The Lake Chad Basin, encompassing Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria, remains a region of complex security, humanitarian, and developmental challenges, largely driven by the activities of Boko Haram and its factions, including the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS). The MNJTF, comprising troops from the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) member states and Benin, remains a critical regional coalition serving as the security instrument in countering the threats posed by these groups. The Force has reportedly facilitated the return of over 3,800 internally displaced persons (IDPs) and 2,306 refugees in 2024 alone.

However, despite significant military successes by the MNJTF, the terror groups continue to pose a threat through asymmetric tactics such as the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), suicide attacks, abductions and attacks on civilian and military targets. In one such recent major attack, on 25 March, Boko Haram is reported to have killed at least 20 Cameroonian soldiers in an attack on a military base in the Nigerian border town of Wulgo.

One of the issues expected to feature during tomorrow’s session concerns the operational challenges facing MNJTF. Despite ongoing support from the AU and partners, the MNJTF continues to face capability gaps that undermine the effectiveness of its counterterrorism operations, such as a lack of appropriate counter-IED equipment. IEDs, particularly those placed along main supply routes, accounted for approximately 60% of MNJTF casualties in 2024. The unavailability of sophisticated IED detectors has delayed troop movements and places both civilian convoys and military convoys at risk. The absence of a dedicated attack aircraft has also left the force reliant on TCCs national air forces, delaying approvals and undermining the force’s ability to mount coordinated air-ground operations. Considering that terrorist forces have begun using surveillance drones to monitor MNJTF movements, the Force’s lack of anti-drone technology or jamming systems reduces its operational advantage and leaves it vulnerable to enemy intelligence.

As highlighted in respect to the PSC’s 1254^th session, another major challenge for the MNJTF is the continued presence of terrorist groups on the islands of Lake Chad. As reported back then, the 4^th Lake Chad Basin Governors’ Forum identified as a major challenge the need ‘to clear remnants of Boko Haram fighters from their bases on the Tumbuns (islands on the fringes of the Lake Chad) from which they continue to launch attacks on the surrounding areas and beyond. The Tumbuns serve as their logistics hub, secure havens, and staging grounds. Their occupation of these islands also facilitates their generation of funds through illegal fishing and farming activities.’ In this respect, the 5^th Lake Chad Basin Governors’ Forum held late in January 2025 called for ensuring that ‘member states effectively occupy the Lake Chad islands as a means of strengthening transboundary security, with a focus on securing and controlling waterways.’

Another issue is the follow up on PSC’s decision on ensuring the participation of Niger in the MNJTF. Although the initial interruption of Niger’s participation in MNJTF following the coup of June 2023 was restored owing to engagement from Nigeria, in March 2025 Niger announced its withdrawal from MNJTF. Apart from political dynamics, it appears that withdrawal of support for Niger might have played a role. The Communique of the Lake Chad Basin 5^th Governors Forum for the Regional Cooperation on Stabilisation, Peacebuilding and Sustainable Development, thus ‘noted with concern the suspension of donor support for Niger’s National Window of the Regional Stabilisaiton Facility (RSF), which could negatively impact progress across the region.’

It is feared that Niger’s withdrawal will weaken the MNJTF and create a security vacuum that the terrorist groups operating in Lake Chad could take advantage of. The void from Niger’s withdrawal coupled with the influx of militants and weapons from the Sahel and ISIS networks in North Africa, poses threat to the gains made under the MNJTF. It is also worth recalling that the death of 40 Chadian soldiers in a terrorist attack on a military base in Chad’s border region with Nigeria last December prompted Chad’s President Mahamat Idriss Déby to threaten possible withdrawal from the MNJTF as well. During tomorrow’s session, it would be of interest for PSC members to get clarity on the implications of Niger’s withdrawal for the MNJTF and how any adverse impact of the withdrawal can be mitigated.

The other issue that the PSC is expected to discuss during tomorrow’s session is the regional stabilisation strategy. The RS-SRR, endorsed by the PSC during the 816^th session held on 5 December 2018 and entered its second phase in 2024, complements the MNJTF’s military efforts by addressing the structural drivers of conflict through addressing broader governance, humanitarian, and development challenges. The strategy, implemented across eight targeted territories in the four LCBC states, has facilitated community reconstruction, market reactivation, and the reintegration of former combatants. Following the revision of the RS-SRR for 2025 – 2030 at the 5^th steering committee meeting on 20 September 2024, with updated Territorial Action Plans (TAPs) and a Community-based Reconciliation and Reintegration Policy to enhance its effectiveness, the 70^th Ordinary Session of the LCBC Council of Ministers held in Niamey, Republic of Niger on 27 February 2025 adopted the revised strategy. The revised strategy seeks to shift focus from stabilisation efforts to sustained stability and puts greater emphasis on socio-economic development on the basis of the security, humanitarian and development nexus approach. The LCBC Council of Ministers also directed the Executive Secretariat to revise the Territorial Action Plans (TAPs) and develop a Regional Transitional Justice Policy.

The communiqué of the 5^th Lake Chad Basin Governors’ Forum, among others, encouraged the PSC to endorse the adjusted RS-SRR. Tomorrow’s session will thus provide an opportunity for the PSC to assess progress on the implementation of the strategy and consider the updated RS-SRR for endorsement. The PSC is also likely to reiterate its 1207^th session call for the states to develop National Action Plans in line with UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 2250 and 2419, and to operationalise these two UNSC Resolutions through the revised TAPs, in order to ensure that the implementation of the revised RS SRR effectively addresses the structural root causes of the conflict.

Sustained reintegration of returnees and fighters that deserted the terror groups requires stronger investment in infrastructure, education and livelihoods. In the report to the PSC in January 2025, the AU Commission Chairperson noted that ‘[w]hile the number of resettled populations have continued to rise, most of these communities received little or no form of humanitarian assistance, and there is a need for urgent actions to enhance the livelihoods of these resettled communities.’   Environmental degradation, exacerbated by climate change, compounds these challenges and increases community vulnerability.

The expected outcome of the session is a communique. The Council is expected to endorse the revised RS–SRR and call on member states to align their national plans with the revised strategy. The PSC may underscore the need for enhancing close coordination and commitment of MNJTF member states and for continuing to engage in Niger on collaboration in addressing the collective threat posed by terrorist groups in the region. The PSC may also call for fortifying the capabilities of the MNJTF, including by equipping the mission with anti-drone technology or jamming systems to address the threat posed by the deployment of drones from terrorist groups. The Council may also wish to follow up on its 1207^th decision to undertake a solidarity field mission to the Lake Chad Basin. The PSC may call on AU and LCBC to mobilise additional support to the MNJTF, particularly in terms of enhancing its anti-IED and amphibious and naval capabilities. The PSC may underscore the need for climate change sensitive programming and provision of rehabilitation support for affected regions and communities. The PSC may emphasise the importance of enhancing collaboration between the MNJTF and Regional Economic Communities, particularly ECOWAS, to facilitate more coherent cross-border responses and address the transnational nature of the threats posed by Boko Haram and the ISWAP. The PSC may also task the AU Commission and the LCBC to undertake an assessment of the impact of the withdrawal of Niger from the MNJTF and develop strategy for mitigating adverse impacts.