16th annual joint consultative meeting between the EUPSC and AU PSC
16th annual joint consultative meeting between the EUPSC and AU PSC
Date | 8 October 2025
Tomorrow (09 October), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (AU PSC) and the European Union (EU) Political and Security Committee (EUPSC) will convene their 16th annual joint consultative meeting. This follows the 8th annual joint retreat taking place today in Brussels, Belgium, where the consultative meeting is also being held.
Opening remarks at the 16th consultative meeting are expected from Tebelelo Boang, Permanent Representative of Botswana to the AU and the AU PSC Chairperson for October, and the Permanent Chair of the EUPSC, Delphine Pronk.
This year’s consultative meeting comes against the background of three consecutive years of the AUPSC and the EUPSC being unable to adopt a joint communique due to disagreement over the language to be included with specific reference to the war in Ukraine. It is anticipated that this trend will finally come to an end during this year’s consultative meeting.
The members of the PSC reviewed and provided inputs on the draft joint communiqué only yesterday 6 October after the draft was sent by the EU side to the AU belatedly on Friday 3 October. The agenda for this year’s consultative meeting reflects continuity with past discussions, focusing on developments in the Horn of Africa—particularly Somalia/AUSSOM and Sudan—, the Sahel, the Lake Chad Basin, and the Great Lakes Region. In addition, the two sides are expected to address broader global geopolitical developments under ‘Any Other Business’. Additionally, the final agenda included ‘Working lunch on Women, Peace and Security’ during which the AU Special Envoy on Women, Peace and Security is scheduled to make a presentation.
Horn of Africa
Under the Horn of Africa agenda item, two situations are envisaged to receive particular attention: the situation in Somalia, including the deployment of AUSSOM, and the ongoing crisis in Sudan.
With Ethiopia and Eswatini leading the intervention of the PSC on Somalia and AUSSOM, the dominant concern remains the mission’s funding. AUSSOM is faced with an existential crisis, arising from mounting debts and the lack of a predictable and sustainable financing arrangement to sustain operations until its planned exit at the end of 2029.
The AU had pinned its hope on UN Security Council Resolution 2719 on the financing of AU-led Peace Support Operations as a viable framework for predictable financing. However, efforts to operationalise the resolution stalled in May after the UN Security Council failed to reach an agreement, primarily due to U.S. opposition to applying the resolution as a test case for AUSSOM.
The AU has long explored alternative mechanisms, particularly the convening of a pledging conference. Following repeated delays—including earlier plans for Doha to host—progress was made on 25 September 2025 when the AU, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), the UN, and the United Kingdom co-convened a High-Level Financing Event for AUSSOM on the margins of the UN General Assembly in New York. The AU has already committed an unprecedented amount of USD 20 million from its Peace Fund Crisis Reserve Facility for the mission’s 2025 operations, in addition to the provision of personnel and logistical enablers to strengthen operational effectiveness. The United Kingdom pledged GBP 16.5 million (USD 22 million), while Italy and Spain each appeared to commit USD 1 million. Additional, albeit modest, contributions are also anticipated from Japan and the Republic of Korea.
Given the nearly $200 million annual budget of AUSSOM, the pledges—though symbolically important—remain insufficient to bridge the gap. The co-chairs’ summary of the New York event underscored that ‘AUSSOM’s sustainability depends on closing the current financing gap, which remains substantial’. Yet, in the immediate term, there may be a possibility for significantly reducing the financing gap if the EU comes to the rescue of the mission through additional renewed support, considering the EU investment into this mission as the single largest contributor to AU missions in Somalia, providing close to €2.7 billion since 2007.
While the EU has not yet announced a specific funding package for AUSSOM, following the signal from the EU during the pledging conference in New York, expectations remain high that the EU may make an announcement in the near future. Tomorrow’s consultative meeting is expected to provide more clarity on the EU’s thinking in this respect.
Meanwhile, Somalia’s political landscape remains tense, with disagreements sparked by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s introduction of a ‘one person, one vote’ electoral model for the 2026 elections, replacing the long-standing clan-based indirect system. The move has generated friction with opposition figures and some of the federal member states, notably Jubaland and Puntland. These tensions risk diverting focus from the fight against al-Shabaab and, if left unresolved, could potentially escalate into violence.
It is also expected that, despite the fact that the attempt to apply Resolution 2719 to AUSSOM did not succeed, reference will be made in the outcome document to the continued relevance of Resolution 2719 and the imperative for its implementation.
With Tanzania and Algeria leading PSC’s intervention on Sudan, discussions are expected to focus on the security, political, humanitarian situations and the ongoing diplomatic efforts to end the conflict. Fierce fighting has continued around El-Fasher and the Kordofan region between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).
On the political front, a particular point of concern for both counterparts will be the establishment of parallel governing structures and their implications for Sudan’s territorial integrity. In May 2025, SAF leader Abdel Fattah al-Burhan appointed Kamil Idris as prime minister and announced a technocratic government based in Port Sudan. In response, the RSF-led Tasis coalition declared its own parallel government in Nyala, the capital of South Darfur, in July 2025, naming Mohamed Hassan al-Taishi as Prime Minister, RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo as head of a Presidential Council, and SPLM-N leader Abdel Aziz al-Hilu as his deputy.
The PSC, during its 1264th, 1292nd, and 1293rd sessions, firmly rejected the RSF’s creation of a parallel government and urged AU member states and the wider international community not to recognise it. Similarly, the 24 September 2025 Co-Chairs’ statement issued by the AU, EU, France, Germany, and the UK following a ministerial meeting on Sudan ‘strongly’ rejected the establishment of parallel governing structures. In tomorrow’s meeting, the PSC and the EU PSC may reiterate the more neutral language of the co-chairs’ statement, rejecting the establishment of parallel governments in Sudan, while emphasising the need for a Sudanese-led and Sudanese-owned transition process.
Signs of a more concerted diplomatic process gained momentum in September, though it remains fragile and without any breakthrough. On 12 September, the foreign ministers of the United States, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates (the Quad) issued a joint statement calling for an initial three-month humanitarian truce leading to a permanent ceasefire, followed by the launch and conclusion of an inclusive and transparent transition process within nine months. The conflict parties did not heed the call.
On 24 September, the Quad’s foreign ministers met again on the margins of the UN General Assembly in New York. That same day, the AU, EU, France, Germany, and the UK convened a ministerial meeting with relevant actors to discuss Sudan and coordinate efforts toward de-escalation and civilian protection. The Co-Chairs’ statement, while welcoming Quad’s joint statement, expressed support for the AU and IGAD’s efforts to coordinate international and bilateral initiatives to pressure all Sudanese parties towards a ceasefire, humanitarian action and political dialogue. While these peace initiatives are encouraging, the lack of coordination among various initiatives remains a major challenge to launching a credible single peace process for Sudan—a challenge that tomorrow’s meeting is likely to reflect upon further.
The two counterparts are also expected to discuss ways of increasing pressure on the warring parties to allow unhindered humanitarian access, urge foreign actors to refrain from fueling the conflict, and step up humanitarian assistance in response to what has become the world’s most devastating humanitarian and displacement crisis—with over two-thirds of the population (30 million people) in need of assistance and more than 24 million facing acute food insecurity.
Great Lakes Region
With The Gambia and Equatorial Guinea leading PSC’s intervention, on the Great Lakes Region, as before, the focus remains on the situation in eastern DRC and the renewed diplomatic efforts to address it—particularly the involvement of the US and Qatar alongside the AU and relevant regional blocs (SADC and EAC). Diplomatic activity has intensified since M23’s significant territorial advances in eastern DRC beginning in January, including control of mineral-rich Goma in North Kivu Province.
A major breakthrough was the US-brokered peace agreement signed between the DRC and Rwanda on 27 June 2025. The two parties agreed, among others, to refrain from acts of aggression; to immediately and unconditionally end state support to non-state armed groups; and to implement the Harmonised Plan for the Neutralisation of the FDLR and Disengagement of Forces/Lifting of Defensive Measures by Rwanda—an outcome of the Luanda process. To support implementation, a Joint Oversight Committee—composed of the two parties, the US, Qatar, Togo (as AU facilitator), and the AU Commission—has been operationalised and has convened three meetings so far, the latest held earlier this month. In parallel, Qatar has been facilitating direct peace talks between the DRC and M23 since late March. This separate but coordinated track with the US produced a preliminary peace agreement in July, but missed the mid-August deadline for a final deal. Talks are expected to resume during the week of 6 October.
Meanwhile, in March, the joint EAC-SADC Summit appointed a Panel of Facilitators composed of five former Presidents to support the DRC peace process. On 1 August, the Co-Chairs of the Joint EAC-SADC Summit met the Panel in Nairobi and adopted a framework to merge the Nairobi and Luanda processes. They also decided on the immediate merger of EAC-SADC and AU structures into a single mechanism comprising the AU Mediator and the EAC-SADC Panel of Facilitators. The Summit further called on the AU Commission to ensure all other initiatives and stakeholders align with this African-led process.
Against this backdrop, tomorrow’s meeting will grapple with at least three issues. First, despite progress in implementing the US-brokered peace agreement, hostilities and hostile rhetoric persist, with the parties trading blame for obstructing peace efforts. Second, accountability in the region is critical in light of continued allegations of human rights violations against civilians, as evidenced in the 5 September report of the Fact-Finding Mission on North and South Kivu. Third, there is also the issue of how the three peace initiatives could be consolidated into one credible process.
Sahel and Lake Chad Basin
On the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin, Algeria, Angola, and Nigeria will lead the intervention of the PSC during tomorrow’s meeting. The security and political situation in the Sahel has continued to deteriorate since the last consultative meetings of the two organs in November 2024. JNIM and ISGS have intensified their attacks in the Central Sahel and expanded their operations into coastal West Africa. This worsening insecurity is compounded by protracted political transitions, with the juntas in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger consolidating power and extending military rule until 2030.
The approach of the AU and the regional body ECOWAS was primarily focused on the unconstitutional change of government, with no due regard to the priority issue of saving the countries from the existential threat facing them due to terrorism. In a departure from this flawed policy approach, at their second annual joint consultative meeting, they held in May, the PSC and ECOWAS agreed to develop a security cooperation framework with the three countries to more effectively respond to the crisis.
Tomorrow’s consultative meeting is expected to discuss recent AU efforts, including the AU Commission Chairperson’s meeting with representatives of the three countries in May, the visit of Angola’s Foreign Minister as special envoy on behalf of AU Chairperson João Lourenço, and the July appointments of President Évariste Ndayishimiye of Burundi as Special Envoy for the Sahel and former Gambian Foreign Minister Mamadou Tangara as Special Representative for Mali and the Sahel and Head of MISAHEL. The meeting is further expected to deliberate on ways to step up engagement with the three countries to address the security crisis as a critical avenue for facilitating a return to constitutional order.
On Lake Chad Basin, tomorrow’s discussion is expected to focus on the security and humanitarian situation in the Lake Chad Basin, the operations and support needs of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), and the status of implementing the Regional Strategy for Stabilisation, Recovery and Resilience (RS-SRR). The EU has pledged €30 million over 18 months from January 2025 to strengthen MNJTF operations, while the AU Commission has also been providing support through the Crisis Reserve Facility of the AU Peace Fund and equipment from the Continental Logistics Base. A key regional development of interest to the consultative meeting is Niger’s March announcement of its withdrawal from the MNJTF, raising fears that this could weaken the Force and create a security vacuum that can be exploited by terrorist groups active in the region.
This year, beyond African peace and security issues, the agenda also reserves space for Any Other Business (AOB) to discuss global geopolitical developments. As an agenda proposed by the EU side, it remains unclear what the focus of the discussion on this agenda would be. However, there is increasing recognition that the major global geopolitical changes, characterised by, among others, the emergence of a multipolar world, are not without serious implications for both the AU and the EU and for their relationship. In this context, the flagrant breaches of international law norms, including international humanitarian law and related challenges to multilateralism and global governance reform, may also feature in the discussions.
As noted earlier, for the past three years, the PSC and the EU PSC have been unable to adopt a joint communiqué, primarily due to disagreements over the language to be used on the war in Ukraine. As highlighted in our earlier insights on the PSC, the recent AU–EU ministerial meeting held in May 2025 and the ongoing negotiations toward the outcome document of the forthcoming AU–EU Summit, expected in November 2025, have created optimism that both sides may reach common ground to adopt a joint communiqué this time. Indications are that the draft communiqué of the consultative meeting reproduced the formulation used in the joint ministerial communiqué which expressed support for ‘a just, comprehensive, and lasting peace in Ukraine, the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Sudan, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the Sahel and in other major wars and conflicts around the globe, including Syria.’ With this, the two sides are expected to adopt a joint communiqué, ending the past three years of deadlock in adopting such a communiqué.
8th Informal Joint Retreat of the AUPSC and EUPSC
8th Informal Joint Retreat of the AUPSC and EUPSC
Date | 7 October 2025
Tomorrow (08 October), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the European Union (EU) Political and Security Committee (EUPSC) will convene their 8th informal joint retreat, which will be followed by the 16th annual joint consultative meeting to be convened on 09 October. This year’s joint retreat and consultative meeting is set to be hosted by EUPSC in Brussels, Belgium.
Ahead of the joint retreat, the AU PSC, particularly at the level of the Committee of Experts, met in Brussels on 6 October to finalise consultation on the agenda and the assignment of roles in leading interventions by members of the PSC. With the draft communique initiated by the EU side relayed to the AU belatedly on Friday 3 October, this will also be the first time that the AU PSC gets a chance to view and discuss on the draft joint communiqué.
Since 2015, the AUPSC and the EUPSC have institutionalised the practice of holding an informal joint retreat before their annual consultative meeting. Typically, the informal joint retreat focuses on current thematic issues. Tomorrow’s retreat is expected to focus on three key agenda items. The first one will be Peace Support Operations, with a focus on the implementation of United Nations (UN) Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2719 and complementarity between Africa-led operations and EU-Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operations. The second agenda item will focus on maritime security, and the third will address hybrid threats to peace and security, with a particular emphasis on cybersecurity, AI, and disinformation.
Peace support operations constitute a major area of longstanding partnership between the AU and the EU. With the understanding that AU’s peace support operations are critical for advancing global public good and fill in critical gaps in the international peace and security architecture, the EU has been a leading partner of the AU, among others, in making significant financial contributions to AU peace operations. Following the end of the Africa Peace Facility and the inauguration of the European Peace Facility, there has been a shift in approach. Yet, tomorrow’s session is expected to build on the AU-EU ministerial joint communiqué commitment to ‘strengthen African security, defence capabilities and stabilisation, including the supply of military equipment through the European Peace Facility and the African Peace and Security Architecture.’
In terms of partnership on peace operations in Africa, the most notable recent development was the adoption of UNSC Resolution 2719 on the financing of AU-led peace operations. One concrete situation in respect of which there was strong convergence between the AU and the EU on the application of this resolution was the AU Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). Thus, EU-AU Foreign Ministers in the Joint Communiqué they adopted after their meeting on 21 May 2025 ‘recognised the need for adequate, predictable and sustainable international support for AUSSOM and supported the hybrid implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 2719 (2023) pertaining to the framework for financing the AU PSOs by the UN [and] considered this as more pressing given the multiplicity of challenges facing the Federal Government of Somalia and the need to continue supporting the government and strengthening state institutions.’ Despite the consensus between the AU and the EU on the application of UNSC Resolution 2719, the UNSC failed to adopt a decision on the use of this resolution for financing the AU mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). With no alternative source of funding available, the AUSSOM is faced with an existential financial crisis.
Despite the setback regarding the application of the Resolution for financing AUSSOM, the PSC is expected not only to affirm strong support for Resolution 2719 but also to call for strong commitment by all for the implementation of the resolution. The draft joint communiqué initiated by the EU side does not contain a dedicated language on Resolution 2719, which is viewed by members of the PSC as an omission that needs to be rectified. It is thus anticipated that the PSC will push for a formulation expressing strong support for and a joint call for advancing the implementation of the resolution in the joint communiqué to be adopted during the annual consultative meeting.
The second sub-item of the first agenda item focuses on complementarity between African missions and EU missions/operations. The EU runs various missions and operations as part of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy and CSDP in various parts of the continent, including three military operations (Central African Republic (CAR), Mozambique and Somalia) and five civilian missions (CAR, Gulf of Guinea, Libya, Mauritania and Somalia). In the theatres where African and EU missions operate in parallel, there is an opportunity for closer coordination and advancing complementarity. It is expected that during tomorrow’s retreat, the PSC and the EUPSC will exchange on opportunities not only for experience and information sharing but also for technical and logistical cooperation between the Africa-led missions and the EU-CSDP missions and operations operating in the same country.
The other agenda item tabled for the AUPSC-EUPSC informal retreat is Maritime Security. From the Joint communiqué of the May 2025 AU-EU Summit, the ministers welcomed the ongoing cooperation between the two continents on enhancing maritime security in the ocean and sea bordering Africa and Europe. In this regard, they ‘renewed their commitment to maintaining a rules-based maritime order in accordance with the principles of international law as reflected in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and called for greater exchange of information, improvement of operational coordination and provision of enforcement capacity to protect sea lanes and combat transnational crimes, including drug trafficking and piracy. The ministers also committed to work together to end Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing, take action to conserve and sustainably use the ocean and sea, as well as promote science-based management of marine resources.’ The upcoming consultations are likely to discuss the evolving maritime security threats critical to Africa’s blue economy, global trade routes and EU-Africa partnerships.
The engagement on this may build on the 23 April 1275th session of the PSC, which focused on the ‘Imperative of a Combined Maritime Task Force in Addressing Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.’ From the session’s communiqué, it is notable that beyond endorsing the Combined Maritime Task Force for the Gulf of Guinea as a standing, ready-to-deploy force capable of rapid and coordinated regional responses, the PSC underscored the importance of addressing the underlying drivers of maritime crime – poverty, weak governance and limited economic opportunities. This marked a welcome shift toward a holistic, preventive approach to maritime security, recognising that sustainable stability cannot be secured through military and law enforcement measures alone. By prioritising issues such as development deficits, corruption, youth unemployment and lack of sustainable livelihoods, the approach holds promise for building long-term resilience in coastal communities.
Finally, the last agenda item to be discussed at the AUPSC-EUPSC joint informal retreat is hybrid threats to peace and security, with particular focus on cybersecurity, AI and disinformation. Hybrid threats encompassing cybersecurity breaches, AI-driven manipulations and disinformation campaigns have escalated globally and across Africa as well, posing a threat to stability. According to INTERPOL’s 2025 Africa Cyberthreat Assessment Report, a growing share of reported crimes in Africa is cyber-related. The report goes further and highlights that, despite the rising caseloads, most African states surveyed still lack essential IT infrastructure to combat cybercrime. Just 30 per cent of countries reported having an incident reporting system, 29 per cent a digital evidence repository and 19 per cent a cyberthreat intelligence database.
Regarding AI and disinformation, the AU Commission Chairperson noted in a speech earlier this year that ‘with AI’s ability to spread rapidly, …complex ethical and security concerns now exist.’ He cautioned that ‘[l]eft unchecked, AI will amplify these threats, exploiting disinformation, cyber-attacks, and even autonomous weapons,’ adding that disinformation and hate speech in the online space have become ‘most dangerous accelerators of conflicts.’ Accordingly, the AUC Chairperson counselled that ‘[o]ur response must be to pursue a balanced approach—one that maximises AI’s benefits while mitigating its risks.’ It is expected within this context that the two sides would exchange respective experiences, both in terms of the nature and trend of the threat posed by cybersecurity, AI and disinformation, and in terms of the tools being used and developed to respond to these threats. Issues that may feature include closing AI governance gaps, harmonising early warning systems for AI-driven misinformation and expanding capacity-building for digital literacy and fact-checking. By integrating African perspectives into the development of global AI norms and governance, as well as advancing joint action for countering hybrid threats, the consultations can ensure the adaptation of the AU’s and EU’s governance and peace and security instruments to these emerging domains.
Provisional Programme of Work of the PSC for the Month of October 2025
Provisional Programme of Work of the PSC for the Month of October 2025
Date | October 2025
In October, the Republic of Botswana assumes the role of chairing the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC). The Provisional Programme of Work (PPoW) for the month envisages three substantive sessions. Additionally, it schedules the commemoration of the Africa Amnesty Month; the 16th Annual Joint Consultative Meeting and the 8th Joint Retreat between the European Union Political and Security Committee (EUPSC) and the PSC; the 19th Annual Joint Consultative Meeting and the 10th Annual Joint Informal Seminar between the members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the PSC. All three substantive meetings will be held at the ambassadorial level. Two of the sessions will focus on thematic issues, while the remaining session will be on a country-specific situation. The PSC plans to hold one of the meetings as an open session.
In addition to the activities of the PSC, the PSC Committee of Experts (CoE) is also expected to hold two meetings in preparation for the annual joint consultations between the PSC and the EUPSC, as well as between the PSC and the UNSC. The Military Staff Committee (MSC) will also meet to get a briefing from the Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) of the Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) on the operationalisation of the African Standby Force.
On 2 and 3 October, the PSC will be in Kampala, Uganda, to commemorate the Africa Amnesty Month, which is the month of September. It was the 29th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly in July 2017 that declared September of each year as ‘Africa Amnesty Month’ for the surrender and collection of illegally owned small arms and light weapons (SALW). A part of the AU flagship project of Silencing the Guns, the commemoration, involving the symbolic destruction of illegal arms and weapons, seeks to raise awareness about the serious threat that the illegal trade and circulation of SALWs poses to peace and stability as a major driver of conflicts in Africa. The occasion encourages the surrender of illegally owned weapons to designated authorities in exchange for amnesty from prosecution for possession of such weapons. This session will build on the previous year’s commemoration, held in the Central African Republic, under the framework of ‘Advancing the Goal of Silencing the Guns in Africa by 2030.’
On 6 October, the PSC CoE will meet to prepare for the 16th Joint Consultative Meeting between the PSC and the EUPSC. Apart from working on the interventions that various members of the PSC will make on the various elements of the draft agenda for the meeting and the joint retreat, the preparatory meeting is expected to consider the draft of the expected joint communiqué to be adopted by the PSC and the EUPSC.
The PSC will be in Brussels, Belgium, from 7 to 10 October, for the 16th Annual Joint Consultative Meeting with the EUPSC and the 8th Joint Annual Retreat. Ahead of the consultative meeting, the 8th Joint Retreat will be held, focusing on identified thematic issues. One of these is on peace support operations – particularly the implementation of UNSC Resolution 2719 and the complementarity between African-led and EU-CSDP operations. It is also expected to cover maritime security and hybrid threats, including cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, and disinformation. The 16th Annual Joint Consultative Meeting, on the other hand, will address regional and specific conflict situations. Accordingly, the consultative meeting is expected to consider the situation in the Horn of Africa (including Somalia and the AUSSOM deployment and the war in Sudan), the Great Lakes Region, focusing on the situation in Eastern DRC, the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin. It is anticipated that there will be discussion under Any Other Business (AOB) as well. It should be recalled that last year, during the 15th AUPSC and EUPSC Annual Joint Consultative Meeting held on 22 November, the meeting concluded without the adoption of a joint communiqué. This was the third consecutive year that the two bodies failed to produce a shared outcome document, despite substantial agreement on all the agenda items. As discussed in our November 2024 Monthly Digest, the draft joint communiqué was not adopted because of a lack of agreement on items raised under AOB. Given that the AU and the EU held a ministerial meeting in May 2025 and are finalising negotiations on the outcome of the AU-EU summit expected to be held in November 2025, there is anticipation that the two sides will find common ground for adopting a joint communiqué this time around. The Chairperson for the month also plans to work hard to secure such an outcome.
On 13 October, the CoE will meet again to prepare for the Joint Consultative Meeting between the AUPSC and members of the UNSC in Addis Ababa. As the host of this year’s consultation, the PSC is responsible for initiating the agenda and the draft joint communiqué. It is expected that the preparatory meeting will focus on firming up the draft agenda for both the joint seminar and the annual consultative meeting. It will also continue to work on the draft joint communiqué.
On the following day, 14 October, the PSC is scheduled to consider and adopt the programme of work for the month of November.
On 16 and 17 October, the PSC and the UNSC will convene for the 10th Annual Informal Joint Seminar and the 19th Annual Joint Consultative Meeting, respectively, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. In August 2025, Ambassador Mohamed KHALED, Permanent Representative of Algeria to the AU and PSC Chairperson for August 2025; and Ambassador Eloy Alfaro de Alba Permanent Representative of Panama to the UN and President of the UNSC for August 2025, co-chaired an online meeting in preparation for the 10th Annual Informal Joint Seminar and the 19th Annual Joint Consultative Meeting between the AUPSC and the Members of the UNSC. This meeting was also attended by Ambassador Boang, Permanent Representative of Botswana to the AU, and the Deputy Permanent Representative of Russia to the UN, who will respectively co-chair (Botswana and Russia) the upcoming annual consultations. This year, it is expected that the 10th Annual Informal Joint Seminar, scheduled for 16 October 2025, will focus on the Women, Peace and Security agenda, in which the 25th anniversary of the adoption of UNSC Resolution 1325 will be marked. It is worth recalling that this year also marks the 15th anniversary of the adoption of the PSC’s agenda on WPS as a standing agenda of the PSC. The joint seminar will be followed by the 19th Annual Joint Consultative meeting between the AUPSC and UNSC members on 17 October 2025. The issues anticipated to feature include the situations in the Sahel region, the Horn of Africa (with a focus on Somalia and the status of implementation of UNSC Resolution 2719 on financing AU-led peace support operations, Sudan and South Sudan) and the Great Lakes region, particularly Eastern DRC.
On 21 October, the MSC will receive a briefing from PSOD on the Strategic Review of the African Standby Force (ASF), specifically on its effective functioning.
The ICRC is expected to brief the Council on 23 October on its activities and the humanitarian situation in Africa. Since becoming a statutory meeting in 2007, this year’s session is expected to feature a briefing by the ICRC President, highlighting key humanitarian concerns in Africa and trends in humanitarian assistance. It will be the first time that the current president of the ICRC will brief the PSC. It is expected that the focus will include country-specific humanitarian situations, with a particular focus on Sudan, South Sudan, the DRC, and the Sahel. Also to be addressed are key thematic issues such as the humanitarian impact of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), explosive weapons in populated areas (EWIPA); the humanitarian impact of digital technologies in armed conflict; climate change, peace and security; and a highlight on the recently launched Global IHL Initiative by ICRC and six other states – including Brazil, China, France, Jordan, Kazakhstan and South Africa – to ‘galvanize political commitment to IHL.’
Following this, the PSC will convene an open session on Women, Peace, and Security in Africa on 28 October, marking the 25th anniversary of UNSC Resolution 1325. The last meeting of the PSC focusing on this agenda item was held in March 2025, during its 1268th meeting, in which, among other things, Council underlined ‘the need to advocate for the implementation of the UNSC Resolution 1325, adopted on 31 October 2000, which addresses the impact of armed conflict on women and emphasizes the importance of women’s participation in peace and security efforts.’ The Conclusions of the High Level Ministerial Seminar on WPS in Africa of March 2024 requested the AUC to develop a ‘Policy Framework of Women Quotas in Formal Peace Processes across Africa, which will guide the Continent to meet the statutory minimum of thirty percent (30%) gender quota for women’s participation in all conflict prevention and management missions, peace processes and election observation missions led by the AU.’ It is also worth recalling that this session comes fifteen years after the PSC institutionalised annual discussions on this theme through its landmark 223rd meeting in March 2010. The upcoming meeting, therefore, offers a timely opportunity to reflect on the 15-year journey of the PSC on WPS, focusing on progress made, gaps and challenges affecting the effective pursuit of the WPS agenda.
The last PSC meeting of the month, scheduled for 30 October, will focus on the situation in South Sudan. This agenda item was specifically proposed by the Chairperson of the AU Commission to ensure that the PSC closely monitors developments in the country ahead of the December 2026 elections. The meeting comes few weeks after the Council released a Press Statement, on 18 September, in which as much as no substantive decision came from the document, it ‘reaffirmed the AU’s unwavering commitment to continue supporting efforts aimed at enhancing reconciliation, building trust and facilitating the full implementation of the RARCSS and encouraged both, the signatory and non-signatory parties to the Revitalized Peace Agreement to demonstrate their commitment to fostering lasting peace and stability in the interest of the entire people of South Sudan.’ This statement came against the background of the initiation of prosecution of the country’s first vice president and the signatory of one of the two parties to the RARCSS, Riek Machar. This meeting is expected to follow up on the commitments pledged during the 1297th meeting of August 2025, in which the Chairperson of the AU Commission was tasked, among others, ‘to urgently appoint an AU High-Level Representative to South Sudan, preferably a former Head of State, to maintain regular engagements with the South Sudanese authorities and other key stakeholders.’
Briefing on the Sahel region
Briefing on the Sahel region
Date | 29 September 2025
Tomorrow (30 September), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to convene a ministerial-level session to receive a briefing on the situation in the Sahel region.
The Chairperson of the PSC for September 2025, Angola’s Minister of External Relations Amb. Tete Antonio is expected to preside over the session and deliver the opening statement. Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace, and Security (PAPS), is also expected to make a statement. Additionally, the Special Representative of the AU Commission for Mali and the Sahel, and Head of the AU Mission in Mali and the Sahel (MISAHEL), Mamadou Tangara, may brief the PSC.
Since its last meeting on the issue in May 2023, conditions in the region have not improved. The threat facing the countries from the raging conflict involving terrorist groups remains existential. Armed groups and terrorists have intensified their attacks, involving increased use of advanced weaponry, including drones and improvised explosive devices (IEDs).
The al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) undertook major attacks during May 2025 across Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. In Burkina Faso, the deadly attack that claimed the lives of more than 300 people led to the seizure by JNIM of the capitals of two regional provinces, Djibo in the Soum province and Diapaga in the Tapoa province. Throughout the first half of 2025, militant groups also launched major assaults on military barracks in several other towns. In April, the military junta led by Captain Ibrahim Traoré claimed to have foiled a coup plot, accusing neighbouring Côte d’Ivoire of involvement.
The dire security situation in Mali has also shown intensifying persistence, with a surge in attacks by Tuareg rebels and Islamist militant groups such as Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), particularly in the northern and central regions of the country. On 15 September, at least 40 fuel tankers were reportedly destroyed when al-Qaeda-linked insurgents—who had declared a blockade on fuel imports—attacked a convoy of over 100 vehicles under military escort. JNIM’s takeover of the strategic town of Farabougou in central Mali in August was also seen as a huge setback for the Malian Junta. Since July, JNIM has intensified its operations near Mali’s borders with Niger and Mauritania, targeting military and security infrastructure in the western part of the country. JNIM’s attacks on the Dioura military camp in the Mopti region, reportedly killed at least 40 soldiers.
In neighbouring Niger, the Tillabéri region—bordering Mali and Burkina Faso—has seen a sharp rise in terrorist attacks in recent months. Earlier this month, an ambush in the region resulted in the deaths of 14 soldiers, according to the Nigerian Ministry of Defence. In another incident, 22 civilians were killed during an attack on a baptism ceremony. In June, Islamist militants attacked a mosque, killing more than 70 people and injuring at least 20 others. In March, Niger announced its decision to withdraw from the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), which combats the terrorist threat in the Lake Chad Basin.
Terrorism and violent extremism are increasingly spreading from the Sahel states to coastal West Africa with a surge of cross-border attacks affecting several countries, including Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Togo, among others. In light of this development, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has decided to activate its standby force to combat the growing threat and regional insecurity. This issue was also raised during a meeting between the PSC and the ECOWAS mediation and Security Council in May, in which the two sides agreed to expedite the operationalisation of the AU Standby Force and the ECOWAS Standby Force.
Although there had been tensions between ECOWAS and the three Sahelian States that decided to withdraw their membership from the regional bloc, ECOWAS has been seeking to maintain constructive engagement with them. In May, the foreign ministers of the three countries met with the President of the ECOWAS Commission in Bamako to prepare for negotiations on future relations. The ECOWAS Summit in June decided to appoint a Chief Negotiator to lead the discussions with the three countries to ensure an orderly withdrawal. In recent months, regional leaders have also undertaken visits to the Sahel states. This includes Ghana’s President John Dramani Mahama, who visited Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso in May, and Sierra Leone’s President Julius Maada Bio, who travelled to Burkina Faso earlier this month in his capacity as the current Chair of ECOWAS.
Despite differences over military seizure of power in these countries, there is increasing recognition that the threat facing these countries represents a threat to the entire region and needs to be faced collectively. During their annual consultative meeting in May, the PSC and ECOWAS expressed deep concern over ‘the worsening insecurity resulting from the spread of terrorism and violent extremism in West Africa, particularly, in the Sahel region, with potential expansion to the littoral states.’ Going beyond expression of concern and perhaps for the first time in recent years, PSC and the ECOWAS Council agreed ‘to develop a security cooperation framework involving the AU and ECOWAS engagement with Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, in order to more effectively address insecurity in the West Africa Region.’ (emphasis added) However, this recognition has yet to be translated into a shared strategy and the deployment of measures for containing the threat posed by the terrorism menace afflicting these countries. Indeed, this is an area that offers an opportunity for ECOWAS and the AU to work with these countries and restore trust and create the conditions for the restoration of constitutional order.
The three countries have intensified efforts toward forming a confederation focused on diplomacy, defence, and development. In April, their Chiefs of Defence Staff met in Ouagadougou to discuss enhanced defence and security cooperation, including plans to establish a joint confederation force. They also held consultations with Russian officials in Moscow aimed at forging a strategic defence, and security partnership. In June, the Wagner Group, the Russian private security company which suffered numerous casualties in a series of attacks in Mali, withdrew from the country. It was replaced by the Africa Corps, a force directly under the command of the Russian Ministry of Defence. Captain Traoré has reportedly enlisted the services of another Russian military contractor, known as the Bears Brigade, for his personal protection. Russia has also deployed military instructors and an air defence system in Niger. However, the three countries appear keen to avoid overreliance on a single partner and are actively working to diversify their international engagements. Arab and Gulf states have become increasingly active in the region, driven by economic, security, and geopolitical interests. In July, U.S. officials visited Bamako and reportedly offered support to Mali in countering the growing terrorist threat, in exchange for access to the country’s mineral resources.
The escalating security situation has further worsened the humanitarian and human rights crisis in the region, with civilians bearing the brunt of increasing violence and instability. Numerous reports have documented human rights abuses and crimes committed by various actors, often with widespread impunity. Against this backdrop, the three Sahel states announced their decision to withdraw from the International Criminal Court (ICC) on 23 September. In their joint statement, they accused the ICC of serving as ‘an instrument of neo-colonial repression in the hands of imperialism’ and expressed their intention to establish ‘indigenous mechanisms for the consolidation of peace and justice.’
All three countries have been undergoing political transitions; however, these processes appear to have experienced major setbacks. Mali promulgated a transitional charter granting General Assimi Goïta a five-year mandate until 2030. This move triggered protests in the capital, Bamako, for the first time since 2020, with opposition parties, civil society organisations, and other groups denouncing what they view as an attempt by the junta to entrench itself in power. Burkina Faso took a similar path last year, when Traoré’s mandate as transitional president was extended by five years. Following a failed coup attempt in April, Traoré reportedly consolidated his control by purging potential rivals. In March, Niger also adopted a new transitional charter, extending General Abdourahamane Tchiani’s rule until 2030. The military junta dissolved political parties and granted amnesty to individuals involved in the 2023 military coup.
Beyond and above the decision of the PSC and ECOWAS last May for developing a joint security cooperation framework for engagement with Sahel countries, the AU also took further steps reflective of a change of policy approach towards the Sahel countries that is not confined to unconstitutional changes. In May, the Chairperson of the AU Commission met with representatives of the three countries in Addis Ababa to explore avenues for renewed engagement aimed at restoring constitutional order. Subsequently, Angola’s Minister of External Relations visited the three countries as a special envoy, delivering messages from Angolan President and current Chairperson of the AU, João Lourenço, reaffirming the organisation’s commitment to stability and security in the Sahel, as well as its support for the fight against terrorism in the region. In July, the Chairperson of the AU appointed President Évariste Ndayishimiye of Burundi as Special Envoy for the Sahel. Additionally, the Chairperson of the AU Commission appointed former Gambian Foreign Minister Mamadou Tangara as his Special Representative for Mali and the Sahel, and Head of the AU Mission in Mali and the Sahel (MISAHEL), based in Bamako.
The expected outcome of the session is a communique. The PSC is expected to express concern over the dire security situation in the Sahel, the threat it poses to the countries and the region and the slow pace of the transitional process in these countries. It may also condemn the continuing terrorist attacks in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger that are threatening institutional and territorial cohesion and stability of the countries. It may also welcome measures that are being taken by the AU and ECOWAS for engagement with the Sahel countries and the appointment of the AU Special Representative. The PSC may reiterate the decision with ECOWAS ‘to develop a security cooperation framework involving the AU and ECOWAS engagement with Burkina Faso’ and call on the AU Commission to take follow-up steps in this respect.
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Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - August 2025
Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - August 2025
Date | August 2025
In August, under the chairship of Algeria, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) had a scheduled programme of work consisting of eight substantive sessions covering nine agenda items. After the revision of the programme, seven sessions were held, covering nine agenda items and a field mission to South Sudan. Out of the nine agenda items, two focused on country-specific situations, while the rest addressed thematic issues and the Council’s meetings with other relevant bodies. All the sessions were held at the level of permanent representatives.
Re-energising Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa
Re-energising Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa
Date | 23 September 2025
Tomorrow (24 September), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1303rd session in New York, on the margins of the 80th session of the UN General Assembly, at the level of Heads of State and Government, to deliberate on the theme ‘Re-energising Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa.’
The Chairperson of the PSC for September 2025, Angola’s President João Lourenço, will preside over the session and deliver the opening statement, followed by an introductory statement from Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, Chairperson of the AU Commission. António Guterres, Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN), is also expected to deliver a statement. Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), may deliver a presentation on strategies for effective conflict resolution in Africa.
The session appears to be Angola’s signature event during its chairship of the PSC in September. The theme of this session resonates well with President Lourenço’s role as AU Champion for Peace and Reconciliation and his pivotal mediation in the conflict in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo through the Luanda Process. It is expected that tomorrow’s deliberation will present an opportunity for Heads of State and Government to reassess the AU’s conflict resolution efforts and reflect on critical lessons and best practices for enhancing the PSC’s mandate in this area.
The session comes at a critical moment for the AU and its conflict prevention and resolution mandate. Conflicts across the continent are surging, spreading geographically, and causing devastating human and socio-economic impacts. At the same time, the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)—AU’s framework for promoting peace, security and stability—has struggled to provide effective responses. In crises ranging from Libya and Sudan to tensions between the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda, external actors have increasingly assumed a lead role in peace efforts, while the AU has increasingly assumed a marginal role. This decline in African agency is unfolding against a wider backdrop of intensifying global rivalries, the erosion of multilateralism, and the expanding involvement of foreign actors in African conflicts or crises. These developments highlight the urgent need to recalibrate APSA and restore the AU’s role as a leading actor in resolving conflicts on the continent.
These developments make tomorrow’s session particularly significant. A key focus of the deliberations of the session is therefore expected to be how to reverse the downward spiral in AU’s role in conflict prevention and resolution and explore ways and means of advancing effective conflict prevention and resolution strategies and interventions. As a summit-level meeting of the PSC, the outcome of this meeting could also set the framework and inform the ongoing APSA review process.
One aspect of the deliberation is expected to highlight the challenges undermining the AU’s conflict prevention and resolution role. Several interlinked factors stand out, the first being the lack of strategic leadership. In earlier years, the AU demonstrated its ability to initiate credible mediation. The High-Level Implementation Panel on Sudan and South Sudan is a good example as an AU conflict resolution mechanism that highlights the key elements of a successful peace process: strong PSC direction, capable and committed mediators, sustained engagement and robust wider continental and international support. In 2012, it produced a roadmap so credible that even the UN Security Council endorsed it and helped to pull Sudan and South Sudan from the brink of a full-blown war. By contrast, recent AU efforts— Such as the one on Sudan—have been fragmented and ineffective. Despite multiple continental and regional initiatives, no single credible peace process has emerged, resulting in duplication, lack of sustained effort and a strategy that garnered the commitment of key Sudanese political and armed actors and the support of regional and international actors.
The AU once drew strength from putting in place processes that focus on political dialogue, mediation, and negotiation. This has gradually given way to a performative issuance of statements expressing concern or calling for peace and a tendency to focus on securitised peace operations and peace enforcement instruments—resource-intensive and often ill-suited to the complex socio-political dynamics driving most of the continent’s conflicts, particularly in the context of terrorism and violent extremism.
Over the years, the AU has also become more reactive, with interventions typically coming only after conflicts escalate. Inconsistencies in how the AU addresses conflict or crisis situations and applies its norms have also eroded its credibility. Structural setbacks to the Continental Early Warning System due to the removal of the conflict prevention division housing it following AU institutional reforms, the weak link between early warning and early action, and the lack of confidence in AU processes and political denialism of Member States in the face of looming crises have further obstructed timely responses.
There is also a coordination and policy coherence gap between the AU and the Regional Economic Communities and Mechanisms (RECs/RMs), even though the PSC Protocol envisages RECs/RMs as integral parts of the APSA. Despite efforts to strengthen coordination through agreed modalities for enhanced engagement, the current state of collaboration remains far from effective. In practice, the absence of strong coordination has often led to competing or fragmented initiatives in response to conflicts and crises on the continent. This was evident in the case of Sudan, where both the AU and the regional bloc IGAD launched parallel mediation tracks in the early days of the conflict. Such uncoordinated efforts undermine coherence and hinder launching a credible, unified peacemaking initiative, while providing space for foreign actors to step in and fill the vacuum.
Another challenge relates to the rapidly changing security dynamics on the continent, which have grown increasingly complex over the years. Between 2013 and 2023, conflict incidents more than doubled, with sharp spikes after 2019. While coups and interstate tensions have resurfaced, terrorism has emerged as the most pressing threat. Conflicts are increasingly driven by non-state actors in contexts marked by governance crises, organised crime, climate shocks, and disruptive technologies.
The AU’s role has also been further eroded by foreign interference. Africa has become a theatre of renewed global rivalries, with external actors backing factions and shaping political outcomes.
Tomorrow’s deliberation will additionally explore ways of addressing these challenges and identify strategies for repositioning the APSA and restoring Africa’s agency in conflict prevention and resolution. There is a pressing need for the AU to rebuild its agency through credible peacemaking processes and the restoration of the primacy of diplomacy as the main conflict and governance crises management and resolution tool. In this context, AU and its PSC should provide technically sound and diplomatically robust strategic guidance and oversight to peacemaking initiatives, while ensuring effective coordination with all relevant actors. Member States, for their part, should reaffirm their commitment to AU instruments and work collectively. At the same time, the AU Commission should strengthen its relationship with Member States and restore trust through the impartial delivery of its responsibilities and the provision of credible technical input.
Conflict prevention should also be placed at the core of AU’s peace and security work by strengthening the credibility of early warning, enhancing the profile, standing, and working methods of the Panel of the Wise, and increasing the use of non-intrusive and discrete preventive diplomacy. Conflict resolution, meanwhile, should be based on a clear strategy tailored to each situation, backed by adequate technical, diplomatic, and financial resources. Similarly, the AU needs to shift from a security-heavy posture toward a comprehensive approach that restores the primacy of politics. Given that many conflict dynamics are increasingly transregional and often require the engagement of more than one REC/RM, a more effective and conflict-sensitive working arrangement is needed—one that leverages and prioritises coordination between the AU and the concerned RECs/RMs and incentivises co-leadership and joint action rather than the tension-inducing principle of subsidiarity.
The expected outcome is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to welcome the ongoing APSA review. The Council may reaffirm the importance of reclaiming the AU’s agency and credibility in conflict prevention and resolution. It may underscore the need to restore diplomacy as the primary tool of conflict management and call on the AU Commission to focus its attention on the enhanced use of the diplomatic tools of persuasion, consensus building and mobilisation of support for conflict prevention and resolution. It may also call for consistent application of AU norms and even-handed response to conflicts and crises. The PSC may also reaffirm the commitment of the AU and its member states to the principle of non-indifference and the imperative of protection of civilians. It may emphasise that appointments for preventive or peace-making efforts prioritise gravitas, diplomatic skills and a track record of commitment to peace-making. The PSC may also call upon foreign actors to refrain from interfering in the continent’s conflicts, stressing that such interference is exacerbating the humanitarian toll and complicating their resolution. In addition, the PSC may urge Member States and RECs/RMs to reaffirm their commitment to the principles and norms of the AU. Finally, it may emphasise the importance of strong collaboration and coordination with regional and international actors in resolving conflicts on the continent, while underscoring that all peacemaking initiatives respect the AU’s leading role and leverage and respect the AU’s norms.
For a more detailed discussion on re-energising conflict prevention and resolution in Africa, please refer to our latest Policy Brief on the subject.
