The most pressing dilemma for the AU on Niger is to help find a path for a non-military resolution of the crisis
The most pressing dilemma for the AU on Niger is to help find a path for a non-military resolution of the crisis
Date | 13 August 2023
Solomon Ayele Dersso, PhD
Founding Director, Amani Africa
Following the latest extraordinary summit of the West African regional body, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), on the coup in Niger and its decision calling on the African Union (AU) to endorse all its decisions, the major preoccupation in diplomatic discussions in Addis Ababa is whether the AU’s principal decision-making body on matters of peace and security, the Peace and Security Council, would heed the call from ECOWAS and give its full blessing by rubber stamping the ECOWAS decision as a package. No doubt this is a major policy issue of immediate concern. However, there is a more pressing aspect of the policy challenge the AU faces from the ECOWAS request for a wholesale endorsement of its decisions.
As the junta entrenches itself and gets more radical in an attempt to defy the sanctions and threat of force, and, on its part, ECOWAS doubles down on its threat of force, the two are locking themselves on a dangerous path of escalation. If this is not reversed, it could degenerate into armed fighting. Such fighting is sure to frustrate the end state ECOWAS seeks to accomplish through its planed military intervention- reinstating the deposed President back to power, thereby reversing the coup and restoring constitutional order.
Yet, the failure of the military intervention to achieve its end state would be the least consequential outcome. Unfortunately, the fighting that this intervention stands to precipitate is sure to accelerate the dangerous set of conditions put in motion that could blow up Niger, triggering calamitous consequences for the entire region and reverberating across the continent.
First, after the warning by the two other central Sahelian countries under military rule, Burkina Faso and Mali, that military measure against Niger amounts to a declaration of war against them, ECOWAS military intervention in Niger risks to trigger regionalized war.
Second, with the announcement of the formation of a movement led by a former rebel leader aiming at reinstating President Bazoum back to power, Niger faced the danger of internal fighting and hence the acceleration of its fragility.
Third, any military intervention that targets and weakness Niger’s army also exposes Niger to the danger of collapse. With an army battered by a fight with forces from neighboring countries, Niger will easily be overrun by the armed terrorist groups operating in the Sahel.
Thus, the most pressing dilemma for the AU is to help ECOWAS find a path for a non-military and non-punitive (for Nigerien people) resolution of the constitutional crisis in Niger and the attendant democratic setback it represents for the region.
For the West Africa region, the coup in Niger represented the case with the most significant regional and geostrategic implementations. It is the sixth coup to take place in the region since August 2020. With Niger, nearly one in five countries in the region are now under military rule.
However, more than any of the earlier cases, the coup in Niger sent shockwaves for much of the governments of the region. As an attack on a ‘democratically elected’ government, it has triggered understandable concern for governments of the region that, if not reversed, no government in the West Africa and beyond could remain immune from becoming victim of coup.
For the regional body, ECOWAS, which has been in the forefront of fighting coups, the occurrence of the coup in Niger puts spotlight on the efficacy of how it handled the other coups.
It signals that the anti-coup posture and approach of ECOWAS has lost all its potency and credibility – under the weight of elections with questionable credibility, prolongation of power by incumbents through tampering with constitutional provisions on term limits, erosion of civic space and worsening bad governance.
Coming not long after the ascent of Nigeria’s new president to the helm of leading ECOWAS, the coup also came as a major foreign policy challenge for President Bola Ahmed Tinubu, who wishes to reaffirm the regional and continental leadership role of Nigeria.
When ECOWAS set its first extraordinary summit following the coup, the mood on the part of political elites in West Africa was to send a strong message against the putsch in Niger for drawing a line on coups in the region. Indicating that they should have been firm in how they responded to earlier coups, President of Senegal said ‘now that we are together on this, we should take action to make sure that it does not continue.’ Niger was thus slapped with the most severe regime sanctions that the regional body imposed ‘in the history of the region.’ It closed air and land borders. It suspended financial and economic transactions with Niger.
Not surprisingly, President Tinubu’s administration took a tougher stance against the coup. In addition to the ECOWAS sanctions, Nigeria cut power supply to Niger.
It is these measures that took centre stage in ECOWAS effort to reverse the coup. As a follow up to the one-week ultimatum and to add pressure on the junta, on 2-4 August the ECOWAS Committee of Chiefs of Defense staff met in Abuja to draw up a plan of military intervention.
With the space and the air sucked by the harshly punitive sanctions and the threat of military intervention, diplomacy ended up taking a very far secondary place. Indeed, the nature and scope of the sanctions and the ratchetting up of the threat of use of force, instead of facilitating diplomacy, raised the stakes for both Niger and ECOWAS. While the sanctions exact heavy price and the threat of use of force puts Niger’s survival in peril, for ECOWAS it is perceived, albeit wrongly, as a matter of its credibility per Cote d’Ivoire’s President Alassane Outtara.
Having exhausted all of its other ammunition at a go, ECOWAS is left with military intervention as the only instrument of pressure. Not totally surprisingly, when the second extraordinary summit of ECOWAS was convened on 10 August, the regional body doubled down on its stance, including on its threat of use of force. Thus, notwithstanding the admission of President Tinubu on the failure of the one week ultimatum given to the junta, ECOWAS, among others, decided to ‘immediately activate the ECOWAS Standby Force with all its elements’ and ordered ‘the deployment of ECOWAS Standby Force to Niger to restore constitutional order.’ With all these, ECOWAS has locked itself in a tight corner.
On the other hand, the harsh punitive sanctions and the use of force have given the junta the context for stirring nationalist fervour of Nigeriens and ride on their anti-neo-colonial sentiments. ECOWAS’ position is made more difficult due to charges that it was being used to advance the interests of foreign powers in the face of the persistent diplomatic manoeuvring of France and until recently the US centred on securing the reinstatement of President Bazoum.
In the process, the junta has increasingly taken positions that are less amendable to diplomatic engagements. On 3 August a massive demonstration in support of the coup was staged. The ECOWAS diplomatic delegation headed by former Nigerian President General Abdulsalami Abubakar sent on August 6, was prevented from leaving Niamey airport and returned to Nigeria without meeting the coup leader. On 8 August, the junta declined to receive a tripartite delegation from ECOWAS, AU and the UN, alleging that ‘anger and revolt among the population’ against ECOWAS’ sanctions made it impossible to guarantee the envoys’ safety. In the last few days, it was reported that the junta warned that it would kill the deposed president if military intervention is followed through.
All of the foregoing signal that Niger and ECOWAS are on a war footing. The AU should rise to the occasion and mobilize robust diplomatic effort aiming at helping ECOWAS and Niger find a path that steers them clear of military intervention. This effort should include, (as proposed here) and as Joseph Sany, Vice President of USIP rightly counselled, ‘avoiding military action that could worsen the crisis and shaping sanctions in ways to reduce suffering within the general population.’ AU would fail to play a more responsible role if it takes the easy option of reducing itself to rubber stamping the decision of ECOWAS despite all the risks.
The content of this article does not represent the views of Amani Africa and reflect only the personal views of the authors who contribute to ‘Ideas Indaba’
Update on the Situation in the Republic of Niger
Update on the Situation in the Republic of Niger
Date | 13 August 2023
Tomorrow (14 August) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene under its revised provisional program of work, its 1167th session to consider the situation in Niger.
The PSC Chair for the month and Permanent Representative of Burundi to the AU, Ambassador Willy Nyamitwe will be delivering the opening remarks. The Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, is also expected to make a statement. As a country of concern, the Permanent Representative of Niger is also expected to make a statement. The PSC may also hear a statement from the representative of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).
Tomorrow’s session is the second time for the PSC to dedicate a session on the coup in Niger and the third time to discuss it. When the PSC Program of work initially set to consider the situation in Niger on 17 August after the expiry of the two-week timeline the PSC set in its initial session on 28 July, the next course of action of ECOWAS was unknown. The date was brought forward following ECOWAS decision to hold its second extraordinary summit on Niger. As a session that comes two days after the ECOWAS summit, it is expected that PSC will dedicate significant portion of its session on considering the outcome of the summit.
As noted, the first time the PSC met on the current coup in Niger was on an emergency meeting held virtually on 28 July 2023 for its 1164th session, with a communiqué adopted as an outcome of the session. Apart from strongly condemning the coup, the PSC set 15 days for the junta to restore constitutional order. This timeline expired on 11 August.
On its part ECOWAS in its communiqué, following its extraordinary session on 30 July 2023, imposed a series of sanctions such as: closure of land and air borders, institution of a no-fly zone, suspension of all commercial and financial transactions, asset freeze, travel bans, and suspension of financial assistance and transactions. Additionally, it demanded the coup leaders to return the country to constitutional order within 7 days against the threat of the use of force.
The UN Security Council like the PSC also held a briefing and issued a statement. Among others, it called for the release of President Bazoum, underscored the need for constitutional order and expressed support for the role of ECOWAS.
Since the PSC’s last session on 28 July, the grip of the junta on Niger has continued to deepen. Apart from the establishment of Conseil National Pour la Sauvergarde de la Patrie (CNSP) [in English: National Council for the Safeguarding of the Homeland], composed of senior officials from various branches of the defence and security forces and the emergence of the chief of the Presidential Guard, General Abdourahamane Tchiani as the leader of the junta (while General Salifou Moudi, who was appointed as chief of staff by former Nigerien President in 2020 and demoted by President Bazoum in March 2023, became the second in command), on 7 August the junta named former Finance Minister Lamine Zeine Prime Minister. On 30 July, large number of people took to the streets in support of the coup. Just before the convening of the ECOWAS summit, the junta announced a new cabinet. The 21-member new government involves two members of CNSP responsible for ministers of defense and interior.
On the diplomatic front as well, ECOWAS took a lead. It sent various delegations. After he volunteered to mediate, ECOWAS sent the Chadian leader Mahamat Idriss Deby, who himself seized power through military means, to Niamey, although this mission accomplished nothing despite meetings for photo with the coup leader and the deposed President. Earlier on the same day the unfolding of the coup was first reported on 26 July, Benin’s President was also reported as planning to travel to Niger. Designated by ECOWAS Chairperson, President Tinabu of Nigeria as official mediators, another delegation headed by former Nigerian President and member of the AU High-Level Panel on Sudan, General Abdulsalami Abubakar and involving the Emir of Sokota traveled to Niger on 6 August but was unable to meet the head of the junta. On 8 August, a joint ECOWAS-AU-UN mission destined to Niger was unable to undertake its mission, on account of, in the words of an ECOWAS statement, ‘a late-night communication from the military authorities in Niger indicating their unavailability to receive the tripartite delegation.’
Rather than this plethora of diplomatic missions, what received the most attention and concentrated the minds of the members of the junta and people in Niger as well as many others in the region are the raft of sanctions that ECOWAS slapped on Niger and most significantly the threat of use of force. In addition to ECOWAS’ sanctions, Nigeria has cut power supply to Niger. On 2-4 August, the ECOWAS Committee of Chiefs of Defense staff met in Abuja to draw up and agree on an intervention plan. Countries such as Senegal and Cote d’Ivoire announced their plan to send troops as part of ECOWAS intervention force.
The pressure and the threat of force, instead of dissuading the junta from continuing on the unconstitutional path it embarked on, seemed to have had the opposite effect. They hardened its position. The coup leaders have dismissed the sanctions as ‘inhuman’ and have vowed to resist them. The threat of force also stirred nationalist fervor of the Nigerien public, making it easier for the junta to galvanize public support. However, it is also worth noting that the junta is not without opposition. On 10 August report emerged that a former Tuareg rebel leader and politician in Niger, Rhissa Ag Boula, announced the launching of a rebel movement opposing the military junta and seeking to restore President Bazoum’s rule.
Regionally as well, despite unity in condemning the coup and the call for restoration of constitutional order, some of the measures by ECOWAS particularly the threat of use of force divided views both on the part of countries and the wider public in countries neighboring Niger. Niger’s neighbors outside ECOWAS who support the position of ECOWAS on restoration of constitutional order such as Algeria and Mauritania expressed concern over the threat of force, with Algeria indicating its strong opposition to it. Chad on its part stated that it would not join military intervention against Niger. On the other hand, Burkina Faso and Mali announced that military intervention in Niger amounts to a threat of war against them as well, while Guinea also rejected the threat of use of force.
In Nigeria, which chairs ECOWAS, concerns have been expressed over the adverse peace and security implications of military force particularly for northern parts of Nigeria that share border with Niger. When requested for its support, Nigeria’s Senate advised against military intervention. Highlighting the geopolitical dynamics that complicates the position taken by ECOWAS particularly on the use of force, one open letter, addressed to President Tinabu by some Nigerian personalities including a former Commander of the UN Mission in Darfur, pointed out ‘the apparent rising wave of popular support for the putschists might create a situation in which the role of Nigeria is seen as being at variance with the interest of the Nigerien people and in support of external interests.’
It was against the background of the foregoing that ECOWAS convened its second extraordinary session on 10 August. Apart from ECOWAS member states, the summit also saw the presence of the Chairperson of the PSC at heads of state and government level, President Evariste Ndayishimiye of Burundi and the President of Mauritania. Apart from PSC Chairperson, the presence of the AU involved the Commissioner for PAPS, Adeoye.
Despite the emphasis it put on pursuing diplomatic avenues, the communique of the summit decided to uphold and enforce all the earlier decisions from the first summit. Doubling down on its threat of use of force, the ECOWAS Authority directed ‘the Committee of the Chiefs of Defense Staff to immediately activate the ECOWS Standby Force with all its elements’ and most importantly ‘order(ed) the deployment of the ECOWAS Standby Force to restore constitutional order in the Republic of Niger.’ ECOWAS also called on the AU to ‘endorse all the decisions taken by the ECOWAS on the situation in Niger’. (Emphasis added)
As the PSC meets tomorrow, the issue it is facing is not one that is amenable to any easy policy choices. Considering the continuation of the coup after the expiry of the 15 days deadline, the only policy course of action that is easy for the PSC is to invoke Article 7(1)(g) of the PSC Protocol and slap Niger with suspension from participating in AU activities as per Article 30 of the Constitutive Act of the AU. The PSC may even agree to further measures but only to the extent of that they involve the targeted sanction of the authors of the coup.
Any measure going further than the foregoing would not be easy for the PSC. It would be difficult to find consensus in the PSC on the wholesale endorsement of all the sanctions on Niger, particularly those that are not targeted and will directly affect ordinary Nigeriens. Apart from the political and legal challenges, it would be even more difficult for the PSC to agree on the endorsement of the use of force for purposes of reversing the coup in Niger. It is to be recalled that the threat of use of force was the main factor why the PSC was unable to secure consensus when it discussed the outcome of the 30 July ECOWAS Summit during its 31 July session.
There are thus two potential scenarios as outcome for the PSC. Understandably, PSC members from ECOWAS by the dictates of protocol will seek to have the PSC endorse the decision their principals at heads of state and government level adopted. This brings forward as potential outcome of the session the scenario of endorsement of ECOWAS decisions as a whole. On the other hand, for PSC members from other regions, such endorsement of ECOWAS decisions as a package may not be as straight forward. They may therefore agree only to endorsement of the targeted sanctions.
On military intervention, one possibility is that instead of endorsement, the most members of the PSC can agree to take note of the decision of ECOWAS on the matter. Going further, the PSC may need to get clarity on the peace and security implications of military intervention in Niger for making responsible and well considered decision. Given the principal mandate of the PSC for peace and security, it would be difficult for the PSC to proceed with endorsing military intervention without it being both presented with careful assessment of the risks and satisfied that the risks of intervention would not be worse than the adverse consequences of the military coup. Indications are that the risks of military action in the particular context of Niger could far outweigh the adverse consequences of the military coup on its own. It may not only quickly degenerate into regional war as Burkina Faso and Mali get drawn in but also expose Niger to risk of collapse and be overrun by terrorist groups.
It is to be recalled that the PSC, following the military seizure of power and suspension of the constitution in Chad in April 2021, went as far as avoiding the activation of Article 30 of the Constitutive Act in respect of Chad let alone to consider the use of force for upholding constitutional process. The factors for such position, per the terms of the communiques of the PSC, include, ‘the complexity of the political and security situation in Chad.’ Yet, in Chad PSC’s position was informed more by what it called ‘the pivotal role being played by Chad in the promotion and maintenance of peace and security, particularly in the countering terrorism and violent extremism in the Lake Chad Basin and the Sahel regions’, it is in Niger the PSC faces most intensely in a way it never did before the tension between its mandate to uphold constitutional order and its primary role in the maintenance of peace and security.
The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communiqué. Expressing concern about the lack of progress towards restoration of constitutional order, the PSC is expected to immediately suspend Niger from all AU activities on the basis of Article 7(1(g)) of the Protocol establishing the PSC until the restoration of constitutional order. It is also expected to reiterate the call on the coup leaders to ensure the physical integrity of the President, his family and members of his government that are detained. The PSC may express its support for the leadership of ECOWAS in the search for finding solution to the constitutional crisis in Niger. In this respect, the PSC underscoring the importance of pursuing the effort for resolving the situation in Niger through diplomatic means, may urge the junta in Niger to collaborate with ECOWAS and engage constructively with the diplomatic initiatives. With respect to the decisions of ECOWAS both from its 30 July and its 10 August summits, the PSC may endorse the targeted sanctions that specifically single out perpetrators of the coup. On the proposal on the deployment of military intervention, the PSC may request that the AU Commission provides it with legal opinion indicating the legal basis under AU legal instruments for use of military force for reversing military coup and the African Standby Scenario under which such intervention is to be undertaken. Both for purposes of enabling it take informed decision on the peace and security implications of the proposal on military intervention and for instituting robust diplomatic process towards the restoration of constitutional order in Niger, the PSC may decide for the establishment of a mechanism that operates on a full time basis on Niger like a high-level Panel of leading African personalities who, in addition to their diplomatic role, working together with the AU Commission, would present to the PSC their carefully considered assessment of the nature of the peace and security risks of military intervention in Niger. Given the gravity of the situation in Niger, in addition to such standing mechanism, the PSC may also decide to establish an ad hoc committee of five at the level of heads of state and government from the various regions of the continent to provide strategic guidance.
Engagement between the PSC and the PRC Sub-Committee on Human Rights, Democracy and Governance
Engagement between the PSC and the PRC Sub-Committee on Human Rights, Democracy and Governance
Date | 11 August 2023
Tomorrow (11 August) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1166th Session that is dedicated to the PSC’s engagement with the Permanent Representative Committee (PRC) Sub-Committee on Human Rights, Democracy and Governance (HRDG).
The PSC Chair for the month and Permanent Representative of Burundi to the AU, Ambassador Willy Nyamitwe will be delivering the opening remarks. The Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, is also expected to make a statement. Additionally, a briefing is expected to be delivered by James Pitia Morgan, as the Permanent Representative of the Republic of South Sudan to the AU and the Chairperson of the PRC Sub-Committee on Human Rights, Democracy and Governance. It is also anticipated that Remy Lumbu, Chairperson of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) and Chairperson of the African Governance Architecture (AGA) Platform will also make a statement.
The upcoming session marks the second annual joint engagement between the PSC and the Sub-Committee. This session was institutionalized during the 1095th session, where the PSC made the decision to hold the meeting with the Sub-Committee every August. The engagement is not only supported by the PSC’s decision, but is also enshrined in the PSC Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the PSC, which mandates the PSC to follow up on progress towards promoting democratic practices, good governance, the rule of law, and the protection of human rights. Correspondingly, beyond promoting AU shared values, the mandate of the Sub-Committee additionally involves: hearing briefings from AGA platform members; recommending policy initiatives, draft declarations, draft resolutions and decisions in the area of human rights, democracy and good governance; considering proposals/documents concerning the programs, policies, strategies of AU human rights, democracy and governance initiatives; and supporting efforts and initiatives aimed at the full operationalization of the AGA, its platform and its synergy with the APSA.
Similar to the previous engagement, the upcoming session aims to create synergy and coordination between the PSC and the Sub-Committee in respect of the role of the PSC on issues relating to governance, democracy and human rights. The session also seeks to identify joint programs as well as initiatives going forward.
However, the surge in coup d’états in the continent increases the relevance of tomorrow’s session. As a result of the successful coup attempt that took place from 26 – 28 July 2023, Niger has joined Guinea, Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad and Sudan in the list of African countries that have experienced a coup since April 2020. While some of those countries are still struggling to transition from military to civilian rule, Sudan has experienced a full-blown conflict that resulted in the worsening of human suffering with human rights violations including the death and displacement of hundreds of thousands of Sudanese. The increasing frequency of coups throughout the Sahel region reflects the failure of continental frameworks aimed at maintaining democratic order in African countries.
As concern over the growing number of coups in Africa intensifies, PSC has convened three sessions in the past year to address the issue of unconstitutional changes of government, including the reflection forum held in March 2022 in Accra, Ghana. Subsequently, the AU’s Extraordinary Session of the Assembly adopted the Declaration on Terrorism and Unconstitutional Changes of Government on May 28, 2022, in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea. This declaration enshrines the consensus among member states that an urgent response is required from both the AU and the Regional Economic Communities/Mechanisms (RECs/RMs). The AU and the RECs/RMs are intensifying their efforts to restore democratic rule by supporting the on-going transitions and attempting to put a stop to the epidemic of coups on the continent.
However, none of these efforts have succeeded in preventing coups. Progress in facilitating the transition of countries under military rule towards restoration of constitutional order also remains slow. Tomorrow’s session thus presents an opportunity for discussing what more needs to be done collectively by the AGA and APSA institutions to reverse the spread of coups, including by revisiting the Accra Forum and the follow up of PSC’s decision from the 14 September 2022 inaugural meeting with CSOs for reconvening of the Accra forum.
As the PSC itself admitted in various occasions and reflected in the Accra Declaration, the lack of regard by Member States for the provisions of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) and other similar governance and human rights instruments is one of the sources of the decline in the state of democracy and human rights in Africa. Hence, as the organ mandated with promoting the AU’s shared values on human rights, governance, and democracy, tomorrow’s consultation presents an opportunity for critically reflecting on how HRDG Sub-Committee creates the space for the AGA Platform members to critically assess the weaknesses in their current approach to the execution of their mandate and design and deploy strategies and approaches that are more effective in arresting and countering the regression in democratic governance and respect for human rights that serves as fertile ground for military coups, economic dislocation and conflicts and other sources of insecurity in Africa. The PSC’s past engagement with the Sub-Committee had also urged Member States to expedite the universal signature and implementation of the ACDEG. However, despite popularization efforts, the ACDEG has no seen progress in terms of signatories since the previous engagement of the two organs. As such, in the upcoming session, the PSC is expected to be briefed on the work that the AGA Secretariat and the AGA Platform undertook towards enhancing ratification and implementation. The session may also include discussion on elections, as the monitoring of elections through periodic report is in the standing agenda of the PSC and promoting of ACDEG is one of the mandates of the Sub-Committee.
Furthermore, the ACDEG is at the core of the African Governance Architecture (AGA) and the AU Executive Council has also directed the Sub-Committee to continue engaging with AU organs and institutions with human rights and governance mandates in a view to enhance synergy between the AGA and African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). In line with these and building on the PSC’s previous engagement with the Sub-Committee, the PSC may seek to receive updates on the progress made and the challenges to the institutionalization of the synergy. The upcoming session may also present an opportunity for the PSC to explore a critical aspect that was overlooked in the previous session. Particularly, exploring ways to facilitate the implementation of decisions made by the members of the AGA platform, such as the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child as well as the AU Anti-Corruption Board. Additionally, the two organs may hold discussions on promoting the integration of AU democracy and human rights standards across the AU Executive Council and AU Assembly decisions through the PRC.
In terms of further follow up, in its previous engagement with the Sub-Committee the PSC has encouraged the Sub-Committee to engage CSOs through the AU Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC). As per the February 2023 report of the Sub-Committee that was submitted to the AU Executive Council, it was indicated that the Sub-Committee received a briefing from the ECOSOCC. In the report ECOSOCC also cited the promotion of the continental civil society sensitization campaign on the ratification and domestication of the ACDEG, participation in ECOSOCC Citizens’ Forum and supporting ECOSOCC programs on the integration of Women and Youth in democratic governance in Africa as proposed areas of collaboration. Against that backdrop, the PSC may request an update on activities that were undertaken by the Sub-Committee in the engagement of CSOs.
The outcome of the session is expected to be a Communiqué. The PSC may welcome the consultation with the HRDG Sub-Committee of the PRC, while underscoring the need for enhancing the effectiveness of the Sub-Committee and importantly the role of the AGA platform and its members. In light of the coup that took place in Niger, it may condemn the democratic regression in the continent and the blatant disregard by member states of the decisions of the AU bodies on human rights and governance and the recent spike in military coups on the continent. It may also request the Sub-Committee working with the AGA Secretariat and the AGA Platform members to look into the apparent support that African citizens are showing to military coups and develop strategies on how to build strong defence on the part of African people against unconstitutional changes of government in all its forms. The PSC may also request the Sub-Committee to facilitate coordination and dialogue between the AGA Platform members and member states concerned on enhancing the implementation of decisions of the African human rights and governance bodies as critical measures for fending against conditions that make coups possible. While welcoming the engagement between the Sub-Committee and ECOSOCC, the PSC may request that the coordination between the two focuses on measurable activities for enhancing public awareness and support for AU shared values including ACDEG through the use of media and public surveys working, for example, with organizations such as Afrobarometre. The PSC may also reiterate the need for the involvement of CSOs in governance matters and for the representation of Africa citizen in regional human rights bodies and in this respect the importance of expanding and consolidating platforms for their impactful engagement. In the light of the continuation of the occurrence of coups, the PSC may call for the convening of a follow up to the Accra Forum within the framework of decision for the holding of the forum on annual basis.
Amani Africa Dispatch Ep2 - The AU and ECOWAS have to make the best of very bad policy options
https://youtu.be/QbINr_d9bxQ
