Ministerial session on the situation in Somalia and operations of ATMIS
Ministerial session on the situation in Somalia and operations of ATMIS
Date | 27 July 2022
Tomorrow (27 July), African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1094th session at ministerial level to consider the situation in Somalia and operations of the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS).
The session will start with the opening remarks of the PSC Chairperson for July, Djibouti’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, followed by remarks of the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye. PSC is then expected to receive a briefing by the Interim Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission (SRCC) for Somalia and Head of ATMIS, Ms. Fiona Lortan. As a country of concern, the representative of Somalia is also expected to make statements. In addition, the representatives of Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), as well as United Kingdom (UK) may deliver statements.
The session is expected to take stock of recent developments in Somalia and the progress made in the implementation of the mandates of ATMIS as envisaged in PSC communique 1068 (2022) and UN Security Council Resolution 2628 (2022), which authorized the new mission. This will be the third time for the PSC to discuss ATMIS since the Mission’s launch on 1 April 2022. It is to be recalled that PSC decided the reconfiguration of AMISOM into ATMIS during its 1068th session held on 8 March 2022. Tomorrow’s session is also convened within the framework of the PSC’s request in the communiqué of its 1068th session for the Chairperson of the AU Commission (AUC) to submit quarterly reports on the implementation of ATMIS mandate, including the steps taken by the FGS and international partners in implementing the new Concept of Operations (CONOPs). The session also comes at the backdrop of Council’s field mission to Somalia that took place from 19 to 22 July. As such, the session will greatly benefit from the delegation’s assessment of the situation on the ground and the outcomes of its engagement with various stakeholders.
On the situation in Somalia, the conclusion of the protracted parliamentary and presidential elections is one of the political developments since PSC’s last session that will receive attention during tomorrow’s session. On 15 May, the electoral process culminated in the election as President of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, who served as Somalia’s President between 2012 and 2017, defeating the incumbent, Mohamed Abdullahi ‘Farmajo’. On 16 May, AUC Chairperson, Moussa Faki Mahamat, welcomed the outcome of the election, noting the crucial role played by the Somalia Security Forces (SSF) and ATMIS to guarantee security for the election processes. In a statement issued by his Spokesperson on 16 May welcoming the conclusion of the election, UN Secretary-General (SG) António Guterres expressed his hope that ‘the new president would move swiftly to form an inclusive Cabinet, and that the new Government and federal member states will work closely together to advance critical national priorities and address the challenges Somalia faces.’
During his inaugural address on 9 June, President Mohamud outlined that national reconciliation, improving relations between the central Government and federal member states, addressing the security threat from Al-Shabaab, and attending the dire drought conditions are among his national priorities. Given the difficulties the AU mission faced in the relationship with the previous administration, for the PSC maintaining a healthy relationship with the host country authorities would be of interest, considering in particular the dependence of the execution of the mandate and timeline of ATMIS on the cooperation of the FGS. On 16 July, Interim Head of ATMIS, Lortan, along with ATMIS Force Commander, met with Somalia’s new Prime Minister, Hamza Abdi Barre for fostering close relationship. During PSC’s field visit on 19-22 July, Prime Minister Barre, expressed commitment for ‘closer collaboration and effective coordination with ATMIS and the AU PSC.’
In the light of President Mohamud’s priorities particularly that of national reconciliation, a key process of the constitution of the new government being followed with interest is the composition of the new cabinet, as hinted in Guterres’s statement mentioned above. On 25 June, the Parliament approved Hamza Abdi Barre as new Prime Minster. Although he had a 30 days period until 25 July to announce cabinet, Prime Minister Barre requested for extension and Parliament gave him 10 more days to form the government.
On the security front, Al Shabaab has continued wreaking havoc even after the reconfiguration of AMISOM into ATMIS. In his 13 May report on the situation in Somalia, covering the period between 1 February and 6 May, Guterres noted an increase in Al Shabaab attacks where 236 security incidents were recorded, most of which were attributed to the terrorist group. Apart from its infiltration in and attack on the ATMIS base camp in Mogadishu in late March, it orchestrated one of the deadliest attacks on AU Mission targeting the ATMIS base in Middle Shabele region that killed several forces of the Burundian contingent. Highlighting the terror group’s regional ambition and willingness to exploit real or perceived fragilities, on 21 July, the group crossed into the Somali region of Ethiopia and suffered loss after several days of fighting. On 21 July, during the interaction between PSC members and Prime Minister Barre as part of the field mission, the later expressed the determination of the government to ‘launch a forceful and comprehensive fight to counter Al-Shabaab, ISIS and other terrorist organizations through military and non-military means.’
On the implementation of ATMIS mandate, tomorrow’s session may focus on three issues. The first is how reconfiguration of ATMIS is unfolding as key component of Phase I of ATMIS mandate, critical to creating the offensive and agile posture of the mission. Efforts are underway to generate mobile forces to conduct targeted offensive against Al Shabaab and to increase engagement with the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) to enhance their Counter-IED capabilities. As part of the reconfiguration, ATMIS has started rolling out various joint operations with the SSF against Al Shabaab and other armed groups. Yet despite the plan as part of Phase I of the CONOPs, to handover or collapse two to three FOBs per sector (total of 12 to 18 FOBs), only two FOBs (20% of the plan) have been collapsed so far. The FGS has as yet to formulate plan on how to proceed with the taking over or collapsing of FOBs. Of interest to the Council is also progress made in strengthening the command-and-control structure of the mission.
The other is the capacity of the SSF to gradually assume full responsibility based on the force generation benchmarks as envisaged in the ATMIS CONOPs. Accordingly, when ATMIS drawdowns 2000 troops at the end of phase I by December 2022, the FGS is expected to generate 3,850 security forces (more details in Amani Africa’s Monthly digest for March). As the Deputy SRSC observed in a recent interview with a newspaper, ‘despite over a decade of training, we still haven’t reached a point where we have sufficient Somali forces to be able to take control’. She further stated that the mission ‘can only succeed if the government is a viable partner. … This has been the missing link.’ Prime Minister Barre assured the PSC during its field visit that this will change, expressing the full commitment of the government of Somalia to developing the capacity of its security institutions to take over completely security responsibilities from ATMIS by December 2024.
The third key issue is about the financial and logistical support provided to ATMIS as well as the SSF. The PSC highlighted the necessity of predictable, adequate, and sustainable financing for ATMIS at its 1075th session that took place on 12 April. Although the funding shortfall of ATMIS has come down, the mission has a deficit of 70 million USD, which is one of the issues to be discussed in the session, including with partners, such as the UK, expected to propose. In a recent ATMIS-UN Support Office to Somalia (UNSOS) meeting, ATMIS Force Commander Lt. Gen. Diomede Ndegeya emphasized that ‘to maintain a military advantage over Al-Shabaab, … the mission requires efficient acquisition, supply, and delivery of critical material during combat operations.’ The PSC at its 1068th session requested the UN to realign UN Logistics Support with the new CONOPs. During the deliberation between ATMIS and UNSOS that took place earlier this month to align the logistical support the mission receives in line with the new CONOPs, the Head of UNSOS, Assistant Secretary General Lisa Filipetto, indicated that ‘plans are underway to decentralize logistics to the ATMIS sectors to facilitate quick response and provide better support for troop mobile operations.’ How this would be followed up and the pace of such follow up would be of interest to PSC members.
The other issue deserving PSC’s attention is the grim humanitarian situation in Somalia, marked by one of the worst droughts in the country in at least four decades. The four consecutive failed rainy seasons, food price spikes, and underfunded humanitarian response has left 7.1 million Somalis, close to 50 % of the population, facing crisis-level food insecurity or worse, according to a statement issued by the Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia on 7 June. Humanitarian agencies have already raised the alarm over the risk of famine. Despite the ‘dire and grim’ situation, the funding for this year’s Humanitarian Response Plan for Somalia remains low at 15.7 % as of 20 May. The recent uptick of violence by Al Shabaab remains the other major impediment to address the situation.
The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communique. The PSC may welcome the successful conclusion of the elections in Somalia and the peaceful transfer of power to newly elected President Mohamud. Also welcoming the priorities that the new President announced during his inauguration, the PSC may urge the government to focus on mobilizing its efforts in delivering on these priorities and avail AU’s full support in this respect. Council is expected to condemn Al Shabaab’s increased deadly attacks, including its recent attacks inside the Somali region of Ethiopia, and to underscore the need for a more robust collective effort at addressing the threat posed by the terror group. Considering the scale of the humanitarian crisis, created by the drought affecting Somalia, the PSC may call on the AU, working with IGAD, to initiate measures for supporting Somalia, while appealing to international partners to redouble the humanitarian assistance to avoid famine in the country. Regarding ATMIS, Council may welcome the commitment of FGS to closely work with ATMIS and UNSOS’s plan to align the logistical support that the mission receives in line with the CONOPs, and the unanimous adoption of UN Security Council resolution 2632 that extended the mandate of UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) until 31 October. Echoing its 1075th session, Council may emphasize the imperative of predictable funding and logistical support attuned to force mobility for the success of ATMIS, and may call on the partners to help address the funding deficit including through UN assessed contributions. In relation to strengthening the capacity of Somalia security forces, Council may reiterate its call on the FGS to ‘meet its commitments towards achieving the benchmarks and timelines’ as outlined in the CONOPs by capacitating SSF and strengthening local security & law and order institutions.
Briefing on the situation in Central African Republic and Operation of MOUACA
Briefing on the situation in Central African Republic and Operation of MOUACA
Date | 25 July 2022
Tomorrow (25 July) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1093rd session to consider the situation in Central African Republic (CAR), with a focus on the operation of AU Military Observers Mission to CAR (MOUACA).
Following opening remarks by Abdi Mahamoud Eybe, Permanent Representative of Djibouti to the AU and Chairperson of the Council for the month of July, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security is expected to deliver a statement. Ambassador Bertino Matias Matondo, Special Representative of the AU Chairperson (SRCC) for CAR and representative of the Economic Community of the Central African States (ECCAS) are also expected to deliver statements. The representative of CAR is also expected to make a statement as a concerned country. Representatives of the Multidimensional Integrated Mission for the Stabilization of CAR (MINUSCA) and the European Union (EU) are also expected to make statements.
It has been a year since the Council convened a dedicated session on CAR despite the request made at its 936th session, for the AU Commission to provide regular reports, at least every three months, on the implementation of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in CAR (PAPR-CAR). It is to be recalled that the last time the PSC met to discuss CAR was at its 1011th meeting held on 21 July 2021, where the Council considered the report of its field mission to CAR conducted from 27 June to 01 July. The field mission took place after the holding of the presidential and legislative elections that were marred by violence and contention.
Tomorrow’s session will address two broad issues. The first of this is the state of the situation in the CAR. Indeed, considering the fact that the PSC did not consider the situation for a year, tomorrow’s session affords the opportunity to review developments in the situation in the CAR since its last engagement in the context of its field mission. The second issue that tomorrow’s session will address concerns AU’s role in supporting peace and security in the CAR, including the status and operation of the MOUACA.
In terms of the situation in the CAR, it is to be recalled that one of the major challenges that the PAPR -CAR has faced has been the return of some of the armed groups to fighting and the emergence of new armed groups in the context of and after the elections of December 2020 that were marred by violence. After the establishment of the Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC) in December 2020, an umbrella body of six armed groups (also signatories of the peace agreement) with strong backing from former President François Bozizé, the CAR has plunged into violent conflicts, as the CPS launched attacks capturing territories in parts of the country. In the course of 2021, three trends emerged in terms of the response of the government established after the December 2020 elections. The first trend involves the launching by national defense forces of a military offensive, with support from foreign troops deployed on bilateral arrangements, against the various armed rebel groups. Although not successful in substantially reversing and containing the armed rebel groups, the offensive became one of the factors in weakening of the armed rebel groups including the CPC.
However, the military operation and the fighting involving armed rebel groups have led to reports of violations against civilians, further exacerbating the suffering of ordinary people. According to the latest report of the United Nation Secretary-General on CAR, as of June 2022, 374 security violation have been recorded. The majority of the 374 violations were targeted at civilians (284), followed by violations related to restrictions of movement (41), illegal military activities (31) and obstruction of State institutions, humanitarian organizations or the United Nations (18). Anti-personnel mines and other explosive weapons against civilians is another challenge in the country. For the PSC, one of the issues of particular importance is the need for military operations to comply with AU norms on the protection of civilians and respect for human rights and international humanitarian law.
The second trend involves the mobilization of regional engagement and support for the peace process in the CAR. This involved the adoption by the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) of a road map at a meeting of the ICGLR held in September 2021. The joint road map the ICGLR leaders adopted to revitalize the peace process, among others, called for the declaration of a ceasefire by the Government and reaffirmed the continued consultations of the Heads of State and Government of ICGLR with leaders of the armed groups for a total renunciation of violence. This led to the announcement by CAR President in October 2021 of a unilateral ceasefire. Considering the contribution of the Luanda Roadmap for peace in CAR and the need for ensuring complementary implementation with the PAPR -CAR, a strategic review was launched by the President with a view to combine the implementation of the PAPR-CAR with the Luanda Roadmap. Subsequently, on 15 July the 8th meeting of the Strategic Committee on Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration and Repatriation/Security Sector Reform and National Reconciliation adopted a decision for the establishment of a coordination mechanism chaired by the Prime Minister and Head of Government.
The third trend relates to efforts for peace and reconciliation in the country. Parallel to the military offensive, President Faustin Archange Touadera launched the Republican Dialogue in an attempt to breathe some life into the peace process. Following the establishment of the organizing committee for a republican dialogue in June 2021, the dialogue was inaugurated on 1 September 2021. While the CPC affiliated armed groups were excluded, the dialogue brought together various political and security actors. Yet, progress in undertaking the republican dialogue has been slow and marred by contentions over inclusivity and withdrawals of key stakeholders from the process. Thus, despite the convening of the dialogue from 21 to 27 March 2022, several opposition groups and parties announced their withdrawal from the dialogue. Notwithstanding the resultant fragmentation and contentions surrounding the dialogue including the attempt of the members of the President’s party to have a proposal removing the two-term limit of the president removed from the Constitution included as part of the recommendations of the dialogue, the final report of the republican dialogue, which included 217 recommendations, was submitted to the President on 19 April. Subsequently, a presidential decree on the establishment of the committee for implementation and monitoring of the recommendations of the dialogue has been published. For members of the PSC, a major issue of importance is the need for achieving consensus among the major political and social forces in the country on the recommendations if the dialogue is to achieve the objectives of national reconciliation and consolidating peace.
Overall, these various developments removed attention for much of 2021 and early 2022 away from the PAPR-CAR. The UN in its various reports highlighted that implementation of the Political Agreement registered marginal progress. Some progress has been registered during 2021 particularly in the areas of disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation and continuing efforts to operationalize the special mixed security units. Progress was also observed in the area of the socioeconomic provisions of the Agreement, with the development of a toolbox with support from World Bank for monitoring the implementation of projects related to the National Plan for Recovery and Peacebuilding Plan, including the delivery of peace dividends. In August 2021, the 11th session of the PAPR-CAR Executive Monitoring Committee (EMC) was held and resolved to hold the meeting every three months, to set up a coordination unit of the PAPR-CAR. Subsequently, the EMC held its 12th and 13th sessions on 14 February and 25 May 2022 respectively, which among others, highlighted the need for establishment of consultation mechanism for the implementation of the PAPR-CAR and Luanda Roadmap.
It is worth noting that global geopolitical tensions have found expression in the CAR. This is particularly associated with the presence of Russian forces. In this context, CAR has come to suffer some consequences of the mobilization of sanctions and other diplomatic measures against Russia after its invasion of Ukraine, notably in terms of suspension or delay in delivery of aids and support to the country.
The second aspect of tomorrow’s session will focus on the role of the AU on the ground. This relates to both the AU Liaison Office in CAR and MOUACA. Despite its continued efforts to ensure effective engagement of the AU on the ground, the AU Liaison Office in Bangui faces serious financial and human resource constraints which continue to hamper its functioning, a point well emphasized by the PSC at its 1011th session. It is also to be recalled that the AU, the main guarantor of the PAPR-CAR, deployed MOUACA, to support and monitor the implementation of the PAPR-CAR. It is to be recalled that, the PSC at its 936th session held in July 2020, authorized MOUACA and endorsed the operation for the period from 1 September 2020 to 31 October 2022. Despite the fact that the challenges in the theatre of operation led to the reduction of the initial force size of 49 military officers of MOUACA to 34, realizing the operationalization of the mission proved difficult. It was reported that this was on account of challenges relating to modalities in how finances are released, COVID-19, the dependence of MOUACA on receiving protection from CAR forces and logistical and security issues affecting the construction and servicing of sites for housing MOUACA as well as lack of support from MONUSCO.
MOUACA’s deployment was based on funds from the European Peace Facility (EPF) and the current funding for MOUACA is envisaged to run until 31 July 2022. The lack of progress in the effective operationalization of MOUACA and the limited amount of funds absorbed by the mission have raised major question mark on the chances of extension of the EPF funding to MOUACA. It would thus be of particular importance for members of the PSC to know the measures that can be implemented for ensuring both the effective operationalization of MOUACA and the extension by the EU of the EPF funding beyond 31 July.
The other issue expected to receive attention during tomorrow’s session is the lifting of the arms embargo imposed on CAR by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The embargo has since 2013 been extended regularly and is currently in force until 31 July 2022. In this regard, the PSC underscored in the Communiqué of its 1011th session, the need for the lifting of the arms embargo to enable the country to build the required capacity of the CAR defence and security forces, in order to enable them to more effectively discharge their constitutional mandate of defending the country. Similarly, at the UNSC meeting held on 22 June 2022 on CAR, Gabon on the behalf of the A3 echoed the need to lift arm embargo and call for international support for CAR Government efforts to strengthen its management system for weapons and munitions.
The PSC in tomorrow’s meeting might also be keen to receive an update on the state of the preparations for local elections, initially expected to be held in September 2022 for the first time in more than 30 years. On 16 March, the National Electoral Authority announced the postponement of the first round of local elections, scheduled for September 2022 owing to a lack of resources and the delay in the adoption of the law on the delimitation of administrative districts. Similarly, the humanitarian situation in the CAR, exacerbated by the volatile security situation and incidents of violations and fighting, will also received attention during tomorrow’s session.
The expected outcome of the session is a Communiqué. The PSC may pay tribute to ECCAS, ICGLR, MINUSCA and other international stakeholders for their steadfast efforts to promote peace and reconciliation in CAR. The PSC may welcome the Luanda Roadmap and reaffirm the PAPR-CAR as the only peace framework and the Joint Roadmap being the vehicle for revitalizing its implementation on the basis of the coordination mechanism chaired by the Prime Minister. The PSC may express its concern over the recent flare-up of security tension and express its concern over the deteriorating humanitarian situation. The PSC may also condemn the CPC’s action on targeted attacks against civilians and MINUSCA which amount to deliberate violations of human rights, war crimes and crimes against humanity and complete violation of commitments made by CPC while signing of the PAPR-CAR. It may urge all security forces to fully observe and comply with standards and measures for protection of civilians and ensuring respect for human rights and international humanitarian law (IHL) and call on CAR to put in place an independent mechanism for monitoring and investigating reports of violations of human rights and IHL by security forces operating in its territory. The PSC may urge the armed rebel groups to abide faithfully by the commitments made in the PAPR- CAR and ensure its full implementation to contribute to lasting peace and stability in the country. It may welcome the conduct of the republican dialogue, appeal to the government and opposition groups and parties to achieve consensus on the implementation of the recommendations of the dialogue. The PSC may also reiterate its request for the AU Commission to provide regular reports on the implementation of PAPR-CAR as necessary means for it to discharge its mandate in supporting the CAR and in supporting the AU Commission in implementing its measures. The PSC may once again express the need to lift the arms embargo imposed on CAR by the UNSC. The PSC may underscore the importance of local elections and encourage CAR to create the necessary conditions to undertake the local elections and in this regard may request the Commission to provide all the required support. On MOUACA, the PSC may request that the AU Commission requests extension of the financial support to the mission for a further period based on implementable plan that address the challenges impeding effective operationalization of MOUACA. With regards to the AU Liaison Office in CAR, Council may reiterate the call made at its 1011th session, for the Chairperson of the AU Commission to “urgently take necessary measures to ensure that the Office is availed with all necessary capacity, in order to enable it to more effectively discharge its mandate, including supporting the implementation of the 2019 Political Agreement”.
Briefing on the situation in South Sudan
Briefing on the Situation in South Sudan
Date | 11 July 2022
Tomorrow (11 July) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1092nd session to consider the situation in South Sudan, with a focus on the implementation of the 2018 Revitalized – Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS).
The session will commence with the opening remarks of the PSC Chairperson for July, Djibouti’s Permanent Representative to the AU, Abdi Mahamoud Eybe. This would be followed by remarks of the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye. The PSC is expected to receive the main briefing from Joram Biswaro, Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission for South Sudan and Head of the AU Mission in South Sudan (AUMISS). The PSC will also receive statements from the representative of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Ismail Wais and the Head of the United Nations (UN) Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General Nicholas Haysom. As a country of concern, it is also anticipated that there will be the statement by the Permanent Representative of South Sudan to the AU.
The last time the PSC met to discuss South Sudan was at its 1060th session convened on 25 January 2022. At the time, it decided to undertake a solidarity visit to South Sudan on the second anniversary of the formation of the Transitional Government on 22 February 2022, considering that the end of the three-year transition period was approaching fast.
Members of the PSC undertook their sixth field visit to South Sudan from 22 to 25 February 2022. The visit allowed them to assess the overall situation on the ground, particularly the status of progress in the implementation of the R-ARCSS. During the visit, PSC members met with President Salva Kirr Mayardit and encouraged progress on the full implementation of the peace agreement, particularly its Chapter II on security arrangements. They also met with the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), members of the Troika (US, UK and Norway) and other international partners in Juba. Furthermore, they discussed with civil society representatives on the need to engage women and the youth in the implementation of the peace agreement. Subsequent to the visit, the PSC was supposed to discuss its field report and adopt a Communique in March although this did not happen as planned.
Given the present challenges in South Sudan, the co-guarantors of the peace agreement namely Sudan and Uganda have been expected to renew their engagement in support of reinvigorating the implementation of the peace agreement. Sudan is preoccupied with its own internal challenges. Even though it is currently chairing IGAD, it has been a while since the organization met and discussed any of the peace and security challenges in the region, including South Sudan. The IGAD Executive Secretary visited Khartoum recently to secure the participation of the leadership as Chairperson in the IGAD Summit that took place in Nairobi on 5 July.
On his part, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni had invited South Sudan President Salva Kiir and First Vice President Riek Machar to Kampala to facilitate talks on the implementation of the peace agreement, including on the issue of security arrangements. The PSC welcomed his initiative to help the parties resolve some of the outstanding issues. However, the meeting which was planned to be convened from 3-4 March 2022, did not take place.
The PSC also recognized the need to reactivate the AU Ad-Hoc High-Level Committee’s engagements on the South Sudan peace process. Following its meeting and decision to undertake a visit to South Sudan, the Committee traveled to South Sudan in early June and engaged various stakeholders. Among others, it received a briefing from the Revitalized Joint monitoring and Evaluation Commission (R-JEMC) on the status of implementation of the peace agreement.
One of the issues that tomorrow’s session will thus address itself to is the follow-up on the PSC field mission, including the report on the mission and this recent mission undertaken by the AU High-Level Ad Hoc Committee on South Sudan.
South Sudanese government has been partly attributing the delay in the implementation of the peace agreement, particularly as it relates to the security arrangements, to the arms embargo imposed by the UN Security Council (UNSC). At its 1060th session, the PSC had called on ‘the international community to lift the arms embargo and other sanctions imposed on South Sudan to enable the country to build the required capacity of the unified armed forces and for them to more effectively discharge their constitutional mandate of defending the territorial integrity of their country’. However, several UNSC members were of the view that South Sudan did not make adequate progress on the benchmarks set out by the UNSC for the easing or lifting of the sanctions. On 26 May 2022, the Security Council adopted resolution 2633 (2022) renewing the South Sudan sanctions regime until 1 July 2023. Ten Council members including Ghana voted in favor of the resolution, while five abstained including the two African members Gabon and Kenya as well as China, India and Russia.
The implementation of the peace agreement was further complicated by the split within SPLM-IO and the emergence of factions which led to deadly clashes. This eroded trust in the peace process resulting in SPLM/A-IO to suspend its participation in the monitoring mechanisms of the agreements – RJMEC and CTSAMVM. On 30 and 31 March 2022, UN, AU, IGAD and RJMEC representatives met with the South Sudanese leadership – President Salva Kiir Mayardit, and First Vice President Dr. Riek Machar Teny, as well as Vice Presidents Rebecca Nyandeng de Mabior, Dr. Wani Igga, and Gen. Taban Deng Gai – and urged them to de-escalate the political tensions. They also encouraged them to resort to dialogue to resolve their differences and called on the leaders to return to the full implementation of the Agreement underscoring the need to make progress based on a clear roadmap to address outstanding issues such as the unification of forces, the constitution-making process and preparations for elections. The representatives of the three institutions also appealed to SPLM/A-IO to resume its participation in RJMEC and CTSAMVM. The RJMEC and CTSAMVM face further strain due to withdrawal of financial support by the US, which contributes up to 40 percent of their funds. The efforts of the representatives of the four entities culminated in a rapprochement between President Kiir and the first vice President Machar, although SPLM-IO suspended its participation in Parliament over the passage of the Political Parties Amendment Act 2022 without consensus.
With less than eight months left for the end of the transition period, there is increasing concern within the country about what will happen in February 2023 as not much has been done to prepare for elections. There is also growing fear that if South Sudan slides back into yet another cycle of conflict and violence, it will further aggravate the complex situation in the horn of Africa region which is already facing enormous peace, security and humanitarian challenges. At the R-JMEC monthly meeting on 2 June 2022, the Interim Chair Charles Tai Gituai noted the ‘growing public anxiety, frustration and despair on what happens when the Transitional Period lapses in February 2023 without the completion of all tasks of the Agreement’.
The UN Special Representative Nicolas Haysom also underscored the sense of urgency with the impending deadline for the end of the transition fast approaching. In his engagement with the media on 30 June 2022, SRSG Haysom called on ‘all parties to demonstrate collective common purpose—unity of purpose—by working together towards the full implementation of the agreement. I encourage the leaders to take the necessary steps for the country to exit its transitional period, through the conduct of free, fair, credible, and peaceful elections.’
Perhaps, the most pressing issue, which is also of concern for South Sudanese, is the question of whether and how elections could be held at the end of the traditional period. There is no consensus among South Sudanese political forces on whether to proceed with the elections as scheduled for early 2023. While some advocate for holding of elections as scheduled, others point out that the elections should be postponed given the lack of progress in implementing key aspects of the peace agreement including unification of forces, preparation of the final constitution, and establishment of the necessary legal and institutional frameworks.
As this delay may become a site for political contestation and lead to instability, PSC members may seek clarification on contingency plans on how to deal with the uncertainty and disagreement that may result from this situation. It is worth recalling that during its visit last month, the delegation of the AU Ad Hoc Committee received assurance from officials it engaged that it will receive a proposed roadmap on how to manage the uncertainty resulting from the failure to complete the basic transitional arrangements for holding the elections as scheduled in February 2023. The proposed roadmap, which among others is expected to indicate the duration of the possible extension of the transitional period and the plan for completing remaining transitional tasks for holding of elections, has not as yet been received.
The other issue expected to receive attention during tomorrow’s session is the security situation. As noted above, growing disagreement among the parties to the peace agreement brought the country to the brink of the collapse of the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGoNU) and the return to fighting. As parts of the country are experiencing insecurity often on account of local political, socio-economic and security dynamics, it would be of interest for members of the PSC to consider how the lack of progress in implementation of the peace agreement exacerbates these existing conflict dynamics. These include cattle-raiding in the tristate corridor between Warrap, Lakes, and Unity States, child abduction among communities in the GPAA and Jonglei, the impact of cattle migrations from Jonglei and Lakes States into the Equatorias, or contestation over state administrations among ethnolinguistic communities in Wau and Malakal. These highlight the need for peacebuilding initiatives to focus also on measures for mitigating such local conflict dynamics while working on modalities for speeding up implementation of the peace agreement and securing consensus among South Sudanese actors on how to manage transitional tasks not finalized at the end of the traditional period.
The expected outcome of the session is a Communiqué. The PSC may welcome the efforts of AU, IGAD, RJMEC and the UN to accompany the parties to the R-ARCSS through among others mediating their disputes. While welcoming the rapprochement between President Kiir and First Vice President Machar and the progress made in implementing the peace agreement including the launching of consultations for the establishment of the Truth, Healing and Reconciliation Commission, it may also express concern about the lack of progress in the implementation of key transitional activities necessary for successful end of the transition and the convening of elections on time including making of final constitution, adoption of laws for convening of elections, the reform of the elections commission and the graduation and redeployment of the unified forces. The PSC may urge the parties to exert their utmost efforts and commitment for speeding up implementation of the key transitional activities. It may also call on the authorities to present the roadmap outlining the plan on the implementation of the remaining transitional tasks. The PSC may also call on the AU Commission to work with IGAD and the UN to undertake joint assessment of the areas of the transitional process in South Sudan that require urgent engagement and support from the region, the AU and the international community. It may welcome the field visit by the AU Ad Hoc Committee of five member states to South Sudan in June and encourage them to have a follow up visit to review developments since last visit and assess implementation of commitments made during the last field mission. The PSC could also call on the AU and the international community to mobilize peacebuilding and humanitarian support for South Sudan to address the pressing peacebuilding and humanitarian issues including a high-level of food insecurity facing many parts of the country.