Emergency session on the Situation in Burkina Faso
Amani Africa
Date | 31 January, 2022
On Monday (31 January), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will consider the situation in Burkina Faso as one of the agenda items of its 1062nd session.
The session commences with the opening remark of the Chairperson of the PSC for the month and Permanent Representative of Ghana to the AU, Amma Adomaa Twum-Amoah. AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, is also expected to make a statement on the AU Commission’s assessment of the situation. The representatives of Burkina Faso, as the concerned country and Ghana, current chair of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), are expected to make statements as per the usual practice of the PSC.
The session comes a week after the mutiny of 23 January by section of the national army, which evolved on 24 January into a full-fledged coup d’état overthrowing the democratically elected government of President Roch Marc Christian Kabore. Appearing on state television, army officers who call themselves the ‘Patriotic Movement for Safeguarding and Restoration’ led by Lieutenant Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba, announced that government and parliament are dissolved, constitution suspended, and borders closed. Burkina Faso is one of the coup-prone countries in Africa with the previous history of eight coups or attempted coups.
The military takeover of power however did not come as a complete surprise. Early signs of risks of serious challenges to the administration of President Kabore from the mounting discontents on the part of the army and the general public were looming even months ago. Last November, one of the deadliest attacks on Inata Security post (near the Malian border), which claimed the lives of more than 50 Police officers, stirred anger within the security apparatus and the larger public.
The following month, President Kabore, in an attempt to contain the situation, fired his Prime Minister and reshuffled the leadership of the armed forces. On 10 January, the government arrested a dozen soldiers including Lieutenant-Colonel Emmanuel Zoungrana, who had been leading the anti-jihadist operations in Burkina Faso, over the plot to stage a coup. However, even this attempt to avert a coup did not last long. The situation quickly escalated when mutiny erupted in several army barracks including the Sangoule Lamizana camp in the capital, Ouagadougou, on 23 January. On the same day, protesters ransacked the headquarters of Kabore’s ruling party in the capital.
In recent months, President Kabore was under enormous pressure for what is perceived to be his botched handling of the security situation in the country which has seen a significant deterioration. Indeed, Burkina Faso is the country that has experienced fastest rise in number of terrorist attacks and some of the deadliest attacks during the past few years. These attacks claimed the lives of approximately 7000 lives including more than 3000 civilians and displaced 1.5 million people during the past three years. According to ACLED, events of political violence (battles, violence against civilians, explosions and remote violence, riots and protests) almost doubled in 2021 (1489 events) compared to 2020 (751 events), resulting 2,331 fatalities. Allocation of more resources in the battle against jihadists, better treatment for the wounded and families of the dead, and change in the military leadership were reported to be among the demands of mutinying soldiers on 23 January. The coup in Burkina Faso highlights the potential of terrorism and violent extremism in exacerbating existing political crises as well as problems in the security sector in a fragile context by widening the rift in the civil-military and state-society relations.
It is worth noting that apart from the impact of escalating terrorist attacks and the accompanying discontent of security forces, concerns are emerging about both the domino effect of coups in neighboring countries and the role of foreign security arrangements. Report has emerged that the coup leader maintains close relationship with the coup leaders of Mali and Guinea since their participation in a US led military exercise, Flintlock, in 2019 in Burkina Faso. Last November, discontents with the deteriorating security situation and the perceived flaws in the country’s security relationship with France led to a protest that blocked for a week the French military convoy that was on its way to neighboring Niger. A report, quoting close aids of President Kabore, revealed that Colonel Damiba engaged the President on the need for using military support from Russia without success.
The mutiny and the coup that followed it triggered international concerns. ECOWAS and AU issued statements before the announcement of the coup, characterizing the event as an ‘attempted coup’. ECOWAS expressed its concern over the unfolding events while condemning the act as a serious breach which cannot be tolerated under its relevant regulatory provisions. It further called on the military to ‘return to the barracks, to maintain a republican posture’ and favor dialogue with authorities. In his 24 January press release, the Chairperson of the AU Commission, who has been on a working visit to West Africa, condemned the ‘coup attempt’, further calling the national army and other security forces to ‘strictly adhere to their republican vocation’. The Chairperson called on the army to ensure the physical integrity of the President and members of his government. On 24 January, the G5 Sahel also condemned the ‘attempt to disrupt constitutional order’ while expressing its concern over its likely impact on the democratic gains of the country. Similarly, spokesperson for the UN Secretary General, in a statement issued shortly after the coup announcement, ‘strongly’ condemned ‘any attempt to take over a government by the force of arms’. The Spokesperson also urged coup plotters to ‘lay down their arms’, ‘ensure the protection of the physical integrity of the President’, and ‘opt for dialogue’. European Union (EU) on its part called for the respect of the ‘constitutional order and the release of President Kabore’, through a statement issued by its High Representative Josep Borrell. Western countries such as US and France also condemned the act. But none of these initial reactions dissuaded the mutineers from elevating the situation into a military takeover of power. Of major relevance for tomorrow’s session is the decision of ECOWAS to suspend Burkina Faso from the regional bloc during its most recent extraordinary summit, convened virtually on 28 January 2022.
The coup in Burkina Faso, which is further evidence of the trend of the resurgence of coups in parts of the continent, marks the fifth in the continent just in less than a year. Since April 2021, the military seized power in Chad (20 April), Mali (24 May), Guinea (5 September) and Sudan (25 October).
Map on military seizure of power in Africa during the past nine months and PSC’s response
As the continent is witnessing risk of reversal of progress made in reducing the recurrence of coups, it is a high time for members of the Council to critically reflect on the existing legal and institutional frameworks that are in place and check their effectiveness to reverse the tide. In terms of preventive measures, the events in Burkina Faso, Mali and Guinea highlight the urgent need to address not only the democratic governance deficit in state-society relationship but also critically the need for addressing the various capacity and governance issues afflicting the armies particularly of countries affected by terrorism. Equally important is how to address the adverse impact of foreign military presence on both state-society relationship and national security forces. In terms of response, there is a need for paying more attention to addressing the issues and grievances that precipitated the coup than the singular focus on timelines on restoration of constitutional order and the convening of elections. It has thus become critical that sanctions against coups are used strategically as part of such comprehensive measures.
The PSC has considered some seventeen cases of UCG since its operationalization in 2004. Except in three occasions, the Council immediately suspended the country in all other cases of UCG. The sanction of suspension was delayed against the coup in Burkina Faso (2014) and Sudan (2019) while the Council failed to impose any sanction against Chad (2021). In the three most recent cases of UCG (Mali, Guinea and Sudan), the PSC also agreed to immediately suspended them until the restoration of a constitutional order.
The expected outcome of the emergency session is a communique. The PSC is expected to reject and condemn the military coup in Burkina Faso in line with the Lomé Declaration of 2000 and the African Charter on Elections, Democracy and Governance. The Council may echo the statement of the Chairperson of the Commission, which called on army to ‘ensure the physical integrity of the President of the Republic as well as all the members of his Government’. The Council may also urge perpetrators of the coup to adhere to ensure that there is return to constitutional order in the country. Invoking Article 7(1) (g) of the PSC establishing Protocol, the Council is expected to immediately suspend Burkina Faso from all AU activities until the restoration of a constitutional order in the country. The PSC may also request the AU Commission to closely work and coordinate actions with ECOWAS and other international actors to help Burkina Faso find a peaceful path towards the restoration of constitutional order. The PSC may request that steps are taken for strengthening ways of preventing the occurrence of coups including by addressing the governance problems countries facing such risks and the capacity and other issues of national security forces. The Council may take the opportunity to call on the AU Commission to expedite the study on the ‘root causes and impact of the unconstitutional change of government arising from non-consensual and/or politically manipulated democratic processes’, which was mandated during its 1030th session. The PSC may also call for a high-level meeting in the context of the AU summit in February 2022 for considering the resurgence of coups and the rising political consequences of the human and material costs of terrorism in Africa. On foreign interference, the Council may call on external actors to refrain from any interference in the internal affairs of Burkina Faso as it did during the session on Guinea (1030th meeting). Finally, based on its previous practice, the Council is likely to endorse the communique adopted by the extraordinary session of ECOWAS held on 28 January.
Briefing on the deployment of SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM)
Amani Africa
Date | 31 January, 2022
Tomorrow (31 January), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will receive a briefing on the deployment of SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) as one of its agenda items of its 1062nd session.
Following an opening remark of the Chairperson of the PSC for the month and Permanent Representative of Ghana to the AU, Amma Adomaa Twum-Amoah, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, is expected to brief the Council. The representatives of Mozambique and South Africa are also expected to make statements as the concerned state and the chair of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, respectively. Further statement is also expected from the representative of the SADC Secretariat.
Tomorrow’s session is going to be the first time that the PSC considers the deployment of SAMIM since its mandate approval on 23 June 2021 and its subsequent deployment in Mozambique on 15 July 2021. However, this is not the first time for the Council to consider similar deployments. A case in point is its consideration of the deployment of the SADC Preventive Mission in the Kingdom of Lesotho (SAPMIL) during its 748th session, convened on 24 January 2018.
It is to be recalled that the extraordinary summit of SADC decided to deploy SAMIM as a regional response to the rising threat of terrorism and violent extremism in Cabo Delgado of Mozambique within the framework of the African Standby Force. The mandate was approved for the initial period of three months to support Mozambique to combat terrorism and acts of violent extremism in Cabo Delgado, by neutralizing terrorist threat and restoring security in order to create a secure environment; strengthening and maintaining peace and security, restoring law and order in affected areas of Cabo Delgado Province; providing air and maritime support as well as logistics and training to the Mozambique armed defence force (FADM) to enhance its operational capability; and supporting the Republic of Mozambique, in collaboration with humanitarian agencies, to continue providing humanitarian relief to population affected by terrorist activities, including internally displaced persons (IDPs). Since then, SAMIM’s mandate has been extended two times on 5 October 2021 (for additional three months) and 12 January 2022, without changing its mandate nor personnel composition.
The 10 November 2021 update released by SADC on SAMIM deployment indicates that the mission comprises troops deployment from eight Personnel Contributing Countries from SADC namely, Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, South Africa, United Republic of Tanzania and Zimbabwe, working in collaboration with the FADM and ‘other troops deployed to Cabo Delgado’. But, neither this SADC update nor its communiques that approved or extended SAMIM’s mandate disclose troop size of the mission.
Since its deployment in July last year, SAMIM has recorded achievements in the fight against terrorists in Cabo Delgado, including the neutralization of terrorists, recapture of villages, dislodging terrorists from their bases and seizing weapons and equipment. This has contributed to create a relatively secure environment that facilitated the return of IDPs to their homes as well as safer passage of humanitarian support. Nonetheless, as noted by the latest annual consultative meeting between PSC and UN Security Council, the provision of ‘technical, financial and material support by the international community’ remains critical for the mission to discharge its mandate effectively. Currently, SADC uses its own resource to sustain the deployment. This effort of the regional bloc in using its own resource was praised as ‘a unique precedent on the African continent’ at its most recent extraordinary summit convened on 12 January this year.
While SADC’s reliance on self-funding is commendable, it raises an important question of sustainability. There is considerable gap between the total budget of the mission (USD35 million) and the amount of money raised by SADC, standing at less than USD13 million. The budget deficit is expected to further widen with the latest mandate extension and the allocation of extra USD 29.5 million, according to media sources. This is in addition to logistical challenges the mission is currently facing. In this context, the main focus of tomorrow’s session is therefore likely to be on the financial, technical and logistical support that can be provided by the AU and other partners, notably the EU, to enhance the institutional capacity of SAMIM.
SADC and the AU have already started discussion to explore options for funding and logistical support. Three options are currently under consideration in this regard. The first is to use the African Peace Facility (APF)’s Early Response Mechanism (ERM), an EU initiative worth of Euro 55 million that provides AU and RECs/RMs with an immediately available funds for initiatives aimed at preventing and managing violent conflicts or use of windows of opportunity for peacebuilding in Africa. Accessing the ERM however requires both AU and SADC to come up with proposals that fall within the scope of the mechanism (It is worth noting that the purchase of lethal military equipment such as ammunition and arms are not permitted under the ERM). A positive development in this regard is the ongoing consultation between AU, SADC and EU for the allocation of Euro 3 million under the ERM in support of SAMIM mandate.
The second option is the new European Peace Facility (EPF), which has replaced the APF since 2021. This option seems more fitting for SAMIM to fill its budget gap due to the military nature of the mission and as the new financial tool notably allows the purchase of lethal military equipment to African countries or sub-regional military initiatives, with or without AU’s involvement.
The third option is the use of the Continental Logistics Base (CLB) in Douala, Cameroon, particularly in relation to the logistical requirements of SAMIM. Inaugurated four years ago, the CLB has been providing equipment to member states (e.g. Niger, Burkina Faso, and South Sudan) and AU missions such as the AU Military Observers Mission in Central African Republic (MOUACA). As highlighted in the concept note, positive steps have been already taken by the AU Commission and its SADC counterpart in identifying equipment suitable to SAMIM and discussion is underway to ‘facilitate the modalities for the donation and shipment of the confirmed/agreed equipment’.
The issue of enhancing coordination and collaboration between AU and SADC on SAMIM, particularly in the areas of information sharing and updates about the mission, is another area of interest to the Council. The PSC, at its 870th session as well as the second annual consultative meeting between the PSC and RECs/RMs, stressed on the imperative of ‘enhanced collaboration and information sharing between the AU and RECs/RMs’ throughout the conflict cycles. The first consultative particularly highlighted that the ‘African Standby Force should be deployed/employed within a partnership between the PSC and the RECs/RMs policy organs’ while recognizing the latter as the ‘first responders’ to the crisis/conflict situations arising within their jurisdictions. The consultative meeting further underscored the importance of ‘prior consultations and coordination’ during the ‘planning and deployment phases of peace support operations.’ Given the importance of joint mobilization of all required resources at the RECs/RMs and AU levels since no one entity can by itself alone overcome threats to regional peace and security, such prior consultation and coordination are critical for timely identification and deployment of the required resources. SADC and AU did not have such prior consultations and coordination. AU’s engagement on the deployment of SAMIM was also missing at the level also of the PSC as the principal policy-making body. The convening of this session for the first time on SAMIM underscores the imperative of consultation and coordination both at the policy and technical levels from the planning to the deployment and conduct of peace operations like SAMIM.
This session should also enable the PSC to discuss the situation in Cabo Delgado including the humanitarian crisis that the rise and expansion of terrorist attacks precipitated and the conditions that led to and the drivers of the emergence of terrorism in this part of Mozambique.
The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communique. Among others, the Council is expected to welcome the communiques of SADC of 23rd June 2021, 5 October 2021 and 12 January 2022 that approved and extended the mandate of SAMIM, respectively. The Council may commend the efforts and achievements so far by the mission in the fight against terrorist groups in Cabo Delgado. It may further recognize the financial and logistical challenges facing the mission, and in this regard, the council may appeal to AU member states, EU, and other international partners to extend their support. On the provision of logistic support, the Council may authorize the Commission to provide the agreed equipment stored at the CLB. Regarding the issue of coordination and exchange of information, the Council may request both the AU Commission and its SADC counterpart to enhance their engagement. In this respect, as highlighted in the concept note, the Council may particularly request SADC to ‘provide regular updates on progress in the implementation of SAMIM’s mandates’. PSC may also reiterate the joint communique of the 15th annual joint consultative meeting between PSC and UN Security Council in stressing the need for ‘supporting stabilization, reconstruction, and recovery efforts in affected province’ as well as sustained humanitarian assistance.
Consideration of the Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on Elections in Africa
Amani Africa
Date | 31 January, 2022
Tomorrow (31 January), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is set to convene its 1062nd session to consider among its agenda items, the report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on elections in Africa conducted during the second half of 2021 (July to December 2021).
Following opening remarks by Permanent Representative of Ghana to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for the month, Amma Adomaa Twum-Amoah, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye is expected to make a statement. Representatives of AU member States which conducted elections during the reporting period are also expected to deliver statements.
In line with the request made at its 424th meeting to receive quarterly briefings on national elections conducted in Africa, tomorrow’s session is expected to provide updates on elections held in the continent during the second half of 2021 and provide preview of those expected to take place in 2022. The session will follow the previous briefing presented to the Council at its 1034th session where the outcomes of elections held during the period from January to June 2021 were discussed.
The countries that held elections during the reporting period on which the report of the Chairperson is expected to provide update are Cape Verde, Central African Republic (CAR), Ethiopia, Morocco, Sao Tome and Principe, The Gambia and Zambia. Only in Sao Tome and Principe, where the first round of the presidential elections could not secure a majority vote for any of the candidates, was a second round of elections were held. AU election observer mission was deployed to nearly all of these member States. During the reporting period, in addition to the deployment of short-term election observations the AU has also contributed through the provision of technical and financial support to election management bodies and other relevant actors (in The Gambia and Somalia); undertaking multidimensional needs assessment missions (to Chad, Mali and The Gambia) and deployment of preventive diplomacy missions (to Zambia and The Gambia) as indicated in the Chairperson’s report.
Somalia and Libya were the other two AU member States that were scheduled to organise and conduct both presidential and parliamentary elections in the second half of 2021. While Somalia was able to complete the election for members of the upper house of parliament (the House of the People) by mid-November 2021, the election of members of the lower house, who will in turn be in charge of electing the president jointly with members of the upper house, is still underway. As of 9 January 2022, Somalia’s leaders have reached agreement to complete the ongoing election of lower house members of parliament by 25 February 2022.
Following the signing of the 2020 Ceasefire Agreement, one of the main strides achieved in Libya was the determination of a timeline for general elections, which were scheduled to take place on 24 December 2021. A major precondition for the successful organisation of the elections was the completion of the constitutional framework and electoral laws well ahead of the agreed timeline. It is also to be recalled that at its 997th ministerial session, the PSC welcomed the agreement reached to organise the national elections and requested the AU Commission to deploy AU election observation mission to Libya. However, due to the growing disagreement over legal procedures and the delay in the finalization of list of candidates, the general elections were postponed to 2022. With the new proposed date of 24 January becoming untenable to hold elections, after consultations with presidential hopefuls the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General told reporters that it is very reasonable and possible for Libyans to cast their votes in June 2022.
Chad’s legislative elections, originally scheduled for 13 December 2020 and later postponed for 24 October 2021, were also indefinitely postponed.
Together with the delayed elections in Libya and Somalia, some fourteen AU member states are scheduled to hold presidential and/or parliamentary elections during 2022. Apart from Libya and Somalia, others that also face uncertainties about the timing of elections include Mali and Guinea. Mali’s general elections, which were scheduled for 27 February 2022, may experience delays as the transitional government has recently announced a new electoral roadmap. Given the challenging political and security context, Mali’s transition through the conduct of peaceful and democratic elections will benefit from the AU’s close follow up and timely support including through high-level engagement with relevant Malian stakeholders.
In line with the 6 months’ timetable established by the regional body Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) following Guinea’s military coup of 5 September 2021, Guinea is also expected to conduct general elections in March 2022. While Guinea’s transitional government has finalised the formation of the National Transitional Council (CNT) – the body that determines the electoral calendar, the transitional authorities have already indicated more time may be required for constitutional review and institutional reforms, which makes it unlikely for the elections to be held within the timeline established by ECOWAS.
Some of the other expected elections upcoming in 2022 include the Gambia’s legislative elections which are scheduled to take place in the first half of the year as well as Kenya’s and Angola’s general elections planned for the second half of 2022. As in the past, Kenya’s election is expected to attract particular interest, including in terms of requiring diplomatic measures to ensure that the elections are free from violence and conditions for the acceptance of the outcome of elections by candidates are created.
In addition to elaborating on the elections conducted during the reporting period and providing highlights on upcoming elections, the Chairperson’s report is also expected to capture key emerging trends in Africa’s electoral and political governance. In that regard, the winning of presidential elections in Zambia, Cape Verde, and Sao Tome and Principe, and the securing of majority parliamentary seats in Morocco by opposition parties is a noteworthy progress that may be emphasised in the report. Similarly, a notable decrease in election-related violence, increase in self-funding of elections by respective member States and improved technical management of elections are some of the positive trends that may also be highlighted. As underscored in the Chairperson’s report, there was also a significant increase in voter turnout during the reporting period which is a change from the previous report that indicated about voter apathy as trend that dominated elections in Africa. This development is also indicative of the promotion of popular participation in elections which is an important aspect of democratic processes as stressed by the PSC at its 713th session.
A rather worrying trend that may be reflected is the growing postponement or continuity of postponement of elections in multiple member States despite the commendable commitment to electoral calendars in a number of other member States. Other concerning trends that Council may be briefed about include the increase in hate speech and misinformation, inadequate public services and corruption, intense political tension and instances of election-related violence and resurgence in unconstitutional changes of government.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may commend all those countries that concluded their elections without major problems and congratulate countries in which the opposition won elections and smooth transfer of power took place. Council may reaffirm its total rejection of unconstitutional changes of government and express its full support for the democratic will of citizens as expressed through free, fair and credible elections. The PSC may also condemn the extension of term limits through flawed constitutional processes which is also triggering popular discontent and protest and eroding the legitimacy of governments. In light of the increasing misuse of social media and the cyber space to spread misinformation specially during election periods, Council may call on member States to continuously engage their citizens by providing credible and factual information in relation to electoral processes and sensitize their citizens to increase their active and informed participation. It may also call on member States with unduly delayed elections to ensure that political actors commit to agreed electoral calendar and elections are held per such agreement to avoid the uncertainty and crisis of legitimacy that delay in the conduct of elections leads to. The Council may also welcome and commend the efforts of the PAPS Department for introducing to the AU election observation system a gender and youth balanced composition of observer missions, an Experts Advisory Panel as well as better interaction between the AU and Regional Economic Communities/ Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) in monitoring elections. Commending the AU Commission for the support provided to member States which conducted elections during the reporting period, Council may appeal to the Permanent Representatives’ Committee (PRC) to allocate increased financial resources to the AU Commission for the continued support in the continent’s electoral processes.
2022 ELECTIONS OF THE PSC: OVERVIEW OF THE PROCESS AND LIST OF CANDIDATES
Amani Africa
Date | January, 2022
INTRODUCTION
The tenure of all fifteen members of the PSC (see Table 1 below) serving for a two-year and three-year term is set to end at the end of March 2022. All PSC members are elected by the AU Executive Council and endorsed by the Assembly during its ordinary sessions. It is to be recalled that the Assembly delegated its envisaged power to elect members to the Executive Council during its sixth Ordinary Session (Assembly/AU/Dec. 106(VI)). One of the agenda items tabled for the fortieth Ordinary Session of the Executive Council slatted to take place on 2-3 February 2022 is, therefore, the election of the fifteen new or returning members of the Council.