Briefing on the situation in Sudan
Briefing on the situation in Sudan
Date | 18 August 2024
Tomorrow (19 August), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1228th session to discuss the situation in Sudan.
The Permanent Representative of Botswana to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for the month of August 2024, Tebelelo A. Boang will deliver opening remarks. Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) is also expected to make a statement. Mohamed Ibn Chambas, Chairperson of the AU High-Level Panel on Sudan and AU High Representative for Silencing the Guns in Africa will also deliver a briefing which will be followed by a statement by the representative of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD).
The last time the PSC discussed Sudan was at its 1218th meeting on 21 June held at the Heads of State and Government level in which it directed the AU Commission Chairperson to urgently set up a PSC Ad–hoc Presidential Committee comprising one Head of State and Government from each region of the continent led by Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, President of Uganda and PSC Chairperson for June 2024. The establishment of the Ad–hoc Presidential Committee aims to bring the weight of the wider AU membership to bear on the leaders of the warring parties towards facilitating a face-to-face engagement between them. Apart from following up on the implementation of the outcome of its 1218th session, tomorrow’s session is expected to review the state of the diplomatic efforts towards peace in Sudan. An important aspect of the focus of the session would be on the work of the AU High-Level Panel on Sudan.
In his update, it is expected that the Chair of the AU High-Level Panel, Chambas, will provide an update on the work done thus far. Following the listening tour of the Panel for engaging Sudanese actors and neighbouring countries, the focus of the Panel has been on preparing for an inclusive inter-Sudanese political dialogue. It is to be recalled that the PSC at its 1209th session tasked the Panel as part of the process for the convening of the political dialogue to convene ‘the preparatory/planning process’ in collaboration with IGAD and neighbouring states.
Since then, the Panel together with the IGAD Special Envoy for Sudan convened the preparatory meeting for an Inter-Sudanese Political Dialogue in Addis Ababa from 10-15 July 2024. While the plan was to engage Sudanese political and civilian actors on principles to guide the dialogue, the agenda or issues to be on the agenda of the political dialogue, criteria for participation/or representation in the political dialogue and the venue of the inter-Sudanese political dialogue. A significant portion of Sudanese political and civilian forces, who expressed reservations about the inadequacy of consultations in preparing the preparatory meeting and the lack of transparency about the list of participants, boycotted the meeting. Despite this setback, the meeting was conducted with those present at the AU headquarters. Upon the conclusion of the meeting, the participants submitted their recommendations on the convening of the inter-Sudanese dialogue. Recognising the need for engaging other Sudanese stakeholders, Chambas in his remark at the closing of the meeting noted that ‘this particular meeting is one in a series of consultations’ rather than the one preparatory meeting initially expected. Explaining further, he indicated that ‘this will be followed by consultations with Taqqdum, SLM Abdul Wahid, SPLM-North Al Hilu, the Radical Block and others.’
As a follow-up to the foregoing and following the consultations, another round of preparatory meeting was convened from 9-12 August. This round brought together Sudanese civil and political actors that did not participate in the initial convening including representatives of Taqadum, SPLM-North Al Hilu, SLM Abdul Wahid, Ba’ath Party, DUP, and PCP. Following three days of meeting, Tagadum, the DUP and the PCP prepared and submitted a joint document containing their recommendations on the agenda, participation/representation, the phases of the dialogue and the role of the mediator and the international community in the inter-Sudanese dialogue. The armed movements SPLM-North Al Hilu and SLM Abdul Wahid did not sign this joint document.
At the conclusion of the second preparatory meeting, Chambas indicated that the outcome document from this consultation would be synthesised with the outcomes of other consultations to develop the guiding principles, possible agenda and criteria of representation. Considering the differences between the group that participated in the initial meeting and the group in the latest preparatory meeting, there is an expectation on the Panel from some of the participants that the Panel would put forward a bridging proposal to the civilian and political actors based on a synthesis of the proposals presented to it from the two rounds.
Apart from the activities of the AU High-Level Panel, it would also be of interest for members of the PSC to be updated on the status of other diplomatic efforts including those led by the Personal Envoy of the UN Secretary-General and the ceasefire talks being held in Geneva. The UN Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy for Sudan Ramtane Lamamra convened the Sudanese warring parties for proximity talks in Geneva from 11 and 19 July 2024. According to a press release on 19 July 2024, the Personal Envoy and his team had around 20 sessions with the parties, including technical and plenary meetings. Lamamra characterised the meeting as an encouraging initial step in what is likely to be a longer and more complex mediation process. He expressed his intentions to remain in close contact with them to follow up on the implementation of commitments made and address critical issues.
In addition to Lamamra’s ongoing efforts, the US invited the Sudanese parties to participate in ceasefire talks scheduled for 14 August in Geneva. This followed the apparent suspension of the US-Saudi facilitated talks in Jeddah in December 2023 apparently because of the failure of the parties to implement the commitments made as part of the talks, including confidence-building measures and the withdrawal of military forces from key cities.
The US-led Geneva talks, which will be co-sponsored by Saudi Arabia and Switzerland and involve the African Union, the United Nations, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates as observers, intend to facilitate a nationwide cessation of violence to allow humanitarian access to all those in need and develop a robust monitoring and verification mechanism to ensure the implementation of any agreement. The leader of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemeti) welcomed the invitation and expressed his commitment to participate constructively in the talks. The leader of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) Abdel Fettah al-Burhan had also accepted the invitation on the condition that ‘any negotiations before … full withdrawal and an end to expansion (by the RSF) will not be acceptable to the Sudanese people,’ according to media reports. Later on, however, he appears to have backtracked on this after surviving a drone strike while on a military graduation ceremony at the Sudanese army base in eastern Sudan that reportedly left at least five people killed. The US Secretary of State Antony Blinken spoke to Al-Burhan on the phone on 5 August 2024 and urged him to attend the talks. Al-Burhan subsequently sent his delegations to Jeddah for consultations with the US but the meeting reportedly ended without any agreement on SAF’s participation at the Geneva talks. On 14 August, it was reported that Burhan ruled out ceasefire talks until the withdrawal of RSF from the cities it occupies. Despite sending delegations and declaring this as a testament to its commitment, the RSF delegation was not present at the start of the talks on 14 August. One significant development during the Geneva engagement is the announcement made on 17 August regarding the decision by the Sovereign Council of Sudan and commitments made by the RSF concerning humanitarian access. A joint statement by the international delegation highlighted the recent decision by the Sovereign Council of Sudan to open a border crossing from Chad to Nonn Danur via Adre for the next three months and the commitments made by the RSF to allow for humanitarian delivery through Dabbah, providing aid to Darfur and Kordofan. This marks progress in addressing the needs of the 25 million Sudanese requiring humanitarian assistance.
The setbacks that the Geneva talks faced underscores the importance of the role of the AU ad hoc Committee of Heads of State and Government on Sudan and the imperative for its activation. It would therefore be of particular interest for the PSC to be updated on the next steps towards the activation of the Committee for leveraging the voice and diplomatic weight of AU members from the five regions of the continent towards peace in Sudan.
As the PSC pointed out in its 1218th session, the proliferation of various mediation initiatives to resolve the Sudanese conflict has been an ongoing issue in the Sudanese peace process underscoring the need to ensure the necessary coordination and harmonisation of efforts. On 27 May 2023, the PSC adopted its roadmap for the resolution of the conflict in Sudan which, among other things, outlined the need for the establishment of a coordination mechanism to ensure all efforts by the regional and global actors are harmonised and impactful. In this regard, the importance of a single, inclusive, and consolidated peace process for Sudan, coordinated under the joint auspices of the AU, IGAD, League of Arab States, and UN, along with like-minded partners was emphasised. The AU Commission Chairperson established the expanded mechanism on Sudan and its Core Group as an inclusive platform for regional, continental, and global actors and institutions to ensure broad-based, coordinated engagement aimed at fostering political consensus and unified global support for Sudan. However, the lack of periodicity and shared plan as well as a common strategy that anchors it, the role and effectiveness of the expanded mechanism are surrounded by a cloud of uncertainty.
On 12 June, the League of Arab States convened a consultative group meeting in Cairo to facilitate an exchange of views among the various stakeholders engaged in the Sudanese peace process and draw lessons from different peace initiatives, good offices, and mediation efforts. On 24 July, Djibouti hosted the second consultative group meeting which was followed by the Mediators Planning Retreat on Sudan on 25 and 26 July. The retreat, which was proposed by Ramtane Lamamra, emphasised the need for a more coordinated and collaborative multilateral approach to move toward ending the Sudanese conflict. It also stressed the shared and differentiated responsibilities of existing multilateral coordination mechanisms and the recognition of their continued role and comparative advantages.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to commend the High-Level Panel for the convening of the preparatory meetings towards the holding of the inter-Sudanese political dialogue. It may underscore the need for sustaining the momentum by investing in consultations to achieve consensus on the key elements of the convening of the political dialogue and mobilise wider support and engagement by all Sudanese civilian and political actors. It may request that the necessary technical backstopping for the effective conduct of the political dialogue including the development of the mediation process and strategy for the dialogue are put in place. The PSC may take note of the mediation initiatives deployed by various stakeholders, commend these efforts and urge for their fortified coordination and harmonisation to enhance their impact. In light of recent events, the Council may welcome the announcement of the opening up of borders to allow for humanitarian access. It may also reiterate the need for enhanced coordination and to this end may call for the revitalisation of the expanded mechanism. The PSC may request that the ad hoc committee of heads of state and government be activated to harness its political weight to address the lack of progress in talks between the warring parties. The PSC is also expected to express grave concern over the continuingly deteriorating humanitarian situation and urge the conflicting parties and all relevant actors to prioritise addressing the pressing humanitarian needs, including mainly through securing and enabling humanitarian access to affected populations for containing the famine that was declared in Darfur and preventing the emergence of famine in other areas.
Sierra Leone leverages its presidency for Africa’s seat at the Security Council
Sierra Leone leverages its presidency for Africa’s seat at the Security Council
Date | 14 August 2024
Solomon Ayele Dersso, PhD
Founding Director, Amani Africa
Affirming that the ‘time for half-measures and incremental progress is over…(Africa’s) demands for justice and equity must be met,’ Sierra Leone made the most masterful and timely case for securing support for Africa’s common position on the reform of the UNSC.
Led by none other than President Julius Maada Bio, Sierra Leone communicated Africa’s position forcefully during the signature event of its presidency of the UN Security Council held on 12 August 2023. Dubbed by the UN as a historic debate, this was ‘the first ever debate’ as President Bio told the press during the joint stakeout after the session. Coming a month before the UN’s Summit of the Future, the timing of the debate would not have been more perfect.
Characterising the theme of the high-level debate – the maintenance of international peace and security through the reform of the Security Council – ‘a matter of grave importance’, Bio told the Council that ‘[n]early 80 years after its creation, the Council has been stuck in time.’ In her very vivid depiction of a UNSC that is stuck in time, Sithembile Mbete of the University of Pretoria in her briefing delivered during the debate, observed ‘while Africa was on the menu, it still does not have a permanent seat at the table.’ UN Secretary-General agrees that ‘the composition of the council… has not kept pace.’
It was a stroke of genius of those who conceptualised the debate that it put a spotlight on and made the central focus of the attention of the world’s preeminent peace and security body at the highest levels the historic injustice of Africa’s non-representation in the permanent category and under-representation in the non-permanent category. It became evident from Bio’s address and the briefings from both the UN Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, and Mbete that this injustice was a direct outcome and continuing legacy of the wrongs of slavery and colonialism.
The placement of this injustice in this historical context makes it unequivocally clear that Africa’s exclusion was wrong at the time of the constitution of the UN and its perpetuation after eight decades is more wrong. Thus, noting that ‘most of today’s African countries were still under colonial rule and had no voice in international affairs’ in 1945, Guterres called Africa’s non-representation in the permanent category and underrepresentation in the elected category ‘a glaring omission that has remained unresolved until now.’
Bio was spot on in highlighting how Africa’s exclusion is a glaring omission and even more when he noted that it ‘is not merely an anomaly of statistics, it is a profound historic injustice that must be addressed.’ In elucidating this, Mbete located this injustice ‘in the four centuries of European slave trade starting in 1450 and devastating Africa’s population, culture, and economies, as well as the 1884 Berlin Conference that imposed colonial States.’
This echoes the emphasis that Guterres put in his New Agenda for Peace that ‘[i]f the purposes of the Charter are to be achieved, redressing the pervasive historical imbalances that characterise the international system – from the legacies of colonialism and slavery to the deeply unjust global financial architecture and anachronistic peace and security structures of today – must be a priority.’ As argued in Amani Africa’s special research report, for the African continent, reform of the UNSC ‘is particularly important not only for reasons of justice but also because it has been on the receiving end of the injunctions of the Council without having any effective say.’
As aptly captured in Bio’s address, the pathway for achieving this redressing of the historical injustice is through the Common African Position (CAP) encapsulated in the Ezulwini consensus. This calls for the allocation of two seats in the permanent veto-holding category and two additional seats in the non-permanent category, with the AU deciding the African countries to take the permanent seats.
There is consensus, as captured in the elements paper of the Co-Chairs of the UN General Assembly’s Inter-Governmental Negotiation on UNSC reform, on the need for addressing the historic injustice Africa is enduring. On how to achieve this, Sierra Leone, as the Chair of the African Union’s Committee of Ten on the Reform of the UNSC, affirmed with compelling clarity that Africa’s case is ‘treated as a special case and priority’ and that this is reflected in the Pact for the Future expected to be adopted during the Summit of the Future next month.
It is widely accepted as the speeches during the debate demonstrated that correcting the historic injustice of Africa’s exclusion is the right thing to do. Equally important, it is also a good thing. One thus agrees with Bio that the CAP is ‘premised on the fact that by rectifying the historic injustice, the international community will not only promote greater fairness, equity and equality in global governance but also act on the imperative to ensure the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Council itself.’
The Summit of the Future, as articulated in Amani Africa’s latest special research report, is the opportunity to be seized for reforming the UNSC with the special case of addressing Africa’s historic injustice. In the words of President Bio ‘[it] is absurd for the UN to enter into its eighth decade of existence with the scar of injustice against Africa’. Guterres agreed that ‘it is unacceptable that the world’s pre-eminent peace and security body lacks a permanent voice for a continent of well over a billion people…making up 28 per cent of the membership of the UN.’
Sierra Leone demonstrated why its role of Chairing the Committee of Ten is so deserved and how Africa did the right thing in endorsing its candidacy and supporting its election to the UNSC. Africa could not have asked for a better representation of its case at this material time in point at the highest level in the world’s most powerful body of the UN. It is now incumbent on the Africa Group in New York to throw its full weight forcefully to ensure that the proposition of correcting Africa’s historical injustice ‘as a special case and priority’ in UNSC reform is reflected in the Pact for the Future.
The content of this article does not represent the views of Amani Africa and reflect only the personal views of the authors who contribute to ‘Ideas Indaba’
Presentation of the Report of the Inaugural Meeting of the PSC Sub Committee on Sanctions
Presentation of the Report of the Inaugural Meeting of the PSC Sub Committee on Sanctions
Date | 14 August 2024
Tomorrow (15 August), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1227th session to receive the report of the inaugural meeting of the PSC Sub-Committee on Sanctions.
The Permanent Representative of Botswana to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for August 2024, Tebelelo A. Boang, is expected to deliver the opening remarks, followed by statements from the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye. Michael Wamai, an expert from Uganda to the AU and Chairperson of the Sub-Committee for the month of June 2024, is anticipated to present the report of the inaugural meeting of the Sub-Committee on Sanctions.
This session is convened in line with the decision made during the inaugural meeting of the PSC Sub-Committee on Sanctions (SCS) on 12 June 2024, in which the Sub-Committee agreed that the Chairperson for June, Michael Wamai, would present the Summary Record of the meeting to the PSC for consideration.
The PSC SCS was launched in June, fifteen years after the PSC first decided to establish it during its 178th session in March 2009. This decision was made pursuant to Article 8(5) of the PSC Protocol, which empowers the Council to create subsidiary bodies to perform its functions. Despite the 2009 decision, momentum for operationalising the Sanctions Committee only accelerated in recent years, largely due to the resurgence of military coups across the continent since 2021. With six Member States currently suspended from AU activities due to unconstitutional changes of government (UCG), it appears that the AU’s anti-coup norms—once praised for reducing the occurrence of UCGs in Africa—are now facing significant challenges, raising doubts about their effectiveness.
Although the PSC has the option to impose a range of sanctions beyond suspension, the most common form of sanction that the PSC adopted over the years remains suspension. During its 15th retreat on its working methods, held in Tunis, Tunisia in November 2023, the PSC recognised various challenges in the implementation of AU sanction regimes. These include: disparities between the AU and some RECs/RMs on the application of sanctions regimes, non-compliance by some neighbouring countries in the implementation of sanctions imposed by the PSC, and lack of enforcement mechanisms. In response to these challenges, recent years have seen renewed efforts to reactivate and operationalise the PSC SCS. For instance, PSC’s 1061st session, the ACCRA Declaration on UCG in March 2022, and the 16th extraordinary session of the AU Assembly on terrorism and UCG, held in May 2022, called for the operationalisation of the Sub-Committee on sanctions. Particularly significant was PSC’s 1100th session, which directed the Committee of Experts (CoE) to develop the Terms of Reference (ToR) for the SCS.
Against the background of the repeated calls for the operationalisation of the SCS, the AU Commission organised training to enhance the capacity of the PSC CoE on sanctions in Accra in September 2022, which enabled the development of ToRs for the PSC SCS while outlining modalities for operationalising the Sub-Committee. The ToRs were further developed during the retreat of the CoE in Zanzibar held in May 2023 and were considered by the PSC during its 15th retreat on working methods in Tunis, Tunisia, in November 2023.
The SCS, comprising the fifteen expert-level members of the PSC, is envisaged to serve as a technical Sub-Committee to assist the PSC on matters relating to sanctions within the framework of Articles 7(g) and 8(5) of the PSC Protocol. According to the ToRs, the chairperson of the Sub-Committee will align with the monthly rotational chairship of the PSC and the PSC Troika to ensure continuity. While the ToRs do not specify the exact frequency of meetings, the Sub-Committee agreed during its inaugural meeting in June to convene at least once a month and additionally as needed, as determined by the PSC. The ToRs also stipulate that the Sub-Committee will provide the PSC with at least quarterly reports on its activities and the implementation of specific sanctions measures.
During tomorrow’s session, Michael Wamai is expected to brief the PSC on the key outcomes of the inaugural meeting. As noted in our policy brief, one of the critical contributions of the Sub-Committee lies in restoring some level of the lost credibility of AU’s anti-coup norm faced, due to PSC’s failure to apply the norm consistently as highlighted by the case of Chad, by ensuring consistent application by the PSC.
In this regard, a key outcome of the inaugural meeting was its emphasis on the imperative of uniformly applying AU normative instruments and measures against Member States that experience UCG, avoiding selective or case-by-case approaches. This is particularly important given the setback the PSC faced after its handling of the military takeover in Chad in April 2021, in which the Council not only failed to label the military’s seizure of power as UCG but also fell short of imposing sanctions as per its instruments and well-established practice. It was also unable to enforce its decision barring the leader of the Transitional Military Council not to take part in the 6 May 2024 Presidential elections, setting a dangerous precedent for similar situations in Mali, Burkina Faso, Gabon, Guinea, Niger, and Sudan.
Furthermore, given the lack of clarity surrounding the processes and criteria for lifting sanctions—and the potential for this ambiguity to cause policy divergence with RECs/RMS, as evidenced in the cases of Sudan and Gabon with IGAD and ECCAS, respectively calling for lifting of suspension before conditions were met—the inaugural meeting underscored the need to develop robust sanctions implementation, monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, as well as a universally applicable procedure for imposing and lifting sanctions.
Considering the uncertainties surrounding the return to constitutional order in many African countries undergoing political transitions, the inaugural meeting also emphasised the need for the Sub-Committee to devise practical measures to address situations of prolonged or stalled transitions. It also stressed the importance of continuing the practice of holding informal consultations with these countries, providing a platform to update progress toward restoring constitutional order.
Another key outcome of the inaugural meeting, likely to be highlighted during tomorrow’s session, is the Sub-Committee’s request for the AU Commission to conduct a comprehensive study on the effectiveness of sanctions as a deterrent against UCG. A follow-up on this remains crucial, given that the efficacy of AU actions against coups depends on a clear appreciation of the sources of influence and leverage of the AU. The meeting also stressed the importance of assessing the impact of sanctions on the broader public in Member States experiencing UCG and submitting the findings to the PSC.
Amani Africa’s policy brief further notes that the ‘effective functioning of the Sub-Committee also depends on the extent to which its works draws on and is informed by solid independent technical analysis and advise.’ In this context, the Sub-Committee, during its inaugural meeting, underlined the need for regular capacity-building training for its Members, and the importance of collaborating with entities such as CISSA, AFRIPOL and INTERPOL. Reactivating other PSC Sub-Committees with a complimentary mandate was also deemed essential for fulfilling its functions effectively. However, as the policy brief argues, it is imperative to accompany the Sub-Committee with an independent expert body on AU Response to UCGs for the provision of objective and in-depth technical advisory and support on the basis of independent assessment and analysis that helps the Sub-Committee to navigate the complex political dynamics relating to situations of UCG.
The SCS is now operational, with its first task—assigned during the PSC Summit on 21 June 2024—to identify external actors supporting Sudan’s warring parties and propose containment strategies within three months. However, the Sub-Committee’s success in fulfilling its mandate will largely depend on its technical capacity and the degree of political support it receives from the AU.
The session’s outcome remains uncertain, but it seems the Sub-Committee aims to have the report of its inaugural meeting adopted through a communiqué. The PSC is expected to welcome the launch of the Sub-Committee on Sanctions as a significant step in strengthening its institutional framework to address unconstitutional changes of government in the continent. In adopting the inaugural meeting report, the PSC is expected to highlight key outcomes, including a request for the AU Commission to conduct a comprehensive study on the effectiveness of the AU’s sanctions regime, the development of robust mechanisms for implementing, monitoring, and evaluating sanctions, and the establishment of a universally applicable procedure for imposing and lifting sanctions. The PSC may stress the importance of equipping the Sub-Committee with the necessary technical and financial resources to effectively fulfill its mandate, while also reminding the Sub-Committee to submit at least quarterly reports on its activities, in accordance with its Terms of Reference.
FACTSHEET ON THE 2025 AU COMMISSION ELECTION PROCESS
FACTSHEET ON THE 2025 AU COMMISSION ELECTION PROCESS
Date | 9 August 2024
INTRODUCTION
With the deadline for the submission of candidates coming to an end this week on the 6th of August 2024, the process for the 2025 African Union (AU) Commission elections has reached an important milestone. Through this factsheet, this policy brief presents what the list of candidates tells us about the 2025 elections and the next steps in the electoral process, as it relates to the position of six Commissioners in particular.
OPEN SESSION ON CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE
OPEN SESSION ON CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE
Date | 5 August 2024
Tomorrow (6 August), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to hold its 1226th open session on the theme of Constitutionalism, Democracy, and Governance.
Following opening remarks by the Permanent Representative of Botswana to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for the month, Mr. Tebelelo A. Boang, the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, is expected to make a statement. The statement will be followed by a presentation by Professor Mpho Molomo, Political Advisor to the President of the Republic of Botswana and a statement by H.E. Mr. Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations to the African Union and Head of the United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU).
The theme of this session lies in the cross-section of the PSC mandate that combines security and democratic governance. Indeed, under Article 7(1)(m) the PSC is explicitly mandated to ‘follow up, within the framework of its conflict prevention responsibilities, the progress towards the promotion of democratic practices, good governance, the rule of law, protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for the sanctity of human life and international humanitarian law by member states’.
The last time the PSC convened a session on this theme was during its 1061st session. In that session, the PSC requested the AU Commission to undertake an in-depth analysis of the 2000 Lomé Declaration on unconstitutional changes of government (UCG) and the African Governance Architecture (AGA) with the aim to ensure that these frameworks and instruments respond appropriately to the challenges that the continent is currently facing and submit to the PSC for consideration. In addition, the PSC made two important decisions: convening a brainstorming seminar on UCG in Africa and reactivating the PSC Sub-Committee on Sanctions. As a follow-up to these decisions, two editions of the AU Reflection Forum on UCGs, also known as the Accra Forum, were held in Accra in March 2022 and 2024 to critically engage on the structural root causes of UCG in the continent and explore practical recommendations to address the phenomenon. It is also recalled that in May 2022, the Assembly of the AU convened its 16th extraordinary summit in Malabo, which adopted the Declaration on UCGs as well as terrorism in Africa.
There are at least three sets of issues that are of direct concern for tomorrow’s session and are deserving of attention during the session. The first of these concerns the approach of the PSC to the theme of the session and follow-up to its various engagements on the matter thus far. The second concerns a candid reflection on the state of constitutional rule and democratic governance on the continent. The third relates to the role of relevant AU governance instruments, institutions and processes.
In terms of the approach of the PSC to the theme of the session, despite the importance attached to the subject in the PSC Protocol as noted above, the PSC has not established a systematic approach to this dimension of its mandate. It is true that the PSC addresses various aspects of the theme of tomorrow’s session through sessions focusing on specific aspects of this theme as part of its annual indicative program of work or when it is crafted into the monthly program of work of the PSC. Accordingly, the PSC held sessions on ‘popular uprisings and its impact on peace and security’, ‘sanctions and enforcement capacities’, the AU sanctions regime, ‘African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance’, ‘promoting constitutionalism, democracy and inclusive governance to strengthen peace, security and stability in Africa’, ‘engagement between the PSC and the PRC sub-committee on human rights, democracy and governance’ and the regular ‘elections in Africa.’ Added to these are the consultative meetings with AU organs with human rights and governance mandates notably the one between the PSC and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the briefings by an annual retreat with the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM).
Despite the richness that these engagements of the PSC highlight, they also illustrate that they reflect fragmentation and ad hocism. While some of the sessions such as the one on ‘elections in Africa’ have become regularised, the engagement of the PSC tends to be largely performative, lacking in critical and dynamic interrogation of the increasing disenchantment of the increasing number of Africans with elections. One way through which the PSC can institutionalise its engagement on constitutionalism, democracy and governance into a systematic approach is by integrating and addressing these sessions under a standing agenda dedicated to the review of and systematic reflections on the implementation of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance.
In terms of follow-up on previous decisions of the PSC relevant to tomorrow’s session, of particular significance is the decision of the 1061st session of the PSC. It would be of interest for members of the PSC to get an update during tomorrow’s session on the decision of that session regarding the request for an in-depth analysis of the 2000 Lomé Declaration on unconstitutional changes of government (UCG) and the African Governance Architecture (AGA) with the aim to ensure that these frameworks and instruments respond appropriately to the challenges that the continent is currently facing.
With respect to the second set of issues of concern for tomorrow’s session, it would be fitting for the PSC to execute its mandate under Article 7(1) (m) of the PSC Protocol to reflect on the state of constitutionalism, democracy and good governance in Africa. In this respect, one overarching feature of the constitutional and democratisation landscape of the continent is the normative acceptance of regular elections, constitutional systems, the role of media and civil society at national levels and the endorsement of constitutional and democratic norms at the level of the AU. The other, perhaps most significant, feature is the growing popular support and demand for an accountable, corruption-free responsive system of governance. The large number of elections being held this year reflects that elections are widely accepted in the political practice of African states irrespective of the quality of democratic credentials of these states.
Notwithstanding these positive dimensions of the democratic governance and constitutional rule landscape of the continent, in the course of the past several years, Africa has witnessed a worrying escalation in democratic backsliding and challenges to constitutional rule and good governance. One notable manifestation of this democratic backsliding relates to elections. While it has become common for AU member states to hold elections and to do so regularly, free, fair, credible and transparent elections are very few and far in between on the continent. The Mo Ibrahim Africa Governance Index reported a decline in the integrity of elections in Africa during the decade between 2012 and 2021. As Afrobarometer, which conducts surveys on citizens’ perception, reported, one of the consequences of poor-quality elections in Africa is that ‘support for elections has dropped by 8 percentage points across 30 countries’ over the last decade. The poor quality of elections carries consequences for political stability. As the AU Commission Chairperson noted in his opening address to the 37th AU Assembly on 17 February 2024, ‘elections have become, through the extent of their irregularities, factors for deepening crises.’
Beyond the poor quality of elections, another, most notable, manifestation of the growing disenchantment with and backslide in democracy is the resurgence of coups over the past several years on the continent. As established in our policy brief of May 2022 published ahead of the Malabo Summit, ‘until 2021, the trends in the occurrence of coups in Africa is largely characterised by decline, despite its sporadic occurrence in a range of one to two coups per year (in the years when it occurred).’ Prior to 2021, the maximum that Africa experienced a coup since 2000 was in 2003. Since then, there have been a few years (2005, 2008 and 2012) when a maximum of two coups occurred, with several years passing without coups. The persistence of coups since 2020 illustrates reversals in the decline of coups in Africa since the turn of the century.
However poor elections and coups are not the only manifestations of the decline in democratic backsliding in Africa. The Mo Ibrahim Africa Governance Index ten-year trends (2012-2021) show that there has been deterioration in Africa in terms of security and the rule of law (from 50.3 to 49.0) as well as in the area of participation, rights, and inclusion (from 47.5 to 46.7). Some of these issues manifest not only in the resort of governments to excessive force to suppress dissent and peaceful protests but also in the continued shrinking of civic space across various parts of the continent. Further manifestations of the crises facing the process of democratisation in Africa include the circumventing or tampering with term limits by incumbent leaders as experienced in recent years in Central African Republic, Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon, Guinea and Togo. As pointed out in the Afrobarometer 2024 report, leaders ‘in Benin, Tunisia, and elsewhere have used a variety of means to subvert the democratic political order, weakening institutional checks on their authority, harassing the political opposition, imposing media blackouts, and even, in the case of Tunisia, suspending Parliament.’ The recurrence and in some instances the exponential increase in corruption and the failure of electoral democracies to address the socio-economic woes of citizens and deliver tangible material dividends to the public constitute additional factors for the democratic backsliding on the continent.
In light of the foregoing, the third set of issues that are of interest to PSC members as they convene tomorrow is the role of relevant AU governance instruments, institutions and processes. Based on the policy debate that the resurgence of coups triggered during the past years, there has been active engagement on the part of the AU and RECs/RMs notably the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) on how to arrest the resurgence of coups. Despite such heightened level of policy attention it has garnered, the responses to the occurrence of unconstitutional changes of government (UCG) and the resulting complex political transitions in multiple countries are yet to effectively bear fruit. Yet, one notable institutional development of the policy debate within the framework of the AU has been the operationalisation of the PSC sub-committee on Sanctions, which held its inaugural session in June 2024. In terms of elections, while the regularisation of the PSC session with presentation of the report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission is commendable, both the report and the session may end up being nothing more than performative unless attention is given to initiate and implement targeted policy responses to poor quality elections. Institutionally speaking, one of the issues that are worth reflecting on in tomorrow’s session is how to operate the African Governance Architecture (AGA) in a way that harnesses the roles of the AU bodies with governance mandates that form part of the AGA Platform for engaging in joint analysis and assessment of developments, trends and dynamics in democratic governance, constitutional rule and human rights in Africa. Such joint analysis and assessments are critical not only for leveraging the unique perspectives each of the AGA platform members brings but also for crafting responses that both assign responsibility for each of the AGA platform members to initiate measures in their respective mandates and for presenting to the PSC on measures it can take relevant to its mandate.
The expected outcome will be a Communiqué. The PSC may express concern over the plethora of setbacks facing constitutionalism, democracy and governance in Africa including flawed elections, shrinking civic space, executive excesses and systematic undermining of constitutional processes including term limits and the surge in military coups. The PSC may commend the continuing support for the normative acceptance of regular elections, constitutional systems, the role of media and civil society at national levels and the endorsement of constitutional and democratic norms at the level of the AU and RECs/RMs. The PSC may also express support for the growing popular acceptance and demand for an accountable, corruption-free and responsive system of governance. It may also underscore the need to bridge the growing gap between the demands and expectations of people for a more accountable system of governance and quality democracy, and the poor state of democratic and constitutional performance of states. The PSC may institutionalise its engagement on constitutionalism, democracy and governance into a systematic approach by integrating its focus on this theme into a standing agenda dedicated to the review of and systematic reflections on the implementation of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. In terms of elections, while welcoming the regularisation of the submission to and deliberation on the report of the Chairperson of the Commission on Elections, the PSC may also underscore the need for ensuring that attention is given to initiate and implement targeted policy responses to poor-quality elections. The PSC may reiterate its call to member states to expedite the signature and implementation of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance (ACDEG). In terms of the follow-up to the request of its 1061st session for an in-depth analysis of the 2000 Lomé Declaration on unconstitutional changes of government (UCG) and the African Governance Architecture (AGA), the PSC may request the AU Commission to put in place systems to operate the AGA in a way that harnesses the roles of the AU bodies with governance mandate that form part of the AGA Platform for engaging in joint analysis and assessment of developments, trends and dynamics in democratic governance, constitutional rule and human rights in Africa.
Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - June 2024
Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - June 2024
Date | June 2024
During Uganda’s chairmanship in June, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) had initially planned to conduct six sessions, addressing six agenda items including a field mission to South Sudan. After two revisions of the programme of work, six sessions were held and eight agenda items were considered. All sessions envisaged for June took place according to the programme of work with a minor adjustment to the dates of a few sessions.
