Memo to the New AU Commission Leadership from the Roaring Guns on AU's First Decade of Silencing the Guns
Amani Africa
15 October 2024
WHY THIS SPECIAL RESEARCH REPORT
When the STG was first announced, seven years to 2020, the conflict landscape on the continent was not in as bad a shape as it is today. At the end of the first ten years of STGs at the end of 2023, only six years are left to 2030, almost the same length of time when the AU pledged in 2013 to silence the guns by 2020. As the guns get much louder today than ten years ago, questions abound not only on AU’s possession of the requisite strategy and means but also on whether it is acting with the urgency and decisiveness that the situation on the continent warrants.
While the inadequacy of the progress made is not on its own a problem, it is of paramount policy significance to have a clear picture of the extent of the setback that the AU’s STGs agenda has faced in terms of Africa’s peace and security outlook and the nature of this regression. Such clarity is critical to recalibrate the strategy and the approach to STGs and to mobilize the kind as well as nature of the response that the peace and security landscape on the continent warrants.
The first purpose of this memo is accordingly to elevate into the consciousness of policy makers the nature and gravity of the deterioration of the peace and security situation of the continent, with some deserving to be treated as situations of utmost emergency. More and more people are suffering from the plethora of peace and security threats that are compounded by the economic and governance woes facing many countries on the continent. Correspondingly, this research memo to enable the incoming AU Commission leadership adopt measures for changing the current peace and security situation by undertaking a strategic review of the situation and AU’s processes including the STGs and setting a new agenda for peace and security in Africa that has the prospect of success to achieve STGs.
Annual consultative meeting between the PSC and the UN PBC
Annual consultative meeting between the PSC and the UN PBC
Date | 14 October 2024
Tomorrow (15 October), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) are scheduled to hold their 7th annual consultative meeting. This will be the first meeting to take place following the decision during the 6th informal consultative meeting held on 13 November 2023 to institutionalise the annual consultations and elevate it into a formal meeting.
The consultative meeting will be co-chaired by Mohamed Omar Gad, Permanent Representative of the Arab Republic of Egypt to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for October 2024, Sérgio França Danese, Permanent Representative of Brazil to the UN and Chairperson of the UN PBC. It is expected that the consultative meeting will commence with opening remarks from Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, and Elizabeth Spehar, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support.
The first agenda item of the 7th annual consultative meeting involves a review of the status of implementation of the joint statement of the 6th informal consultative meeting. It is to be recalled that the joint statement called for ensuring adequate, predictable and sustained financing for peacebuilding, noting that the amount of voluntary contributions has not been sufficient to meet increasing demands for the support of the Peacebuilding Fund. In this respect, one critical development that the 7th consultative meeting is expected to welcome is the decision of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) to establish the Peacebuilding Account, a dedicated multi-year special account, as a modality for financing the Peacebuilding Fund. UNGA Resolution 78/257 on Investing in Prevention and Peacebuilding further decided for the first time ‘to approve $50 million of assessed contributions per annum, under grants and contributions, to fund the Peacebuilding Account, starting 1 January 2025.’ Beyond welcoming this decision, it is expected that the PSC and the PBS will call for enhancing the funding base for peacebuilding including through partnerships with international financial institutions.
In light of this major development in expanding the role of peacebuilding, the other element of the joint statement from the 6th informal consultative meeting that is expected to receive attention is the support for priorities identified and communicated by the PSC. It would be of interest for this year’s informal consultation to consider and agree on processes for identifying priorities and the modalities for coordination in the identification of such priorities to benefit from the Peacebuilding Fund.
The second agenda item focuses on achievements and challenges of peacebuilding and sustaining peace in Africa. It is envisaged that Egypt, supported by Equatorial Guinea, will take the lead in making a statement on this agenda item. The development of National Action Plans on Youth and Women, Peace and Security, implementation of national truth and reconciliation processes of the ones in the Gambia and the Central African Republic and security sector and other reform processes in Lesotho can be mentioned as good examples in this respect. Challenges to peacebuilding are many and they include, among others, an increase in conflicts, most notably those involving terrorist groups such as in the Sahel and West Africa; collapse of transitions and peace processes leading to relapse to conflicts such as in Sudan; geopolitical tensions undermining multilateral cooperation critical to successful peacebuilding; and lack of inclusive political consensus and settlement that anchors effective peacebuilding processes.
The third agenda item of the 7th consultative meeting is transitions from Peace Support Operations to Peacebuilding in Africa. It is envisaged that Uganda, supported by Morocco, will make a statement on the subject. This agenda seeks to speak to recent experiences on the continent involving the untimely ending or departure of peacekeeping operations or their ongoing drawdown. It is to be recalled that the UN mission to Mali (MINUSMA) departed Mali at the end of 2023 following a disagreement with the transitional government in Mali. Similarly, the UNITAMS, the UN Mission that replaced UNAMID, was terminated in December 2023. Another UN mission, MONUSCO in the DRC is in the process of a drawdown. One can similarly mention the end of the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM). In all of these cases, concerns about the emergence of a security and peacebuilding vacuum have been raised. Proper contextualisation of these trends is critical to draw the right lessons from them. First, they manifest the mismatch between what national authorities and host communities expect of these missions and what these missions are designed and able to deliver. Second and related to the first, they reflect an emerging trend in which national authorities seek to bend the operation of these missions towards their preferred political and security choices, focusing on regime interest and survival. Third, they also manifest the poor state of support on the part of the mandating authority, the UN Security Council, to these missions. Finally, the unplanned departure of these missions also shows a lack of adequate coordination not only between national and international actors but also between the AU and the UN in facilitating the effective functioning of these missions.
These issues underscore the need for addressing the demand and supply side crises relating to peace support operations at the host state and UN levels as well as the challenge of close coordination between the AU and UN. While addressing the challenges facing peace support operations, particularly UN peacekeeping in Africa which requires dealing with the foregoing issues, consideration should be given to how peacebuilding can help fill in some of the gaps that are left by the departure of these missions. Additionally, to mitigate the impact of the untimely withdrawal of peacekeeping operations, the PSC and the PBC may underscore the importance of integrating peacebuilding into the mandate of peace support operations from the outset.
Amani Africa short briefing on the Summit of the Future
Amani Africa short briefing on the Summit of the Future
17 September 2024
Amani Africa Exec Director, Dr Solomon Ayele Dersso briefed the diplomatic community on key highlights of the joint Namibia-Amani Africa High-Level Panel Report during a reception held in recognition of the Summit of the Future by H.E. Mr Parfait Onanga-Anyanga on 17 September 2024.
The Peace, Security and Development Nexus in Africa: Bridging Gaps Between Policy and Practice
The Peace, Security and Development Nexus in Africa: Bridging Gaps Between Policy and Practice
Date | 1 October 2024
Tomorrow (2 October), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1234th meeting to deliberate on the theme ‘Peace, Security and Development nexus in Africa: Bridging the gaps between policy and practice’.
There will be opening statements from Mohamed Gad, Permanent Representative of the Arab Republic of Egypt to the AU and PSC Chairperson October 2024, and Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security. Ashraf Sweilam, Assistant Foreign Minister for African Multilateral Organisations is expected to make a remark. The session will also hear from Ahmed Abdel-Latif, Director General of the Cairo International Center for Conflict Resolution, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding and Executive Director of the Aswan Forum for Sustainable Peace and Development; Nardos Bekele-Thomas, Chief Executive Officer, African Union Development Agency; Kanayo Awani, Executive Vice-President, Intra-African Trade Bank, African Import-Export Bank; and Libakiso Matlho, Executive Secretary, African Union Centre for Post-Conflict Reconstruction.
The various peace and security issues on the continent are linked to development issues in more ways than one. As enunciated in the Constitutive Act of the AU, on the one hand ‘the scourge of conflicts in Africa constitutes a major impediment to the socio-economic development of the continent.’ On the other hand, promoting peace, security and stability is ‘a prerequisite for the implementation of our development and integration agenda.’ Buttressing this interlinkage between peace and security and development, the World Bank reported that a civil war costs the average developing country roughly 30 years of GDP growth, and countries in protracted crises can fall over 20 percentage points behind in overcoming poverty. It further estimates that by 2030, up to two-thirds of the world’s extremely poor may live in fragile and violent conflict settings.
This is one of the thematic issues that featured on the agenda of the PSC on several occasions. The first time the PSC had a session dedicated to this theme was at its 883rd meeting whereby the PSC, in the communiqué it adopted, underscored ‘the importance of giving due consideration to the interdependence between peace, security and development, in order to ensure the effectiveness of all efforts aimed at conflict prevention, peacekeeping and the consolidation of peace in Africa.’ It also requested the AU Commission Chairperson to submit an annual report on the measures taken towards enhancing collaboration and coordination between departments within the AU Commission and AU Specialised Agencies on account of its recognition of the interdependent nature of peace, security and development. This theme was also featured during the 975th meeting of the PSC.
Subsequently, the PSC held the Tangier Conference from 25 to 27 October 2022 in collaboration with four key partners in the development arena: the African Development Bank (AfDB), the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank). It is to be recalled that, the 36th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union held on 18 and 19 February 2023, through Decision Assembly/AU/Dec.842(XXXVI) ‘Endorsed the Declaration of the First African Union Policy Conference on Promoting the Peace, Security and Development nexus in Africa – The Promise of Regional Integration adopted in Tangier, Kingdom of Morocco, in October 2022; and urged the AU Commission to implement its conclusions; in this regard, called on the partners of the Tangier process to scale up support for the implementation of the nexus projects.’
A major challenge for the peace, security and development nexus is the persistent divide between the peace and security and the development dimensions. As pointed out in the edition of Insights on the PSC on the Monthly Programme of Work for October, despite wide recognition at a normative level of the need for aligning peace and security policy action and development policy action as reflected in various meetings the PSC held on this theme, this is not translated into practice owing to various factors. These factors include, as outlined in our Special Research Report, ‘The growing threat of terrorism in Africa: A product of misdiagnosis and faulty policy response?’ (EN and FR), the inertia of existing practice in peace and security policy-making with its focus on peace and security tools, gaps in expertise, divergent working methods and lack of interaction between peace and security policymakers and those engaged in development policy making.
These persisting challenges to the nexus question require changes both at policy and operational levels. In a presentation of Amani Africa during a joint African Union and Aswan Forum workshop on the operationalisation of the humanitarian, peace and development nexus held on 1 December 2023, the dimensions of change to which reference was made include: a) a multidimensional analytical approach that goes beyond the narrow focus on peace and security indices; b) joint strategy that integrates the peace and security and development dimensions for informing peace and security policy making and development policy making; c) intervention programming by either peace and security or development actors informed by joint analysis and strategy; d) a joint forum of peace and security and development policy makers for regular dialogue and exchange as vehicle for strategic coherence and operational coordination critical for leveraging the comparative advantage of both dimensions; and e) creating space for enlisting inputs and contribution from each other in each other’s decision-making process for advancing complementarity. Also, of significance is exploring avenues to build synergies between existing continental, regional and national frameworks for the operationalisation of the Peace, Security and Development Nexus.
At its 1055th session held at the ministerial level, the PSC specifically called for ‘collaboration between the AU Commission, AUDA-NEPAD, African Development Bank and the broader international community to overcome socio-economic challenges and address human security.’ A major development in this respect was the launch of the AUDA-NEPAD Programme on Socio-economic development in post-conflict states. Bekele-Thomas is expected to flag this in her intervention. The establishment of the Africa Facility for Supporting Inclusive Transition (AFSIT) in collaboration with the UNDP is another practical example of translating the issue of nexus from policy discussion to policy practice.
Tomorrow’s meeting provides the Council with an opportunity to discuss the progress AFSIT has made in advancing the nexus issue in practical terms and the support rendered within that context to targeted member states of the AU. Additionally, the PSC may also draw on the aspect of the Tangier’s conference declaration which, along with the AU Assembly Decision (Assembly/AU/Dec. 817(XXXV)), called for a financial instrument designed to mobilise scalable and flexible resources via a Security-Indexed Investment Bonds to address the root causes of insecurity, enhance the capacity of formal institutions, and rehabilitate communities and infrastructure adversely affected by insecurity. This initiative is expected to be carried out via the Africa Development Bank. A recent development worth addressing by the Council is the signing of an MoU between the African Development Bank and partners to scale up support for the Security-Indexed Investment Bonds and the implication it might have for mobilising resources for programmes related to peace, security and development.
The session is expected to also draw on insights from the 4th Aswan Forum conclusions. In this respect issues that may be highlighted, in the intervention of Abdel-Latif, include the connection highlighted in the conclusion between the reform of international financial institutions and peace and security, the emphasis it put on the need for focusing on conflict prevention and peacebuilding in the work of the PSC including through leveraging the role of peacebuilding bodies, the adoption of a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach and promotion of the role of trade and investment in unlocking Africa’s economic potential and in advancing sustainable peace and development.
The expected outcome is a communiqué. The PSC may reiterate the importance of giving due consideration to the interdependence between peace, security and development, in order to ensure the effectiveness of all efforts aimed at conflict prevention, peacekeeping and the consolidation of peace in Africa. In terms of bridging the gap between policy and practice, the PSC may call for the establishment of a forum that brings together peace and security policy actors and development policymakers in Africa for mainstreaming the nexus lens in respective processes and policy action. The PSC may also call for the need for adopting a multidimensional analytical approach that leverages the peace and security-specific analysis and the development lens. It may also underscore the need for integrating the development in the implementation of the AU Master Roadmap of Practical Steps to silence the guns in Africa. It may also call for the activation of its call from the 883rd session on the AU Commission Chairperson to submit an annual report on the measures taken towards enhancing collaboration and coordination between departments within the AU Commission and AU Specialised Agencies on account of its recognition of the interdependent nature of peace, security and development. The PSC may also underscore the need for leveraging the PCRD policy as an instrument for mainstreaming nexus particularly in deploying peacebuilding and post-conflict development interventions.
Provisional Programme of Work of the PSC for October 2024
Provisional Programme of Work of the PSC for October 2024
Date | October 2024
In October, the Arab Republic of Egypt will chair the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC). The Provisional Programme of Work (PPoW) for the Month, prepared under Egypt’s lead as incoming Chairperson, outlines nine substantive sessions, with all but one session focusing on thematic issues. Three of the sessions will be conducted virtually, while the remaining six will be held in person. In addition to the substantive sessions, the PSC will undertake field missions to Cairo and Port Sudan. The PSC will also travel to New York for the rotating annual consultative meeting between itself and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).
The month will commence with a four-day visit to Cairo and Port Sudan. The visit involves a half-day joint consultation meeting between the League of Arab States and the PSC. The last such consultation between the two bodies was held in 2010. This planned meeting aims to reactivate the consultative meeting between the two sides and discuss and agree on the periodicity and method of work of the consultation between the two sides. Substantively, it is envisaged that the consultation between the two sides would focus on matters common to the agenda of both sides notably Libya, Somalia and Sudan.
On 2-3 October, the PSC will conduct two additional engagements in Cairo. The first is a meeting on the peace, security and development nexus. On 2 October, the PSC will convene a session on this theme that will be held in person in Cairo. Held in the context of the 20th anniversary of the PSC, this session presents an opportunity for high-level dialogue and deliberation among members of the PSC and other key stakeholders on how to overcome the gap between existing policy ambition and the actual realities of policy practice about the peace, security and development nexus. As gathered during a consultation with the Chairperson, the session will be anchored on the Aswan Forum outcome document from the recent Aswan Forum held in August 2024 in Cairo, Egypt in which representatives of PSC participated.
Despite wide recognition at a normative level of the need for aligning peace and security policy action and development policy action as reflected in various meetings the PSC held on this theme, this is not translated into practice owing to various factors including, as outlined in our Special Research Report (EN and FR), the inertia of existing practice in peace and security policy making with its focus on peace and security tools, divergent working methods and lack of interaction between peace and security policymakers and those engaged in development policy making.
The second engagement will mark the inauguration of the Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) Centre. Following the revised PCRD policy that was endorsed at the 37th AU Summit in February 2024, this launch marks a further step in revamping AU’s PCRD policy and institutional infrastructure. It is worth noting in this regard that the PPoW of the PSC for October envisages that the PSC is expected to initiate the launch of its Sub-Committee on PCRD. Following the inauguration of the PCRD Centre, the PSC will visit the police training academy, which serves as one of the platforms for the training of police personnel for countries contributing police capabilities to peacekeeping operations.
On 3 October, the PSC will also undertake a daytime field visit to Port Sudan. It is to be recalled that the PSC at its 1209th PSC meeting in April of this year (and in other sessions on Sudan), expressed its desire to undertake a field mission to Port Sudan. However, this plan to visit Sudan is tied essentially to the country’s conflict situation following the outbreak of the civil war in April 2023. This visit also comes ahead of a possible visit by the UNSC to Port Sudan under the presidency of the UK in November and prior to the annual joint PSC-UNSC consultation where Sudan will feature as one of the agenda items of the consultation.
Even outside of the PSC’s decision for a field mission in relation to the war, the field mission to Port Sudan did not come as a surprise. It is a manifestation of a recent trend in the PSC for direct engagement with transitional authorities of countries suspended from the AU for unconstitutional change of government following military usurpation of power. A case in point is the PSC engagement with the leader of the military junta in Gabon as part of its field mission to Gabon during 12-14 September 2024. This approach marks a break from the established approach whereby the PSC informs its engagement on the transitional process in such countries through the AU Commission and the mechanisms put in place for such purposes by the Commission on the direction of the PSC, such as a special envoy. While this change from the established practice brings the PSC the benefit of gaging the political dynamics on the ground first-hand, it has the risk of affecting the PSC’s role in crafting its policy actions in relation to the situations it covers with a level of dispassion necessary for it to treat situations it deals with consistently and impartially. Considering the complaints from the Sovereign Council about Sudan’s suspension from the AU following the 25 October 2021 ouster from power of the civilian government by the military, the issue of the lifting of Sudan’s suspension is anticipated to feature during PSC’s engagement with the leadership of the Sovereign Council, which is the internationally recognised authority that conducts the international relations of Sudan. It is believed that this may entail a discussion on a roadmap towards the lifting of the suspension of Sudan from the AU.
On 8 October, the PSC is envisaged to initiate the launch of its Sub-Committee on PCRD. It is accordingly due to consider the adoption the Terms of Reference (ToRs) of the Sub-Committee. The membership of the Sub-Committee is envisaged to be the same as that of the Committee of Experts (CoE) of the PSC.
The PSC will hold a virtual session on 9 October to consider of the AU Commission’s annual report on combating terrorism in Africa. At its 1182nd meeting in October 2022, the PSC in the communiqué it adopted following the consideration of the Chairperson’s report advocated for enhanced financial and military support for the Union’s counter-terrorism institutions. While there has not been any major initiative by the AU during the year, the escalation and expansion of the threat of terrorism on the continent is not showing any sign of abating. According to the Institute for Economics and Peace’s 2024 Global Terrorism Index (GTI), the epicentre of global terrorism has shifted from the Middle East to Africa’s Central Sahel region. By the end of 2023, data from the Africa Centre on the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT), now known as the African Union Counter Terrorism Centre (AUCTC), revealed a 99% increase in terrorist attacks and a 53% rise in terrorism-related deaths compared to the previous year.
In preparation for the 9th informal seminar and the 18th joint annual consultative meeting, the CoE of the PSC will travel to New York on 13 October. They will have various engagements including with the UNSC Working Group, to work on the drafting of the joint communiqué. In the context of the PSC’s visit to New York and preparations for the annual joint consultative meeting, the PSC is expected to hold meetings with the African three members of the UNSC plus (A3 plus). It is also envisaged that the PSC will consult with the UN Peacebuilding Commission. This is expected to serve as an opportunity for projecting the voice of the PSC and the AU based on the newly revised PCRD policy ahead of the 2025 review of UN peacebuilding. The PSC will also participate in an outreach activity that involves a lecture to be delivered at Yale University.
Ahead of the joint consultative meeting, the 9th informal seminar will be held. As per the practice, the agenda of the informal seminar is limited to thematic issues. This year’s informal seminar is expected to feature the following themes: working methods (which may cover discussion on how to follow up on the joint communiqué in between the annual consultative meeting, the outstanding issue of joint field missions or coordination around joint field missions considering the risk of divergent messaging particularly when the PSC and the UNSC undertake field mission to the same place as happened in the context of their mission to DRC only less than two weeks apart), climate, peace and development, implementation of Resolution 2719, youth, peace and security, women, peace and security and Children Affected by Armed Conflicts (CAAC). As far as the working methods issue is concerned, the two sides may consider enhancing the reference value of the joint communiqué to start their annual consultative meeting by a systematic review of the last joint communiqué, thereby ensuring that their engagement builds on the previous consultation rather than starting from a clean slate every year.
The 18th annual joint consultative meeting follows the informal seminar. During the consultative meeting, the UNSC and the PSC are expected to focus on country/region-specific conflict situations and peace and security dynamics. This year, the agenda of the consultative meeting would accordingly cover Sudan, Somalia, West Africa/Sahel and countering terrorism and violent extremism.
On 22 October, the PSC is expected to have the first engagement with the Permanente Representative Committee (PRC) Sub-Committee on Budget and General Supervision and Coordination on Budgetary, Financial and Administrative Matters (GSCBFAM). This session will focus on the financing of AU peace and security work including funding of peace support operations and the activities of the PSC. The goal of these discussions is to create synergy between financial resources and the peace and security initiatives undertaken by the AU. As the Chairperson indicated, there are working methods and legal issues that need to be clarified in terms of the PSC as a policy organ engaging a PRC sub-committee. This is an important issue considering that at times the PSC engages with entities that are not in terms of legal standing at par with its policy-making status, as it does, for example, with the PRC Sub-Committee on Democracy, Governance and Human Rights.
The PSC will hold a session on 23 October for the consideration of the reports on its missions to Cairo and Port Sudan.
On 25 October, the Council will have a virtual session to receive an update on the situation in Somalia and post-ATMIS arrangements with a specific focus on the preservation of State Institutions. Key developments influencing this discussion include the UNSC meeting scheduled for 11 October, the Secretary-General’s engagement with the AU Commission chair on 21 October, as well as the SG’s report on ATMIS/Somalia, based on consultations with the AUC chair, which will be submitted to the UNSC on 15 November. The session is unlikely to cover the ATMIS drawdown, as consultations between the AUC and the FGS are still ongoing.
During the last week of the month, the Council will engage in three thematic sessions. On 29 October, the PSC will receive an ICRC briefing on the humanitarian situation in Africa. The following day, 30 October, the PSC will hold an open session on Women, Peace and Security in the context of the annual Resolution 1325 anniversary.
Lastly, on 31 October, the Council is scheduled to convene a session on Climate Change, Peace and Security where it will address the consultations undertaken by the AU Commission on the Common African Position which took place in August in Nairobi, Kenya. Over the three days, participants worked to improve the draft Common African Position on Climate Change, Peace, and Security (CAP-CCPS). They offered key recommendations for its enhancement and developed a revised draft intended for submission to the PSC for consideration and potential adoption.
Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - August 2024
Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - August 2024
Date | August 2024
In August, the Republic of Botswana chaired the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC). During the month, the Council planned to conduct four substantive sessions. Of the four sessions, one was dedicated to addressing country-specific situations. The remaining three sessions, along with the informal consultation, focused on thematic matters. During the month, all the sessions were held at the ambassadorial level.
Towards a New Agenda for Peace and Security in Africa: New Security Threats and the Future of the Peace and Security Council
Amani Africa
25 September 2024
WHY THIS REPORT MATTERS?
This special research report seeks to contribute to the ongoing debate on the future of the PSC and AU’s peace and security instruments in the context of Africa’s evolving security landscape. It will highlight some of the key emerging security threats in Africa and their implications to the existing AU Peace and Security Architecture. The report will then propose adjustments in tools, approaches, and processes to ensure that the AU/PSC and its security architecture remain relevant and fit for purpose in the face of new and emerging security threat and changing geopolitical dynamics both continentally and globally.
