Consideration of the Report of AUC Chairperson on the activities of MNJTF and mandate renewal of the Force

Date | 12 January 2025

Tomorrow (13 January), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC), in its first session of the year, will consider the report of the AU Commission Chairperson on the activities of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) and renew the force’s mandate.

Figure 1 Lake Chad Basin

Following opening remarks by Ennio Maes, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Cote d’Ivoire to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for January 2025, Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to make a statement introducing the Chairperson’s report. As usual, the Executive Secretary of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), Mamman Nuhu, is also expected to brief the PSC.

It was during its 1197th session held on 30 January 2024 that the PSC last renewed the mandate of the MNJTF for another period of twelve months, which is set to expire on 1 February 2025. The PSC also requested the AU Commission and the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) to renew the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and Support Implementation Agreement (SIA) between AU, LCBC and MNJTF Troop Contributing Countries, which will guide the provision of AU additional support to the MNJTF, for a year. Tomorrow’s session could focus on the state of operation of the MNJTF, the security situation in the Lake Chad Basin and the implementation of the regional stabilisation strategy.

There have been some notable developments during the year in the operation of the MNJTF. Although it took the MNJTF two years since the conduct of Operation Lake Sanity in 2022, the Force managed to undertake Operation Lake Sanity II during April-July 2024, following its postponement from 2023. This focused on focused on the degradation of the capacity of terrorists within the fringes of the Lake Chad Islands while enhancing local support to isolate them and induce more surrender. It is reported that the operation and related activities led to the ‘neutralisation’ of 344 members of terrorist groups and the capturing of various weapons, including one RPG bomb, 2 Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) tubes and 4 Anti-Aircraft guns. Despite these successes, it was noted in the report of the 4th LCB Governors Forum that ‘the urgent need remains to clear remnants of Boko Haram fighters from their bases on the Tumbuns (islands on the fringes of the Lake Chad) from which they continue to launch attacks on the surrounding areas and beyond. The Tumbuns serve as their logistics hub, secure havens, and staging grounds. Their occupation of these islands also facilitates their generation of funds through illegal fishing and farming activities.’ To this end, it emphasised ‘[o]ne key area of need is enhancing its (MNJTF’s) amphibious and naval capabilities in and around Lake Chad.’

The MNJTF has also continued to implement non-kinetic activities in support of the regional stabilisation strategy, including civil-military coordination (that seeks to foster trust, community dialogue and close coordination with local communities and facilitate humanitarian activities), quick impact projects and counter-messaging radio and other communication programmes. The Chairperson’s report also recorded that by ‘November 2024, the MNJTF had facilitated the return of over 3,800 IDPs to Kukawa and other communities within the MNJTF Area of Operation and about 2,306 refugees to Banki town in Nigeria.’

During 2024, the MNJTF also faced operational challenges not just from lack of resources but also from divergence of national interests and variations in military strategies among participating countries, as well as geopolitical challenges. In October 2024, 40 Chadian soldiers were killed in a terrorist attack targeting a military base near Chad’s border with Nigeria. Boko Haram was allegedly responsible for the attack, prompting the Chadian security forces to launch a military operation, reportedly killing at least 61 terrorist elements. Following this incident, Chad’s President Mahamat Idriss Déby threatened to withdraw from the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), accusing the force of failing to address the security threats posed by terrorist groups. Additionally, the MNJTF was forced to operate for much of 2024 without the participation of Niger, which suspended its participation following the souring of relations owing to the sanctions imposed on Niger by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). As such, the Force operated its 13,799 troops in 3 MNJTF Sectors of Cameroon, Chad and Nigeria.

However, a major positive development took place during the third quarter of 2024 with respect to Niger’s participation in MNJTF. The December 2024 report of the UN Secretary-General on West Africa noted that on ‘28 August, the defence chiefs of Niger and Nigeria signed a memorandum of understanding in Niamey to boost cooperation against terrorism in the Lake Chad basin, with the Niger resuming its participation in the Multinational Joint Task Force.’

The security situation in the region indicates that the LCB region continues to maintain the significant degrees of stabilisation achieved in the affected areas, with military operations contributing to eroding the capabilities of terrorist groups operating in the areas of operation of the MNJTF and successfully restoring state presence in several borders and other areas in the region. Yet, the major terrorist groups operating in the region, namely Boko Haram and its splinter group Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), continue to pose a significant threat.

Figure 2 Major terrorist groups operating in the LCB region

One major development that persisted during the reporting period is the worrying increase in the use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). Thus, despite the overall decline in the threat level of the region, there has been a spike in the use of IEDs, particularly in the Far North Province of Cameroon and corresponding areas on the Nigerian side of the border, targeting the MNJTF and national armed forces as well as civilians. According to the Chairperson’s report, ‘a total of 70 IED incidents were recorded compared to 50 similar incidents during the same period in 2023, with 37 soldiers and 13 civilians killed during these attacks against 34 soldiers and 57 civilians killed during similar attacks in 2023.’  Further threats to the security situation arise from suicide attacks, kidnappings and other militant and criminal activities, including predatory attacks by terrorist groups on civilian communities. In June and July 2024, suicide attacks were reported in Borno State, Nigeria, attributed to Boko Haram/Islamic State West Africa Province, resulting in several fatalities. Additionally, in September 2024, suspected Boko Haram members targeted communities in Yobe State.

The threats from the two major terrorist groups in the region, combined with the impact of climate change, have exacerbated the humanitarian crisis in the region. The report of the 4th Governance Forum of the LCB noted that during the 13 years of insurgency and conflicts, ‘Boko Haram and ISWAP continue to attack and unleash violence on communities, producing around 2.9 million internally displaced (IDPs), including 2 million in Nigeria alone.’ According to the latest UN figures from September, there are approximately 21,650 refugees, more than 220,600 internally displaced persons, and around 16,885 returnees in Chad. In Cameroon, the numbers are about 120,600 refugees and 453,660 internally displaced persons. The humanitarian situation is also affected by inadequate humanitarian and rehabilitation support, which undermines returnees. In this respect, the Chairperson’s report noted that ‘[w]hile the number of resettled populations have continued to rise, most of these communities received little or no form of humanitarian assistance, and there is a need for urgent actions to enhance the livelihoods of these resettled communities.’   Climate change further aggravates the difficult humanitarian situation in the region, as recent flooding events affecting all of LCB countries highlighted. The UN reported that as of ‘2 December, over 4.9 million people have been affected by floods, with 1.94 million in Chad, 1.52 million in Niger, 612,700 in Nigeria and over 448,000 in Cameroon.

The other issue expected to receive attention during tomorrow’s session is the implementation of the Regional Stabilisation, Recovery, and Resilience Strategy for Areas Affected by Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin. One of the major developments in this respect during the reporting period is the updating of the Strategy. On 20 September 2024, the 5th meeting of the Steering Committee for the implementation of this regional strategy took place virtually. The meeting approved the adjusted Regional Strategy and Community-based Reconciliation and Reintegration Policy for 2025-2030, which is expected to be endorsed by the LCBC Council of Ministers. The revised strategy seeks to shift focus from stabilisation efforts to sustained stability and put greater emphasis on socio-economic development on the basis of the security, humanitarian and development nexus approach.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may commend the MNJTF for the progress it registered in degrading the capabilities of the terrorist groups operating in its areas of operation in the LCB region and the resultant progress in the stabilisation of the affected regions. It may also welcome the productive conclusion of Operation Lake Sanity II undertaken by MNJTF. The PSC may commend the MNJTF participating countries and encourage them to sustain and enhance the close coordination between them. In this respect, the PSC may welcome the MOU signed between Nigeria and Niger and the resumption of Niger’s participation in the MNJTF. It may call on AU and LCBC to mobilise additional support to the MNJTF particularly in terms of enhancing its anti IED and amphibious and naval capabilities. It may request the renewal of the MoU between the AU and the LCBC for another year. In light of the threat that terrorist groups in the LCB region pose and the need for sustaining gains made, the PSC is expected to renew the mandate of the MNJTF for a further period of 12 months. The PSC may also commend the LCBC for its role in the stabilisation of the region through the implementation of the Regional Stabilisation Strategy and the progress made towards the revision and adjustment of the Strategy. The PSC may express concern about the humanitarian situation in the region, including the impact of climate change and the recent flooding. It may underscore the need for a climate change sensitive programming and provision of rehabilitation support for affected regions and communities.