Women, Peace and Security in Africa: 25 years of UNSCR 1325
Women, Peace and Security in Africa: 25 years of UNSCR 1325
Date | 29 October 2025
Tomorrow (30 October), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1309th open session virtually on Women, Peace and Security in Africa: 25 years of UNSCR.
Following opening remarks by Tebelelo Boang, Permanent Representative of Botswana to the AU and Chair of the PSC for October 2025, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), will deliver the introductory statement. Liberata Mulamula, Special Envoy of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on Women, Peace and Security (WPS), is also expected to brief the Council on the progress of implementing the WPS agenda. Statements are also expected from Justice Effie Owuor, Co-Chair of FemWise-Africa; a representative of UN Women; a representative of the Delegation of the European Union to the AU; and representatives of the Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs).
As the AU marks the 25th anniversary of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1325 (2000), this session provides a forum to review results, address persistent gaps and set a practical course for implementation. It comes fifteen years after the PSC institutionalised annual deliberations on WPS at its 223rd meeting in March 2010. The Council may assess performance over this period, identify obstacles to effective delivery and agree on corrective actions.
The Council last considered the agenda in March 2025 at its 1268th meeting. On that occasion, Council underlined ‘the need to advocate for the implementation of the UNSC Resolution 1325, which addresses the impact of armed conflict on women and emphasises the importance of women’s participation in peace and security efforts.’ The Council also ‘underscored the need for the AU Commission to carry out an assessment’ to assist Member States in advancing national policy and stressed ‘the need to establish clear indicators and robust monitoring and evaluation mechanisms’ to enable regular reporting on commitments.
This year additionally marks the 15th anniversary of the PSC decision to institutionalise the WPS agenda. In tomorrow’s session, the Council may review the progress registered in advancing the WPS within the framework of the AU and the persisting challenges. The Special Envoy on WPS, established in 2014, serves as the lead and anchor of the effort for advancing the WPS agenda within the AU. It has helped initiate measures and institutional frameworks to advance women’s inclusion across peace support operations (PSOs), election observation and mediation. Developed through the Special Envoy on WPS, the Continental Results Framework (CRF) is the principal roadmap for tracking commitments across four pillars: participation, prevention, protection and relief and recovery; covering National Action Plans (NAPs) now adopted by 37 Member States, the growth of regional women’s mediation networks and recognition of women’s leadership in peace processes. A June 2025 high-level workshop on ‘Reinvigorate CRF Monitoring’ recommended a simplified digital reporting tool, biennial reporting, real-time feedback loops, harmonised AU reporting timelines and the use of CRF reports to inform policymaking and budget allocations.
Established in 2017, FemWise Africa and the African Women Leaders Network (AWLN) advance mediation and the promotion of women’s leadership, respectively. FemWise Africa, a subsidiary mechanism of the AU Panel of the Wise, identifies, trains and deploys women mediators in AU peace efforts and election observation processes, while AWLN increases women’s participation in decision making through peer learning, mentoring, solidarity, advocacy and capacity building.
Despite the emphasis on Resolution 1325, the WPS agenda has a strong normative foundation in the AU legal instruments. The Maputo Protocol (2003) aligns with and advances obligations consistent with Resolution 1325, with Articles 10–11 requiring participation in peace processes and protection in situations of conflict. The AU Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa (2004) is a pledge by Heads of State to accelerate women’s rights and parity across governance, peace and security, education, health and economic life, with annual reporting to track progress. The AU Strategy for Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment (2018 to 2028) aligns Agenda 2063 and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) to mainstream gender equality across AU organs and Member States, prioritising dignity and security, effective laws and institutions, economic empowerment and leadership and voice. The AU Policy on the Prevention of and Response to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Peace Support Operations (2018) establishes zero tolerance and a survivor-centred system with vetting, mandatory training, confidential reporting, immediate support services and clear accountability, including investigations, repatriations, sanctions and referrals for national prosecution. And, the recent AU Convention on Ending Violence Against Women and Girls (2025) further reinforces existing legal guarantees, requiring states to prevent, protect, prosecute and provide survivor-centred support for all forms of violence, including cyberviolence and femicide, complements the Maputo Protocol.
In view of the foregoing, the session may deliberate on prioritising the concrete operationalisation of existing instruments, anchored in a forward-looking implementation strategy and tested by a rigorous stocktake of how deliberations have translated into practice. As recorded in Amani Africa’s special research report, the Council’s deliberations called for action on five priority issues: accountability that ends impunity and expands access to justice for women; meaningful representation across prevention, mediation, PSOs and post conflict reconstruction; attention to structural gender disparities and other drivers of conflict; formal institutionalisation of the agenda; and the systematic deployment of gender advisers. Yet outputs remain largely programmatic and weakly tied to measurable targets, time-bound delivery and independent review. Although the AU is positioned as a global leader in policy architecture, credibility now rests on converting commitments into measurable gains for citizens, articulating coherent African positions and mobilising Member States and civil society through implementation.
Critical review of the realities shows that the major gap has nothing to do with a lack of normative, policy and institutional frameworks but the lack of implementation and disregard of the commitments thereunder. Instruments to prevent and mitigate sexual and gender-based violence (GBV) in PSOs have yielded limited protection gains; declarations to end impunity are rarely paired with conflict-sensitive monitoring, adequate investigative capacity or accountability pathways with clear, realistic timelines. Gender analysis is inconsistently integrated into briefings, situation reports and mandate renewals and findings from the Office of the Special Envoy’s field missions seldom inform corresponding country and regional deliberations. Follow-through is uneven and senior-level ownership is fragile, while conflicts continue to target civilians, including the strategic use of sexual violence as warfare, terrorism and torture. The most recent Windhoek+25 Declaration urges bold action to ‘bridge persistent gaps’, an ‘intergenerational imperative’ to sustain gains, use of regional strategies and NAPs for implementation and review, and alignment of ‘political will, institutional reform and societal transformation’ grounded in unity, resilience and inclusion. In the same vein, on 31 July 2025 in Benin, the Cotonou Meeting reviewed implementation and urged accelerated responses to ‘climate insecurity, digital threats, and persistent gender inequalities’, ‘terrorism, climate-related insecurity, gender-based violence’, and the ‘weaponisation of digital technologies’.
For Council deliberation, a notable finding from the UN Secretary-General’s 2025 WPS report is that approximately 676 million women lived within 50 kilometres of deadly conflict in 2024, the highest level since the 1990s. Rising global military spending and an evident backlash against gender equality are straining the WPS agenda. Funding shortfalls are closing clinics, shrinking food aid and cutting education in Somalia, the DRC and the Sahel (including Mali). Protracted crises across the Sahel, Great Lakes and Horn of Africa disproportionately expose women and girls to GBV, displacement and marginalisation. In Ethiopia, the World Food Programme (WFP) cut refugee rations from 60 per cent to 40 per cent due to shortages. Without new funds, programmes for breastfeeding women and malnourished children will end in December 2025. In Somalia, women and children, who face heightened risks of GBV, sexual exploitation and eviction, accounted for more than 80 per cent of the displaced population. In South Sudan, violence is at the highest level since the 2017 cessation of hostilities, with women and girls often targeted. In El-Fashir, Sudan, reports indicate that 38 per cent of pregnant and breastfeeding women are malnourished. In its 2025 open letter to UN permanent representatives, the NGO Working Group on WPS underscores that the agenda’s norms remain far from realised and condemns the escalating backlash against women’s autonomy, rights and the advocates who defend them.
Tomorrow’s meeting is also expected to put women’s meaningful participation in peace processes front and center, heeding the Swakopmund Process Conclusions of 23 March 2024 that call for gender parity across all AU led and co-led mediation tracks. Such a policy should guide the selection and appointment of mediators, technical experts and special envoys, embed gender analysis in terms of reference and set measurable participation targets at every stage. Yet women remain underrepresented, particularly in high-stakes negotiations and security sector reform processes. With inadequate commitments, shrinking resources and efforts to roll back protection measures, obligations under the CRF and NAPs are under-enforced. Although the AU endorses a gender-parity policy for AU-led mediation and a 30 per cent minimum quota for women’s participation in peace missions and processes, accountability and regular reporting mechanisms are lacking. UN data from 2020 to 2024 show women’s participation in peace processes stayed far below targets. In 2024, women were 7 per cent of negotiators and 14 per cent of mediators; nearly 90 per cent of negotiation tracks and about two-thirds of mediation efforts had no women. Although Africa hosts many UN peace operations, including in the DRC and South Sudan, women still make up a small share of peacekeepers globally: 6.4 per cent of military personnel and 12 per cent of police personnel as of 2023. In light of this, the PSC may shift the focus towards identifying specific interventions for advancing the level of women’s participation in peace processes and periodic monitoring and reporting on trends in this respect.
The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communique. The Council may call for clear, realistic roadmaps and a pivot from norm setting to implementation, prioritising systematic integration of the WPS agenda across the conflict continuum from prevention to post-conflict. Member States may be urged to embed the agenda in national and local processes, and those without NAPs to adopt costed plans with meaningful participation of women, youth and grassroots groups. In terms of protection, the PSC may request the AU Commission to mainstream update on WPS in briefings and reports of conflict situations submitted to the PSC and task the Special Envoy to monitor, track and document violations against women in conflict and crisis situations in Africa and prepare a dedicated annual report on the same. The PSC is expected to condemn conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) and reiterate the need for full and effective participation of women in early warning, prevention, mediation and dialogue, backed by adequate, predictable and sustained financing. It may seek concrete steps to implement the 30 per cent quota at the AU, REC/RM and national levels. It may encourage well-resourced national and regional FemWise chapters to expand the pool of women peace experts. It may press for stronger delivery across the four pillars and for integrating climate risks into implementation strategies. It may underline the coordinating role of the Office of the Special Envoy on WPS.
CGTN: "Africa’s early role and enduring struggles in the UN"
CGTN: "Africa’s early role and enduring struggles in the UN"
October 25, 2025
Update on the Situation in South Sudan
Update on the Situation in South Sudan
Date | 27 October 2025
Tomorrow (28 October), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1308th session to receive an update on the situation in South Sudan.
The meeting will be chaired by Tebelelo Boang, Permanent Representative of Botswana to the AU and the Chairperson of the PSC for October. Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) will make the introductory remarks. Statements are then expected to be delivered by representatives from South Sudan; South Africa (as Chairperson of the AU Ad Hoc High-Level Committee on South Sudan (C5); Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); Chairperson of the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (R-JMEC); and the representative of the United Nations Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). The most recent engagement of the PSC on South Sudan took place during its 1302nd session, held on 19 September 2025. However, the session did not introduce any substantively new or different measures compared to the Council’s previous communiques on South Sudan. During that session, the Council issued a press release urging the Revitalised Transitional Government of National Unity (R-TGoNU) to redouble its efforts toward the full implementation of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS). The PSC also called for the organisation of a genuine, “all-inclusive South Sudanese national political dialogue leading to a national reconciliation process that would culminate in the successful conduct of democratic elections in December 2026”.
Since early 2025, the PSC’s engagements on South Sudan (1297th, 1283rd, 1270th, and 1265th Sessions) have unfolded amid escalating political and security instability. Since clashes erupted in March between the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF) and armed groups linked to the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO), the fragile peace established under the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) has been severely undermined. This incident triggered the most serious crisis since the signing of the 2018 peace agreement, with hostilities spreading across Upper Nile, Jonglei, Unity States, Central Equatoria, and Western Equatoria, causing extensive civilian displacement and loss of life.
The political and security situation in South Sudan has sharply deteriorated following the detention of senior officials, mainly First Vice President Riek Machar; the emergence of splinter factions; the deployment of Ugandan troops; and intensified military operations by the SSPDF against SPLM/A-IO and allied groups. Machar’s arrest effectively paralysed the RTGoNU, which the PSC previously described as a ‘blatant violation of the R-ARCSS.’ The crisis further escalated when Machar and eight other senior members of the SPLM/A-IO were charged on 11 September with murder, treason, crimes against humanity, and other serious offences linked to a White Army attack in Nasir County. Subsequently, Machar was temporarily suspended from the vice presidency pending his trial. Since Machar was placed under house arrest, multiple envoys seeking to meet Machar, including former Kenyan Prime Minister Raila Odinga in March and a delegation from the AU in April, have reportedly been denied access. As such, it is expected that during tomorrow’s session, the PSC is expected to receive an update on detention and legal processes concerning Riek Machar and other SPLM-IO detainees.
Beyond Machar’s detention, a series of political manoeuvres by President Kiir has further consolidated executive power while weakening coalition inclusivity. Since March, Kiir has undertaken extensive reshuffles by presidential decree, replacing senior officials, including the Chief of Defence Forces, the Chief Justice, the Central Bank Governor, and several state governors, moves the SPLM/A-IO has condemned as unilateral. The appointment of his daughter, Adut Salva Kiir, to a senior position has fueled perceptions of growing nepotism and entrenched patronage within the government, raising concerns about governance legitimacy and the monopolisation of state institutions by loyalist networks. Furthermore, President Kiir’s reconstitution of the high-level ad hoc committee overseeing the implementation of the R-ARCSS, which excluded former SPLM/A-IO representatives and instead incorporated members aligned with the Par Kuol splinter faction, has raised significant concern. The committee is mandated to oversee the implementation of all aspects of the R-ARCSS, except for provisions related to the permanent ceasefire and transitional security arrangements. Observers note that this move appears to signal an attempt to reshape the peace architecture in favour of the SPLM’s political dominance.
These political manoeuvres by President Kiir have significantly heightened tensions, triggering intense clashes between government forces and opposition groups, particularly in Upper Nile, Jonglei, Central Equatoria, and Western Equatoria, and resulting in substantial casualties and widespread displacement. The humanitarian situation has consequently worsened, with the UN (OCHA) reporting that, in addition to the existing two million internally displaced persons, more than 497,000 people were newly displaced between January and September 2025, approximately 321,000 due to conflict and 175,000 due to flooding. In response, the UN Human Rights Commission has urged the African Union and the UN Security Council to take decisive action to prevent further escalation. UNMISS, on the other hand, has reported increasing restrictions on humanitarian access and attacks on aid workers, warning of a potential collapse of life-saving services in the most affected regions. Exacerbating these challenges, according to OHCHR, systemic corruption among South Sudanese leaders continues to undermine governance and humanitarian interventions, deepening the crisis. It is therefore expected that the PSC’s deliberations will focus on the severe humanitarian repercussions resulting from the escalating political and security crisis.
Another key issue expected in tomorrow’s session, in view of the foregoing conditions, is the implementation of the R-ARCSS amid worsening humanitarian and governance conditions. In previous sessions, the PSC has also emphasised that the R-ARCSS remains the only viable framework for lasting peace, calling for investigations into violations of the R-ARCSS and warning that peace spoilers will be held accountable. The Revitalised Joint Monitoring Evaluation Commission (RJMEC), body monitoring the R-ARCSS, reported during the reporting period that the country faces a serious and growing risk of the unravelling of the 2018 peace agreement and relapse back to full-blown war. In the report it released this month, the Commission urged the RTGoNU to ‘urgently resolve the current political and security impasse and return to full and inclusive implementation of the R-ARCSS.’ Given the clear warning on the fast-growing risk of the deteriorating situation plunging the country back to large-scale national civil war, the PSC is expected to receive updates on the imminency of the risk and the ways and means and opportunities for reversing this risk.
On 11–12 August, the PSC conducted a field visit to South Sudan to assess the deteriorating political and security situation, review progress on the R-ARCSS, and discuss preparations for the 2026 elections. On 7 October, the RJMEC held an extraordinary meeting in Juba, warning that rising tensions and stalled implementation had increased the risk of a relapse into conflict unless urgent corrective action is taken. On 12 September, the UN Security Council(UNSC) unanimously adopted Resolution 2791 (2025), extending the Sudan sanctions regime, including targeted sanctions and the arms embargo, along with the mandate of the Panel of Experts until 12 October 2026, to align both timelines. Subsequently, on 13 October, the AU Commission Chairperson appointed Abdiwelli Ali as the AU Special Representative and Head of Mission to South Sudan, while important it does not dispense with the PSC’s earlier June call for the AU Chairperson’s sustained engagement with President Salva Kiir and regional leaders, fostering inclusive dialogue, facilitating the release of political detainees, and promoting full implementation of the R-ARCSS.
In tomorrow’s session, the PSC is also expected to follow up on its previous decisions aimed at advancing the implementation of key transitional provisions of the R-ARCSS. Specifically, the Council will likely assess progress on its earlier encouragement to the Trilateral Mechanism (AU, IGAD, and UN) to work closely with the RTGoNU in reactivating the Government–Trilateral Joint Task Force (JTF) to expedite the implementation of pending provisions, including the constitution-making and electoral processes. Furthermore, the PSC is expected to review the extent of progress made in operationalising transitional justice mechanisms, following its reiterated call for the RTGoNU to collaborate with the AU Commission’s Office of the Legal Counsel (OLC) in finalising the guidelines for establishing the Hybrid Court of South Sudan and defining modalities for truth, reconciliation, compensation, and reparation processes.
The expected outcome is a communique. The PSC is expected to express concern on the deteriorating political and humanitarian conditions and condemn continued violations of the R-ARCSS. It may also condemn the violence against civilians and humanitarian workers and call for credible investigations and accountability mechanisms. The PSC may also express concern over the stalled implementation status of the R-ARCSS. In this regard, the Council is expected to call for the acceleration of transitional security arrangements, particularly the unification and deployment of the Necessary Unified Forces, as well as institutional preparations for the election. Furthermore, the Council may reiterate that the R-ARCSS remains the most viable framework for sustainable peace and stability in South Sudan and may urge both parties to recommit to the permanent ceasefire and transitional roadmap. The PSC could also call for the release of all political detainees, restoration of political dialogue, and full reactivation of the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM) to ensure compliance with the ceasefire. The PSC may echo RJMEC’s call on the RTGoNU to urgently resolve the current political and security impasse and return to full and inclusive implementation of the R-ARCSS. In addition, the PSC may reiterate its request for the AU Commission to maintain sustained engagement, including possibly appointing a High-Level Envoy to work jointly with IGAD, the C5, and the Trilateral Mechanism to facilitate direct dialogue between Kiir and Machar.
Briefing by the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) on its Activities and the Humanitarian Situation in Africa
Briefing by the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) on its Activities and the Humanitarian Situation in Africa
Date | 23 October 2025
Tomorrow (24 October), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene for its 1307th session to receive a briefing from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on its activities and the humanitarian situation in Africa.
Following opening remarks by Tebelelo Boang, Permanent Representative of Botswana to the AU and the Chairperson of the PSC for October 2025, Bankole Adeoye, the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to deliver a statement. Dr Gilles Carbonnier, ICRC Vice-President, is expected to brief the Council. Ambassador Amma Adomaa Twum-Amoah, Commissioner for Health, Humanitarian Affairs and Social Development, and Ambassador Churchill Ewumbue-Monono, Permanent Representative of Cameroon to the AU, are also expected to make statements.
Tomorrow’s briefing is expected to present an update on current trends in the humanitarian situation across the continent. The discussion will include country-specific assessments, with a particular focus on Sudan, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Somalia and the Sahel. In addition to highlighting major ongoing crises, the session will examine the underlying factors and dynamics driving the worsening conditions. It will also provide an opportunity to spotlight the key challenges hindering effective humanitarian action and the sustainable resolution of these crises.
The last time the ICRC briefed the PSC was at the PSC’s 1239th meeting held on 29 October 2024, in which, among other decisions, reiterated the request for the AU Commission, ‘in consultation with the UN humanitarian Agencies and other key partners, to redouble resource mobilization efforts, in order to ensure the provision of adequate and flexible funding for humanitarian action in Africa, as well as for the AU Commission to undertake a comprehensive study, identifying the financial shortfalls and make concrete and practicable proposals on how to address the financial challenges for meeting Africa’s humanitarian needs.’
In Sudan, as of early September 2025, a devastating landslide in Tarasin, located in the Marrah Mountains of Central Darfur, reportedly claimed over 1000 lives, with a Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) official reporting on 4 September that 370 bodies had been recovered and buried. The region is grappling with compounded crises, as famine grips areas like El-Fasher and the nearby Zamzam displacement camp, where the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have trapped approximately 260,000 civilians, including 130,000 children. The World Food Programme highlighted the dire situation, noting that 24.6 million people—about half of Sudan’s population—are facing acute food shortages, with 637,000 enduring catastrophic levels of hunger. Compounding the crisis, the ICRC, in mid-September 2025, reported that Sudan is experiencing its worst cholera outbreak in years, driven by war-ravaged infrastructure, with over 5000 cases of malaria, typhoid and dengue fever, alongside dozens of deaths, reported in one area of the capital in the past month. Meanwhile, the desperation to flee the conflict has led to further tragedy, with at least 50 Sudanese refugees perishing after their vessel caught fire in the Mediterranean Sea.
In South Sudan, a rapidly shifting political landscape and worsening humanitarian crises are creating an alarming situation. According to UNOCHA, as of September 2025, severe challenges – including flooding, food insecurity, violence and disease outbreaks – continue to devastate communities. Floods have affected over 639,000 people across 26 counties in six states, with Jonglei and Unity hit hardest. Meanwhile, ongoing conflict in Upper Nile, Jonglei, Central Equatoria and Western Equatoria has driven mass displacement, with 497,000 people newly displaced between January and September 2025 – 321,000 due to conflict and 175,000 due to flooding. Recent clashes in Western Equatoria alone displaced tens of thousands, including nearly 21,000 from Nagero County to nearby villages. Compounding these challenges, multiple disease outbreaks, such as cholera (93,200 cases, 1565 deaths across 55 counties), anthrax, hepatitis E and mpox, continue to strain communities.
DRC, on the other hand, is grappling with a complex humanitarian crisis driven by conflict and natural disasters, resulting in widespread internal displacement. According to a recent IOM report, approximately 4.9 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) were recorded in the DRC as of September 2025, a 2% decrease since August. Conflict, particularly in eastern provinces like North Kivu, accounts for 85% of displacements, with the advance of the M23 armed group in early 2025 triggering new and repeated displacements in existing camps. Natural disasters, such as flooding, contribute to the remaining 15%. Meanwhile, repatriation efforts are showing progress, with 5.2 million IDP returnees recorded, representing a 4% increase since August 2025. Beyond displacement, conflict and disasters in regions like South Kivu and Ituri continue to exacerbate the crisis, driving UNHCR’s estimate that 27 million people will need humanitarian assistance in 2025.
In the Sahel region, escalating violence, armed conflict and climate shocks have intensified a humanitarian crisis, displacing millions and devastating livelihoods. According to UNOCHA’s September 2025 Humanitarian Overview, 31.3 million people urgently need aid and protection in 2025. The region hosts 5.7 million IDPs and 2.4 million refugees. However, funding shortages – with only 18% of the required $4.9 billion secured – have forced humanitarian organisations to prioritise support for 10.4 million of the most vulnerable, down from 20.6 million previously targeted. Aggravating the situation, a cholera outbreak is spreading across West and Central Africa, with over 1,600 cases and 52 deaths reported in Nigeria. Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and Mauritania remain at high risk.
In Somalia’s northern and eastern regions, severe drought due to poor rainfall from April to June has worsened food insecurity, water scarcity and pasture shortages, driving increased pastoralist migration, according to UN agencies and local authorities. Compounding this crisis, nearly 142,000 people – 81% in the Banadir region – have been evicted from temporary shelters since January 2025, severely disrupting community stability. Further escalating concerns, a diphtheria outbreak threatens children, with the Federal Ministry of Health reporting 2,109 suspected cases and 99 deaths (a 5 % case fatality ratio) across 10 health facilities between January and August 2025. Most cases involve unvaccinated individuals over five years old, with infections surging fourfold compared to 2024.
Of importance to tomorrow’s deliberations will also be the humanitarian impact of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas (EWIPA). The discussion is expected to address critical concerns regarding the means and methods of warfare, both new and longstanding. Despite decades of progress and growing consensus on the need to universalise humanitarian disarmament treaties to minimise civilian casualties and the human cost of conflict, there remains a significant risk of regression. Recent developments concerning the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) are particularly concerning, with some States considering withdrawal, which could undermine years of hard-won achievements. It is worth recalling that the PSC, in April 2025, held its 1271st session dedicated to the theme of Mine Action, in which it reiterated its call ‘for the establishment of a continental mechanism for mine action…’ This also saw the AU Commission being tasked ‘to continue sensitizing Member States in promoting a better understanding of the humanitarian impacts of explosive weapons, including landmines and cluster munitions in populated areas, as well as the importance of EWIPA Political Declaration and the policy and practical changes it seeks to generate,’ and in this context, encouraged Member States that have not yet done so, to endorse the EWIPA Political Declaration.
Relatedly, the humanitarian impact of digital technologies in armed conflict cannot go unmentioned. The rise of autonomous weapons, AI, surveillance systems and combat drones in African conflicts is transforming warfare. International Humanitarian Law (IHL) applies to these technologies, setting limits to protect civilians and infrastructure from harm, including digital threats. Understanding their legal, ethical and humanitarian implications is critical for action.
Finally, it is worth noting that the ICRC recently launched the Global IHL Initiative in collaboration with six other states – including Brazil, China, France, Jordan, Kazakhstan and South Africa – to ‘galvanise political commitment to IHL.’ With South Africa notably leading as a co-founder, the initiative prioritises IHL politically, develops actionable recommendations across seven workstreams – co-chaired by African states including Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and Sierra Leone – and adapts IHL to modern warfare’s rapid evolution. Several African Member States have joined, with hopes that more will participate with the Council’s support, culminating in a High-Level Meeting in 2025 to promote humanity in conflict.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may express concern over the escalating humanitarian crises across Africa, particularly highlighting the combined impact of armed conflicts, violent extremism, climate-driven extreme weather and epidemics. Council may condemn attacks by conflict parties on humanitarian workers, medical facilities, civilians and civilian infrastructure. Council may also highlight the imperative of the establishment, protection and expansion of the necessary humanitarian space, especially in the countries affected by conflict, which extends to the protection of critical infrastructure. Council is also expected to highlight the critical importance of ensuring compliance with international humanitarian law by all parties to the conflict to address escalating crises. The PSC may call upon parties to conflicts to implement practical measures to ensure civilian protection and unimpeded humanitarian access, including the protection of and access to schools and other learning institutions.
Annual Joint Informal Seminar and Consultative Meeting between the AU Peace and Security Council and the UN Security Council
Annual Joint Informal Seminar and Consultative Meeting between the AU Peace and Security Council and the UN Security Council
Date | 15 October 2025
Tomorrow (16 October), the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) will hold their 10th annual informal joint seminar, ahead of the 19th annual consultative meeting taking place on 17 October.
The informal seminar and the consultative meeting are expected to be jointly chaired by the Chairperson of the PSC for October and the President of the UNSC for October, respectively. Ahead of the seminar and the annual consultation, the AUPSC Committee of Experts and the UNSC Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa held a preparatory meeting on 13-14 October 2025 on the agenda and the draft joint communiqué prepared by the PSC as host of this year’s consultative meeting at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The meeting also addressed working methods issues, most notably, as highlighted in the 2024 edition of Insight on the PSC dedicated to the annual consultation, monitoring and review of implementation of joint commitments undertaken during annual consultations, by designating a mechanism for follow-up, building on the commitment they made from the 2024 annual consultative meeting.
This year’s informal seminar has three agenda items: Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Agenda, terrorism and violent extremism in Africa, the status of implementation of Security Council resolution 2719 (2023) on the financing of AUPSOs.
This year marks the 25th anniversary of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), a landmark resolution that laid the foundation for the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda. Namibia, then a member of the Security Council, played a key role in facilitating its adoption. The AU has actively promoted the WPS agenda and worked to integrate gender perspectives into its peace and security initiatives. 2025 marks the 15th anniversary of the decision of the PSC to have the WPS agenda as a standing thematic agenda of the Council. On 26 August, AU Commission Chairperson Mahmoud Ali Youssouf appointed Ambassador Liberata Mulamula of Tanzania as the new AU Special Envoy on WPS, who succeeded the inaugural Special Envoy, Bineta Diop. The AU also established FemWise-Africa, a network of women mediators aimed at enhancing the meaningful participation of women in mediation, election observation, and other peace processes across the continent. In 2017, the AU, in collaboration with the UN, launched the African Women Leaders Network (AWLN), which serves as a platform for advocacy, mentorship, and capacity-building for women leaders.
On 6 October, the Security Council held an open debate on the WPS agenda. Secretary-General António Guterres, addressing the meeting, highlighted ‘troubling trends in military spending, more armed conflicts, and more shocking brutality against women and girls,’ as outlined in his annual report on the WPS agenda. The AUPSC is scheduled to hold an open session on 28 October. The 25th anniversary of the WPS agenda presents an important opportunity for both Councils to reflect on the progress made and the ongoing challenges in its implementation, with a particular focus on the African context.
The growing threat of terrorism continues to affect multiple conflict zones across Africa. In April, the AUPSC held a meeting focused on deradicalisation as a leverage for the fight against violent Extremism in Africa. The meeting expressed grave concern over the alarming surge in terrorist activities across the continent, which has resulted in devastating consequences, including loss of life, destruction of livelihoods, and population displacement, creating a severe humanitarian crisis. In this regard, the meeting underscored the need to holistically address the deep-rooted structural causes of terrorism and violent extremism, as well as the factors that fuel and facilitate them, based on the nexus between peace, security, and development. It also emphasised the importance of enhancing collaboration between and among all critical stakeholders at all levels: local, national, regional and continental as well as international. The discussion with UNSC members at the joint informal seminar is expected to advance this objective. The informal seminar is also expected to reflect the outcome of the PSC meeting in August and welcome the non-binding principles on preventing, detecting, and destroying the use of the new and emerging financial technologies for terrorist purposes as adopted by the UNSC Counterterrorism Committee in January 2025, referred to as the Algerian Guiding Principles.
The financing of AUPSOs has remained a recurring topic at the joint informal seminar in recent years. It is expected that the two sides would reaffirm the importance of AU-UN cooperation in peace and security and the critical role of AU-led PSOs and UN PKOs in advancing peace and security. This year, AUPSC proposed its inclusion again, with a specific focus on following up on the implementation of resolution 2719. Although the AUPSC specifically proposed a discussion on Somalia and the financing of AUSSOM, the agenda item faced opposition in the Security Council from Somalia itself, while European members advocated for its inclusion. Due to this disagreement, the Security Council proposed to address it within the broader context of enhancing and supporting AUPSOs. Nonetheless, AUPSC members held that while the reference to Somalia could be removed, there is a need for a dedicated section on the deployment of AUSSOM, inclusive of its financing, particularly given the fact that AUSSOM personnel have gone without allowances for the past 15 months. Despite recent pledges at a high-level meeting on AUSSOM financing held on 25 September in New York, on the margins of the UN General Assembly, the total amount committed remains far short of the $196 million required to cover troop allowances.
17th Annual Joint Consultative Meeting
On 17 October, the AUPSC and members of the UNSC will hold their 19th joint consultative meeting. Conflict situations in three regions in Africa will be on the agenda: the situation in the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin; the situation in the horn of Africa, including Sudan, South Sudan and Abyei (not sure if the AUPSC has accepted its inclusion); and the Situation in the Great Lakes, particularly the conflict in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
The security situation in the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin has markedly deteriorated this year, with a surge of attacks by armed groups and terrorists operating in the regions. The threat of terrorism is increasingly spreading from the Sahel states to coastal West Africa, with cross-border attacks affecting several countries. The escalating security situation has further worsened the humanitarian and human rights crisis in the region, with civilians bearing the brunt of increasing violence and instability.
Sahel countries have been undergoing political transitions amidst these security dynamics, which constitute a very challenging context for the effective pursuit of the transitional process. Although there had been tensions between the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the three Sahelian States─Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali─ that decided to withdraw their membership from the regional bloc, ECOWAS has been seeking to maintain constructive engagement with them. The ECOWAS Summit in June decided to appoint a Chief Negotiator to lead the discussions with the three countries to ensure an orderly withdrawal.
The AU has also been promoting renewed engagement with the Sahel countries. In July, the Chairperson of the AU appointed President Évariste Ndayishimiye of Burundi as Special Envoy for the Sahel. Additionally, the Chairperson of the AU Commission appointed former Gambian Foreign Minister Mamadou Tangara as his Special Representative for Mali and the Sahel, and Head of the AU Mission in Mali and the Sahel (MISAHEL), based in Bamako. On 30 September, the AUPSC held a ministerial-level meeting to receive a briefing on the latest developments in the Sahel. During the annual consultations, the two Councils are expected to explore how to reinvigorate joint UN-AU efforts in addressing the root causes of the crisis in the region and stem the tide of terrorism. In this regard, they may reiterate their continued support to the implementation of the regional strategies for the Sahel as well as for the Stabilisation, Recovery and Resilience of areas affected by Boko Haram activities in the Lake Chad Basin.
On the Situation in the Sudan, the AU has been insisting on a Sudanese-led and Sudanese-owned inclusive political dialogue, as the only viable pathway forward for resolving the current crisis. The AU High-Level Panel (HLP) on the Resolution of the Conflict in Sudan is leading the AU’s efforts aimed at resolving the conflict in Sudan in coordination with other regional and international partners. However, the raging conflict in Sudan does not show any sign of abating, and the involvement of external actors has complicated the situation. The parties to the conflict appear determined to pursue a military solution, with the escalation of fighting in Darfur and South Kordofan. This has exacerbated the humanitarian situation on the ground, including in El-Fasher, which remains under siege. Two-thirds of the Sudanese people need urgent humanitarian assistance, according to the UN.
During the high-level week of the UN General Assembly last month, the AU, together with other bilateral and multilateral partners, convened a ministerial meeting which brought a spotlight on the dire humanitarian situation in the Sudan. The meeting urged the warring parties to resume direct negotiations to achieve a permanent ceasefire and implement a humanitarian pause in El-Fasher. Recent efforts by the US to revive the peace process through the convening of a Quad meeting, comprising Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), have drawn attention. The foreign ministers of Quad countries issued a joint statement on 12 September that called for a humanitarian truce, for an initial three months, to enable the swift entry of humanitarian aid to all parts of Sudan, to lead immediately to a permanent ceasefire, then an inclusive and transparent transition process should be launched and concluded within nine months. This had no bearing on the conflict.
The situation in Sudan has had a significant impact on security in Abyei, contributing to growing instability in the region. The A3+ proposed adding the issue of Abyei to the agenda. In November, the Security Council is expected to review the situation in Abyei and renew the mandate of the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA). However, it has been some time since the AUPSC formally addressed the issue. Although a meeting was scheduled for March last year, it did not take place as the Sudanese representative in Addis Ababa sent a letter requesting that the AUPSC not proceed with the meeting.
On South Sudan In August, members of the AUPSC conducted a visit to South Sudan in response to the escalating political and security crisis in the country. During the visit, they engaged with South Sudanese authorities and other key stakeholders on the implementation of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS), as well as preparations for the general elections scheduled for December 2026—critical steps toward completing the country’s transitional period. On 7 October, the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC) convened an extraordinary meeting in Juba to address the growing difficulties facing the R-ARCSS, amid escalating political and security tensions. It warned that the risk of relapse back to conflict has heightened, and it could materialise unless there is a change of course in the situation in the country. In light of these developments, preserving the R-ARCSS and averting further instability in South Sudan is likely to feature prominently in the annual consultations.
On Great Lakes and the DRC, despite progress in ongoing mediation efforts to address the situation in eastern DRC—including commitments made during the Washington and Doha talks—the security situation on the ground remains largely unchanged. In recent months, a number of meetings have been held to facilitate the implementation of the 27 June agreement signed between the DRC and Rwanda. Further follow-up meetings between the two sides are expected later this month. A key issue remains the neutralisation of the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) and the lifting of Rwanda’s defensive measures. On 10 October, the Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC) issued a communiqué calling on all FDLR factions to disarm and surrender in accordance with the 27 June agreement. Meanwhile, negotiations between the Congolese government and the Mouvement du 23 Mars (M23) rebel group had stalled, but reports indicate that talks are expected to resume this week. Amid externally driven mediation efforts, African-led processes appear to have been overshadowed. Against this backdrop, efforts have been made to merge regional and continental initiatives and to ensure that external mediation efforts are aligned with a unified, African-led approach. AUPSC members may emphasise this issue during the annual consultations. It is anticipated that the two sides would express concern about the situation in Eastern DRC, focusing in particular on the fighting involving the M23. In this context, they may affirm the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the DRC and reject the establishment of parallel regional administration. They may also call on the parties to honour the commitments they have made under the recent mediation process in Washington, DC and Doha.
Session on the situation in Madagascar
Session on the situation in Madagascar
Date | 15 October 2025
Today (15 October), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene an emergency session to consider the constitutional rapture in Madagascar. This 1306th session of the PSC has been called following the risk of a military seizure of power becoming a reality, following weeks of public protests and the President’s escape from the country, declaring fear of a coup after an elite force of the military took the side of protestors.
The session will commence with the opening remarks of Tebelelo Boang, Permanent Representative of Botswana to the AU and the Chairperson of the PSC for October. Mahmoud Youssouf, Chairperson of the AU Commission, is expected to make a statement framing the policy issues for the PSC decision and the AU Commission’s assessment of the situation. The PSC may also hear from the Representative of the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission in Madagascar. The concerned Regional Economic Community/Regional Mechanism, the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), will make a statement, so as to the Chargé d’affaires of Madagascar, as representative of the country concerned.
This meeting comes just less than 24 hours after the emergency session of the PSC held on Monday, 13 October. The 1305 session of the PSC, held as an emergency session, was called following a major escalation in the political instability of Madagascar. It in particular came after tensions escalated dramatically over the weekend of 11–12 October, when members of the elite Army Personnel Administration Centre (CAPSAT) unit of the military expressed support for the protestors and marched alongside demonstrators in Antananarivo and entered symbolic public spaces such as May 13 Square. Their support for the protestors, reportedly welcomed by some protesters, has blurred the line between civilian unrest and exploitation of the situation by some in the army. In the communiqué that it adopted after the meeting, the PSC stated, among others, that it ‘totally rejects any attempt at unconstitutional changes of government.’ It further urged ‘all united of the Madagascar Armed Forces to uphold their constitutional mandate, and to refrain from meddling in the political affairs of the country.’
News outlets reported that the public protest was initially triggered by widespread frustration over chronic power and water outages, compounded by rising living costs, unemployment, and public disillusionment with governance. What began as localised, youth-led (Gen Z) protests in late September quickly evolved into a nationwide movement calling for greater accountability and political reform. It attracted the support of opposition politicians.
The state’s response has been increasingly heavy-handed, with security forces employing live ammunition and tear gas to disperse demonstrators. The UN reported that over 22 people were killed, a number the government contested. Civil society groups and international media report dozens of fatalities, while hospitals in the capital struggle to treat casualties amid growing shortages. The government has justified its actions as necessary to preserve order, but its credibility has been further eroded by the visible divisions within the security establishment and by mounting accusations of repression.
With the heavy-handed response failing to yield fruit and a key segment of the army taking sides with the protestors, the government also attempted to make symbolic concessions. President Andry Rajoelina dissolved the government and named a new prime minister, demanding an effective response to the demands of the public. As the situation further escalated during the weekend, he also called for dialogue. These efforts did not placate protestors who insisted on his departure from power.
It did not take long after the elite CAPSAT unit of the military expressed support to protestors that Rajoelina fled the country to an unknown destination. With no segment of the political, institutional and social sectors of society coming to his defence, the President’s attempt to assert his authority solely on the basis of constitutional technicalities, such as his declaration of dissolution of the national Assembly, did not last nor did it succeed. What started as a support of an elite segment of the army for the public protest against governance failures evolved into the full-fledged ouster of the President and the seizure of political power by the army.
Ahead of the announcement of the seizure of power by the army, the National Assembly, which Rajoelina tried to dissolve through a letter that did not carry the seal of authority, adopted a motion impeaching Rajoelina with those members of the Assembly present and voting supporting the impeachment, except one who voted against the motion.
The Constitution of Madagascar envisages the processes that need to be followed in the event of the vacancy of the position of the president due to impeachment or abandonment of the position by the president. Following the adoption of the motion of impeachment, the National Assembly submitted the matter of filling the vacancy to the High Constitutional Court. It was reported that despite the provisions of the Constitution which stipulate that the President of the Senate or, in his or her absence, the President of the Assembly assumes the role of President temporarily, the High Constitutional Court ‘invited’ CAPSAT leader Col. Michael Randrianirina to ‘exercise functions of head of state.’ Yet, there is no provision in the Constitution that vests authority in the Court to assign such functions to the army. The court also asked Randrianirina to hold elections within 60 days of its decision, citing the Constitution’s Article 53, which requires a presidential election within 30 to 60 days after the High Constitutional Court declares the office vacant.
Notwithstanding the attempt on the part of the National Assembly and the Court to follow the Constitution, albeit selectively on the part of the Court, Colonel Randrianirina, after announcing the seizure of power, declared the dissolution of all institutions except the lower house of parliament. ‘The following institutions are suspended: the Senate, the High Constitutional Court, the Independent National Electoral Commission, the High Court of Justice, and the High Council for the Defence of Human Rights and the Rule of Law,’ a statement from the country’s military leaders read. Contrary to the Constitution and what the High Constitutional Court stipulated, a committee led by the military would rule the country for a period of up to two years alongside a transitional government before organising new elections.’
In the light of these series of developments, the PSC has to make a determination of whether an unconstitutional change of government took place in Madagascar during tomorrow’s session. While provision has been made by the PSC for sending a joint mission to Madagascar in the communiqué of its 130th session, and SADC took a decision to deploy a fact-finding mission, there are adequate facts that are incontestable for enabling the PSC to make the determination. First, it is not contested that the President of the country no longer holds the office: He had fled the country, the National Assembly impeached him, and the High Constitutional Council declared the position of the President vacant. Second, the High Constitutional Court’s invitation of Colonel Randrianirina to step in for exercising the role of President does not have any constitutional basis. It is nothing more than an exercise in giving a military seizure of power a semblance of ‘legality,’ similar to what happened in Chad in 2021. Third, it cannot also be contested that the army that took power froze the country’s Constitution by suspending key institutions of the Constitution. Fourth, in the statement it issued, the army that seized power declared that a committee that is led by itself will lead the country for two years. Taken together, these incontestable facts that don’t need any verification establish the occurrence of an unconstitutional change of government, involving seizure of power by the army. As such, the PSC has no option but to treat the situation in Madagascar as an unconstitutional change of government.
Internal dynamics of the PSC is such that some member states may argue against the application of Article 7(1)(g) of the PSC Protocol, which requires the PSC to suspend a country that experienced an unconstitutional change of government, even when they may agree that what happened was a coup or an unconstitutional change of government. Such an approach would constitute a serious deviation from the clear terms of not only the PSC Protocol but also the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance and most importantly the AU’s grand law, the Constitutive Act. Additionally, there is no advantage to be gained by the AU if it considers the situation as a coup but fails to attach the consequences relating thereto as clearly stipulated in the Constitutive Act of the AU. However, the PSC may face a backlash if it falls short of applying the AU rules on unconstitutional changes of government fully. It loses whatever leverage that the application of the rules fully would give the AU for ensuring that the grievances of the people are addressed through reforms and in pushing for the restoration of constitutional order. Further to this, the PSC may face charges of selective application and double standards. It would also face an increasing crisis of legitimacy and credibility in continuing to keep the suspension of the five AU member states currently under suspension.
The expected outcome of the session is a communique. The PSC is expected to express its condemnation of the occurrence of an unconstitutional change of government in Madagascar, with the seizure of power by the army. It may decide to apply Article 7(1)(g) of the Protocol and suspend Madagascar from the AU pending the transfer of political power by the army to a civilian administration in accordance with the procedures set in the constitution and the restoration of the suspended constitutional processes. The PSC may reiterate its position of the 1305th session, urging the Madagascar Armed Forces to uphold their constitutional mandate and to refrain from meddling in the political affairs of the country. It may also urge that the PSC may take note of the plan of SADC to dispatch a fact-finding mission and request the AU Commission to send a delegation that accompanies the SADC mission. The PSC may additionally express its readiness to receive the report on the fact-finding mission and review, as necessary, its policy position on the situation on the basis of SADC’s fact-finding report. It may also reiterate its request that the Chairperson of the AU Commission urgently appoint a special envoy on Madagascar. Echoing the Statement of the Chairperson of the SADC Organ, the PSC may also impress upon the de facto authorities their obligations under various AU instruments to respect and safeguard the rights, freedoms and dignity of citizens. It may also call for close coordination between the AU and SADC. It may urge all AU member states and the international community to support the decision of the PSC and the initiatives of the AU and SADC towards supporting measures for addressing the grievances of citizens, particularly the youth and the restoration of constitutional order in Madagascar.
Emergency Session on the political unrest in Madagascar
Emergency Session on the political unrest in Madagascar
Date | 13 October 2025
Today (13 October 2025), at 3:00 PM, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene an emergency session to consider the political unrest in Madagascar. This 1305th session of the PSC has been called following the escalating tensions and signs of a military coup in the wake of the widespread protests that gripped the island nation for the past few weeks.
The session will be chaired by Tebelelo Boang, Permanent Representative of Botswana to the AU and the AU PSC Chairperson for October, and will feature opening remarks from the Chairperson of the PSC. Mahmoud Youssouf, Chairperson of the AU Commission, is expected to make an introductory remark. As Madagascar is also the current chairperson of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), apart from the representative of Madagascar, who will make a statement as a concerned country, the PSC is also expected to receive a statement from SADC. During the closed segment of the session, the Representative of the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission in Madagascar is expected to make a presentation to the PSC.
The meeting follows alarming developments in the country, where soldiers have reportedly joined mass anti-government protests, and an elite military unit has declared that it is assuming control of parts of the armed forces. The situation, described by the Malagasy presidency as an ‘attempted illegal seizure of power,’ marks one of the most serious political ruptures in Madagascar since the 2009 military-backed change of government.
News outlets reported that the current unrest was initially triggered by widespread frustration over chronic power and water outages, compounded by rising living costs, unemployment, and public disillusionment with governance. What began as localised, youth-led protests in late September quickly evolved into a nationwide movement calling for greater accountability and political reform. It attracted the support of opposition politicians. Despite the fact that President Andry Rajoelina dissolved the government and appointed a general as the Prime Minister (read as an attempt to maintain the military’s allegiance) and called for dialogue, the effort did not placate protestors who insisted on his departure from power. Tensions escalated dramatically over the weekend of 11–12 October, when members of the elite CAPSAT unit, the same corps implicated in previous coups, marched alongside demonstrators in Antananarivo and entered symbolic public spaces such as May 13 Square. Their support for the protestors, reportedly welcomed by some protesters, has blurred the line between civilian unrest and exploitation of the situation by some in the army, hence heightening fears of a potential coup.
The state’s response has been increasingly heavy-handed, with security forces employing live ammunition and tear gas to disperse demonstrators. The UN reported that over 22 people were killed, a number the government contested. Civil society groups and international media report dozens of fatalities, while hospitals in the capital struggle to treat casualties amid growing shortages. The government has justified its actions as necessary to preserve order, but its credibility has been further eroded by the visible divisions within the security establishment and by mounting accusations of repression. As part of the stabilisation measures, it may be of interest for the PSC members to call for an end to the use of excessive force by security forces and for people to exercise their rights to peaceful protest without resort to violence.
Regional and international actors, including SADC and the AU Commission, have voiced grave concern over the situation, urging restraint and respect for human rights. In a statement released on 27 September, SADC expressed deep concern over violent protests in Madagascar and offered full support and solidarity to the government and people of Madagascar, commending the government’s commitment to restoring peace and stability. The statement also called on all stakeholders to exercise calm, restraint, and engage constructively and peacefully to resolve differences in the interest of national unity and reconciliation. On 12 October, the AU Commission Chairperson issued a statement emphasising adherence to the Lomé Declaration and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, calling on all parties to demonstrate responsibility and patriotism to preserve the country’s unity, stability, and peace within constitutional and institutional frameworks.
The crisis reveals deep-seated structural fragilities in Madagascar’s political order. It underscores the volatile nexus between socioeconomic hardship, governance deficits, and eroding civil–military boundaries. If left unchecked, the situation could slide into protracted instability, with severe implications for the broader Indian Ocean region. Already, curfews, internet restrictions, and disrupted flights point to a rapidly deteriorating security environment that could undermine Madagascar’s fragile economic recovery and displace populations toward neighbouring islands and mainland southern Africa.
For the PSC, the immediate challenge lies in containing the crisis before it hardens into a full-fledged coup or civil conflict. As such, the Council is expected to deliberate on deploying preventive diplomacy measures, including the dispatch of a high-level AU mission to engage with the government, opposition leaders, and civil society representatives. Such a mission could serve to create conditions for facilitating dialogue and facilitating reform measures for addressing the grievances of the public, particularly the youth.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may express grave concern over the deteriorating political and security situation in Madagascar. The PSC is also expected to condemn the use of excessive force and guarantee independent investigations into the deaths of civilians. It may also call for restraint by all actors, including the need for protestors to observe rules on the right to peaceful protest. The PSC may reaffirm the AU’s zero-tolerance policy for unconstitutional changes of government. The Council may also reaffirm its support for SADC’s mediation efforts and request the AU Commission Chairperson to coordinate closely with SADC to promote a peaceful and credible electoral process. In this regard, the PSC may endorse AU-SADC-led joint mediation to bring the government, protest representatives (including youth leaders), political parties, and civil society into an urgent dialogue to address immediate grievances and to agree on a roadmap for political and socio-economic reforms and deepening democratic processes. Additionally, the PSC may call for inclusive dialogue among political actors to address grievances related to the electoral process. It may encourage the government to guarantee civic and political freedoms, including freedom of expression and assembly, in the run-up to the elections. The PSC may also call on the security forces to maintain their impartiality and restrain from actions that undermine conditions for dialogue and addressing the grievances of the public.
