MONTHLY DIGEST ON THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL - NOVEMBER 2022
MONTHLY DIGEST ON THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL - NOVEMBER 2022
Date | November 2022
Namibia chaired the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) in November. The Provisional Program of Work initially envisaged six sessions with eight substantive agenda items. One of these sessions – a briefing on the deployment of 3000 troops to Sahel – was postponed to December. Two sessions that were not initially envisaged were added to the monthly program. Accordingly, the PSC held seven sessions in total. Of the seven sessions, four had two substantive agenda items (the 1117th, 1120th, 1121st, and 1122nd). Six of these agenda items were committed to country/region specific situations while three addressed thematic issues and one was a preparatory meeting held to receive key messages on climate change and peace and security nexus ahead of the 27th Conference of the Parties of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (COP 27). The remaining agenda was a consultative meeting of the PSC and the United Nations (UN) Peace Building Commission (UNPBC).
MONTHLY DIGEST ON THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL - NOVEMBER 2022
MONTHLY DIGEST ON THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL - NOVEMBER 2022
Date | November 2022
Namibia chaired the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) in November. The Provisional Program of Work initially envisaged six sessions with eight substantive agenda items. One of these sessions – a briefing on the deployment of 3000 troops to Sahel – was postponed to December. Two sessions that were not initially envisaged were added to the monthly program. Accordingly, the PSC held seven sessions in total. Of the seven sessions, four had two substantive agenda items (the 1117th, 1120th, 1121st, and 1122nd). Six of these agenda items were committed to country/region specific situations while three addressed thematic issues and one was a preparatory meeting held to receive key messages on climate change and peace and security nexus ahead of the 27th Conference of the Parties of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (COP 27). The remaining agenda was a consultative meeting of the PSC and the United Nations (UN) Peace Building Commission (UNPBC).
MONTHLY DIGEST ON THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL - NOVEMBER 2022
MONTHLY DIGEST ON THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL - NOVEMBER 2022
Date | November 2022
Namibia chaired the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) in November. The Provisional Program of Work initially envisaged six sessions with eight substantive agenda items. One of these sessions – a briefing on the deployment of 3000 troops to Sahel – was postponed to December. Two sessions that were not initially envisaged were added to the monthly program. Accordingly, the PSC held seven sessions in total. Of the seven sessions, four had two substantive agenda items (the 1117th, 1120th, 1121st, and 1122nd). Six of these agenda items were committed to country/region specific situations while three addressed thematic issues and one was a preparatory meeting held to receive key messages on climate change and peace and security nexus ahead of the 27th Conference of the Parties of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (COP 27). The remaining agenda was a consultative meeting of the PSC and the United Nations (UN) Peace Building Commission (UNPBC).
MONTHLY DIGEST ON THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL - NOVEMBER 2022
MONTHLY DIGEST ON THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL - NOVEMBER 2022
Date | November 2022
Namibia chaired the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) in November. The Provisional Program of Work initially envisaged six sessions with eight substantive agenda items. One of these sessions – a briefing on the deployment of 3000 troops to Sahel – was postponed to December. Two sessions that were not initially envisaged were added to the monthly program. Accordingly, the PSC held seven sessions in total. Of the seven sessions, four had two substantive agenda items (the 1117th, 1120th, 1121st, and 1122nd). Six of these agenda items were committed to country/region specific situations while three addressed thematic issues and one was a preparatory meeting held to receive key messages on climate change and peace and security nexus ahead of the 27th Conference of the Parties of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (COP 27). The remaining agenda was a consultative meeting of the PSC and the United Nations (UN) Peace Building Commission (UNPBC).
Update briefing on the situation in Sudan
Update briefing on the situation in Sudan
Date | 2 November 2022
Tomorrow (2 November), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is set to convene its 1117th session to receive update briefing on the situation in Sudan.
Permanent Representative of Namibia to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for the month of November, Emilia Ndinealo Mkusa, is expected to make opening remarks. AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, is expected to deliver statements while the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission to the Sudan, Mohamed Belaiche, will brief the Council during the closed segment of the session. The representative of the Secretariat of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) may also deliver statements as the relevant regional mechanism.
PSC has considered the situation in Sudan only in four instances (1041st, 1050th, 1060th, and 1076th sessions) since the 25 October 2021 military coup despite its decision, at its 1041st meeting, to receive monthly update on the evolution of the situation in Sudan. Sudan gave the AU and its PSC cold shoulder after the latter suspended Sudan on 26 October last year, which, to an extent, seems to have constrained PSC’s active engagement in resolving the political crisis in the country. It is to be recalled that PSC’s planned field mission to Sudan, which was slated for February, could not take place as Sudan’s military authorities were reluctant to receive the delegation.
25 October marked first anniversary of the coup, which derailed the civilian-led transition process and plunged the country into a protracted political instability. Tens of thousands of protesters marched on the anniversary of the coup, demanding a return to civilian rule. The 25 October 2021 coup was staged just a few months before the military’s handover of the chairship of the Sovereign Council—a body composed of the army and civilians with the task of overseeing the transition—to the civilian leadership as agreed in the 2019 Constitutional Declaration. It apparently aimed at pre-emptively averting both the risk of security sector reform and the concomitant potential loss of the military’s role and influence in the economy & politics of the country and the risk of accountability for alleged human right violations – past and present. The military authorities led by al-Burhan justified the 25 October seizure of power as a necessary step to put the transition back on track and improve the worsening conditions of the country.
One year after the coup, the socio-economic, political, security and humanitarian situations of the country indicate a downward spiral. In his 2 September 2022 report to the UN Security Council, UN Secretary-General noted that ‘the lack of political agreement and of a fully functional Government contributed to insecurity in various parts of the country, as well as to the deterioration of the economic and humanitarian situation.’ Intercommunal conflicts and armed banditry in West, North and South Darfur, West Kordofan, Kassala, Blue Nile States have spurred with the latest intercommunal violence in Blue Nile State reportedly killing over 220 people. International partners and financial institutions have suspended their financial assistance until the restoration of civilian transition. The ongoing political impasse and rising insecurity coupled with global dynamics as marked by food price spike, as well as the suspension of financial assistance by international partners and financial institutions on account of the Coup have sent Sudan’s economy into free fall. The year-on-year inflation in 2022 is estimated to remain high at 245.1 per cent, according to UN Secretary-General’s 2 September report. The socio-economic condition is further compounded by natural disasters, including flash floods.
On the political front, the military coup has also continued to face stiff resistance from the streets despite a heavy crackdown that reportedly killed hundreds of protesters since 25 October 2021. Despite some hopes in recent times, breaking the political deadlock on some of the sticky points on how to restore a civilian transition remains as elusive as before. In a televised speech on 4 July 2022, al-Burhan announced army’s withdrawal from the political dialogue facilitated by the UN-AU-IGAD trilateral mechanism to ‘allow space for political and revolutionary forces to form a government of national competencies’ to lead the transition period. He further pledged to dissolve the Sovereign Council, following the formation of an interim government, and establish a Supreme Council of Armed Forces composed of the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces, which will be responsible for security and defence tasks and ‘related responsibilities’, in consultation with the government. This is seen as an attempt to keep the security forces from required reforms and there is still lack of clarity and disagreement among different actors over the exact mandate & composition of the envisaged Council as well as the need for civilian oversight.
Meanwhile, military’s announcement of withdrawal from the political negotiation has placed the ball in the court of the civilian actors to reach on a consensus for an interim government and the way forward to the transition. Currently, efforts are underway to forge unity, the drafting of constitutional declarations by the Sudan Bar Association (SBA) being an encouraging step in this regard. In August, the SBA unveiled a final draft of a new transitional constitution, which saw the participation of wide range of stakeholders from the Forces for Freedom and Change-Central Council (FFC-CC), resistance committees, the Communist Party of Sudan, as well as rebel groups. The draft constitution is hoped to replace the August 2019 constitutional document if it succeeds in garnering support from majority of Sudanese stakeholders. Around mid-October, the FFC, which was part of the 2019 power-share deal and continued to remain an important political actor, rolled out its political vision for the restoration of the transitional civilian government based on the SBA’s draft constitution. The vision reportedly proposes to, among others, form a technocrat cabinet, amend the Juba Peace Agreement, and a Security and Defence Council under the chair of a civilian Prime Minister. However, nature of the cabinet (technocratic versus party cabinet), the role of the military in the transition, status of the Juba Peace Agreement and duration of the transition remain contested issues.
In the short term, appointing an agreed Prime Minister and establishing an interim civilian government seem priority in the move towards the restoration of a civilian transition. However, getting the country on a path toward sustainable peace and democracy requires reckoning with longstanding issues that have become divisive and continued to shape the political state. This would necessitate reforms in the governance architecture of the state under a new constitution, civil-military relationship including security sector reform, transitional justice and accountability and reforms in the economic sector.
The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communique. Among others, Council may express its concern over the growing insecurity and deterioration of socio-economic and humanitarian conditions of Sudan amid the ongoing political deadlock. It may call on Sudan authorities to urgently address sources of insecurity and take appropriate measures to ensure peace and stability of conflict hotspots, including the full implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement. It may also highlight the importance of breaking ongoing political deadlock and bring the transition back on track to resolve multidimensional challenges facing Sudan. Council may express concern over the slow pace of progress towards the restoration of a civilian transition for whose disruption the military coup is to blame. Council may urge civilian actors to expeditiously agree on the appointment of a Prime Minster and establishment of a civilian interim government and urge the de facto military authorities to commit to the principles on civilian oversight on the defence and security forces and civilian leadership over defence and security decision-making. Council may commend the UN-AU-IGAD tripartite mechanism for its effort to facilitate the Sudanese-led and Sudanese-owned consultations among the various actors. Council may encourage these actors to engage in a political dialogue to build consensus on the outstanding issues to restore the civilian transition, including the transitional bodies, role of military in the transition, and duration of the transition. Regarding the status of the Juba Peace Agreement, Council may welcome the recent training of the first batch of nearly 2000 troops from the signatory armed groups to the peace agreement and may further call on Sudanese authorities to expedite the training and integration of the remaining forces of the armed groups. Against the background of the violent responses of the military authorities toward peaceful protests, Council may call on the authorities to respect the right to peaceful assembly and ensure the non-use of disproportionate force against peaceful protests and to reiterate its previous call on Sudanese authorities to undertake a credible investigation into the killings of protesters and other violations since 25 October coup and held perpetrators accountable.
Amani Africa statement on the climate and security nexus in preparation of COP27
Amani Africa statement on the climate and security nexus in preparation of COP27
1 November 2022
One of the issues that receives inadequate attention in COP negotiations is the climate-security nexus. While the causal links between climate and conflict remains a subject of increasing interest and debate, there is mounting consensus and evidence that the climate crisis carries adverse consequences for political stability and peace and security. Indications are that there is perhaps no other part of the world that stands to suffer from the security consequences of climate change more than Africa. The latest UN report released early this year, which gave the starkest warning yet that any further delay in effective climate action will miss a brief and rapidly closing window of opportunity to secure a liveable and sustainable future, confirmed once again that the climate crisis will have particularly dire consequences in Africa. In an intervention that attests to this, last year, the Foreign Minister of Niger told the UN Security Council in September 2021 that ‘climate change has intensified competition for land, fodder and water resources. That has led to the resurgence of community-level conflicts between herders and farmers, thereby hampering peacebuilding and development efforts in the (Sahel) region.’
Amani Africa in its research identified that there are at least four aspects to this peace and security dimensions of the climate crisis in Africa. The first is where climate induced scarcity of natural resources on which vast majority of people on the continent depend for their livelihood and survival leads to violent competition over control and access to such ever depleting resources in the face of climate change. A case in point in Africa is the growing inter-communal violence that has become more ferocious and deadly over the years in the Sahel and Horn of Africa. In the Lake Chad basin region, shrinking water resources and the impact of the decline in the lake’s ecosystem on the livelihood of people in the basin have sparked resource-based conflicts.
Second, climate change induced extreme whether events also operate as multipliers of conflict factors, through their interaction with existing national and local political, social and environmental stresses. An example is Somalia. Here, more frequent and intense droughts and floods are undermining food security, increasing competition over scarce resources and exacerbating existing community tensions, from which Al-Shabaab continues to take advantage of.
Third, climate related disaster interferes with and undermines peace processes and transitions. A case in point is South Sudan, where the devastating flooding it experienced in 2021 has added a layer to various political and security factors that are delaying the implementation of the 2018 revitalized peace agreement.
Fourth, climate change in causing disasters and humanitarian emergencies leads to not only displacements that could undermine social cohesion but also impedes development efforts and resilience of societies for averting and managing political tensions and conflicts. It has thus become abundantly clear that climate change is a fast growing security challenge hat requires urgent and sustained policy attention.
Against the background of the foregoing, Amani Africa proposes that the AU adopts the following measures to address the security dimension of the climate crisis in Africa:
- Establishment of a thematic focus and a dedicated expert group on climate and security in the COP negotiations: Security has not featured in COP negotiations and while the upcoming COP27 presents an opportunity to take the first step, the effort has to be strengthened through deliberate policy intervention that lay the foundation for the formulation and refinement of a Common Position on climate and security and to also amplify a continental voice globally. The systematic incorporation of security issues in the COP processes in a form of a standing expert group would enable a continuous and robust policy engagement and consultation on climate and security that can that will make COP processes agile and responsive to the various major policy issues of the climate crisis. The institutionalization of this theme would be beneficial to make the global climate negotiations grounded and fully cognizant of the various consequences of climate change, particularly for countries most at risk of severe consequences of climate change and its interaction with existing conditions of fragilities, thereby threatening international peace and security.
- Fast tracking climate finance in fragile settings: it is high time that the continent approaches the global pledges made by developed nations to finance adaptation efforts in a strategic and pragmatic manner. Developed nations are far from meeting their commitment of providing 100 billion for developing nations adaptation cost. A very small amount is trickled down to affected countries and communities. The climate finance gap in Africa is staggering. Over a period of three years African countries collectively received only 18 billion USD in climate finance. On the other hand, the climate finance gap amounts to 1288 billion annually from 2020-2030. According to the UNDP report on Climate Finance for Sustaining Peace, this situation is even more complex for countries in fragile contexts where they encounter more challenges in accessing climate finance compared to non-fragile contexts. Recent reports also demonstrate the severity of financing gap noting that countries in fragile settings only receive 1/80th of per capita climate financing in comparison to non-fragile contexts. This also relates to the structural challenges of the global financial system. Grants that come as a form of a loan have intensified debt burden for developing nations. While it is important for the continent to operate within the broader bloc of the global south in negotiations, efforts should also be geared towards addressing specific needs and challenges of the continent by particularly paying attention to countries in fragile contexts and finding ways of making the financing framework responsive to these urgent needs in a way that also helps meet the climate commitments given that conflicts exacerbated by climate change further aggravate climate change both by increasing greenhouse gas emissions and hampering climate sensitive interventions.
- Africa centered research data collection on climate and security: currently the nexus between climate and security is more anecdotal. A more robust documentation on the how climate factors interact with socio-economic and political factors and their effects on peace security is critical in designing policies. At the moment there is an imbalance in which knowledge is being produced in the overall climate related issue. A lot of data is being produced from outside the continent including on matters concerning Africa. It is important for policies to be informed by knowledge produced within the continent and for Africa’s ownership of its own data, analysis and policy response. Africa has experienced severe climate data limitation and inequities in research funding. As noted in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report of 2021, from 1990 to 2019 research on Africa received only 3.8% of climate-related research funding globally, and 78% of this funding for Africa went to European Union- and North America–based institutions and only 14.5% to African institutions. This will have a direct impact on the way in which conflict sensitive climate adaptation policies are designed and implemented in Africa. It is critical for Africa not only to produce the necessary data but to also formulate its policies in line with homegrown and context specific data and analysis to effectively respond to the compounded effects of insecurity and climate change.
- Making the African Peace and Security Architecture responsive and fully adapted to climate change risks of conflicts – there is also the need to revisit our continental peace and security architecture and our intervention instruments within the context of the risks and threats associated to climate change. There is a need to review and adapt existing peace and security tools and architecture so that they can take in consideration and respond to emerging security situations more effectively. Retooling the African Peace and Security Architecture would require adopting a broader approach to security, one that is anchored in human security. This can be done by streamlining and integrating climate risks in all AU peace and security intervention through various mechanisms including the deployment of climate experts in peace support operations, integrating climate change analysis in AU country/region reports presented to the Council and for the PSC to allocate adequate time to consider the nexus between climate and security in the continent’s conflict hotspots, conducting field visits to natural disaster affected countries and integrate climate risk analysis in conflict early warning.
Provisional Programme of Work for the Month of November 2022
Provisional Programme of Work for the Month of November 2022
Date | November 2022
In November, Namibia will assume the role of chairing the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC). The month’s programme of work envisages six sessions with eight substantive agenda items, out of which four will focus on country/region specific situations while the remaining four will address various thematic issues. One of the sessions taking place in November will be convened at ministerial level while the remaining sessions will be held at ambassadorial level. During the month, Council is also expected to undertake two retreats – the PSC’s annual joint retreat with the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and the annual PSC retreat on its working methods.
The first session of the month is scheduled to take place on 2 November with two agenda items. The first agenda item will be an update briefing on the situation in Sudan. The last time Council addressed the situation in Sudan was at its 1076th session which assessed developments in countries undergoing political transitions including Sudan. Sudan’s political crisis which unfolded following the 25 October 2021 coup largely remains unresolved having serious security and humanitarian implications on the nation. Despite efforts initiated by the Trilateral Mechanism [consisting of the AU, United Nations (UN) and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)] to enable negotiations between the military and civilian leadership, concreate agreement is yet to be achieved. On 04 July, the military component announced that it will no longer take part in the negotiations facilitated by the Trilateral Mechanism suggesting instead that this mechanism focuses on facilitating a dialogue among the various civilian components. The coming session is expected to take stock of such key developments that have characterised the situation in Sudan since Council’s previous session.
The second agenda item Council is expected to address on 2 November is a presentation of key messages on the nexus between peace and security and climate change, in preparation for COP 27 [27th Conference of the Parties of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)] which is scheduled to take place from 06 to 18 November 2022, in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt. Climate change and security is one of PSC’s standing thematic issues regularly addressed since its 585th session where it decided to hold annual sessions dedicated to this theme. The outcomes of these deliberations are expected to inform the key messages to be presented at the upcoming meeting, including the impact of climate-related displacement in driving up local tensions and setting the stage for the eruption of violent intercommunal conflicts, a point well emphasised at Council’s 1079th meeting. It is also to be recalled that on 18 October Council convened a ministerial session on climate change, peace and security nexus with a focus on the need to build resilience and adaptation for African island States.
The next day, 3 November, Council is set to convene its second session of the month which will be an open meeting dedicated to the theme of Youth, Peace and Security (YPS) in Africa. This will be the third time Council will be addressing YPS in 2022, demonstrating the growing attention it’s receiving and the importance attached to Africa’s youth in contributing to efforts aimed at maintaining peace and security in the continent. Following up from its 1080th session which formed Council’s previous meeting on the theme, the coming session may serve to highlight progress obtained among AU member States in domesticating the AU Continental Framework on YPS, particularly through the development of National Action Plans (NAPs).
On 04 November, the PSC Committee of Experts (CoE) will meet to prepare for the Annual High-Level Seminar on the Peace and Security in Africa. The High-Level Seminar on Peace and Security in Africa is a yearly forum which has been convened since 2013, with the main purpose of enhancing cooperation between the PSC and the African members of the UN Security Council (A3 States) in advancing Africa’s voice within the UN Security Council. It is to be recalled that the previous Seminar took place in Oran, Algeria, from 02 to 04 December 2021.
The third session of the month is planned to take place on 07 November and will be a ministerial meeting on the situation in Mozambique and Operations of Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM). Since Council’s previous session on Mozambique which took place in January 2022 – 1062nd session – the security situation in the country’s northern province of Cabo Delgado has continued to deteriorate worsening the humanitarian toll. While it has continued its efforts to neutralise terrorist threats in the region, SAMIM has also been experiencing logistical and financial challenges which could impede on its effective response if not well addressed. In addition to receiving updates on these and other key aspects, Council is expected to endorse the Communique of the 42nd Ordinary Summit of SADC Heads of State and Government which extended SAMIM’s mandate.
The fourth session of the month will be an engagement between the PSC and the AU Commission on International Law (AUCIL), scheduled for 09 November. This will be the first time the PSC commits a session to an engagement with the AUCIL, which is an advisory organ of the AU established on the basis of Article 5(2) of the AU Constitutive Act. As provided in the Statutes of the AUCIL, the main objectives of the organ revolve around codification and progressive development of international law in Africa including through revision of existing treaties and conducting studies on legal matters of interest to the AU and its member States. The planned engagement between the two AU organs could serve to discuss challenges and opportunities for advancing international law norms relevant for the maintenance of peace and security in the continent.
On 11 November, Council will consider and adopt the draft provisional programme of work for the month of December 2022.
From 14 to 15 November, the Annual Joint-Retreat of the PSC and APRM will be held in Durban, South Africa. The Joint-Retreat of the PSC and APRM was held for the first time in December 2021 based on the decision of PSC’s 914th session for the AU Commission to work with the APRM Secretariat to organise a joint-retreat of the two organs. This year’s joint-retreat will be held in line with the decision of the inaugural retreat to have the convening on a yearly basis. The coming joint-retreat may address the increasing governance related instabilities in the continent and the value of investing on preventive tools to avert governance issues from becoming security concerns.
The next PSC activity during the month will be the Annual PSC Retreat on its Working Methods. The PSC Retreat is expected to take place in Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe, from 17 to 19 November. This year’s retreat will constitute Council’s 14th retreat.
On 28 November, Council will convene its fifth session which is expected to address two agenda items. The first one of these will be a briefing on the deployment of the 3000 troops to the Sahel region. Despite the decision of the AU Assembly in 2020 to deploy 3000 troops to the Sahel region [Assembly/AU/Dec.792(XXXIII)] and PSC’s endorsement of the “Revised Strategic Concept Note on Planning Guidance for the Deployment of 3000 Troops to the Sahel” at its 950th session, the deployment of the troops remains pending. Having regard to the situation on the ground, particularly the withdrawal of operation Barkhane from Mali and the potential security vacuum that could result, Council may take note of the important role the 3000 troops could play in managing the security situation in the region and urge all relevant stakeholders to exert efforts towards realising their deployment.
The second agenda item which forms part of Council’s 28 November session is a briefing on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) efforts in Africa and an engagement with the UN Peacebuilding Commission (UNPBC). It is to be recalled that at its 1047th session where Council last addressed PCRD in Africa, it launched the AU PCRD Awareness Week from 7 to 14 November 2021 and decided it shall be regularly commemorated during November each year. On 11 November 2021 on the side-lines of the AU PCRD Awareness Week, the PSC also held its regular meeting with the UNPBC.
One of the key decisions of the 1047th session was to ensure “urgent review of the AU PCRD Policy Framework in order to ensure that it is re-aligned and adaptable to the emerging challenges in the Continental peace and security landscape”. In line with the decision of the 35th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly [Assembly/AU/Dec. 815(XXXV)], a High-Level Expert Engagement was facilitated by the AU Commission from 09 to 14 September 2022, to review the AU Policy Framework on PCRD. The engagement which took place in Accra, Ghana served to conduct a comprehensive review of the architecture, mechanisms and processes of AU PCRD. At the coming briefing, the PSC may welcome the High-Level Expert Engagement and hear about some of the key aspects of the review and emerging recommendations.
The last session of the month is scheduled to take place on 30 November. The session will be committed to a briefing on the situation in South Sudan. Since Council’s 1092nd session which was the last time it addressed the situation in South Sudan, some key developments have unfolded in the country’s political transition process, a critical one being the extension of the transitional period by 24 months with effect from 23 February 2023 to 22 February 2025, through consensus reached among parties to the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS). The decision to extend the transition period was reached in light of the lagged implementation of the R-ARCSS, with some of the agreement’s essential elements still outstanding, including completion of the permanent constitution-making process. The coming session will serve for Council to reflect on this and other developments in the implementation of the peace agreement.
In addition, Council’s provisional programme of work for the month also envisages in footnote, the convening of a Lesson Learnt Forum on AU Peace Support Operation (PSOs) to take place in Abuja, Nigeria, from 01 to 03 November. The footnotes also envisage a Summit on Industrialization with the participation of the Executive Council, from 23 to 25 November.