Update on the deployment of the 3000 troops in the Sahel region
Update on the deployment of the 3000 troops in the Sahel region
Date | 16 December 2022
Tomorrow (16 December), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1127th meeting to receive update on the deployment of the 3000 troops in the Sahel region. The update will be one of the two agenda items that the PSC is set to consider in this session and the meeting is expected to take place in-person.
Following opening remarks of the Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of Nigeria to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for the month, Victor Adekunle Adeleke, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye is expected to deliver a statement. AU High Representative for Mali and the Sahel, Mamane Sidikou, and the representatives of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the G5 Sahel may deliver statements.
The decision to deploy 3000 troops to Sahel was made by the AU Assembly at its 33rd Ordinary Session [Assembly/AU/Dec.792(XXXIII)] in February 2020. While PSC discussed the situation in the Sahel several times this year, including during its 1087th session in June and 1116th session in October, the last time that PSC dedicated a stand-alone session on the deployment of the 3000 troops was its 950th meeting that took place on 30 September 2020. In that meeting, PSC endorsed the Revised Strategic Concept Note on Planning Guidance for the Deployment of 3000 Troops to the Sahel and requested the AU Commission together with the G5 Sahel and the ECOWAS to develop and submit the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for the deployment of the troops. At its 1087th session of 1 June 2022, PSC also requested the Chairperson of the Commission to ‘intensify consultations with the concerned stakeholders, inclusive of ECOWAS, ECCAS, and G5 Sahel Joint Force’ on the deployment and ‘promptly brief the PSC on the outcomes of the consultations for due consideration’. Most recently, during its 1116th session, PSC expressed its commitment to ‘revisit the possible deployment of 3000 troops for six months’. Tomorrow’s session is an opportunity to assess progress made in that regard and deliberate on actions that should be taken to expedite the deployment.
The security situation in the Sahel has deteriorated as the region continues to experience increasing terrorist attacks and geographical spread of these attacks, which makes the deployment of the Force even more important today than two years ago when the decision for the deployment was made. Bilateral and multilateral security arrangements in the Sahel are facing enormous challenges at a time when strong cooperation and coordination is desperately needed, raising the fear of creating security vacuum that could be exploited by terrorist groups. One month after its decision to leave the G5 Sahel Joint Force, on 14 June, Mali’s military authorities announced to end the commitment of Malian personnel serving in the western zone (Mali-Mauritania) and central zone (Mali-Burkina Faso-Niger) as of 30 June. The operating environment for United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) has become very challenging. Growing number of troops contributing countries are announcing either suspension of activities or the intention to terminate troop contribution for various reasons. The last French military unit of Barkhane forces also left Mali on 15 August after a fallout between the two countries following the 24 May coup.
Against the backdrop of the expanding threat of terrorism and ever deteriorating security situation of the Sahel marked by the spike in asymmetric warfare, there is also a growing call for a more robust AU-led peace support mission in the Sahel. On this point, UN Secretary-General, António Guterres, was quoted, in his 5 May 2022 interview with French radio station RFI, saying that ‘but it [MINUSMA] is operating in circumstances that really call not for a peacekeeping force, but a strong force to enforce peace and fight terrorism.’ He further called for an African-led mission with a ‘Chapter Seven Security Council mandate’ and ‘obligatory financing’ as more fitting to the security situation in Mali than MINUSMA. Recent developments and regional dynamics in the region as highlighted above could make now an opportune time to take the implementation of the 3000 troops deployment forward.
Challenges remain abound while pursuing the implementation of the deployment. The first is the funding issue. Mobilizing funds for another deployment while the existing AU peace support operations are experiencing enormous financial and logistical challenges would remain an arduous task for the AU. It is to be recalled that Assembly decision 792 requested the Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC) to explore funding options, as well as ECOWAS to take necessary steps for the ‘urgent disbursement of its pledged 100 million USD’ to support the deployment.
The second challenge would be generating the required number of troops. The July 2020 revised Concept Note envisaged AU in coordination with ECOWAS to lead the force generation process within the AU Member State but excluding the G5 Sahel Countries (Burkina Faso, Chad Mali, Mauritania, and Niger). Generating 3000 troops in a context where many African countries have been already overstretched in the fight against multiple security threats within their respective regions is not expected to be an easy task.
The third challenge is lack of cohesion among members of the G5 Sahel. If the original plan of integrating the 3000 troops into the G5 Sahel Force with a unified command is to remain intact, there is a need for achieving shared commitment among the countries of the Sahel for the effectiveness of the 3000 troops deployment.
Fourth and most important is the assumption underpinning the proposed deployment of the 3000 troops. The experience thus far shows that the military response, while necessary, has failed to deliver in terms of reversing the trend in the incidents of terrorist attacks and geographic spread of attacks. There is therefore a need for asserting the primacy of the political. As such, attention should focus on rolling out a multidimensional strategy that aims at mobilizing governance, development, environmental and humanitarian interventions into which the military response is integrated. As such, it may as well be necessary for the PSC to await the join AU-UN assessment that former Nigerian President Mahamadou Issoufou is undertaking in order to consider the deployment of troops as part of the recalibration of regional and international efforts for addressing the security situation in the Sahel.
The expected outcome from tomorrow’s session is a communique. PSC is expected to express its concern over the persistence of growing terrorist attacks in the Sahel region and the spread of such attacks towards West African coastal states. It may note the unfavorable developments around the different collective security arrangements operating in the region, and in that regard, PSC may express concern over the possibility of creating security vacuum likely to be exploited by terrorist groups. Against the backdrop of worsening security situation in the Sahel and the challenges that existing security arrangements are facing, PSC may stress the need to expedite the implementation of Assembly decision 792 for the deployment of additional 3000 troops in the Sahel. To that end, PSC may wish to set a timeline for the finalization of the CONOPs for the deployment, which is critical to its operationalization. PSC may also request the Commission to step up engagement with relevant regional mechanisms, Member States, as well as international partners to address issues of funding and force generation of the deployment. The PSC may further emphasize the importance of harmonization and coordination among the various security forces and actors. Finally, and most importantly, it may re-emphasize the importance of adopting a comprehensive approach that would address not only the immediate security challenges but also the underlying causes of the security crisis in the Sahel. The PSC in this light may request the AU Commission to continue working on the planning for the deployment of the troops having regard to and with a view of making it informed by and anchored on the outcome of the ongoing AU-UN joint assessment.
Briefing on the activities of the AFCONE and CTBTO
Briefing on the activities of the AFCONE and CTBTO
Date | 16 December 2022
Tomorrow (16 December), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1127th session to receive briefing on the activities of the African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE) and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO).
Following opening remarks of the Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of Nigeria to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for the month, Victor Adekunle Adeleke, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye is expected to deliver a statement. Representatives of AFCONE and CTBTO are expected to brief the PSC. Representatives of the United Nations (UN) Office to the AU (UNOAU) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) may also make statement in the opening segment of the session.
The last time PSC convened to discuss updates regarding the activities of AFCONE and implementation of the African Nuclear-Weapon Free-Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty) was in March 2022, at its 1071st session. As expressed in the Communiqué of the session, recent developments geopolitical developments indicative of possible use of nuclear weapons have triggered the PSC’s concern over the impact of such developments on peace, security and humanitarian efforts, globally and in Africa in particular. One of the important outcomes of the session was the PSC’s call for joint action between relevant international and regional actors including AFCONE, IAEA, UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) and CTBTO in undertaking implementation efforts for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Tomorrow’s session is expected to follow up on-going efforts including collaborations among relevant actors towards ensuring nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.
One area of update the PSC may be briefed on at tomorrow’s session is the discussions of the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) which took place from 1 to 26 August 2022, in New York. Although the conference came to an end without the adoption of any concreate outcome document due to Russia’s opposition to the draft tabled by the presidency, the occasion did serve to renew commitments made in the treaty to ‘prevent the spread of nuclear weapons’ and to ‘promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy’. Representing the AU Commission and AU States Parties to NTP, AFCONE submitted a statement to the Tenth Review Conference of NTP which among other points, emphasised the importance of Nuclear Weapons Free Zones (NWFZ) and encouraged the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) to ‘prioritize efforts towards ratification of all the applicable protocols of all the NWFZ Treaties.’
Regarding implementation of Pelindaba Treaty – one of the five global NWFZ Treaties – AFCONE may update the PSC about ongoing efforts to ensure ratification of the treaty by all AU member States in order to boost its implementation. As indicated in Amani Africa’s previous insight on PSC’s 1071st session, 11 AU member States are yet to ratify the Pelindaba Treaty. Further to contributing towards global non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and creating conditions for sustaining peace and security, the full implementation of the Pelindaba Treaty would also significantly advance socio-economic development in Africa, through promoting cooperation on the use and application of nuclear energy in critical fields such as power generation, agriculture and various industrial endeavours. The treaty could serve as an essential step for member States to forge a common goal and establish the necessary mechanisms for advancing nuclear science and technology. As noted by the AFCONE in its reflections on the Tenth Review Conference of the NPT, the peaceful application of nuclear power and technology could ‘meaningfully contribute to the achievement of a country’s socio-economic development goals, the Sustainable Development Goals, and the African Union’s Agenda 2063’.
Regarding the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), the CTBTO may update the PSC on the significant increase achieved in the signature and ratification of the treaty in Africa. Currently, 51 African States have signed the CTBT while 50 of these have ratified it. Within the framework of international nuclear arms control and disarmament and having regard to the fact that nuclear testing is a key step in the development of nuclear weapons, the CTBT bans the testing and explosion of nuclear weapons globally, be it above ground, under water and/or underground. The treaty is however yet to enter into force as ratification by eight States is still pending (these are China, North Korea, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Pakistan and the United States). The CTBT’s entry into force wold be critical both for enhancing implementation of the NPT and to contain threats and use of nuclear weapons that have currently become causes for serious concern.
In its efforts to detect nuclear explosions around the world, the CTBTO has also mobilised 38 monitoring facilities in 24 African countries within the framework of its International Monitoring System. While these have been commendable steps, it is important to ensure that better collaboration and coordination exists between the CTBTO and AFCONE in order to have a coherent approach for nuclear weapons non-proliferation and disarmament in Africa.
In addition, while the CTBT would considerably contribute towards the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons both in Africa and the world, it is important to ensure clarity on the difference between efforts aimed at peaceful use of nuclear energy on the one hand and nuclear testing for the purposes of developing nuclear weapons on the other. As emphasised in AFCONE’s reflections on the Tenth Review Conference of NTP, it is essential to ‘guard against attempts to deny technology, especially to developing countries, under the guise of non-proliferation or nuclear security measures’ and that States Parties should ‘guard against any reinterpretation of, or restrictions on, the inalienable right of States to pursue the peaceful uses of nuclear technology’.
Another critical aspect the PSC may wish to reflect on is the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons. The destructive impact of nuclear weapons on human life and livelihood – including aspects related to environment, health and development – is an already well-established factor. However, recalling past experiences such as the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings as well as the Chernobyl nuclear incident and the devastating humanitarian impacts they entailed is critical in order to keep relevant global actors from engaging in a destructive nuclear discourse.
The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a Communiqué. The PSC is expected to commend AFCONE and the CTBTO for their continued efforts to ensure non-proliferation of nuclear weapons both in Africa and globally. It may welcome the conclusion of the Tenth Review Conference of NPT and commend AFCONE for contributing to the review on behalf of the AU Commission and African States Parties. It may express regret however, over the lack of consensus faced in adopting an outcome document at the Tenth Review Conference, which makes it second time in a row, following the Ninth Review Conference of 2015 which also unfortunately came to an end without agreement on a substantive final declaration. The PSC may also call on AFCONE, CTBTO and IAEA to better coordinate their efforts. It may also reiterate its call to AFCONE, working in collaboration with the AU Commission and other relevant stakeholders including the IAEA, to mobilise resources and technical expertise to member States to advance and promote use of nuclear science and technology for peaceful and developmental purposes.
Review of the Integration and Implementation of IHL in African Union Policies and Activities
Amani Africa
December 12, 2022
In Africa and the world at large, conflict continues to be a major driver of humanitarian crises and human suffering. As a research report published early in 2022 showed, the factors that account for this phenomenon include the increase in the number of conflicts and the expansion in the geographic spread of conflicts. In this context, the importance of norms that contribute to the regulation of conflicts and provide minimum standards to govern behaviour of belligerents cannot be overemphasised. While conflicts are unfortunately hard to completely avoid, International Humanitarian Law (IHL) provides rules and principles which enhance safeguards to minimise the destructive impacts of armed conflicts, particularly to civilians and civilian objects.
Updated briefing on the situation in Guinea Bissau
Updated briefing on the situation in Guinea Bissau
Date | 12 December 2022
Tomorrow (12 December) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1126th session to receive an updated briefing on Guinea Bissau as one of the two agenda items that PSC is set to consider during this session.
Following the opening remark of the PSC Chairperson for December, Nigeria’s Permanent Representative to the AU, Victor Adeleke, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, Bankole Adeoye is expected to deliver a statement. Ovidio Manuel Barbosa Pequeno, the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission for Guinea Bissau and Head of AU Liaison Office in Guinea Bissau is scheduled to make a statement. The representative of the Economic Community for West Africa States (ECOWAS) is also expected to brief the PSC. The representatives of the United Nations Office to the AU (UNOAU) and of the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries are expected to make a statement. The representative of Guinea Bissau as the country concerned is also expected to make an intervention.
The last time the PSC held a session on Guinea Bissau was in January 2020 at its 905th meeting. The session was held during the time where the country was experiencing an electoral dispute following the presidential runoff vote between two candidates, Domingos Simões Pereira (Partido Africano para a Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde – PAIGC) and Umaro Sissoco Embaló (Movimento para Alternância Democrática (MADEM) G- 15). Despite the National Election Commission’s confirmation of Umaro Cissoko Embalo as winner of the December 2019 presidential run-off vote, Domingos Simoes Pereira contested the result at the Supreme Court with allegations of fraud. After contention between several institutions including the National Election Commission, the Supreme court and the Assembly, Umaro Sissoco Embaló was sworn in on 27 February 2020 while his victory remained highly contested.
The political tensions that arose during the electoral process in 2019 continued to affect the political environment of the country and disagreements have persisted. The dispute particularly between the President and the Assembly which is dominated by the opposition party PAIGC has resulted in the President dissolving the legislative body and calling for a snap election to take place in December 2022, although this will not take place as planned. The dissolution of the parliament came after corruption allegations of members of the Assembly by the President. Moreover, Embaló justified his decision by making reference to ‘persistent and unresolvable differences’ with the parliament.
Beyond electoral disputes, the political upheaval in Guinea Bissau is a result of long standing governance challenges. Guinea-Bissau has experienced successive military interventions including the last military coup in 2012 and the most recent attempted coup in February 2022. The AU, United Nations and the ECOWAS reacted quickly to the concerning development. The AU Commission Chair called upon the military to return to their barracks and to ensure the physical integrity of the President. UN Secretary General called for restraints after the attempted coup.
Apart from the political crisis, tomorrow’s session would also serve for discussing the support that the region has mobilized for stabilising the country. ECOWAS has been involved in mediating in the various political crises in the country including the 2012 military coup and the presidential dispute of 2019. Most recently in February 2022, ECOWAS convened an extraordinary summit two days after the attempted coup in which it expressed solidarity with the President and decided to deploy a force towards ‘supporting the stabilization of the country’. Following this decision, the stabilization force was deployed last June comprising troops and police from countries including Nigeria, Senegal, Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana for a one-year period. Hence, the main focus of tomorrow’s session would be the update the PSC would receive on the deployment of the force and the mission’s operational, logistical and financial conditions since its deployment in June and the kind of support that the AU is expected to mobilize for the effective operation of the ECOWAS mission.
This is in not the first time for ECOWAS to deploy such a mission. Following the military coup that ousted prime minister Carlos Gomes Junior in April 2012, the bloc had deployed a force for stability and security in Guinea-Bissau, ECOWAS Mission in Guinea Bissau (ECOMIB). The force left in 2020 after staying in the country for eight years. It would be of interest for PSC members to enquire of the lesson learned from the 2012 ECOWAS’s experience and how it can be applied in making this new force even more effective in preventing military coups and supporting the country’s endeavor in advancing democratic value. Certainly, the efforts of promoting good governance and constitutionalism would require interventions that are broader than military response.
An important factor in Guinea Bissau’s political crisis is the complex relationship between the legislative, the executive and the judiciary branches of government. The ambiguity around the division of power continues to fuel dispute and the semi-presidential system has been characterized by power struggle between the various centers of power. After the election of Embaló, ECOWAS has called for the revision of the constitution to properly address these structural challenges that continue to trigger political crisis. Embaló in May 2020 had established an independent commission to draft a revised constitution with also the objective of reforming the semi-presidential system. Although the constitutional reform is a much-needed step the approach pursued by the President created displeasure in the parliament. Through the establishment of the commission not only was the President’s move in violation of the provisions of the constitution itself with regards to amendment but it also duplicated the mandate of the already existing parliamentary constitutional review committee.
The interference of drug trafficking and related crime in the political process of the country is also another major complicating factor affecting security issues and political stability. In the recent attempted coup President Embaló has also indicated of the possibility of drug traffickers being behind the plot to overthrow the government, although there is still no evidence to support these claims.
The expected outcome of the session is a communique. The PSC may condemn the February 2022 attempted coup in Guinea Bissau and may express the need for addressing the conditions that have made the country to coups. It may welcome the deployment of a stabilization mission by ECOWAS and applaud the regional bloc’s leadership in promptly responding to the crisis. The PSC may endorse the activities of the ECOWAS mission in Guinea Bissau and express its support for the mission. The PSC may also call on the AU Commission to mobilize the requisite financial and logistical support for the ECOWAS mission and request it and ECOWAS to report to the PSC on the activities of the mission. The PSC may also call on international actors including the UN Security Council and the European Union to support to the mission. The PSC may reiterate its previous decision on the need for institutional reform and constitutional review in the country to provide a more sustainable solution to the continuing political crisis in the country. The PSC may underline that such reforms need to take place in full compliance with the procedures laid down in the Constitution of the country and the participation of all political and social forces in the country. The PSC may express concern over the continued dispute between the President and the Assembly and it may call on the parties to resolve their disagreement through peaceful means to prevent any further disruption to the country’s efforts towards political and constitutional stability. The PSC may also express its concern over the challenges related to drug trafficking and the deep impact it has on the political stability of Guinea Bissau. In this respect the PSC may call on the AU Commission working with AFRIPOL and ECOWAS to put in place a regional framework for addressing the threat that drug trafficking poses to Guinea Bissau and the region. It may further reiterate the importance of strengthening institutional mechanisms including security sector reform in Guinea Bissau to effectively fight against drug trafficking.
Consideration of the mandate of the MNJTF
Consideration of the mandate of the MNJTF
Date | 12 December 2022
Tomorrow (12 December), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1126th session to consider the renewal of the mandate of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram as one of the two agenda items that PSC is set to consider during this session.
The permanent Representative of Nigeria to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for the month of December, Victor Adekunle Adeleke will make opening remarks. AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye is expected to present the Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on MNJTF against Boko Haram terrorist group and the European Union (EU)-AU support to the force. The Executive Secretary of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) and Head of Mission MNJTF, Mamman Nuhu and the Commander of the MNJTF Major General Abdul Khalifah Ibrahim will also deliver statements.
The session is convened in the context of the upcoming mandate expiry of the MNJTF on 1 February 2023. It was during its 1057th session held on 14 January 2022 that the PSC renewed the mandate of the MNJTF for additional one year effective from 1 February 2022. It is also in accordance with the PSC request of the AU Commission, in coordination with the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) Secretariat, to report to PSC regularly on the activities of the MNJTF, in line with the relevant provisions contained in the Communique PSC/AHG/ COMM.2(CDLXXXIV) of 29 January 2015.
The last time that PSC considered the situation in the Lake Chad Basin (LCB) was on 31 May 2022, at its 1086th session, where it assessed the security and humanitarian conditions of the region, as well as the implementation of the Regional Stabilization Strategy (RSS) for Boko Haram affected countries.
Tomorrow’s session comes on the heels of the 16th Summit of the LCBC, which took place on 29 November in Abuja, Nigeria. In his opening remarks, the outgoing chairman of the Summit, Nigeria’s President Muhammadu Buhari noted the success recorded by MNJTF that brought about relative stability to the region, but also raised the alarm over the influx of weapons posing fresh challenges. He was quoted saying that ‘…the situation in the Sahel and raging war in Ukraine serve as major sources of weapons and fighters that bolster ranks of the terrorists in the Lake Chad Region’. He further stated that ‘a substantial proportion of the arms and ammunition procured to execute the war in Libya continues to find its way to the Lake Chad Region and other parts of the Sahel’. Not completely surprisingly, ‘weapons being used for the war in Ukraine and Russia are equally beginning to filter to the region’, according to the President. On account of the looming risks of heightened proliferation of small arms and light weapons and their implication to the peace and stability of the region, Buhari called upon his counterparts for more vigilance and tightening of security around the borders of the six member countries. In tomorrow’s discussion, members of the PSC could be interested to hear more about the reported influx of weapons to the region from near and far and could use the opportunity to reiterate their request for a continental strategy for the fight against illicit small arms and light weapons.
MNJTF has undertaken around six major operations since its authorization by the PSC in 2015, which significantly degraded the operational capacity of the terrorist groups (Boko Haram and Islamic State of West Africa Province (ISWAP)). Three of these operations were conducted following the decision of the extraordinary summit of the LCBC in December 2018 consequent on the deteriorating security situation in the region. The latest of such operations, Operation LAKE SANITY, saw MNJTF troops making unprecedented incursions deep inside the Lake Chad Islands and settlements known as ‘Tumbuns’. Plan to undertake the second phase of Operation LAKE SANITY is also currently underway. Major General Abdul Khalifa Ibrahim, the Force Commander of MNJTF, in his recent article, noted that the military pressures have led to the shrinking of operational space for the terrorist groups and their activities have been successfully confined to opportunity and limited attacks. The military intervention has also improved the security conditions of the conflict affected areas, paving the way to increasing humanitarian assistance, returning of displaced people to their homes, and surrendering of terrorists in large number. Despite these achievements, both Boko Haram and ISWAP have continued to pose security risks as they are adopting new technics, including the increasing use of Vehicle Borne Explosive Devices attacks.
In terms of support to MNJTF, AU and EU have continued providing critical supports that enhance the operational capability of the Force for the effective discharge of its mandate. For instance, EU has been providing USD 20.8 million financial support for this year, which is in addition to the various supports that are instrumental in filling the operational capability gaps of the Force. AU, on its part, has deployed around 14 staff at the AU and MNJTF Headquarters to facilitate the delivery of support in the areas of utilization of funds, delivery of fuel, and human rights and humanitarian law compliance, among others.
While MNJTF’s military success is an encouraging development, members of the PSC are expected to stress that the scourge of terrorism in the region or other parts of the continent cannot be sustainably tackled without addressing the underlying conditions that create conducive environment for terrorists. This certainly requires anchoring military operations on political strategies and accompanying non-military measures such as creating opportunities for the youth, increasing the provision of development projects, and (re)establishing the legitimacy and effectiveness of local state administration infrastructure and the delivery of basic services. It is within this context that the region, in partnership with the AU, developed a Regional Strategy for Stabilization (RSS) based on the recognition of the need for a comprehensive approach that goes beyond military action and encompass development efforts for addressing the root causes of terrorism in the region. As such, it is important for members of the PSC to pay equal attention to the implementation of the Strategy while discussing the activities of MNJTF.
In this regard, the finalization and launching of the Territorial Action Plans (TAPs) during the third LCB Governors Forum in October last year is a major step forward in the implementation of the RSS. This was further complimented by the development of priorities for regional intervention in the Regional Action Plan for 2022-2024 and its subsequent endorsement by the Steering Committee of the RSS – a key platform for review, decision-making, and strategic direction for the RSS – during its 3rd meeting held on 10 June 2022 in Douala, Cameroon. Cross-border interventions are accordingly prioritized to improve cross-border human mobility and trade in the region. Mobilizing the required resources for the execution of the Plans remain critical towards the full implementation of the Strategy.
It is to be recalled that the PSC, during its 1086th session, requested the AU Commission to take the lead in mobilization of the needed resources for the implementation of the Strategy. In relation to resource mobilization, it is worthy to note that the 3rd meeting of the Steering Committee endorsed the request by the LCB to apply for the allocation of UN Secretary-General’s Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), but there is also interest to explore the possibility of using AU’s Peace Fund.
The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communique. PSC is expected to commend the MNJTF and troop contributing countries for the progress made in the fight against terrorist groups and the restoration of relative stability in the region. Despite the progress, PSC may note the continued security threat posed by the terrorist groups and highlight the need to sustain the role of the MNJTF to consolidate the gains and address remaining security concerns. In that context, PSC is expected to renew MNJTF’s mandate for another one year. Echoing the statements of the outgoing chairman of the LCBC, Nigeria’s President Buhari, PSC may express concern over illicit flow of arms leaking from the conflicts in Libya, the Sahel, and the war in Ukraine. As part of the effort to strategically address the problem not only in the LCB but also in the rest of the continent, PSC may reiterate the request made at the 1086th session for the AU Commission to initiate a draft Continental Strategy for the fight against illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons as well as other emerging weapons used by terrorists. PSC is also expected to stress the importance of anchoring MNJTF’s military engagement on solid political strategy geared towards resolution of the main factors behind the terrorist threat facing the region and complement the security measures with non-military measures that would address the governance, development and humanitarian deficits that make the emergence and growth of terrorist groups. In that regard, PSC may highlight the need for the full implementation of the RSS and intensifying developmental interventions in line with LCBC’s territorial and regional action plans. The PSC may also highlight the need for elevating support for affected populations including in terms of protection of IDPs and refugees including from sexual and other violence and acts of abuse, the provision of humanitarian assistance and the delivery of livelihood support interventions. The PSC may also emphasize the imperative of compliance with international humanitarian law and human rights law as critical element of the protection of civilians and call on the MNJTF to work closely with the AU Commission to strengthen its human rights, IHL and conduct and discipline compliance monitoring and reporting system. The PSC may also call on members of the MNJTF to ensure that reports of violations of IHL, human rights and breaches of other standards of conduct are independently investigated and publicly dealt with.
MONTHLY DIGEST ON THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL - DECEMBER 2022
MONTHLY DIGEST ON THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL - DECEMBER 2022
Date | December 2022
Nigeria assumed chairship of the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) in December. Four sessions were convened during the month and three of these had two agenda items (the 1126th, 1128th and 1129th sessions), making the total agenda items discussed during the month seven. Of these agenda items, three were committed to country/region specific situations whereas one addressed a thematic issue and the remaining three were committed to consideration of conclusions of some retreats and convening of the PSC which took place during the year.