stockpiles of member states and the safekeeping of those stockpiles – this, in particular, pertains to the issue of auditing of stockpiles in member states and enhancing capacities for the safekeeping of stockpiles; 2) diversion of lethal and non-lethal Contingent Owned Equipment (COE) that are deployed for use in peace support operations into illicit market; and 3) in cases where no effective framework and resources for undertaking DDR as part of peace agreements for settling conflicts are provided for, weapons in the hands of armed groups ends up being traded. Similarly, the poor implementation of DDR includes the proper accounting of weapons and arms in the hands of various armed groups in the DDR process which means that such weapons and arms remain outside of the control of formal institutions.
Additionally, at policy and institutional levels, there is a need for reinforcing continental institutional mechanisms for countering the scourge of SALW. The various RECs have established frameworks within their respective regions. Although this is a positive step, it has resulted in parallel legal regimes and has made responses fragmented. Even in regions that have instruments, implementation is still lacking. The fragmented response has also left regions such as the Sahel without an established instrument. The very nature of the flow of illicit weapons necessitates a response that is trans-regional and a standardized continental framework.
At the international level and of particular importance for the Common African Position is the need for the establishment of an international body that tracks, monitors and reports on an annual basis on illicit trade, supply and circulation of arms and weapons, which among others, lists the actors involved in and enables these. This body should take the form of an international commission on control of illicit trade, supply and circulation of arms and weapons that end up fueling conflict. Building on UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2457 on Silencing the Guns in Africa adopted on 27 February 2019, this body should be empowered to report to the UNSC for appropriate action including sanctions against such actors.
The need for the establishment of an international body that tracks, monitors and reports on an annual basis on illicit trade, supply and circulation of arms and weapons, which among others, lists the actors involved in and enables these.
Additionally, as part of the effort to fend off diversion, which is one of the main sources of illicit circulation of SALW, the Common African Position needs to call for dedicated resources for building and strengthening the capacity and regulatory infrastructure of states. This will help in enhancing the implementation of the International Tracing Instrument (ITI), adopted in 2005 by the UN, which requires states to ensure that weapons are properly marked, records are kept in a timely and reliable manner and that the ITI provides a framework for cooperation in weapons tracing. It is thus anticipated that AU member states and all the stakeholders involved in the drafting of the common African position will consider the complex dynamics surrounding the prevention, combating and eradication of the illicit trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its aspects.
The Review Conferences are held every six years to assess progress and challenges in implementing the Programme of Action (PoA) and the ITI on preventing, combating and eradicating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. The previous conference, the 3rd Review Conference, took place in 2018 and served as an important opportunity for countries to strengthen their efforts in the prevention and proliferation of small arms and light weapons.
The expected outcome of the session is either a press statement or a communique. The PSC may welcome the drafting and presentation of the draft Common African Position and adopt the common position with amendments. As part of the Common Position, the PSC may highlight the need for developing and implementing national action plans to help countries put in place comprehensive measures to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in these weapons in order to support the implementation of the UNPoA. This includes measures for effective regulation of the manufacture, acquisition, transfer, stockpiling, retention and disposal. It may also encourage national strategies to incorporate a gender-mainstreaming approach to the implementation of the UNPoA and ITI, and to ensure the alignment of these national strategies with relevant regional and international frameworks and ensure the meaningful participation of women and youth. Apart from calling for collaborative efforts between the AU, RECs/RMs which is vital for curbing the illicit proliferation of SALW, the PSC may on the other hand call for a standardised continental framework as part of the UNPoA that addresses fragmentation and lacuna in the existing diverse frameworks and the lack of uniformity in the existence and institutional arrangements. Additionally, it is likely that the PSC may call for the AU Commission and RECs/RMs to support member states in developing standards and harmonising their national legislation on the manufacture, trade, brokering, possession and use of small arms and light weapons. In this respect, as part of the Common Position, the PSC may urge for the establishment of dedicated resources, such as an international fund, that avails to the UN, AU and RECs/RMs the resources for building and strengthening the capacity and regulatory infrastructure of states for effectively implementing ITI. In the expansive efforts of the fight against the illicit trade and diversion of illicit small arms and light weapons, there could be the consideration of supporting effective monitoring and protection by incorporating the agenda in AU-led, AU-authorized and AU-endorsed Peace Support Operations as well as UN Peacekeeping Operations.
In terms of emerging technological developments that ease the production and circulation of weapons, the Common Position expresses support for the call in the UN for the appointment of a Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) to undertake a comprehensive study on new and emerging technologies related to the manufacturing of small arms and light weapons, including polymer and modular weapons produced using 3D printing. The study should take into account the intermediacy of the unconditional provision of such manufacturing technologies to developing states, the technological gaps that exist between developing and developed countries, as well as the diverse national legal systems governing the regulation of these evolving small arms and light weapons capabilities, in order to better understand the implications and identify appropriate responses to address any associated challenges or risks while ensuring equitable access for developing nations.
Perhaps most crucial for purposes of addressing the growing threat posed by SALW in Africa is for the PSC to urge the incorporation of an international body that tracks, monitors and reports on an annual basis on illicit trade, supply and circulation of arms and weapons, which among others, lists the actors involved in and enable such acts. Finally, the PSC may also underscore the need for harnessing the contribution and role of civil society organizations.
Making the Panel of the wise fit for purpose critical for effectively delivering on AU’s preventive diplomacy role
Making the Panel of the wise fit for purpose critical for effectively delivering on AU’s preventive diplomacy role
Date | 9 May 2024
Solomon Ayele Dersso, PhD
Founding Director, Amani Africa
Previne Habu
Researcher, Amani Africa
While the Panel of the Wise is one of the pillars of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) operational since 2007, both its effective functioning and the carving out of clear space in executing its role, primarily involving conflict prevention, remain a work in progress. This can be gathered, for example, from the recent briefing of the Panel to the 1204th session of the Peace and Security Council (PSC). The measures specified in the outcome of this session and their implementation are key for making the Panel a fit-for-purpose continental preventive diplomacy tool. At the same time, it is critical that the Panel is not encumbered with roles that spread it thin and undermine its effectiveness in its primary role of conflict prevention.
The reflections in the PSC session can be logically organised as focusing on not only the activities of the Panel but also it’s a) the Panel’s institutional interface with bodies with relevant mandates, b) institutional and operational arrangements, and c) its working methods. As the communique of the 1204th session indicates, on the institutional interface of the Panel with AU bodies with relevant mandates, the issues that the PSC deliberations covered include:
i. the Panel’s role in revitalising cooperation with similar mechanisms at the Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) [i] and
ii. the operationalisation of the roles of the subsidiary mechanisms of the panel – FemWiseAfrica, PanWise and Network of African Youth (WiseYouth).
The deliberations and the communique also highlight the importance of coordination and ensuring synergy of efforts in conflict prevention as well as the need for creating platforms of meaningful participation of women and youth in preventive diplomacy, mediation and peacebuilding and the engagement and the signing of Framework of Cooperation with APR Panel of Eminent Persons. The PSC also encouraged the Panel to extend a similar relationship with the Banjul Commission, which is erroneously stated in the communique as the African Court instead of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights.
In terms of the institutional and operational arrangements of the functioning of the Panel, the activity report of the Panel highlighted the perennial challenges of provision of the requisite resources for the effective execution of its mandate. Indeed, apart from the composition and dynamism of the members of the Panel, the effective implementation of the Panel’s mandate depends on the secretarial and institutional support that the AU Commission puts at its disposal.
In this respect, the PSC reiterated its request for the AU Commission ‘to provide requisite resources, including political, human and financial resources, to enable the Panel to implement its mandate effectively in line with its modalities to ensure the timely prevention and resolution of conflicts in Africa.’ Additionally, the PSC also tasked the AU Commission to ‘facilitate rapid deployment mechanism for the Panel of the Wise to timely respond to emerging conflicts and crises.’ This is a major step forward in the evolution of the institutionalisation of the work of the Panel. It is worth recalling that despite the fact that the PSC Protocol envisages that the Panel meets as may be required for the performance of its mandate, the Panel is not a standing body. Accordingly, among others, facilitating a rapid deployment mechanism for the Panel necessitates that the Panel and its membership be organised to operate on a standby basis.
The other aspect of the functioning of the Panel that the session addressed concerns the working methods of the Panel. In this respect, the Communique of the session canvased issues of the Panel’s working methods as part of the key actionable decisions of the session. Thus, the PSC requested the AU Commission to:
i. facilitate the provision of mission reports of the Panel of the Wise to the Council;
ii. ensure the Panel of the Wise receives early warning information and analyses to enable the Panel to proactively deploy preventive diplomacy efforts;
iii. strategic reviews of the Panel of the Wise’s activities to evaluate the effectiveness of the Panel’s interventions, identify areas for improvement, and adjust strategies in alignment with the dynamic nature of conflict and crisis situations on the continent; and
iv. support and facilitate joint deployments of the Panel of the Wise with similar regional bodies, particularly in contexts requiring urgent attention, leveraging the collective expertise and resources for conflict prevention and management efforts.
One of the other key outcomes of the 1204th session was the call of the PSC for a follow-up and re-engagement plan by the Panel for maintaining sustained attention to countries that the Panel visited as part of its conflict prevention initiative. Additionally, the PSC requested the Panel to continue engaging stakeholders in countries where it undertook missions. Developing these working practices is key not only for following up on recommendations made by the Panel as pointed out by the PSC but also for monitoring developments in those countries, among others, in order to initiate follow-up engagement that the situation in those countries warrants.
As documented in the AU PSC Handbook, the Panel’s track record also shows that it has identified an effective mechanism for exercising its advisory role through its thematic reflections. As a strategy for building its preventive diplomacy role, it has also developed preventive missions to countries with potential risks of crises particularly in the context of elections. In this respect, it is also expected that the Panel will have another mission to South Sudan before the country’s general elections in December 2024. While these experiences provide guidance towards making the Panel fit for purpose, it should not lead to bulging the Panel’s role too wide.
As if the Panel’s mandate in conflict prevention is not itself onerous enough (and has yet to be fully and effectively implemented) and the Panel has the luxury of adding further work, the PSC encouraged it to support the implementation of peace agreements on the Continent and support mediation efforts of AU High-Level Panels in their respective areas of engagement. The PSC also further muddied the role of the Panel when it envisaged ‘the critical need to utilise the Panel’s extensive expertise and influence to accompany Mali, Gabon, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Niger and Sudan to return to constitutional order, as well as processes in South Sudan and Chad.’
Instead of the Panel, these transitions each require a standing mechanism that catalyses and facilitates the initiation and implementation of relevant reforms that would ground each on a solid path for not only achieving restoration of constitutional order but also avoiding the recurrence of unconstitutional changes of government. Thus viewed, the expansion of the work areas of the Panel envisaged in the outcome of the session will not advance the effectiveness of the Panel. If anything, it would reduce the Panel’s focus on its core areas of responsibilities relating to preventive diplomacy.
Both the deliberations and the outcome of the session reflect a continuing lack of clarity about the role of the Panel. While the Panel’s mandate covers preventive diplomacy and advisory roles, it seems that there is an expectation for it to expand its role to early warming, mediation, and provision of support to countries in transition. As an essentially technical process with its own protocols and modules for tracking and measuring as well as analysing various risk factors, the provision of briefings on country situations and horizon scanning briefings should be left to the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) supported by CISSA and APRM which have early warning roles on account of their mandate and areas of work.
The best use of the role of the Panel – as per the mandate entrusted to it under the PSC Protocol and its standing as a preventive diplomacy instrument that engages in preventive or de-escalation action within the framework of APSA – would be for it to implement effective preventive diplomacy actions on the basis of a robust conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy strategy building on and as a follow up to the early warning provided by CEWS. Such a focused use of the Panel would not only provide clarity on the focus of the Panel’s mandate and areas of work but also avoid the risk of the Panel spreading thinly with little effectiveness. The most accurate formulation of the 1104th PSC session communique in this respect tasks the AU Commission to ensure that the Panel ‘receives early warning information and analyses to enable the Panel to proactively deploy preventive diplomacy efforts.’
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[i] Reference is made to the structures similar to the Panel of the Wise established at the RECs/RMs levels notably the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Council of the Wise, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) Panel of Elders, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) Committee of Elders, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Panel of Elders and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Mediation Reference Group.
The content of this article does not represent the views of Amani Africa and reflect only the personal views of the authors who contribute to ‘Ideas Indaba’
Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - March 2024
Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - March 2024
Date | March 2024
In March, under the chairship of Namibia, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) had a scheduled program of work consisting of six sessions and an informal meeting. After the revision of the programme, four sessions and two informal consultations were held.
Provisional Program of Work for the Month of May 2024
Provisional Program of Work for the Month of May 2024 *
Date | May 2024
In May 2024, the United Republic of Tanzania will assume the role of chairing the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC). Given that May 2024 marks 20 years since PSC’s operationalization, the PSC Secretariat has dedicated May and the following months of the year, to the commemoration of this body with the incorporation of ‘PSC@20’ for consideration on most of its agenda items. The provisional program of work indicates that each week will be dedicated to a particular thematic issue as part of the marking of the 20th anniversary of the PSC. Accordingly, the first week of May is dedicated to ‘mediation and dialogue’; the second to ‘humanitarian, peace and security’; the third to ‘women and youth, peace and security’; the fourth to ’child protection’; and the fifth to ‘peace support operations’.
During the month, PSC is expected to convene five substantive sessions with six agenda items, including a High-level event at the Heads of State and Government level. It will also have an exhibition day, Committee of Experts (CoE) meetings, a field mission to Tigray region in Ethiopia and the induction of the Military Staff Committee (MSC) which will be held in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. One of the sessions will be an open session.
On 13 May, the PSC is expected to convene its first substantive session on consideration of the Report of the post-ATMIS Assessment. The last convening of the PSC on ATMIS was the 1205th session on 3 April 2024 on the Briefing by the Federal Republic of Somalia on its Proposal for a Post-ATMIS Security Arrangement in Somalia, pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 2710 (2023). It is to be recalled that during this session, PSC requested the AU Commission to undertake a comprehensive and detailed planning based on the situation on the ground, including undertaking threat assessments, in consultation with the Federal Government of Somalia, the ATMIS Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs), and the UN, and report back to it by the end of April 2024. It is against the end of this timeline that the meeting is being convened for receiving this report.
On the same day (13 May), the PSC will also consider and adopt the draft provisional program of work for June 2024.
The second substantive PSC session, scheduled for 15 May, will be an open session on Stocktaking of the Implementation of the Protocol establishing the AU PSC, Article by Article – Practice, Performance and Prospects. The session is expected to take stock of the 20 years journey of the PSC and presents the occasion for identifying opportunities for sustaining achievements and areas for improvement in the functioning of AU’s premier standing peace and security decision-making body. The meeting is also expected to provide the platform for assessing how well each article of the PSC Protocol has been put into practice.
On 17 and 18 May, the PSC is expected to undertake a field mission to Tigray Region in Ethiopia. This mission is taken under the spirit of Consolidating Peace in Africa – Pretoria Peace Agreement. The Ethiopia-Tigray peace agreement (Pretoria Agreement or Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA)), signed on 2 November 2022 in Pretoria, South Africa aimed to end the war in Tigray region of Ethiopia by establishing a permanent ceasefire between the government of Ethiopia and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). During the 1158th PSC session, the PSC requested the AU Commission to undertake a needs assessment for the extension of the deployment of the Monitoring, Verification and Compliance Mechanism (MVCM) – with consideration on the timelines and funding requirements to avoid its premature withdrawal. During its 37th Ordinary Session held in February 2024, the AU Assembly endorsed the disbursement of 1 Million USD from the Crisis Reserve Fund of the AU Peace Fund to support the DDR program within the Pretoria COHA for the Tigray region. This field mission is therefore expected to give the PSC an update on the situation on the ground, including the humanitarian situation, as well as provide valuable insights that can improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the AU’s future mediation and dialogue initiatives.
On 20 May, the PSC will convene its third substantive meeting to receive an updated briefing on countries under political transitions, specifically Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, Niger and Gabon. This builds on earlier sessions of the PSC on countries in complex political transitions focusing specifically on those countries that experienced unconstitutional changes of government. This session provides an opportunity to review the state of the transitional process in each of these countries, the issues facing the transitional process and the ways in which the AU can enhance its role in facilitating reform processes and the implementation of transitional tasks that pave the way for return to constitutional order. If the experience thus far is anything to go by and the recent ECOWAS decision regarding some of these countries serves as guide, there is a need for the PSC to have a more realistic consideration of the situation of those countries in transition that are experiencing active fighting in conflicts involving terrorist groups in their territories. This is also important in the light of the recently concluded Inaugural Annual Joint Consultative meeting between the PSC and the Mediation and Security Council (At Ambassadorial Level) of the ECOWAS held in Abuja, Nigeria on 24 April 2024 which underlined the need to support countries in political transition in order to ensure the resilience of state institutions and to prevent their weakening.
The fourth substantive PSC session to be held on 21 May will have two agenda items. The first agenda will be on the Consideration of the Draft Common African Position on the 4th Review Conference of the United Nations (UN) Program of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its Aspects (UNPoA). The 4th Review Conference (RevCon4) of the UN Program of Action (PoA) on small arms and light weapons and the International Tracing Instrument (ITI) is expected to take place from 18 June – 28 June 2024. The conference will provide an opportunity to highlight the progress made in the implementation of the PoA to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects, as well as the review of the ITI. In this context, from 28 to 30 November 2023, the PAPS Department convened a meeting of AU Member States Experts, including experts on small arms and light weapons control from AU Member States and Regional Economic Communities (RECs), Regional Mechanisms (RMs) and Intergovernmental Regional Bodies (RBs) as well as the Chair of the Peace and Security Cluster of the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC), to develop a Common African Position on the fourth Review Conference of the UNPoA. The coming PSC meeting therefore will offer the opportunity to review and consider the draft Common African Position, prior to the conference in June.
The second agenda item expected to feature on 21 May is the Consideration of the Report of the Field Mission to Tigray Region of Ethiopia that is scheduled during the month.
The fifth PSC meeting will be taking place on 25 May, which marks the annual celebration of Africa Day, the PSC@20 Anniversary Colloquium and will be held at HoSG Level under the theme, “20 Years of the AU PSC as a Standing Decision-Making Organ: The Next 2 Decades of the Peace and Security We Want in Africa.” The event which will be held in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, will also see unveiling of the PSC Logo by the PSC Troika.
The PSC CoE is also expected to convene a meeting on 02 May to Consider the Draft Common African Position on the 4th Review Conference of the UN PoA, in preparation for the substantive PSC meeting scheduled to be held on 21 May. On 06 May, the CoE will convene a meeting in preparation for the PSC 20th Anniversary Colloquium, which will be held on 25 May.
On 27 May, there is expected to be the inaugural meeting of the PSC Sub-Committee on Sanctions. The 16th Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union held in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, in May 2022, called for the full operationalization of the PSC Sub-Committee on Sanctions and directed the PSC CoE to develop the Terms of Reference (ToRs) for the Sub-Committee. It is against the development of the latter that the PSC Sub-Committee will convene its inaugural meeting on this day on the margins of the 20th Anniversary of the PSC.
On 06 May, the PSC also envisages an exhibition day for the celebration of the 20th anniversary of the PSC at the AU Commission. The exhibition will be an opportunity to showcase the PSC’s remarkable journey over the past two decades, its accomplishments and its reinforcement role as a vital organ within the AU.
The last activity of the month will be the induction of the PSC Military Staff Committee (MSC) in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania to be held on 28-31 May. The induction’s purpose is to familiarize members of the MSC of newly elected PSC member states, with the operational procedures of the PSC and to strengthen the MSC’s assistance to the PSC, as outlined in Article 13 of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the PSC.
PSC’s provisional program of work for the month also envisages in footnote, the commemoration of the International Day of Living Together in Peace on 16 May.
*Post-script: The first revision of programme of work of the PSC effected on 3 May introduced three major changes. First, the session on consideration of the Report on the Post-ATMIS Assessment which was scheduled for 13 May has been removed from the programme and is put under footnote. The PSC may thus reinstate the session after the completion of the preparations for the meeting and the finalization of the Report. Second, the field mission to Tigray region which was scheduled to be on 17-18 May has been postponed. As a result, the PSC will not hold the meeting on the consideration of the Report of the field mission to Tigray region planned for 21 May. Finally, the inaugural meeting of the PSC sub-committee on sanctions which was slated to happen on 27 May has also been postponed.
Amani Africa wishes to express its gratitude to the Australian Embassy in Ethiopia for the support in the production of this Insight on the Monthly Programme of Work of the AU Peace and Security Council
