Solomon Ayele Dersso, PhD
Founding Director, Amani Africa

Africa played host to two major international summits. Under South Africa’s Presidency, Johannesburg played host to the 2025 Group of 20 (G20) summit. Under Angola’s chairship of the continental body, the African Union (AU), Luanda was the stage for the 7th AU and European Union (EU) summit. They took place one after the other, on 22-23 November and 24-25 November respectively.

Despite minor differences in the issues they cover, they share major convergence on the major themes covered by the agendas of the two summits. The G20 summit, being held for the first time on African soil under the theme ‘solidarity, equality and sustainability, focused, among others, on issues dubbed to be of particular interest for developing countries, particularly Africa. This can be seen from the broad thematic areas that the G20 presidency advanced: Debt reform, climate resilience, inclusive development and a more democratic global governance system.

As can be gathered from the Leaders’ Declaration, the G20 addressed, among others, debt crisis, energy transition, critical minerals for growth and sustainable development, inclusive economic growth, industrialisation and reduced inequality, sustainable financing, and equitable global governance.

These are all issues covered in the joint AU-EU Summit Declaration under the sub-themes of  ‘shaping a prosperous and sustainable future for Africa and Europe’  and ‘a stronger commitment to multilateralism.’

One of the successes of the Johannesburg G20 summit was the adoption of the Leaders’ Declaration at the start of the summit in a departure from usual practice and despite the boycott and pressure from the United States (US.) The successful convening and the adoption of a substantive leaders’ declaration is applauded for showing how multilateral diplomacy can be pursued without the US (and even in the face of opposition from it), the architect and anchor of much of the multilateral platforms of the post-World War II world order, including the G20.

With at least 25 African states in debt distress and at least three of them defaulting on their debt payment, the debt crisis is one of the most pressing issues of particular concern for Africa that was at the centre of the G20 summit agenda. According to the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) 2025 Economic Report on Africa, African countries spent about US$163 billion on debt service in 2024 alone. Despite having a lower debt-to-GDP ratio than G7 countries, African governments spend, according to a report from Tony Blair Institute, on average 18% of all revenue just on interest payments, which is up to 6 times more than G7/EU countries.

It was no surprise that debt became one of the four high-level priorities identified by the G20 under South Africa’s presidency. As President Cyril Ramaphosa of South Africa observed in his opening of the summit, the ‘G20 needs to renew its efforts to advance debt sustainability, with a particular emphasis on African countries.’ The Johannesburg G20 leaders’ declaration did not downplay nor shied away from acknowledging the gravity and adverse developmental consequences of the debt crisis. Thus, it recognised that ‘a high level of debt is one of the obstacles to inclusive growth in many developing economies, which limits their ability to invest in infrastructure, disaster resilience, healthcare, education and other development needs.’ (Emphasis added)

By contrast, the 7th AU-EU summit adopted a more reluctant framing, potentially downplaying the cost of debt distress. It thus stated ‘high level of debt can be an obstacle to inclusive growth and ‘may limit their ability to invest in infrastructure, disaster resilience, healthcare, education and other development needs.’ (Emphasis added) While the G20 recognised a high level of debt as factually being an obstacle to inclusive growth, the AU-EU summit declaration used ‘can be’ and ‘may’, hence casting uncertainty about whether high-level debt carries such consequences for affected countries. There is, however, ample evidence, including from UNECA and UNCTAD, that debt is, to use the words of President Ramaphosa, ‘stifling public spending and economic growth’. The AU draft enjoined the AU-EU to a number of targeted commitments, including ‘to take decisive actions to address the high debt premium of borrowing countries, especially in Africa, that pay significantly higher interest rates compared to their peers despite similar risk ratings.’

Both the G20 and AU-EU summits failed short of adopting robust measures that address the structural conditions embedded in the international financial order that create cyclic debt distress, including those advanced in the joint Namibia-Amani Africa High-level Panel of Experts on Africa and the Reform of the Multilateral System and the AU’s Common African Position on debt, including the proposal for a UN framework convention on sovereign debt. Even then, while the joint AU-EU summit declaration called for qualified ‘reform of the international debt architecture’, the G20 declaration adopted a more specific and emphatic language, by underscoring ‘the need for enhancing the representation and voice of developing countries in decision making in multilateral development banks (MDBs) and other international economic and financial institutions.’

What is striking about the changes introduced is not just that they watered down the already reasonable formulations in the draft from the AU. The deletion even included a reference to support for the recent initiative to find a sustainable solution to the debt crisis. One example of such deletion is ‘we welcome the Sevilla Forum on Debt launched at UNCTAD 19 to tackle entrenched debt crises in developing countries.’ Signifying the lack of common ground on addressing the structural conditions perpetuating the debt crisis, it was reported that the EU voted against a resolution on sovereign debt under discussion in New York just as the summit was being held.

The AU draft commenced the section on ‘shaping a prosperous and sustainable future for Africa and Europe’ with ‘We further reaffirm our commitment to accelerating economic transformation and sustainable development to achieve inclusive growth and sustainable development to create economic opportunities for all, particularly for youth and women.’ After the changes introduced by the EU, not only was the reaffirmation of such commitment left out, but the section commences with a language that foregrounds the EU’s Global Gateway Initiative as reflected in the final copy of the declaration adopted in Luanda. It is worth noting that, as opposed to the very positive framing reflected in the summit declaration, the AU draft on the Global Gateway emphasised ‘the need for greater transparency, timely delivery, and measurable impact to ensure that the promised investment effectively supports Africa’s priorities and is fully aligned with the vision and goals of the AU’s Agenda 2063. The selection and implementation of projects must be conducted jointly to ensure full African ownership and appropriation.’

The substantive issues raised in the draft by the AU member states around Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), including its potential for increasing costs, limiting competitiveness and undermining efforts to sustainably manage natural resources, such as biodiversity-based exports and the reference to ensuring in this regard respect for implementation of Article 3(5) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) were also removed. After negotiations, the final version commits only to ‘maintaining open, transparent, and inclusive channels of dialogue, including on trade-related environmental measures, such as CBAM and EU Deforestation Regulation (EUDR).’ Instead of the reasonable and clear language calling for provision of adequate time, capacity building support and flexibility for African countries to adapt to such new regulatory measures, the final declaration stated ‘the EU and AU will tackle together challenges posed to African exporters in sustainably managing natural resources, including biodiversity-based exports.’ This language and the reading of the entire paragraph 10 hide the concern raised in the AU draft that the challenge ‘in sustainably managing natural resources’ is a potential challenge posed by trade-related environmental measures, such as CBAM and EUDR.

By contrast, despite not going far enough and falling short of making direct reference to CBAM, the G20 declaration is explicit in stating that ‘measures taken to combat climate change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade.’

These are just some of the examples that highlight the contrasting outcomes of two international summits hosted on African soil, one after the other and covering similar issues. Despite all the appearances of progress and the symbolic changes on display in the lead-up to and during the AU-EU summit, substantively, the examples cited above suggest that the summit in Luanda did not mark a departure from the past. It shows the entrenchment of the power asymmetry and the reflex of being comfortable with dominating in setting the agenda and the process of shaping the outcomes of partnership meetings. The contrast between what the opening speeches projected and this outcome is reflective of what Carlos Lopes called the self-deception trap.

This outcome is not just to be blamed on the EU. After all, the AU, particularly its member states, were not without the possibility of achieving a different outcome. This can be gathered from the draft that they initiated, which sought such a different outcome. Yet, the push of the AU, particularly its member states, failed short. Whatever success was achieved in bringing back elements initially proposed, produced formulations that substantively changed the essence of the original formulation or hugely watered-down language on substantive policy issues, as those cited above exemplify.

It is worth noting that the effort to regain the momentum succeeded in securing the removal of the reference to the ambiguous and problematic language of ‘rules-based international order’ and the restoration of the reference to the work towards the UN Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation, which was deleted from the AU draft. Thus, ‘rules-based international order’ was replaced with the neutral and accurate framing of ‘commitment to international order based on international law and effective multilateralism grounded in international law, including the Charter of the United Nations and its Purposes and Principles, as well as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law.’ (Emphasis added)

No doubt that this outcome could have been avoided. It happened not for lack of ways of avoiding it, but proposals advanced in various European and African publications, such as here and here, as well as earlier counsel from Lopes, were not heeded.

While the G20 summit outcome carried content that projected Africa’s interest and had about 5 times more to ‘Africa’ than the previous record of 18 references to Africa during the G20 in 2017, the AU-EU summit was a major missed opportunity to move the partnership meeting beyond performative dialogue.

This tale of the two summits amply affirms that the observation (made ahead of the two summits) that the G20 summit ‘appears to generate more excitement in the AU and Africa than the AU-EU summit’ was not without merit.

The 7^th AU-EU summit kicked off earlier today under the theme ‘Promoting Peace and Prosperity through Effective Multilateralism.’ As the nearly 80 leaders of the African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU) convene in Angola’s capital, Luanda, on 24-25 November 2025, a major question in the minds of many is whether this summit will mark a departure from the previous summit.

The last time the two sides met at a summit level was in February 2022. It is to be recalled that the summit was held under the theme ‘Two unions, one vision’. As it was clear for many close observers at the time, coming against the background of major policy dissonance over the COVID-19 pandemic, including over access to the vaccine, the idea of the AU and EU having ‘one vision’ was seen as nothing more than an illusion. What unfolded soon after that summit in February 2022, with the Russian invasion of Ukraine, made it clear that the idea of ‘one vision’ was anything but grounded in reality.

The reality is that there are areas of shared interest between the AU and the EU. This has been in full display in the robust partnership and cooperation of the AU and the EU on peace and security. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine the operationalisation of the peace and security architecture of the AU without the critical role played by this partnership. Understandably, the peace and security partnership, for which the EU established the African Peace Facility, was premised on the recognition that the AU’s enhanced role in peace and security is a useful contribution to the global public good of the maintenance of international peace and security, which the EU has an interest in promoting.

Parallel to such a major area of convergence, the other equally important reality is that there are many policy areas in respect of which the interests of the two sides diverge, at times fundamentally. The policy dissonance regarding COVID-19 brought this into sharp relief. While the AU Assembly advocated for a TRIPs waiver regarding COVID-19 vaccines underscoring the need for a just international system, the EU was not supportive of the demand for TRIPs waiver. Although not the same situation, in the context of the war in Ukraine and unsurprisingly, the lack of shared policy position between the EU and the AU on the response to the war became a deal breaker in three consecutive annual consultative meetings of the EU Political and Security Committee and the AU Peace and Security Council. As a result, the annual consultative meetings held during 2022, 2023 and 2024 ended without adopting a joint communiqué.

Given that it is being held in a much more fraught global context and regional dynamics that further strain multilateral cooperation, the AU-EU summit in Luanda needs to be informed by the lessons from these experiences. For example, AU’s support for multilateralism is increasingly accompanied by the demand by AU member states (which is getting louder and was evident during the G20 summit in Johannesburg) for both a) reform, among others, of the global tax regime and the international financial institutions and b) delivery on commitments made in relation to the sustainable development goals and measures for addressing the threat of climate change.

This requires both sides treating the relationship with the seriousness it deserves. Despite being courted by many, the reality is the AU needs the EU. A case in point is the EU’s critical support for the AU’s mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). If mobilised towards priorities set by Africa and jointly designed and implemented, investments from the EU under the Global Gateway would be catalytic to advance some of the flagship projects of Agenda 2063 of the AU. The EU, on its part, needs Africa’s endowment with critical minerals, the demography that will be a major source of labour for the global economy and its growing market. It also needs, like others, AU member states in multilateral negotiations. Despite the power asymmetry and the different institutional arrangement for developing positions still working in its favour, the EU would do well not to perpetuate the business-as-usual model of engaging the AU, hence being comfortable with setting the agenda and dominating the process of shaping the outcomes of the AU-EU partnership meetings.

There is a lot of dialogue between the AU and the EU. As the cases referenced above show, the dialogue does not always translate into listening and mutual understanding. As the EU would do well not to perpetuate the business-as-usual-model of engaging the AU, for member states of the AU, there can be no exercise of agency without being able to set and negotiate the agenda of the AU-EU partnership meetings. Similarly, the rhetoric and ambition of speaking with one voice should be supported by a negotiated common position premised on Agenda 2063.

These were barely on display during the AU-EU ministerial on the part of the AU member states. By contrast, the AU adopted a different posture in the preparations for the summit. Instead of taking the easy road of copying and pasting from the AU-EU ministerial outcome document, the AU initiated a draft with new elements that reflect the interests and policy positions of Africa on the various agenda items agreed between the two sides.

In the negotiation on the outcome document for the AU-EU summit in Luanda, initially, there was no real discussion both on what informed the elements of the draft that the AU initiated and on why the EU side responded by deleting and replacing with its proposed formulations. This was far from an ideal way of engaging in negotiations. It became clear to both sides that there was a lot of value in engaging in direct negotiations held on 11 and 12 November. A critical factor in creating such an atmosphere was the role of the chair on the side of the AU. It has become apparent that there is a need for a more flexible engagement grounded in principle.