OPEN SESSION ON CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE
OPEN SESSION ON CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE
Date | 5 August 2024
Tomorrow (6 August), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to hold its 1226th open session on the theme of Constitutionalism, Democracy, and Governance.
Following opening remarks by the Permanent Representative of Botswana to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for the month, Mr. Tebelelo A. Boang, the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, is expected to make a statement. The statement will be followed by a presentation by Professor Mpho Molomo, Political Advisor to the President of the Republic of Botswana and a statement by H.E. Mr. Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations to the African Union and Head of the United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU).
The theme of this session lies in the cross-section of the PSC mandate that combines security and democratic governance. Indeed, under Article 7(1)(m) the PSC is explicitly mandated to ‘follow up, within the framework of its conflict prevention responsibilities, the progress towards the promotion of democratic practices, good governance, the rule of law, protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for the sanctity of human life and international humanitarian law by member states’.
The last time the PSC convened a session on this theme was during its 1061st session. In that session, the PSC requested the AU Commission to undertake an in-depth analysis of the 2000 Lomé Declaration on unconstitutional changes of government (UCG) and the African Governance Architecture (AGA) with the aim to ensure that these frameworks and instruments respond appropriately to the challenges that the continent is currently facing and submit to the PSC for consideration. In addition, the PSC made two important decisions: convening a brainstorming seminar on UCG in Africa and reactivating the PSC Sub-Committee on Sanctions. As a follow-up to these decisions, two editions of the AU Reflection Forum on UCGs, also known as the Accra Forum, were held in Accra in March 2022 and 2024 to critically engage on the structural root causes of UCG in the continent and explore practical recommendations to address the phenomenon. It is also recalled that in May 2022, the Assembly of the AU convened its 16th extraordinary summit in Malabo, which adopted the Declaration on UCGs as well as terrorism in Africa.
There are at least three sets of issues that are of direct concern for tomorrow’s session and are deserving of attention during the session. The first of these concerns the approach of the PSC to the theme of the session and follow-up to its various engagements on the matter thus far. The second concerns a candid reflection on the state of constitutional rule and democratic governance on the continent. The third relates to the role of relevant AU governance instruments, institutions and processes.
In terms of the approach of the PSC to the theme of the session, despite the importance attached to the subject in the PSC Protocol as noted above, the PSC has not established a systematic approach to this dimension of its mandate. It is true that the PSC addresses various aspects of the theme of tomorrow’s session through sessions focusing on specific aspects of this theme as part of its annual indicative program of work or when it is crafted into the monthly program of work of the PSC. Accordingly, the PSC held sessions on ‘popular uprisings and its impact on peace and security’, ‘sanctions and enforcement capacities’, the AU sanctions regime, ‘African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance’, ‘promoting constitutionalism, democracy and inclusive governance to strengthen peace, security and stability in Africa’, ‘engagement between the PSC and the PRC sub-committee on human rights, democracy and governance’ and the regular ‘elections in Africa.’ Added to these are the consultative meetings with AU organs with human rights and governance mandates notably the one between the PSC and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the briefings by an annual retreat with the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM).
Despite the richness that these engagements of the PSC highlight, they also illustrate that they reflect fragmentation and ad hocism. While some of the sessions such as the one on ‘elections in Africa’ have become regularised, the engagement of the PSC tends to be largely performative, lacking in critical and dynamic interrogation of the increasing disenchantment of the increasing number of Africans with elections. One way through which the PSC can institutionalise its engagement on constitutionalism, democracy and governance into a systematic approach is by integrating and addressing these sessions under a standing agenda dedicated to the review of and systematic reflections on the implementation of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance.
In terms of follow-up on previous decisions of the PSC relevant to tomorrow’s session, of particular significance is the decision of the 1061st session of the PSC. It would be of interest for members of the PSC to get an update during tomorrow’s session on the decision of that session regarding the request for an in-depth analysis of the 2000 Lomé Declaration on unconstitutional changes of government (UCG) and the African Governance Architecture (AGA) with the aim to ensure that these frameworks and instruments respond appropriately to the challenges that the continent is currently facing.
With respect to the second set of issues of concern for tomorrow’s session, it would be fitting for the PSC to execute its mandate under Article 7(1) (m) of the PSC Protocol to reflect on the state of constitutionalism, democracy and good governance in Africa. In this respect, one overarching feature of the constitutional and democratisation landscape of the continent is the normative acceptance of regular elections, constitutional systems, the role of media and civil society at national levels and the endorsement of constitutional and democratic norms at the level of the AU. The other, perhaps most significant, feature is the growing popular support and demand for an accountable, corruption-free responsive system of governance. The large number of elections being held this year reflects that elections are widely accepted in the political practice of African states irrespective of the quality of democratic credentials of these states.
Notwithstanding these positive dimensions of the democratic governance and constitutional rule landscape of the continent, in the course of the past several years, Africa has witnessed a worrying escalation in democratic backsliding and challenges to constitutional rule and good governance. One notable manifestation of this democratic backsliding relates to elections. While it has become common for AU member states to hold elections and to do so regularly, free, fair, credible and transparent elections are very few and far in between on the continent. The Mo Ibrahim Africa Governance Index reported a decline in the integrity of elections in Africa during the decade between 2012 and 2021. As Afrobarometer, which conducts surveys on citizens’ perception, reported, one of the consequences of poor-quality elections in Africa is that ‘support for elections has dropped by 8 percentage points across 30 countries’ over the last decade. The poor quality of elections carries consequences for political stability. As the AU Commission Chairperson noted in his opening address to the 37th AU Assembly on 17 February 2024, ‘elections have become, through the extent of their irregularities, factors for deepening crises.’
Beyond the poor quality of elections, another, most notable, manifestation of the growing disenchantment with and backslide in democracy is the resurgence of coups over the past several years on the continent. As established in our policy brief of May 2022 published ahead of the Malabo Summit, ‘until 2021, the trends in the occurrence of coups in Africa is largely characterised by decline, despite its sporadic occurrence in a range of one to two coups per year (in the years when it occurred).’ Prior to 2021, the maximum that Africa experienced a coup since 2000 was in 2003. Since then, there have been a few years (2005, 2008 and 2012) when a maximum of two coups occurred, with several years passing without coups. The persistence of coups since 2020 illustrates reversals in the decline of coups in Africa since the turn of the century.
However poor elections and coups are not the only manifestations of the decline in democratic backsliding in Africa. The Mo Ibrahim Africa Governance Index ten-year trends (2012-2021) show that there has been deterioration in Africa in terms of security and the rule of law (from 50.3 to 49.0) as well as in the area of participation, rights, and inclusion (from 47.5 to 46.7). Some of these issues manifest not only in the resort of governments to excessive force to suppress dissent and peaceful protests but also in the continued shrinking of civic space across various parts of the continent. Further manifestations of the crises facing the process of democratisation in Africa include the circumventing or tampering with term limits by incumbent leaders as experienced in recent years in Central African Republic, Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon, Guinea and Togo. As pointed out in the Afrobarometer 2024 report, leaders ‘in Benin, Tunisia, and elsewhere have used a variety of means to subvert the democratic political order, weakening institutional checks on their authority, harassing the political opposition, imposing media blackouts, and even, in the case of Tunisia, suspending Parliament.’ The recurrence and in some instances the exponential increase in corruption and the failure of electoral democracies to address the socio-economic woes of citizens and deliver tangible material dividends to the public constitute additional factors for the democratic backsliding on the continent.
In light of the foregoing, the third set of issues that are of interest to PSC members as they convene tomorrow is the role of relevant AU governance instruments, institutions and processes. Based on the policy debate that the resurgence of coups triggered during the past years, there has been active engagement on the part of the AU and RECs/RMs notably the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) on how to arrest the resurgence of coups. Despite such heightened level of policy attention it has garnered, the responses to the occurrence of unconstitutional changes of government (UCG) and the resulting complex political transitions in multiple countries are yet to effectively bear fruit. Yet, one notable institutional development of the policy debate within the framework of the AU has been the operationalisation of the PSC sub-committee on Sanctions, which held its inaugural session in June 2024. In terms of elections, while the regularisation of the PSC session with presentation of the report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission is commendable, both the report and the session may end up being nothing more than performative unless attention is given to initiate and implement targeted policy responses to poor quality elections. Institutionally speaking, one of the issues that are worth reflecting on in tomorrow’s session is how to operate the African Governance Architecture (AGA) in a way that harnesses the roles of the AU bodies with governance mandates that form part of the AGA Platform for engaging in joint analysis and assessment of developments, trends and dynamics in democratic governance, constitutional rule and human rights in Africa. Such joint analysis and assessments are critical not only for leveraging the unique perspectives each of the AGA platform members brings but also for crafting responses that both assign responsibility for each of the AGA platform members to initiate measures in their respective mandates and for presenting to the PSC on measures it can take relevant to its mandate.
The expected outcome will be a Communiqué. The PSC may express concern over the plethora of setbacks facing constitutionalism, democracy and governance in Africa including flawed elections, shrinking civic space, executive excesses and systematic undermining of constitutional processes including term limits and the surge in military coups. The PSC may commend the continuing support for the normative acceptance of regular elections, constitutional systems, the role of media and civil society at national levels and the endorsement of constitutional and democratic norms at the level of the AU and RECs/RMs. The PSC may also express support for the growing popular acceptance and demand for an accountable, corruption-free and responsive system of governance. It may also underscore the need to bridge the growing gap between the demands and expectations of people for a more accountable system of governance and quality democracy, and the poor state of democratic and constitutional performance of states. The PSC may institutionalise its engagement on constitutionalism, democracy and governance into a systematic approach by integrating its focus on this theme into a standing agenda dedicated to the review of and systematic reflections on the implementation of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. In terms of elections, while welcoming the regularisation of the submission to and deliberation on the report of the Chairperson of the Commission on Elections, the PSC may also underscore the need for ensuring that attention is given to initiate and implement targeted policy responses to poor-quality elections. The PSC may reiterate its call to member states to expedite the signature and implementation of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance (ACDEG). In terms of the follow-up to the request of its 1061st session for an in-depth analysis of the 2000 Lomé Declaration on unconstitutional changes of government (UCG) and the African Governance Architecture (AGA), the PSC may request the AU Commission to put in place systems to operate the AGA in a way that harnesses the roles of the AU bodies with governance mandate that form part of the AGA Platform for engaging in joint analysis and assessment of developments, trends and dynamics in democratic governance, constitutional rule and human rights in Africa.
Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - June 2024
Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - June 2024
Date | June 2024
During Uganda’s chairmanship in June, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) had initially planned to conduct six sessions, addressing six agenda items including a field mission to South Sudan. After two revisions of the programme of work, six sessions were held and eight agenda items were considered. All sessions envisaged for June took place according to the programme of work with a minor adjustment to the dates of a few sessions.
Updated 'Insights on the PSC' on the consideration of the Concept of Operations for the post-ATMIS mission
Updated 'Insights on the PSC' on the consideration of the Concept of Operations for the post-ATMIS mission
Date | 31 July 2024
Tomorrow (1 August), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its session to consider the Concept of Operations (CONOPs) of AU-Led Mission in Somalia post-African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). It is envisaged that ATMIS will be replaced by the AU Stabilisation and Support Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). This session was originally scheduled for 25 July and was postponed twice.
Following an opening remark by Tebelelo Alfred Boang, Permanent Representative of Botswana to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for the month of July 2024, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to make a statement. The PSC may also receive briefings from the Special Representative of the AU Commission Chairperson for Somalia and Head of ATMIS, Mohamed El-Amine Souef, potentially with a focus on the state ATMIS and its drawdown, and PAPS Conflict Management Directorate who worked on the development of the CONOPs.
The last time the PSC held a meeting on post-ATMIS security arrangements for Somalia at its 1217th session, it chose the option of deploying an AU-led mission among the options presented by the AU assessment report. As a follow-up to that decision, the PSC requested the AU Commission, in consultation with ATMIS, the FGS, and all relevant stakeholders, to submit a Concept of Operations (CONOPs). The CONOPs intends to outline the new post-ATMIS security arrangements, including its mandate, configuration, benchmarks, duration, and transition timelines from the existing mission to the new one. The PSC’s request was also acknowledged by UNSC Resolution 2741, which in addition to the request from the PSC, called for clear milestones and progress indicators, as well as a comprehensive exit strategy for the new mission.
In light of these requests, the session tomorrow is expected to provide the Council with an update on its request for the development and submission of the CONOPs. As such the focus of tomorrow’s session will be based on the informal session held in July and thus predominantly focus on the work done by the AU Commission in producing CONOPs based on the requests from both the PSC and UNSC. To develop the new CONOPS, it is reported that nine members from the AU Commission held a four-day consultation in Mogadishu with the Federal Government of Somali (FGS) and key partners between 14-17 July. The consultations included discussion among the senior leadership team of ATMIS officials, the FGS, representatives of ATMIS Troop-Contributing Countries (TCCs) and international partners who consist of members from the Core Security Partner Groups (CSPG). Based on the press release of the engagements in Mogadishu, the consultations covered key elements of the CONOPs and were used for informing the development of the CONOPs.
The CONOPs has 17 major parts: principles; assessment of the situation in Somalia; key assumptions; mandate; political directive; strategic end state; operational end state; exit strategy; major risks; component-specific tasks; mission composition and structure; mission phases; command, control and coordination mechanism; strategic management and control; operational and administrative processes; key performance benchmarks; and Mission support. Among the principles is AU leadership, which in an earlier version of the draft CONOPs envisaged the central role AU would play in the strategic management and oversight of the new mission. Under this, the initial draft of the CONOPs envisaged a comprehensive approach to PSOs focusing on the provision of support to security, stabilisation, and state-building processes through a multidimensional AU PSO deployment with civilian, police, and military components.
While FGS is against a multidimensional mandate that also attributes political mandate to the mission, indeed, reducing the mission’s role to only fighting and a military component leads to fragmentation and disconnect between military and other stabilisation and political processes key to the success of the mission. Such fragmentation exposes mission personnel to grave peril and undermines the effectiveness of the mission. PSC’s reflections on opposition to the multidimensionality of the mission thus require careful consideration. This can be informed by the PSC’s 1217th session decision that the mission needs to have must be given a strong political mandate, with scope, size, posture, composition, and duration. It is also worth mentioning that the PSC’s 1217 session additionally ‘emphasised the importance of peace-building and the post-conflict reconstruction and development component to Somalia and in the mandate of the new post-ATMIS mission.’
Much of the components of the CONOPs reflect continuity. As with ATMIS, the exit strategy for the post-ATMIS mission is premised on the effective implementation of the Somalia Stabilisation and Development Plan (SSDP). More specifically, it is predicated on the achievement by Somalia Security Forces (SSF) of a level of capability for taking over security responsibility from the AU mission, the erosion of Al Shabaab’s capacity to a point where it no longer poses serious threats, and most notably the consolidation of national political cohesion and settlement and the expansion of state authority through enhanced legitimate local governance structures that deliver public services. All of these considerations depend on the capacity of first and foremost the FGS and generally the wider Somalia political and social forces to shoulder effectively their part of the responsibility much better than they have done in recent years.
In terms of composition, it is envisaged that the post-ATMIS mission will be made up of 11,911 personnel, comprising 85 civilians, 11,146 military and 680 police personnel, deployed in 4 Sectors. One of the issues for tomorrow’s session in terms of the composition of the mission is whether it will be constituted from existing troops or will be constituted with new troops and troop-contributing countries (TCCs). The FGS is advancing a position that the mission has to be new and not a re-hatting of ATMIS. It is to be recalled that the PSC hinted that the new mission may need to build on ATMIS when it stated in the communiqué of its 1217th session that there is a need for harmonisation of the exit of ATMIS ‘with the follow-on mission, including the harmonisation of TCCs, to ensure that there is no security gap between 31 December 2024 and 1 January 2025.’ This can be realistically achieved if the nucleus of the follow-up mission is constituted by retaining ATMIS troops.
The implementation of the mission envisages three phases and pre and post-mission phases. The pre-mission phase is the transitional phase involving the completion of ATMIS phases and the parallel preparation of the reorganisation of the areas of operations and troop deployments. As such it runs for the duration of the last two phases of ATMIS, namely Phase III and Phase IV which is envisaged to conclude on 31 December 2024. In this context, the PSC may benefit from a discussion of the current progress of the ATMIS drawdown as it will influence the final composition of a new post-ATMIS Arrangement. With regards to the amalgamation of the four phases of ATMIS drawdown and the formation of new missions, the PSC’s outcome document highlighted the need for careful coordination between the exit of ATMIS and the follow-on mission that will replace it.
The other three phases are envisaged to be implemented from 01 January 2025 to 31 December 2026, 01 January 2027 to 31 December 2028 and 01 January 2029 to 31 December 2029. Accordingly, the post-ATMIS mission is expected to run for a period of four years. Then, there is a post-mission phase involving the liquidation of the mission.
Of particular strategic significance for tomorrow’s session, in addition to the details of the CONOPS, is the financing of the post-ATMIS mission. Considering the financing shortfalls that frustrated the effective functioning of ATMIS, the importance of finding predictable and sustainable funding for the mission cannot be overemphasised. It is to be recalled that in the communique of its 1217th session, the PSC requested ‘that a dedicated funding mechanism, through UN assessed contributions in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2719 (2023) …be established to guarantee the financial stability of the mission.’ The adoption of a CONOPs that has the support of all stakeholders, including the host country and members of the UNSC, will be crucial, if not a sufficient condition, for AUSSOM to be a test case for the application of 2719. In this regard, the earlier the preparatory processes are thoroughly carried out, the higher the chances for facilitating the processes for the adoption of a UN Security Council Resolution authorising UN-assessed contributions for the mission within the framework of Resolution 2719. Considering that this process may not be completed by 1 January 2025 and that the funding from UN assessed contribution may not exceed 75%, it would be of interest for PSC members to reflect on the mobilisation of funds both for the period until the finalisation of the adoption of UNSC resolution authorising UN assessed contributions (provided that no major UNSC member opposes it) and for meeting the balance beyond the 75 per cent.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to welcome the preparation and presentation of the CONOPS as per the Council’s request. The PSC may condemn the recent attacks in the Lower Shabelle region as well as the attacks on ATMIS and Somali Security Forces over the past month. On the phased drawdown of ATMIS, the PSC may also welcome the efforts by ATMIS and FGS in handing over crucial forward operating bases (FOBS) to the Somali Security Forces. However, the PSC may reiterate the need for ATMIS and the FGS to follow the revised timeline set for the third phase drawdown. The PSC may endorse the CONOPs subject to amendments and request the submission of the CONOPs to the UNSC ahead of 2 August 2024. It may press on the FGS the need for it to shoulder its part of the responsibility by ensuring the generation of forces with adequate capacities and at a number for the success of the Mission in supporting SSF and in SSF ultimately taking over full security responsibilities. Regarding sustainable funding for the post-ATMIS mission, the PSC may reiterate its previous request for the AU Commission and UN Secretariat to develop options for funding for the new mission within the framework of UN Res 2719.
Provisional Program of Work of the PSC for the Month of August 2024
Provisional Program of Work of the PSC for the Month of August 2024
Date | August 2024
Botswana, elected back to the PSC in February 2024 after eight years, will be chairing the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) for the month of August 2024. The PSC’s Provisional Program of Work includes four substantive sessions. One will focus on country-specific situations while two of the sessions will address thematic issues. The remaining will be a consultative meeting. All of the planned sessions are expected to be held physically unless a virtual meeting is specifically called for.
On 6 August, the PSC will convene its first substantive session focusing on the theme Constitutionalism, Democracy and Governance. This meeting is to be convened in line with the 791st PSC meeting held on 22 August 2018 in which the PSC in a press statement it adopted, agreed to dedicate an annual session to review the status of implementation of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG). However, there has been increasing PSC engagement in the course of the past few years on this subject mostly prompted by the resurgence of unconstitutional changes of government on the continent. The various sessions of the PSC on this subject such as its 1061st and 1098th meetings highlighted that the concern with democracy and constitutional rule is not confined to the resurgence of military coups. It also relates to the democratic governance deficit, the tampering of constitutional term limits and the rising disenchantment of the public with elections that are flawed and unable to lead to democratic change. The session set for 6 August serves as a platform for the PSC to take stock of developments regarding the state of constitutionalism, democracy and governance during the past years since its last meeting on the theme, trends in terms of both encouraging developments and persisting challenges and what the AU is able to and should be doing. It is also to be recalled that the Report of the PSC presented at the thirty-seventh ordinary session of the Assembly urged member states that have ratified the ACDEG Charter to submit their reports for review by the African Governance Platform (AGP) for relevant gains to be derived in the consolidation of governance in the Continent. In this vein, Togo recently became the first to submit the initial State Parties Report under ACDEG, followed by Rwanda. Notably, since 2007, 38 member states have ratified the ACDEG.
On 15 August, the PSC will convene its second substantive session which will be committed to the situation in Sudan. It is to be recalled that during the 1218th PSC meeting held at the Heads of State and Government level on 21 June 2024, the PSC called for a ceasefire in the country, which would only be realised through direct negotiations between the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) leaders. The PSC tasked the AU Commission Chairperson to urgently set up a PSC Ad–hoc Presidential Committee comprising one Head of State and Government from each region of the Continent led by Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, President of Uganda and PSC Chairperson for June 2024 – to facilitate face–to–face engagements between the leaders of the SAF and RSF, at the shortest possible time. Building on this, from 10 to 15 July 2024, an AU/IGAD-facilitated preparatory meeting for Inter-Sudanese Political Dialogue was convened at the AU Commission. The meeting sought to engage on key issues related to the convening of an inclusive political dialogue process that would facilitate a comprehensive interaction to end the ongoing devastating conflict in Sudan and institute a consensual transitional constitutional order. It is worth noting that the meeting was boycotted by a significant portion of Sudanese civilian and political forces, hence prompting the AU High-Level Panel to make this meeting one in a series of preparatory meetings instead of the initial plan of making this the preparatory meeting. The UN Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy also held indirect talks between the warring parties focusing on humanitarian issues in Geneva. Djibouti, in its capacity as Chairperson of IGAD, also hosted a meeting of the various special envoys of Sudan – in which the AU participated through the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission. The session envisaged for 15 August will serve not only to follow up on the actions taken to implement the various PSC decisions including those adopted at its 1218th session but also to get a briefing on these various diplomatic engagements and on the state of the conflict situation in Sudan.
On the same day, the sanctions sub-committee is expected to present its inaugural session report to the Council and also the PSC is expected to consider and adopt the draft program of work for September 2024, via emails.
On 19 August, there will be consultations between the PSC/AU Panel of the Wise and RECs/RMs Panel of Elders. The 1204th session of the Council held on 13 March 2024 stressed the importance of the Pan-African Network of the Wise (PanWise) as a foundational framework for collaborative engagements between the Panel of the Wise, RECs/RMs and other key stakeholders. The PSC Protocol states in Article 16 that the Regional Mechanisms are part of the overall security architecture of the Union, the Chairperson of the Commission is tasked with working closely with Regional Mechanisms to ensure effective partnership as well as harmonising and coordinating the activities of the Regional Mechanisms in line with the objectives and principles of the AU. Furthermore, the Modalities for the Functioning of the Panel of the Wise stipulate that the AU and RECs shall, where appropriate and within the framework of their conflict prevention strategies, establish structures similar to the Panel of the Wise, as provided for by Article 11 of the PSC Protocol. The proposed consultation for 19 August therefore contributes towards pursuing the objectives of (i) intensifying their efforts towards the prevention of conflicts through, among other things, fostering policies aimed at promoting democratic principles and practices, good governance, the rule of law and the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for the sanctity of human life and international humanitarian law; and, (ii) the spirit of working together and drawing on each other’s expertise to contribute to the implementation of regional and continental instruments relevant to the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa.
On 21 August, the PSC is expected to convene an open session on inclusive education in conflict situations. The meeting is also being held in pursuit of the AU theme for 2024 which is ‘Educate an African fit for the 21st Century: Building resilient education systems for increased access to inclusive, lifelong, quality and relevant learning in Africa’ within the framework of the 20th anniversary of the PSC. The AU theme of the year was adopted during the thirty-sixth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union [Assembly/AU/Dec.864(XXXVI)] held on 18 and 19 February 2023. PSC’s session on inclusive education in conflict situations is expected to draw on existing engagements of the PSC on the subject. Part of the recommendations on the concept note of the 1206th PSC meeting on prevention of the ideology of hate, genocide and hate crimes in Africa, held on 4 April 2024, provided that ‘the education systems should be inclusive in their policies and reflect the ethnic, racial and cultural diversity of each member state. The education policies by member states should aim at producing citizens free from ethnic, regional, national and religious prejudices and who are committed to protecting human rights. Furthermore, the education sector should contribute to national reconciliation by creating a culture of peace, emphasising positive values, and promoting the universal values of justice and tolerance, among others. The teaching of peace, reconciliation, tolerance, justice, and democratic values should be promoted.’ It is also to be recalled that the Banjul Conclusions adopted at the Ministerial and High-Level open session on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights and Welfare of Children in Situations of Conflict in Africa, held on 4 and 5 December 2023 in Banjul, The Gambia, highlighted the imperative of member states to ensure sensitisation on the rights of children in the communities and endorse, domesticate and implement the Safe Schools Declaration to ensure continuity of education in conflicts.
The last week of August will commence with the capacity building of the PSC Sub-committee on Sanctions, which is expected to take place from 26 to 28 August. In the same week, from 28 to 31 August, there will be the inaugural consultative meeting between the PSC and the SADC Organ and Members of the SADC to be held in Gaborone, Botswana. This is the second such consultative meeting to be held by the PSC since the consultative meeting it held in April 2024 with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Mediation and Security Council.
In addition to the substantive sessions and activities of the PSC, the program of work encompasses the meetings of the PSC subsidiary bodies. The Military Staff Committee (MSC) is scheduled to convene on 8 August for a timely brainstorming session on the African Standby Force (ASF) Concept, in view of the contemporary/changing security dynamics on the continent. The Committee of Experts (CoE) on the other hand is scheduled to convene on 13 August for preparations for the 18th Annual Joint Consultative Meeting between the UNSC and AUPSC, and also preparation for the inaugural consultative meeting between the PSC and SADC Organ and members of SADC. Finally, as envisaged in the footnote of the program, the PSC will also consider the situation in Somalia and post-ATMIS on a date to be communicated.
Consideration of Mid-year report of the Chairperson of the Commission on elections in Africa: January to June 2024
Consideration of Mid-year report of the Chairperson of the Commission on elections in Africa: January to June 2024
Date | 24 July 2024
Tomorrow (25 July), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1224th session to consider the mid-year report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on elections in Africa, covering the period between January and June 2024.
Following the opening statement of the Chairperson of the PSC for the month, Miguel Cesar Domingos Bembe, Permanent Representative of Angola to the AU, Bankole Adeoye, the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to present the report. Statements are also expected from the representatives of Member States that organised elections during the reporting period and from the representatives of the Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) that observed the elections. Despite not deploying election observation to Chad due to violation of relevant PSC decisions and AU norms on non-eligibility of members of the Transitional Military Council (TMC) in elections, it appears that Chad is invited, along with Madagascar, Mauritania, Senegal, South Africa, Togo and The Union of Comoros, to make a statement on the presidential election held on 6 May 2024.
The Chairperson’s mid-year report on elections in Africa is in line with the PSC’s decision at its 424th session of March 2014 to receive regular briefings on national elections in Africa. The last time the Chairperson presented the half-year report was during PSC’s 1194th session held on 24 January 2024, covering elections held between July and December 2023. As with the previous report, tomorrow’s briefing on the Chairperson’s report will provide an update on the electoral process and the conduct of the elections held during the reporting period, while also providing a snapshot of elections planned for the second half of 2024. The report is also expected to highlight emerging governance trends during the period under review, as well as positive practices and areas of concern.
During the first half of 2024, seven Member States organised presidential and parliamentary elections, namely The Union of Comoros, Senegal, Togo, Chad, South Africa (where the AU Commission also deployed a pre-election assessment mission in April), Madagascar, and Mauritania. The AU Commission deployed Election Observation Missions (EOMs) in the elections in all these countries, except the Presidential elections in Chad.
The Presidential and gubernatorial elections of the Union of the Comoros held on 14 January, in which the incumbent was declared to have won the presidential election by 57.2 per cent, saw varying levels of turnout for the two elections held on the same day. The elections were marred by political tension and protests over allegations of irregularities.
On 24 March, Senegal held presidential elections following a turbulent electoral season. Deadly protests erupted following Macky Sall’s decision to postpone the originally scheduled 25 February 2024 election. The Constitutional Council rejected both the law passed by parliament delaying the election until December and the 2 June proposed election date by the National Dialogue Commission. Consequently, Sall’s government was compelled to set a new election date before his term expired on 2 April. The vigilance of the Senegalese youth-led mass movement gave the Constitutional Council the conducive context for it to play its critical role in safeguarding Senegal’s democratic process. Bassirou Diomay Faye from the opposition PASTEF party emerged victorious with 54 per cent of the vote.
On 29 April, Togo convened legislative elections alongside its inaugural regional elections, with a voter turnout of 61.76 per cent, following the adoption of a controversial constitutional amendment that changed the country’s system of government from presidential to a parliamentary system. The ruling party amassed 108 out of the 113 contested seats. The opposition criticised the constitutional reform as an ‘institutional coup’, claiming that this would pave the way for the incumbent President Faure Gnassingbé’s prolonged rule if his party maintained an assembly majority, effectively circumventing previous term limits.
The other election held during the period under review is the presidential election in Chad held on 6 May. The Constitutional Council declared Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno, who led the TMC that unconstitutionally seized power following the death of his father Idriss Déby Itno, the winner with 61 percent of the votes.
Déby’s candidacy and eventual victory in the election clearly disregarded the AU’s anti-coup norms and the decision of the PSC on 14 May 2021, which expressly demanded that the chairman and members of the TMC do not take part in the election at the end of the transition. Amani Africa’s ‘Ideas Indaba’ published on 9 April warned that ‘If the PSC is unable to enforce the rule on non-eligibility concerning Chad, it would be the end of any future application of this rule as well. And most immediately, this would also mean that the AU would have no standing to apply this rule for stopping any of the military leaders in the six other countries (Burkina Faso, Gabon, Guinea, Mali, Niger, and Sudan) from becoming candidates for elections.’ The invitation of Chad to make a statement during this session without the PSC reaffirming its decision on non-eligibility for election may constitute another instance of the PSC enabling disregard of its own decisions and the applicable AU norms it is meant to safeguard.
On 29 May, South Africa held general elections to elect Members of the National Assembly and Provincial legislators. The election was notably competitive, with the ruling African National Congress (ANC) receiving only 40.18 per cent of the votes, losing its parliamentary majority for the first time since the end of apartheid in 1994. This unprecedented outcome forced the ANC to strike a deal with the opposition Democratic Alliance (DA), which came in second with 22 per cent, and other parties to form a ‘national unity’ government.
Madagascar also convened legislative elections on 29 May. Contrary to last year’s presidential election, which was marred by low voter turnout and boycotts, political actors showed interest in the legislative elections, fielding 473 candidates for the 163 parliamentary seats. The ruling party secured 51.53 per cent of the vote. Mauritania also held its presidential election on 29 June, in which the incumbent President, Mohamed Cheikh El Ghazouani, who is also the current chairperson of the AU, was re-elected with 56 per cent of the vote.
The report is expected to preview ten elections scheduled to take place between July and December 2024: Rwanda, Algeria, Tunisia, Mozambique, Botswana, Guinea Bissau, Namibia, Ghana, South Sudan, and Mauritius. On 15 July, Rwandans elected their President, with President Paul Kagame re-elected to a fourth term in office in a landslide victory, securing a provisional result of 99 per cent of the vote.
In Algeria, President Abdelmadjid TEBBOUNE will be seeking a second term in the upcoming election slated for 7 September. Tunisia will hold its presidential election on 6 October, while in Mozambique, general elections are slated for 9 October, with the ruling party FRELIMO represented by regional governor Daniel Chapo, succeeding President Filipe Nyusi. Botswana’s general election is also set to take place no later than 29 October. The legislative elections in Guinea-Bissau are scheduled for 24 November, a year after President Umaro Sissoco Embaló dissolved the opposition-dominated parliament in December 2023. On 27 November, Namibia will hold presidential and legislative elections, while Ghanaians will elect their new president on 7 December, with President Nana Akufo-Addo stepping down as he completes his second term. Mauritian legislative elections are also expected to take place before the end of this year.
South Sudan’s general elections—scheduled for 22 December, which will be the first since its independence in 2011—are perhaps the most consequential, warranting closer attention from the PSC. Considering the high stakes of these elections to the peace and stability of South Sudan as well as the wider region, the PSC may explore different preventive measures to ensure that the elections do not re-ignite armed confrontations between different factions. It is worth recalling that during its 1219th session, the PSC made important decisions in relation to accompanying South Sudan throughout the electoral season.
The other aspect of the report is expected to provide an overview of the governance trends. On a positive note, the report is likely to highlight that the majority of the elections during the period under review were conducted relatively calmly. Notably, some of the Member States, such as Senegal and South Africa, were able to consolidate the conduct of free and fair elections, with Senegal avoiding the threat of democratic backsliding.
On the other hand, the report is likely to point out the prolonged political transitions in Member States that experienced unconstitutional changes of government as a major issue of concern for the continent’s governance landscape covering not only countries affected by coups but also others such as South Sudan and Libya.
The expected outcome is a communiqué. The PSC may commend Member States for holding their periodic elections in a relatively calm environment and for the consolidation of democracy in some of the countries. The PSC may also take the opportunity to express its dissatisfaction with the participation of the leader of the Transitional Military Council (TMC) of Chad in the 6 May Presidential election in defiance of the PSC’s decision on the non-eligibility of members of the TMC and the AU norm as enshrined in the African Charter on Elections, Democracy and Governance. It may also call on AU member states to expand the civic and political space both to address voter apathy, particularly on the part of young people of voting age and the growing disenchantment with elections on the continent. In relation to countries under political transition, given the complexity of the issue, the PSC may go beyond reiterating the need to strictly adhere to their respective transition agreed timelines, and task the Commission to undertake a comprehensive study with practical strategies on how to expedite the return of constitutional order in these countries in line with relevant AU norms. On upcoming elections, while urging the Commission to continue its support to Member States to hold credible elections, it may particularly emphasise the need to deploy effective mechanisms in relation to the elections in South Sudan, in line with the decisions made at its 1219th session.
