Open Session on Children Affected by Armed Conflicts
Open Session on Children Affected by Armed Conflicts
Date | 18 August 2022
Tomorrow (18 August), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1101st session which will be an open session on children affected by armed conflicts (CAAC).
Following opening remarks of the Permanent Representative of The Gambia to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for the month, Jainaba Jagne, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye is expected to deliver a statement. Robert Nanima, African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACERWC) Special Rapporteur on CAAC is also expected to make a statement at the session. Presentations and statements are also expected to be delivered by representatives of the respective Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs), the United Nations (UN) Office to the African Union (UNOAU), the European Union (EU) and Save the Children International to the AU and Pan Africa Office. Four children affected by armed conflicts are also expected to share their experiences at the session.
The last time Council discussed CAAC was at its 1070th session convened on 29 March 2022. At that meeting, Council considered two draft policies essential for the protection of children in situation of armed conflicts – Policy on Child Protection in AU Peace Support Operations (AU PSOs) and Policy on Mainstreaming Child Protection in the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) – and requested that they be considered by the Specialized Technical Committee for Defence, Safety and Security (STCDSS). At its 14th Ordinary Session convened on 12 May 2022, the STCDSS considered and adopted both policies. Further to welcoming the adoption of the policies, tomorrow’s session may serve as an opportunity for Council and invited participants to reflect on the necessary steps that will be required for their implementation.
Tomorrow’s session is expected to deliberate on the general situation of children in armed conflicts in Africa, highlighting some of the more concerning country/region situations and address some of latest issues arising in connection with protection of children in conflict and crises settings in the continent. In the various regions of Africa, the situation of children caught in conflict and crises situations continues to deteriorate, in some cases reaching alarming levels.
According to the United Nations (UN) Children’s Fund (UNICEF), West and Central Africa continues to account for a quarter of the global violations against children in situations of armed conflicts. Since 2005, more than 67,000 verified grave violations against children have been recorded in these regions. This accounts for the six incidents which form grave violations – killing and maiming, child recruitment and use, abductions, rape and other forms of sexual violence, attacks on schools and hospitals, and denial of humanitarian access. In the Sahel region in particular, the high rate of displacement resulting from conflict and insecurity has put children at the risk of overlapping grave violations. Reportedly, in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, the number of verified grave violations has shown a 40% increase as compared to the data recorded for the last quarter of 2021.
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in Central Africa is among the countries globally that have recorded highest number of grave violations committed against children in the context of armed conflicts. According to the UN, 3,546 violations against 2,979 children were verified in the DRC in the course of 2021. Children are also affected by conflicts in Cameroon and the Central African Republic (CAR). One of the worst manifestation of the conflict in Cameroon involves the direct targeting of children and schools, thereby leading to the exclusion of hundreds of thousands of children from school as the UN reported. In the North-West and South-West regions of Cameroon, over 700,000 children are estimated to be deprived of education due to attacks on schools. In CAR, about 944,000 children were projected to be in need of psychosocial support due to the impacts of conflict and sexual violence.
In the East and Horn region, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan are among the countries with highest rates of grave violations recorded during 2021. While no statistics are available, children are among those most affected by the conflict in northern Ethiopia. In South Sudan, the UN verified 196 grave violations against 183 children, including the recruitment and use of 129 children. In Sudan, 202 grave violations were verified against 195 children, including killing of 54 and 112 cases of maiming against 166 children. Somalia has recorded the highest rate of grave violations against children in situations of armed conflicts in the region with 3,340 grave violations against 2,687 children as verified by the UN. Out of these, 1030 were cases of children abducted by Al-Shabaab while 307 were cases of sexual violence against children, 306 of which were perpetrated against girls.
The situation of children affected by conflicts is compounded by food insecurity and challenges to humanitarian access. Such is the case, for example, in the Horn of Africa, which is also experiencing severe drought. According to data availed by UNICEF in early June 2022, over 1.7 million children in Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia are estimated to be facing severe acute malnutrition out of which 386,000 reside in Somalia.
In Southern Africa, conflict and terrorist violence in the Cabo Delgado province of Mozambique continues to fuel the displacement crisis in the region. As of September 2021, over 800,000 people were estimated by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to have been internally displaced and out of these, 48% were reported to be children. Since the outbreak of insurgency in northern Mozambique in 2017, about 370,000 children have reportedly been displaced. Recent reports by Save the Children also indicate that renewed violence in the northern region of Mozambique has displaced nearly 30,000 children. In most cases, children in the region are forced to face secondary and tertiary displacement and are growingly running out of safe shelters due to the spread in attacks. Not only does this entail significant immediate challenges, its long term psychological impacts on children will likely be grave.
Although relatively better, Libya from the North African region experiences its share of challenges in relation to protection of children affected by conflict and crisis situations. The latest UN report indicates that 63 grave violations against 52 children were verified in the country throughout 2021. In the midst of continued concerns over protection of human rights of detained migrants, including children, 125 additional cases of detention of children were reported during that period.
In addition to reflecting on these concerning trends faced in the various regions of the continent, Council may also wish to draw attention to the issue of statelessness faced among displaced children or children born in displacement, an issue which has gained relatively little attention in the past. Displaced children or children born to displaced parents are among the principal victims of the consequences of armed conflicts, natural disasters and other crises including political instabilities. Although the issue of statelessness of such children does not become apparent until they are confronted with situations that require official documentations and national identification, studies have demonstrated the prevalence of the issue across Africa.
A recent study by the UNHCR indicates for instance that while providing exact or estimated statistics on stateless children is not possible – owing mainly to poor birth registration and documentation practices of member States – the risk of statelessness among children in the Horn of Africa has currently become a highly concerning issue. The report specifically highlights that ‘children in Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea and Ethiopia, including those of mixed parentage, with parents who have been displaced or are members of cross-border communities, and those who have been separated from their parents, are among persons most at risk of statelessness in the Horn of Africa’. It is known that the immediate causes for statelessness are gaps in nationality laws which provide safeguards against statelessness in line with international law. For example, Art.6 of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC) provides the right of every child to acquire nationality. However, children born in displacement (from refugee, migrant or asylum-seeker parents) are often denied this right by host countries.
The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a Communiqué. Council is expected to welcome the adoption of the Policy on Child Protection AU PSOs and the Policy on Mainstreaming Child Protection in APSA. It may further highlight the importance of a well-defined strategy to help guide the implementation of these policies and call for the development of such framework. Taking note of the high prevalence of grave violations against children in conflict settings in the continent, Council may urge all parties to conflicts to abide by the fundamental principles of international humanitarian law and international human rights law and to exercise utmost restraint in the conduct of hostilities as to avoid victimisation of children. It may further appeal to all relevant stakeholders including regional and international partners to strengthen their support and assistance for children affected by conflicts in Africa. Having regard to the growing concern of child statelessness, Council may also call on member States to align their laws regulating nationality with relevant regional and international standards on the prevention of statelessness. Having regard to the absence of data on statelessness among children caught in crisis situations, Council may also call on relevant AU organs such as the ACERWC to conduct a mapping study in that area. In the light of the worrying statistics of children affected by conflicts, the PSC may call on the AU to use the policy on mainstreaming child protection in APSA for preventive diplomacy, mediation, peace-making and peace processes to ensure that measures are put in place for ensuring protection of children in the concerned conflict or crisis settings where these tools are deployed.
Sanctions and Enforcement Capacities: Deterrence Against UCG
Sanctions and Enforcement Capacities: Deterrence Against UCG
Date | 15 August 2022
Tomorrow (15 August), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is set to convene its 1100th session to discuss “sanctions and enforcement capacities: deterrence against unconstitutional changes of government (UCG)”.
Following opening remarks of the Permanent Representative of The Gambia to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for the month, Jainaba Jagne, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye is expected to deliver a statement. Representatives of the respective Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) are also expected to deliver statements while presentations will be made by representatives of the United Nations (UN) and the Institute of Security Studies (ISS).
The recent resurgence in UCG in the continent, noted particularly over the course of 2021, has brought the issue to the fore of policy discourse continentally in the AU and various state and non-state actors and regionally at RECs/RMs. Regionally, the policy debate has been dominant in West Africa, within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). As highlighted in Amani Africa’s Policy Brief, the fact that sanctions imposed on Mali did not deter subsequent coups in four other cases has brought into sharp focus the efficacy of the responses of the AU and RECs/RMs.
While some of the recent conversations on UCG in the continent have focused on the critical importance of comprehensively addressing governance deficits, human rights violations and other governance related underlying root causes which create the fertile ground for coups, the debate within the AU and among the wider policy stakeholders illustrated that not any less important is the issue of ensuring enforceability and impactfulness of sanctions imposed once UCG takes place in a given member State. Beyond the emergence of divergent perspectives in the PSC about whether and when to apply the enforcement measures of suspension and sanctions, the importance of this issue also came out during the March 2022 Accra Forum that the PSC convened in Ghana. In addition to reflecting on the challenges faced so far in applying the enforcement measures (of suspension from AU and/or regional bodies), tomorrow’s session may also serve as an opportunity for building on and articulating modalities for effective operationalization of commitments made under the Accra Declaration with respect to enforcing UCG sanctions.
When addressing the issue of enforceability of sanctions against UCG, one of the first considerations that will require close examination is the existence of a comprehensive framework which establishes clear designation criteria, thresholds and categories for imposition of sanctions as well as conditions that need to be met for lifting them. It is true that the AU Constitutive Act, the Lome Declaration of 2000, the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) of 2007, the PSC Protocol and the practice of the PSC in enforcing the AU norms on UCG show that there is adequate clarity about the automaticity of suspension from the AU in cases of UCG, most notably coups. The PSC for example invoked Article 7(1)(g) to suspend AU member states for 19 times. Only in two instance that the PSC withheld the automatic application of suspension (November 2014 on Burkina Faso & April 2019 on Sudan), underscoring that automatic suspension from participating in the AU upon the occurrence of UCG in a member state is the norm.
It is worth noting that this clarity and largely consistent application has significantly contributed to the decline of coups until their unprecedented upsurge in 2021. As established in our policy brief of May 2022 published ahead of the Malabo Summit, ‘until 2021, the trends in the occurrence of coups in Africa is largely characterized by decline, despite its sporadic occurrence in a range of one to two coups per year (in the years when it occurred).’ Prior to 2021 the maximum that Africa experienced a coup since 2000 was in 2003. Since then, there were a few years (2005, 2008 and 2012) when a maximum of two coups occurred, with several years passing without coups.
However, with the unprecedented number of coups in 2021/22, signs of doubt on upholding this established norm and practice on applying suspension has been observed on the part of policy makers (including some PSC members). It is however critical to resist any temptation to blame the lack of effectiveness during 2021/22 on the norm that may lead to the revision or the scraping of the normative automaticity of suspension and the dominant practice of applying it (throwing the baby with the bath water). Instead, attention should focus on whether there is weakening of the strong political commitment & wider public support for the AU norm of zero tolerance against coups. Indeed, although the lack of regard by coup perpetrators is mostly a product of national political power dynamics, this weakening of both political commitment in AU & wider public support for zero tolerance would not be without its contribution. Tomorrow’s session affords the PSC an opportunity for finding ways of strengthening strong political commitment within the AU (both on the part of member states and AU Commission) for upholding the principle of zero tolerance for coups irrespective of their origins.
Equally significant in restoring confidence in the principle of zero tolerance to coups and hence the automatic suspension of States upon occurrence of coups is to ensure that the enforcement of suspension for coups is backed by strong consensus within the AU and at the level of RECs/RMs with formidable backing from AU’s partners. The weaker the consensus among AU member states and between the AU and RECs and the divided the backing of the UN, EU and major powers, the less effective will suspension by AU & RECs/RMs against coups would be.
When it comes to enforcement measures other than suspension (namely diplomatic, territorial and economic sanctions), the major gap (other than the fact that the AU lacks the economic tools (such as those at the disposal of the EU) or (economic & military tools, at the disposal of the UN Security Council) both at the AU and RECs/RMs levels is the absence of a common framework on what kind of sanctions to be applied, under what circumstances, the mechanism for monitoring and the criteria for the lifting of such sanctions. On account of this, participants of the Accra Forum have undertaken to ensure the development of a ‘comprehensive framework establishing different categories of sanctions that may be gradually applied, upon the approval of the relevant AU policy organs, in accordance with the gravity of the violation or threat to the constitutional order.’ It is critical that the PSC uses tomorrow’s session for initiating a process for developing a framework for sanctions, which could also potentially serve as basis for reforming the UN’s sanctions regime, which has increasingly become under scrutiny.
Another important point that must form part of the discourse on imposition and enforcement of sanctions is ensuring protection of the rights and welfare of ordinary citizens of the concerned member State. Imposition of blanket economic and financial sanctions on member States or the closure of borders have had disastrous impacts on populations as multiple examples across the world stand to demonstrate. Mali’s recent experience has particularly invoked much concern and is among the factors that have informed the need to convene tomorrow’s session on sanctions. It is to be recalled that following the inability of Mali’s transition authorities to conduct elections by the timeline stipulated by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the regional bloc imposed sanctions against Mali at its Extraordinary Summit of 09 January 2022. At its 1057th session, the PSC also endorsed ECOWAS’s decision, albeit reluctantly and with a proviso on the need for ensuring that it does not affect the general public. The sanctions which carried measures such as closure of borders, suspension of economic and financial transactions and suspension of financial assistance, affected the country’s economy which has already been battered by insecurity and impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. As a result, the sanctions were felt more among ordinary citizens. The resultant public anger against the sanctions and ECOWAS contributed to the weakening of the efficacy of the sanctions.
One key lesson to draw from Mali’s experience is therefore the importance of making sanctions as specifically targeted as possible. In order to make sanctions impactful and avert negative implications on wider populations, they need to as much as possible be targeted against specific individuals and entities. So far, the PSC has dealt with UCG in various member States 23 times. Out of these, the Council imposed targeted sanctions only four times – at its 168th, 204th, 363rd and 551st sessions – while it merely resorted to suspension in all other cases. Equally important is the need for building into sanctions, well-crafted carve-out clauses that ensure that lifesaving activities such as provision of humanitarian assistance or access to life supporting supplies are not impeded.
Another critical area that has contributed to the lack of effectiveness of enforcement measures against UCG is the lack of consistent application. At one level this has to do with inconsistency in how the AU applied, for example, suspension. The seizure of power by the military in Chad by suspending the constitutional process is case in point. The failure of the PSC to apply the same measures it applied on Mali has led to legitimate charges of selective application and double standard of the norms. At another level, there is also the fact that the AU is more disposed to take measures against coups than other forms of unconstitutional changes of government outlined in the Lome Declaration of 2000 & ACDEG. Accordingly, it is of utmost importance that the AU develops a predictable process for taking measures against extension of term limits within the framework of Article 23(5) of ACDEG.
The role of various complementary measures is another essential consideration that should be taken into account while imposing sanctions. If the ultimate objective of restoring constitutional order is to be realised, enforcement measures (whether suspension and/or sanctions) need to be combined with parallel, complementary measures such as diplomatic engagement with the concerned member State and support to national dialogue. The need for diplomatic engagements with transition authorities should not however be regarded as a factor for dispensing with more serious measures such as suspensions. In this regard, the Lome Declaration of 2000 clearly requires that such diplomatic engagements are undertaken parallel to the suspension of the country concerned following UCG.
The outcome of the session is expected to be a Communiqué. Council may reaffirm the conclusions of the Accra Forum on strengthening the efficacy of enforcement measures and request that the measures outlined in this regard in the Accra Declaration are followed up and reports are submitted to the PSC within specified timelines. It may underscore the need for restoring the political commitment of the AU and other stakeholders in the principle of zero tolerance to coups and the automatic application of suspension upon the occurrence of UCG such as coups as a matter of principle. The PSC may also underscore the need for building strong consensus within the AU and among other stakeholders with the relevant leverage when considering and adopting enforcement measures. It may call on the AU Commission, in collaboration with RECs, to work towards the development of a comprehensive sanctions framework which illustrates relevant criteria and benchmarks for imposition, monitoring and lifting of sanctions. It may also urge the immediate activation of its Sanctions Committee which, supported by an expert body, could play an instrumental role in monitoring implementation of sanctions imposed by the Council and in assessing fulfilment of conditions for their lifting thereof. It may also reiterate the sentiment of the Accra Declaration on ensuring that sanctions do not harm the ordinary citizens of a non-complying member State. It may further highlight the importance of having clarity on the goals intended with sanctions so that they do not aggravate political disputes and the need to closely examine the humanitarian and human rights consequences of sanctions, particularly on countries experiencing overlapping governance, security and humanitarian crises.
Experience Sharing Session Between the PSC and AGA Platform Members
Experience Sharing Session Between the PSC and AGA Platform Members
Date | 11 August 2022
Tomorrow (11 August), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1098th session to hold an experience sharing session with the members of the African Governance Architecture (AGA) Platform.
The session will start with the opening remarks of the PSC Chairperson for August, Permanent Representative of the Gambia Jainaba Jagne, followed by remarks of the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye. The Chairperson for the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) Rémy Ngoy Lumbu will then deliver a statement as the Chairperson of the African Governance Platform (AGP). Other AGP members and representatives of UN Human Rights Council are also expected participate in the session.
This will be the first session between the PSC and the AGP. Hence the deliberations will aim at creating a deeper understanding of the Platform, the AGA and its synergy with the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The AGP which consists of about 19 human rights organs, bodies that have mandate of promoting and advancing governance, democratization and constitutionalism as well Regional Economic Communities (RECs), serves a coordination framework of various AGA initiatives. In 2021 the ACHPR was elected as a chairperson and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) as the vice chairperson of the AGP for a two-year term.
The AGA Platform, as an amalgam of various bodies including even the PSC itself, is a vague construct, with no specific legal raison d’etre. Its value lies in promoting synergy and coordination but as far as delivering substantive mandate is concerned it is a matter that lies in the mandate of each AGA Platform member. In terms of engagement with the PSC, it is worth mentioning that within the framework of Article 19 of the PSC Protocol and taking into account the mandate of the ACHPR in responding to human rights issues in conflict and crisis situations, the PSC and the ACHPR have institutionalized annual consultative meeting. This has been held annually since 2018 culminating in communiques that outlined rich modalities for close working relationship and addressing human rights issues in conflict and crisis situations. Similarly, the PSC has also received briefings from the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACERWC). These engagements have proved particularly useful both in terms of implementing specific provisions of the PSC and advancing implementation of the PSC mandate.
Tomorrow’s session is expected to build on, rather than dilute and displace, such existing engagements with individual members with a focus on the AGA Platform as a whole. The statement of the AGA Platform chair may include various elements. First it may provide an overview of the platform and its objectives. Second it is expected that the Chair of the AGP will brief the PSC on progress made on the implementation of joint flagship projects and programs within the AGA including the Youth Engagement Strategy (YES), Women Engagement Strategy (WES) and the annual High-Level Dialogue on Democracy, Human Rights and Governance which is convened under the auspices of the AGP.
For members of the PSC of particular significance is how the AGA Platform contributes to strengthening of its engagement with those that the PSC has established institutionalized working relationship and to facilitate implementation of the outcomes of those engagements for addressing the governance and human rights dimensions of its mandate in conflict prevention, management, resolution, post-conflict reconstruction and in dealing with unconstitutional changes of government.
In this regard the engagement is also very timely to discuss AU norms relating to countering unconstitutional changes of government, their application and their effectiveness in responding to the rising governance challenges. The PSC may recall its recommendations made during the Eight High-Level Seminar on Peace and Security in Africa, held in Oran, Algeria in December 2021, particularly with regards to the need to review the AGA and the 2000 Lomé Declaration on unconstitutional changes of government. The high-level seminar also tasked the AUC to undertake in-depth analysis of the 2000 Lomé Declaration on unconstitutional change of government and the AGA, to assess whether these frameworks and instruments respond appropriately to the challenges that Africa is currently confronted with. The AUC is also expected to submit the reviews to the PSC for consideration. This session may thus serve as an occasion for following up on these pending requests.
To enrich the experience sharing exercise, the PSC may recall the consultation it held with the Permanent Representative Committee (PRC) subcommittee on human rights, democracy and governance (HRDG) at its 1095th session on 1 August 2022. It can further reiterate the points highlighted during the session around enhancing partnership on election observation missions, the promotion of democracy on the continent and the provision of technical support to countries emerging from violent conflicts. In this regard, it is also expected that the AGP Chairperson will highlight ways of enhancing synergy with the PSC around conflict prevention through the promotion and sustenance of democracy, governance, and human rights in the continent.
Another key area that is expected to receive attention in tomorrow’s meeting is on exploring ways and means on how the PSC can support the implementation of recommendations made by members of the AGP at the national level and how the PSC can support the efforts of ratification and operationalization of AU Shared Values instruments. A number of decisions are formulated by the various members of the AGP. The session can further reflect on ways to further advance the development of a joint mechanism to follow on implementation of recommendations made by members of the AGP. Particularly, in support of the Platform members with human rights mandate, it would be of interest for tomorrow’s session to reflect on concrete steps towards strengthening human rights compliance framework to also ensure member states fulfill their responsibilities in implementing decisions of the various human rights treaty bodies.
As indicated in the concept note the experience sharing session will also take place in the presence of the two African vice chairpersons of the UN Human Rights Council. It is expected that their contribution will highlight areas of synergy with AGP including the PSC. Their intervention may afford participants to reflect on ways of engaging institutions and actors beyond the ones in the AU policy space and to have a deeper understanding of the experiences of other institutions that operate in a global policy environment.
The outcome of the session remains unknown. It is however expected that the PSC would welcome the work undertaken by the AGP. It may commend the work of the AGP and its members. It may highlight the importance of using the AGP as a useful forum for engaging in deeper reflections on selected issues, such as the dedicated reflection forum that the PSC held in March 2021 on unconstitutional changes of government. The PSC may express its commitment to support the growth of the partnership through joint programs and initiatives that aim at advancing democratic values and the respect and promotion of human rights. Council may further reiterate the importance of collective efforts in advancing these values to also strengthen early response and conflict prevention mechanisms. The PSC may underline the important role of AGP in enhancing synergy between AGA and APSA. It may also underscore the importance of the institutionalized engagement it has established with individual members of the AGP and call on the AGP to facilitate follow up of the outcome of those engagements.
Emerging technologies and new media: Impact on democratic governance, peace and security in Africa
Emerging technologies and new media: Impact on democratic governance, peace and security in Africa
Date | 04 August 2022
Tomorrow (04 August), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will hold its 1097th session on a relatively new thematic issue on “Emerging technologies and new media: Impact on democratic governance, peace and security in Africa”.
Following opening remarks of the Permanent Representative of The Gambia to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for the month, Jainaba Jagne, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye is expected to make a statement. The Director of the AU Commission Department of Infrastructure and Energy, representative of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and expert on emerging technologies, Thompson Chengeta, will deliver presentations. Representatives of Amani Africa and Institute for Security Studies (ISS) are also expected to make intervention.
While the PSC discussed specific issues relating to emerging technologies and new media, this is the first time that the Council has a dedicated session on emerging technologies and new media in general, with a focus on their impact on democratic governance and peace and security in Africa. This strategically important session helps the PSC to grapple with a theme whose ramifications and significance have been expanding at a pace that continues to widen the gulf between the rate of change of these technologies and media and the response of policy makers.
The use of emerging technologies and new media including access to the internet and mobile technology continue to contribute positively to democratic governance and the promotion of peace and security in Africa, as in other parts of the world. For example, drones have improved the way healthcare is provided in Rwanda as they are being used to deliver blood in remote areas, thus enhancing access by overcoming geographic limitations. Mobile phones and social media also present opportunities to empower citizens and transform their relationship with the state. Real-time photos and videos uploaded to social media can expose government corruption or abuse and increase government responsiveness to citizen concerns. These technologies have also revolutionized people’s ability to organize and coordinate protest movements as well as electoral campaigns.
A case in point is the 2016 elections in the Gambia. According to one study, 92% of people interviewed believed that social media played the most role compared to traditional media. Especially, they affirmed that social media platforms such as WhatsApp or Facebook allowed the population to receive and spread information, even when the then incumbent government closed the access to the Internet. Furthermore, social media allowed locals to get in contact with Gambians living abroad. The interviewees affirmed that WhatsApp and Facebook ‘dominated the transmission of ideas’ and were able to ‘educate a larger number of people about the necessity of change’. In Mali, the mobile application ‘MonElu’ has been utilized as a medium to strengthen citizen participation in governance by facilitating dialogue with elected officials and in the process increasing accountability to citizens. In Kenya, Kenyan civil society successfully deployed crowd-sourcing technologies (Ushahidi) to map out the unfolding post-election violence in the country in 2008 election.
Council has taken note of the contribution of new media in various at its various sessions including the 589th, 791st and 1062nd sessions convened under the theme of “Elections in Africa”. For example, at its 1062nd session it stressed ‘the important role of … responsible media, both print and electronic, in electoral processes and encouraged these entities to always contribute more positively towards promoting the integrity and credibility of elections and maintenance of peace and stability in Member States, especially by promoting civic education and accurate public information, as well as refraining from inflammatory reporting and miscommunication that may incite violence.’
In terms of the role of new technologies for promoting clean elections and limiting the rigging of elections, there is a need for identifying optimal conditions under which technologies contribute for enhancing the confidence of the electorate in the role of elections for advancing democratic governance in Africa. This is also important in terms of strengthening the quality of AU election monitoring through the use of relevant technologies and new media both for planning and conducting the election monitoring work of the AU.
In terms of positive contribution of emerging technologies for peace and security, the use of these technologies helps in timely exposing risks of violence and crises thereby strengthening early warning capabilities. Increasing use of these technologies by conflict actors also mean that it has increasingly become possible to establish the positions, motivations and movement of conflict actors, thereby enabling the planning of informed policy responses and mediation and peace-making efforts. The use of these technologies in peace processes has not only enabled mediators and peace support operations to have strong situational awareness, but to also engage in public diplomacy. These technologies also contribute to enhancing the legitimacy of peace processes by enabling engagement with various stakeholders. Admittedly, the extent to which AU peace processes, whether in mediation or in peace support operations, are able to harness these positive contribution of these technologies depend on their possession of the requisite skills and capabilities for using these technologies for such ends.
In the light of the foregoing, one issue that would be of interest to the PSC is the need for examining the current state of how AU and Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) peace processes are using and harnessing the potentials of emerging technologies and new media for their work in conflict management and resolution.
It is clear from the foregoing that emerging technologies and new media have significant actual and potential contribution for the achievement of AU’s Agenda 2063 broadly and those relating to democratic governance and peace and security in particular. But the optimization of their current contributions and the harnessing of their enormous potentials depends on expanding access to these technologies and the technical know-how of and digital literacy for various areas of public life.
Emerging technologies and new media are not however without peril. Indeed, previous engagements of the PSC and recent and current experiences illustrate the adverse impacts of emerging technologies and new media in Africa.
Internet and social media platforms have been misused for spreading misinformation and inciting violence, particularly during election periods, undermining democratic processes and imposing serious risk to peace and security. In this regard, Council’s 653rd and 713th sessions have been particularly critical in drawing attention to the abuse and misuse of the media space by some political actors, which has the impact of undermining the credibility of electoral processes. A relatively newer trend Council may wish to note at tomorrow’s session is also the manipulation of algorisms by social media platforms to shape perceptions of people during elections, with the core purpose of precipitating artificially engineered electoral outcomes.
Aside from the context of elections, the more general abuse of media space for spread of hate speech and incitement of violence has also been a matter of serious concern in the continent. For example, in cases where it is difficult to trace the individual(s) or group(s) engaged in disinformation or misinformation operations, the distribution of content, such as images, memes, videos, and even voice messages, leads to a high level of violence among communities. In Nigeria, images of corpses in mass graves were used to fuel animosity between the Fulani Muslims and Berom Christians, which resulted in violence and killing. The perilous use of these technologies is something that the PSC has addressed, particularly in the context of its thematic agenda on hate crimes and prevention of genocide. At its 761st session for example where Council highlighted how the misuse of social media has the potential of escalating the ideology of hate and genocide and how the abuse of media space can disrupt social cohesion and endanger national unity, it urged member States to set up mechanisms for monitoring the use of media.
The use of new technologies for surveillance and disinformation by state actors has also become a major source of concern as it dampness the positive contribution of these technologies and new media by exposing people with dissenting voices to serious peril. The 2020 titled a roadmap for digital cooperation noted, ‘new technologies are too often used for surveillance, repression, censorship and online harassment’ and that ‘greater efforts are needed to develop further guidance on how human rights standards apply in the digital age.’ The PSC may in this regard welcome the initiative of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ under its resolution 473 on artificial intelligence, robotics and other new and emerging technologies.
Council’s 850th session addressing the theme of “Cyber Security” has highlighted the ‘importance of a safe and secure cyber space for reaping the dividends of digital transformation of Africa’. On the adverse side, a number of PSC’s sessions on terrorism and violent extremism have expressed concern over the growing use of technologies and media by terrorist groups. In addition to emphasising the concerning use of technologies such as UAVs by terrorist groups, as well as the manipulation of internet for purposes of radicalisation and recruitment, it is also important for Council to reflect on the use of new technologies in armed conflicts and the impact thereof. In recent years, the demand for military drones in Africa has significantly been on the rise, driven by a growing number of internal conflicts and counter-terrorism operations. Libya for instance is often even called the world’s largest ‘drone war theatre’, with multiple countries supporting one of the warring parties militarily in the civil war through the delivery of drones. France is deploying armed drones in the Sahel region against militants in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, and both US and French air strikes in Africa are notorious for injuring and killing civilians, often without any transparency or accountability regarding civilian casualties.
According to the latest drone study reports, African countries have also increasingly acquired and used (armed) drones themselves in their fights against armed groups. At the same time, armed groups are increasingly putting effort into weaponizing small commercial drones, turning these into surveillance and combat drones, of which Boko Haram is a primary example. These developments make clear that military drones have become an essential tool for armed forces in their operations, but that their use gives rise to questions about clear legal norms, wider military-strategic considerations and improved export controls.
The expected outcome of the session is a Communiqué. Council may recognize the enormous contribution and potential of emerging technologies and new media in addressing the socio-economic, governance and peace and security challenges and for the implementation of AU’s Agenda 2063. It may call for the imperative for enhancing Africa’s participation both in the development of and access to emerging technologies and use of new media for the advancement of the wellbeing of the people of the continent. It may express concerns about the threats posed by actors that use emerging technologies to disseminate malicious online contents that diminish trust for democratic governance. The Council may call for the development of regulatory framework for ensuring that technology firms strengthen their supervisory mechanisms to prevent the use of their technologies for destructive purposes. It may request for greater collaboration between member States, RECs/RMs, the AU Commission, and the Private Sector in promoting the development and responsible use of emerging technologies and new media. Having regard to upcoming elections in the continent, particularly Kenya’s general elections scheduled to take place 09 August, Council may also urge all relevant stakeholder to refrain from misuse of new media and task the AU election observers to pay particular attention to the impact of new media with a view to propose ways of more effectively addressing the increasing adverse use to which new media and technologies are used in tampering electoral processes. It may also call on member States to ensure respect of human rights and international humanitarian law (IHL) standards in their use of new technologies including weapons such as battle drones and UAVs.
Updated briefing on the situation in the Horn of Africa
Updated briefing on the situation in the Horn of Africa
Date | 04 August 2022
Tomorrow (4 August), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1097th session for an updated briefing on the situation in the Horn of Africa.
The PSC Chairperson for August, The Gambia’s Permanent Representative to the AU, Jainaba Jagne, is expected to start the session with an opening remark. AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, is also expected to make statement. AU Representative for the Horn of Africa, Olusegun Obasanjo, is expected to deliver an updated briefing on the situation in Ethiopia and his activities since the last meeting of the PSC. The representatives of Ethiopia, as a concerned country, and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) are also expected to deliver statements through their representatives.
The last time the High Representative addressed the Council on the situation was during its 1064th session held on 10 February. It is to be recalled that a briefing session was planned to take place on 4 May and then on 5 July but both sessions were later canceled. Tomorrow’s briefing would provide update on the activities of the High Representative since his last briefing in February and overall developments regarding the situation in the country.
One of the major developments Obasanjo is likely to highlight is the 24 March declaration of an ‘indefinite humanitarian truce effective immediately’ by the government of Ethiopia. This was reciprocated by the Regional Government of Tigray expressing their commitment to respect the truce and cessation of hostilities provided that humanitarian assistance is delivered adequately and timely. Regional and international actors including AU, UN, and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) also welcomed the said truce. The Chairperson of the Commission, in a statement issued on 25 March, welcoming the truce, stated that he ‘continues to advocate for a negotiated permanent comprehensive ceasefire.’ The 25 March statement by UN Secretary-General, António Guterres, also commended the humanitarian truce while stressing that the positive development should ‘translate into immediate improvements on the ground’. Guterres further urged for the ‘restoration of public services in Tigray, including banking, electricity and telecommunications’ and for all sides to ‘enable and facilitate the delivery of desperately needed humanitarian assistance across all affected areas’.
PSC members may be interested to hear about the state of the implementation of the declared truce and how far it moved the needle on the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Northern Ethiopia, particularly Tigray. The first humanitarian convoy of 20 trucks since mid-December arrived in Tigray through the Semera-Abala-Mekelle route a week after the declaration of the truce on 1 and 2 April.
On the activities he carried out, Obasanjo is expected to brief the Council about the outcome of his interaction with the Federal Government and the leadership of the Tigray region in late May and early June. During his media engagement on 1 June, Obasanjo told BBC Focus on Africa that the peace process was progressing ‘very slowly but steadily’. Indeed, the ‘truce’, though fragile, has continued to hold. While highlighting next steps, Obasanjo is likely to point out his expectations that the truce would translate into a negotiated ceasefire, paving the way for peace talks for a comprehensive political agreement for the full resolution of the conflict.
Both sides have reaffirmed their commitment to the peaceful resolution of the conflict. The government announced the establishment of a seven-member committee for the peace talk. On the other side, the President of the regional government of Tigray in an open letter he issued on 13 June expressed readiness to participate in a ‘credible, impartial, and principled peace process’. But, the same letter also raised concern that ‘the proximity of the High Representative to the Prime Minster of Ethiopia has not gone unnoticed by our people’. On 18 July, the regional state also reportedly set up a team of negotiators for the talks with the federal government. There is apparently disagreement between the two parties on who should lead the negotiation – the federal government wants the peace talk to be held under the auspice of the AU while Tigray regional state prefers peace talks facilitated by Kenya with the support of international partners, including US, EU, UAE, UN, and the AU. There are reports that peace talks may start soon in Kenya. In this respect, members of the PSC may seek from Obasanjo on the level of preparations for the start of the talks and ways of addressing the deficit of trust undermining progress for starting peace talks.
On the security front, the situation remains relatively calm, although tense and volatile. In May, clashes were reported between Tigray forces and Eritrea though it did not worsen into a full blown conflict. The leaderships in Tigray and the federal government have also continued trading accusations of mobilization of forces, raising the spectre of renewed conflict.
During his last engagement with the PSC, Obasanjo stated that ‘we …continue to call on all parties to fully withdraw from occupied territories and to return to their original positions…in order to lay the foundation for the commencement of dialogue and negotiations.’ On 12 April, the authorities in Tigray announced the withdrawal of their forces from Erebti, in the Afar region. Subsequently, they also announced the withdrawal of all their forces from Afar and declared their expectations for unhindered delivery of humanitarian aid into Tigray. One territory that remains major site of contention from which Tigray forces call for withdrawal of forces that seized the region since the start of the war is Western Tigray.
Obasanjo’s briefing is also expected to touch on the humanitarian situation in the northern part of the country. In this connection, the High Representative may highlight the relative increase of aid deliveries to Tigray region following the humanitarian truce. According to OCHA’s 22 July situation report, ‘in Tigray Region, since the resumption of humanitarian convoy movement on 1 April, and as of 19 July, 4,308 trucks have arrived in Mekelle via Afar through 30 humanitarian convoys.’ The convoy movement also included 1,081,155 liters of fuel, though partners requires 2 million litres each month. Although the government rejected it as ‘myth’, an EU official who visited Tigray pointed out that shortage of fuel is preventing the delivery of much-needed humanitarian aid. In a press conference after the meeting of the Council of the EU, Joseph Borrrel, High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, told reporters that progress made ‘not enough for full normalization of relations’ and underscored the need for ‘restoring basic services in Tigray and lifting restrictions on fuel and fertilizers…to save millions of people from death.’ Given that this is also a farming season, Obasanjo may also touch on the need for ensuring that fertilizers and other farm inputs are promptly released and availed to farmers.
Despite progress in aid delivery, the humanitarian situation in the northern part of the country remains alarming with high levels of food insecurity and malnutrition. The 27 June OCHA humanitarian update indicates that the number of people in need of food assistance in northern Ethiopia has increased from 9 million in November of last year to more than 13 million people, of which 4.8 million in Tigray, 1.2 million in Afar and over 7 million in Amhara regional states. The other issue that the High Representative may also touch on is the non-resumption of basic services such as banking, electricity, telecommunication. In his last briefing on 10 February, he pointed out that ‘the continued limitations in access to essential services is worsening the dire humanitarian situation in Tigray and other areas directly affected by the conflict.’ He went on to tell the PSC that ‘[w]e should collectively continue to urge the Federal Government to lift the blockade and restore services as critical confidence-building measures.’
The other issue that Obasanjo touched on from his last briefing was release of prisoners. It is to be recalled that Tigray forces reportedly announced the release of over 4000 prisoners of war, while it is reported that a few thousands more remain in prison in Tigray. In a statement it issued on 30 June, Ethiopian Human Rights Commission report called for the immediate release of 8560 Tigrians held in two camps in Afar region noting that they ‘are detained illegally and arbitrarily based on their ethnic identity.’
It is to be recalled that no outcome document by way of communique or press statement came out of the previous sessions including the previous 1064th session during which the High Representative briefed the Council. This time, the PSC may issue a communique. The PSC may recognize the humanitarian truce as an encouraging development towards addressing the dire humanitarian situation in the north, but at the same time, express concern over the prevailing gap between the humanitarian needs on the ground and the level and pace of delivery of aid so far. In this respect, members of the Council may appeal to all parties to ensure that the humanitarian truce holds and act in good faith to allow flow of aid commensurate with the needs on the ground including by creating conditions such as increased access to fuel that enable humanitarian actors to execute emergency relief efforts. The PSC may also reiterate Obasanjo’s call from his February briefing for release of all political prisoners and prisoners of war. Members of the Council may also stress on the importance of building on the humanitarian truce and reiterate the call made by the High Representative during his February briefing for the restoration of disconnected social services including telecommunication, banking and electricity and urgent distribution of fertilizers and other farm inputs for farmers. The PSC may also recognize as positive step withdrawal of Tigray forces from Afar and may reiterate the call Obasanjo made in February for ‘all parties to fully withdraw from occupied territories and to return to their original positions.’ On security and peace process front, while welcoming the fact that the truce the parties declared is holding, PSC may request that further steps are taken towards negotiating permanent ceasefire and peace agreement. It may encourage the parties to build on the pronouncements they made expressing their commitment for starting peace talks.