Consideration of the situation in Guinea
Consideration of the situation in Guinea
Date | 21 January 2026
Tomorrow (22 January), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene a session to consider the situation in Guinea.
The session will commence with an opening statement by the Chairperson of the PSC for the month, Jean-Léon Ngandu Ilunga, Permanent Representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the AU, followed by a statement from Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). Guinea’s representative may also deliver a statement following the closed session.
The session takes place against the backdrop of recent developments marking the formal conclusion of Guinea’s transition following the September 2021 military coup. These developments culminated in the presidential election held on 28 December 2025. The coup leader, General Mamadi Doumbouya, was declared the winner with 86.72 per cent of the vote following the proclamation of the final results by the Supreme Court on 4 January 2026, and was subsequently sworn in as President on 17 January.
In a communiqué released on 4 January, the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Mahamoud Ali Youssouf, extended his ‘warmest congratulations’ to the President-elect of Guinea. He commended the Guinean people for demonstrating political maturity through peaceful participation in the electoral process, and called on the AU and the international community to assess the situation in the country with a view to lifting the sanctions imposed on Guinea. He stated that such a step would reflect the progress achieved and help create favourable conditions for the implementation of the roadmap aimed at rebuilding and modernising the state for the well-being of the Guinean people.
A similar position was reflected in the Preliminary Statement of the AU Election Observation Mission, led by former President of Burundi and member of the AU Panel of the Wise, Domitien Ndayizeye. The Mission concluded that the election was conducted in a ‘peaceful, orderly and credible environment, consistent with relevant international standards and the national legal framework.’ On this basis, it recommended that the AU consider lifting the sanctions imposed on Guinea as a gesture of increased solidarity, to encourage the acceleration and successful completion of structural reforms, support national reconciliation, and create a conducive environment for forthcoming elections as drivers of social stabilisation and democratic consolidation.
Tomorrow’s session thus unfolds in the context of these calls by the Chairperson of the Commission and the AU Election Observation Mission for the lifting of the sanctions imposed by the PSC at its 1030th session of 10 September 2021, following the unconstitutional change of government in the country. Mirroring the approach taken in the case of Gabon—where suspension was lifted after a presidential election despite its inconsistency with the AU’s anti-coup norm barring coup perpetrators from contesting elections—the PSC is expected to lift the sanctions and bring Guinea back into the AU fold.
Guinea was suspended by the PSC on 10 September 2021 from participation in all AU activities following the military coup of 5 September 2021 led by the current President, General Mamadi Doumbouya. Since then, the political transition in the country experienced delays, notwithstanding the two-year transition period agreed between Guinea and the regional bloc, ECOWAS, in October 2022. However, in 2025, Guinea took steps to complete the political transition.
A constitutional referendum was held on 21 September 2025, laying the foundation for the entry into force of a new Constitution adopted by the people and promulgated on 26 September. The Constitution amended the legal framework to allow members of the ruling military authorities to stand as candidates and extended the presidential term to seven years, renewable once. A new Electoral Code was also adopted and promulgated on 27 September 2025. On 28 December, Guinea organised the presidential election, a key milestone in the political transition and a major step toward the restoration of constitutional order in the country.
The PSC conducted a field mission to Guinea on 30 and 31 May 2025, during the chairship of Sierra Leone, to encourage the authorities to complete the transition. During the mission, it is recalled that the Guinean authorities requested that the AU consider lifting sanctions following the constitutional referendum in September, in order to facilitate re-engagement with the international community and access to vital partnerships for socioeconomic development. However, both the report of the field mission and the communiqué adopting it alluded that the conduct of the presidential election in December—rather than the constitutional referendum—would mark the formal end of the transition and trigger the lifting of sanctions.
In the communiqué adopted at its 1284th session, the PSC requested the AU Commission to engage with the Guinean transition authorities to identify areas of support and provide the necessary technical and financial assistance, particularly for the constitutional referendum and the preparation of the general elections scheduled for December. In follow-up to this request, the Commission deployed a short-term Election Observation Mission to Guinea from 20 December 2025 to 1 January 2026, composed of 62 observers and led by Mr Domitien Ndayizeye.
As PSC members prepare to consider the lifting of Guinea’s suspension, they will be confronted with the question of how to reconcile such a decision with Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG), which explicitly prohibits perpetrators of unconstitutional changes of government from participating in elections held to restore democratic order or from holding positions of responsibility in political institutions. This, however, is not the first time the PSC has faced this dilemma. At its 442nd session in June 2014, when lifting Egypt’s suspension, the PSC explicitly stated that the decision was taken with the ‘understanding that this does not constitute a precedent’ regarding compliance with Article 25(4) of the Charter.
More recently, in the case of Gabon, the PSC at its 1277th session held on 30 April 2025 lifted the country’s suspension following the 12 April presidential election, which resulted in the election of Brice Oligui Nguema—the leader of the August 2023 military seizure of power—without reiterating the non-precedential caveat or reaffirming the relevance of Article 25(4). This signalled a notable shift in the PSC’s approach, with growing emphasis on reintegrating countries suspended following military coups into the AU fold, even at the expense of weakening the Union’s own anti-coup norms. The prevailing sentiment within the PSC appears increasingly pragmatic and flexible, marking a departure from the AU’s declared policy of zero tolerance for unconstitutional changes of government.
Lifting Guinea’s suspension without addressing its compatibility with Article 25(4) of ACDEG would have serious implications—not only for the AU’s normative stance on unconstitutional changes of government, but also for the precedent it sets for other sanctioned contexts. It would raise fundamental questions about the applicability of Article 25(4) and the message conveyed to militaries across the continent. If those who seize power through military coups can ultimately secure legitimacy through elections endorsed by the AU, it risks incentivising unconstitutional seizures of power by altering the perceived balance between the risks and rewards of military intervention in politics.
In this context, the critical questions raised in our previous analyses of the PSC’s approach in the case of Gabon remain equally relevant to Guinea. When considering the lifting of Guinea’s suspension, the issue should not be limited to whether the completion of the electoral process constitutes the restoration of constitutional order. It should also address how the PSC intends to manage the implications of this decision in relation to Article 25(4). At a minimum, the PSC could reiterate the formulation adopted at its 442nd session, emphasising the continued relevance of Article 25(4) and clarifying that the lifting of Guinea’s suspension does not constitute a precedent for future cases.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is likely to commend the conduct of the presidential election held on 28 December 2025 and may congratulate Mamadi Doumbouya on his election as President. In line with the calls by the Chairperson of the AU Commission and the AU Election Observation Mission, the PSC is also expected to lift Guinea’s suspension and invite the country to immediately resume participation in AU activities. However, it remains unclear whether the PSC will explicitly reaffirm the relevance of Article 25(4) of ACDEG and clarify the non-precedential nature of its decision—as it did in 2014—or whether it will follow the approach adopted in its 1277th session on Gabon, thereby tacitly tolerating a breach of this provision.
Consideration of the half-year report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on elections in Africa
Consideration of the half-year report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on elections in Africa
Date | 20 January 2026
Tomorrow (21 January), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1325th Session to consider the mid-year report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on elections in Africa, covering the period between July and December 2025.
Following the opening statement of the Chairperson of the PSC for the month, Jean-Léon Ngandu Ilunga, Permanent Representative of the Democratic Republic of Congo to the AU, Bankole Adeoye, the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to present the report. Statements are also expected from the representatives of Member States that organised elections during the reporting period.
As per the PSC’s decision from its 424th session in March 2014, which mandates periodic updates on African electoral developments, the Chairperson presents a mid-year elections report. The previous update was delivered during the 1288th PSC session on 4 July, 2025 and covered electoral activities from January to June 2025. Tomorrow’s briefing will similarly provide accounts of elections conducted from July to December 2025, covering elections held in Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Malawi, the Seychelles, Somalia, and Tanzania, while also outlining the electoral calendar for the first half of 2026.
Across the second half of 2025, governance trends across Africa reflected a complex and often uneven interplay between electoral continuity, democratic backsliding, and institutional resilience. A recurring pattern was the consolidation of executive power through elections held in constrained political environments, frequently following constitutional changes that weakened term limits or enabled incumbents or transitional authorities to entrench themselves. Many of these polls were marked by low or moderate voter turnout, opposition boycotts or exclusions, and contested credibility, even where regional and continental observation missions officially endorsed peaceful conduct, highlighting a growing gap between formal electoral procedures and substantive democratic competition. At the same time, episodes of acute instability, most notably the military interruption of elections in Guinea-Bissau, underscored the continued fragility of civilian rule in some contexts, prompting robust but reactive responses from regional bodies. In contrast, a smaller number of cases demonstrated democratic resilience through competitive elections, peaceful concessions, and credible alternation of power.
In the aftermath of Cameroon’s contested 12 October 2025 presidential election, President Paul Biya was re-elected to an eighth term amid heightened political tensions. Post-election protests were reported in parts of the country, with security forces intervening to restore order, resulting in casualties. The Constitutional Council confirmed Biya’s victory with 53.7% of the vote, a result rejected by opposition candidate Issa Tchiroma Bakary, who claimed victory and accused authorities of systematic manipulation. The AU deployed an election observer mission led by Bernard Makuza, former Prime Minister and former President of the Senate of the Republic of Rwanda, composed of 40 short-term observers (STOs). Later, a joint statement from the AU and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)indicated that ‘the election was conducted peacefully, with respect for democratic values and citizen participation.’ They also noted low turnout and urged stakeholders to channel grievances through legal mechanisms.
In the Central African Republic’s 28 December 2025 presidential election, the incumbent President Faustin-Archange Touadéra secured a third term, garnering approximately 76.15 % of the vote according to provisional results from the National Elections Authority, which will be officially validated by the Constitutional Court. Touadéra’s victory follows a controversial 2023 constitutional referendum that abolished presidential term limits and extended term lengths, enabling him to run again and entrench his decade-long rule. The major opposition coalition boycotted the vote, decrying an unequal political environment and unfair conditions, and some challengers have alleged electoral malpractice and fraud. Voter turnout was at around 52%, reflecting mixed public engagement amid ongoing instability, even as the election technically proceeded peacefully and without widespread unrest reported.
The 2025 electoral cycle in Côte d’Ivoire opened with the presidential election on 25 October, followed by legislative polls on 27 December. According to the electoral commission, President Alassane Ouattara won decisively with 89.8% of the vote, while businessman Jean-Louis Billon trailed at 3.09%. Voter turnout stood at 50.1%, underscoring limited public participation. At the invitation of Ivorian authorities, the AU and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) deployed a joint Election Observation Mission (EOM) of more than 250 observers across the country, reflecting strong regional engagement. Their preliminary report highlighted candidate exclusions, weak opposition presence, accessibility challenges, and logistical shortcomings. For the December legislative elections, the AU dispatched a separate mission of 31 observers to assess preparations, voting operations, and the post-election environment.
In Egypt, following the August senate elections, parliamentary elections were conducted in multiple phases starting in November, producing a legislature overwhelmingly aligned with President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. His political bloc secured the super-majority required to advance constitutional amendments, consolidating executive dominance. Overall turnout and participation levels fluctuated.
The 23 November 2025 general elections in Guinea-Bissau, intended to produce a legitimate presidential and legislative outcome in a country long beset by political fragility, were abruptly upended when military forces seized power on 26 November, a day before provisional results were to be announced. Both incumbent President Umaro Sissoco Embaló and opposition candidate Fernando Dias da Costa had claimed victory prior to the official tally, but the military takeover involved storming the National Electoral Commission’s offices, the seizure and destruction of ballots, tally sheets and servers, and suspension of the entire electoral process, making completion of the vote effectively impossible. Major-General Horta Inta-A Na Man was installed as transitional president and appointed a new cabinet, drawing accusations from opposition figures and observers that the coup was either staged or exploited to forestall the constitutional transfer of power and preserve entrenched elite interests. In response, ECOWAS convened an extraordinary summit on 27 November, condemned the coup, suspended Guinea-Bissau, rejected any arrangements undermining the electoral process, and demanded the immediate declaration of the 23 November election results, while mandating a high-level mediation mission led by Sierra Leone’s President Julius Maada Bio. The PSC followed on 28 November by also suspending Guinea-Bissau, strongly condemning the coup, and calling for the completion of the electoral process and inauguration of the winner during its 1315th session. The Council also tasked the AU Commission Chairperson to create an inclusive AU Monitoring Mechanism, in collaboration with ECOWAS and stakeholders, to monitor the situation, especially the implementation of ECOWAS and PSC decisions.
In the 28 December 2025 presidential election in Guinea, held under a new constitution that followed the 2021 military coup, junta leader Mamady Doumbouya secured a landslide victory with 86.72 % of the vote and was later sworn in as president, marking the end of the formal transitional period since he seized power. AU observers were deployed to monitor the campaign and voting phases, with a mission arriving in mid-December and issuing preliminary statements that attested that the election took place in a peaceful, orderly, and credible environment. However, the electoral trajectory, notably a constitutional referendum earlier in 2025 that amended the legal framework to allow members of the ruling military authorities to stand as candidates, has deepened concerns about compliance with the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) Article 25(4), which seeks to restrict participation of those who have seized power through unconstitutional means.
In Malawi’s 16 September 2025 general elections, former President Peter Mutharika won a clear victory over incumbent President Lazarus Chakwera, securing 56.8 % of the vote to Chakwera’s 33%, with turnout around 76% of registered voters, prompting a peaceful concession by Chakwera and a commitment to a smooth transfer of power. The elections were observed by a joint African Union–COMESA Election Observation Mission and a SADC Electoral Observation Mission, both deployed at the invitation of Malawi’s government to assess compliance with national, regional, and international democratic standards, and to engage with key electoral stakeholders, including the Malawi Electoral Commission (MEC), political parties, civil society and media. Preliminary observation reports highlighted a generally peaceful and orderly process, with long queues and broad voter participation, though technical issues such as late polling station openings and structural challenges (e.g., biometric machine failures and the need for improved dispute resolution timelines) were noted, pointing to areas for future reform. This election reinforced Malawi’s democratic resilience and provided lessons for Africa on peaceful leadership alternation and the significance of robust electoral frameworks.
In the 2025 Seychelles general and presidential elections, the multi-stage process began with presidential and National Assembly polls on 25–27 September 2025, observed by a Joint AU and COMESA Election Observation Mission following an invitation from the Government and Electoral Commission; the mission engaged with key stakeholders across political, media, civic and institutional spheres to assess compliance with continental democratic standards enshrined in ACDEG and related instruments. According to the Joint Preliminary Report of the Joint mission, the candidate secured an outright majority in the first round, triggering a run-off held from 9 -11 October 2025 between opposition leader Patrick Herminie of the United Seychelles party and incumbent President Wavel Ramkalawan of Linyon Demokratik Seselwa. Herminie won the run-off with 52.7% of the vote to Ramkalawan’s 47.3%, returning his party to executive leadership and reversing the 2020 result that had first brought Ramkalawan to office. Observers and regional bodies, including SADC, noted the generally peaceful, orderly and professionally managed electoral environment.
In Gabon, the 27 September (first round) and 11 October (second round) parliamentary elections consolidated President Brice Oligui Nguema’s political dominance following his April presidential win, with his newly formed Democratic Union of Builders (UDB) securing a decisive majority in the National Assembly, winning around 101–102 out of 145 seats and relegating the long-dominant Gabonese Democratic Party (PDG) to a distant second, alongside a handful of smaller parties and independents. According to International IDEA’s Global State of Democracy Tracker, while the elections were largely peaceful and marked a significant shift in Gabon’s post-coup political landscape, they were also marred by irregularities, including missing ballots and annulments in several constituencies.
In Tanzania, the general elections held on 29 October 2025 produced an overwhelmingly one-sided result with President Samia Suluhu Hassan declared the winner on over 98% of the vote, but they were marred by deep controversy, violent unrest, and allegations of severe democratic deficits. The African Union Election Observation Mission’s preliminary report indicated that the elections “did not comply with AU principles, normative frameworks, and other international obligations and standards for democratic elections”, noting a restricted political environment, opposition boycotts and exclusions, internet shutdowns, outbreaks of deadly protests, and significant procedural irregularities that compromised electoral integrity and peaceful acceptance of results. On the other hand, the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, H.E. Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, issued a public statement congratulating President Suluhu on her victory while expressing regret at the loss of life in post-election protests and emphasising respect for human rights and the rule of law.
The period also marked a pivotal shift in Somalia’s electoral framework with the introduction of direct municipal elections. Somalia’s municipal elections held on 25 December 2025 in Mogadishu’s Banadir region introduced direct, one-person-one-vote polling for the first time in nearly six decades, a major departure from the indirect, clan-based model used since 1991 and direct voting last seen in 1969. The polls, involving some 1,604 candidates competing for 390 council seats and more than 500,000 registered voters, were widely framed by authorities and local observers as a critical first step toward restoring universal suffrage and laying the groundwork for nationwide direct elections scheduled for 2026, and showcased significant logistical and security efforts amid ongoing instability and insurgent threats. While the exercise proceeded under heightened security and with heavy public interest, it was also shadowed by political tensions, including opposition boycotts and concerns about inclusivity and turnout.
Furthermore, the report will highlight elections scheduled between January and June 2026. The majority of elections planned for 2026 will take place in the first half of the year, with Benin, Cape Verde, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Uganda holding polls during this period.
Uganda opened Africa’s 2026 election cycle with a presidential poll on 15 January. The presidential election saw long-time incumbent President Yoweri Museveni extend his rule into a seventh term, securing approximately 71.6 % of the vote against opposition leader Robert Kyagulanyi (Bobi Wine), who received about 24.7 %, in a contest marked by significant controversy and political tension. Official results indicated a 52.5 % voter turnout, the lowest since the return to multiparty politics. The joint preliminary statement of The African Union – Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa and the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development Election Observation Mission indicated that Uganda’s elections proved more peaceful than the 2021 election, earning praise for voter patience, professional staff, and transparent counting, though concerns persisted over military involvement, internet shutdowns, opposition arrests, media bias, high fees excluding marginalized groups, Electoral Commission independence issues, and Election Day delays.
The Republic of Congo is scheduled to hold its presidential election on 22 March 2026, with incumbent President Denis Sassou Nguesso officially nominated by the ruling Congolese Labour Party (PCT) to run for another term alongside candidates from opposition parties.
The 2026 presidential election in Djibouti is scheduled to take place by April 2026, with incumbent President Ismaïl Omar Guelleh, who has governed the country since 1999, formally nominated by the ruling Rassemblement Populaire pour le Progrès (RPP) to seek a sixth term following a constitutional amendment in late 2025 that removed the presidential age limit, allowing the 77-year-old leader to run again.
The 7th general election in Ethiopia is scheduled to be held on 1 June 2026, with the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) confirming the official election timetable, including candidate registration and campaigning periods ahead of polling day. A wide range of political parties are expected to contest seats in the House of Peoples’ Representatives, including the ruling Prosperity Party and several opposition and regional parties participating with their candidates across constituencies.
The national election process in Somalia is expected to take place in June 2026 under a newly adopted electoral framework aimed at moving toward universal suffrage and direct elections after decades of indirect, clan-based vote systems. Preparatory local polls and voter registration efforts were conducted in late 2025 as part of this transition, although there remains significant political disagreement over the roadmap and mechanisms for the upcoming national vote. Several political figures, including incumbent President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and other declared or prospective contenders such as Abdi Farah Shirdon, are positioning themselves for the upcoming presidential race amid a fractured political landscape.
In Benin, President Patrice Talon steps down in line with constitutional term limits, breaking with the regional trend of incumbents extending their rule. The 2026 presidential election in Benin is set for 12 April 2026, with former finance minister Romuald Wadagni, endorsed by outgoing President Talon, emerging as a leading candidate after the ruling coalition cleared the required sponsorship thresholds. On 11 January 2026, parliamentary and local elections were held, in which the ruling Progressive Union for Renewal and the Republican Bloc together won all 109 seats in the National Assembly under a new 20 % threshold that left the main opposition without representation. These votes followed a failed coup attempt on 7 December 2025, when a small group of soldiers briefly announced the overthrow of the government but were quickly contained by loyal forces with regional support.
The Republic of Cabo Verde will hold its legislative elections on 17 May 2026 and its presidential election on 15 November 2026, with a possible second round for the presidency on 29 November if no candidate wins an outright majority. President José Maria Neves announced the dates after consultations with political parties and the National Elections Commission, and key parties preparing to contest include the ruling Movement for Democracy (MpD) and opposition parties such as the African Party for the Independence of Cape Verde (PAICV) and the Independent and Democratic Cape-Verdean Union (UCID).
The expected outcome is a communiqué. The PSC may take note of the Chairperson’s elections report, covering electoral developments from July to December 2025 and the electoral calendar for the first half of 2026. The PSC may commend Member States where elections were conducted peacefully and led to credible outcomes, while encouraging those facing post-electoral tensions or transitions to resolve disputes through constitutional and legal mechanisms. The Council may reiterate its condemnation of unconstitutional changes of government, and call for the restoration and completion of disrupted electoral processes in line with AU norms. It may further underscore the importance of aligning national electoral frameworks with the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, particularly concerning term limits, inclusivity, and the participation of transitional authorities. The PSC may encourage Member States to invite AU election observation missions in a timely manner, undertake necessary electoral and institutional reforms, ensure the neutrality of security forces, and uphold restraint and responsibility among all stakeholders to promote peaceful, credible, and inclusive elections across the continent.
The gathering storm facing Africa in 2026: Entrenching conflicts, Fractured Order, and eroding agency
The gathering storm facing Africa in 2026: Entrenching conflicts, Fractured Order, and eroding agency
Date | 14 January 2026
Abdul Mohammed, Former Senior UN Official and Chief of Staff of AU High-level Panel on Sudan
Solomon Ayele Dersso, PhD, Founding Director, Amani Africa
Africa is entering 2026 not at a moment of transition, but at a moment of reckoning. Across the continent, armed conflict, state fragmentation, humanitarian collapse, economic distress, climate shocks, democratic erosion, and geopolitical entanglement are converging with a simultaneity and intensity unseen in recent decades. What distinguishes this moment is not the presence of crisis per se, but the growing risk that instability is becoming structural rather than episodic—normalized rather than exceptional.
This reckoning is unfolding against the backdrop of a deepening global disorder. The international system itself is unraveling at alarming speed. Established norms, institutions, and rules are eroding, replaced by ad hoc power politics, coercive economic statecraft, and fierce geopolitical competition. This disorder is not stabilizing. It is accelerating—and its consequences are ominous, particularly for Africa and others in the global South as events on Christmas day in Nigeria and on 6 January in Venezuela illustrate.
Parts of the Global South are struggling, unevenly and imperfectly, to reposition themselves in response to this turbulence. The question for Africa is, as SRSG and Head of UN Office to the AU Parfait Onanga-Anyanga recently put it, will it position itself to negotiate collective interests amidst this prolific and plural competition, or will African countries get picked off one by one?
Africa, however, enters 2026 with no clear evidence of serious, collective, continent-wide strategic reflection on how to navigate the emerging global order. As captured in a recent Amani Africa policy brief, Africa’s engagement is characterized by fragmentation, operating on the basis of ‘a patchwork of’ individual, often competing foreign policies of African states. While individual states and sub-regions may be engaging externally, they are largely doing so through transactional, bilateral, and short-term calculations, rather than through a shared Pan-African vision or common strategic posture.
The result is deeply concerning. Fierce competition among middle powers and major powers in Africa is deliberately fragmenting the continent, integrating African states, sub-regions, and institutions—by default or by design—into rival spheres of influence, one by one. This process steadily undermines Africa’s capacity to articulate and defend common positions, erodes continental solidarity, and dismantles the very foundations of collective action. These conditions are compounded due to the absence of a collective policy for governing its relations with global actors.
As Nkrumah prophesied on the dire consequences of disunity, without collectivity, Africa will not be a shaper of the emerging global order. It will be relegated to a footnote—reacting, adapting, and absorbing the consequences of decisions made elsewhere. In such a scenario, Pan-Africanism itself becomes hollow, reduced to rhetoric rather than strategy, symbolism rather than power.
The Geography of Africa’s Polycrisis
From the Horn of Africa to the Sahel and the Great Lakes region, conflict has ceased to be contained within national borders or finite political disputes, as extensively documented in Amani Africa signature publications (here and here). Instead, it has become regionalized, protracted, and embedded within broader political and economic systems. These regions now function as interconnected theaters of instability—zones where internal fragmentation intersects with external intervention, and where war increasingly sustains itself.
Arms flows, armed groups, war economies, displaced populations, and political narratives move fluidly across borders. Violence migrates, mutates, and reproduces itself. Local wars acquire continental and global consequences, disrupting trade corridors, fueling forced migration, and drawing in ever more external actors.
From Contested Wars to Permanent War Systems
In its signature publication accompanying the African Union summit, a report by Amani Africa poignantly pointed out that Africa has entered a new era of insecurity and instability. The nature of war in Africa has fundamentally changed. Contemporary conflicts are no longer primarily about seizing state power or achieving decisive military victory. They increasingly resemble wars of permanence—open-ended struggles sustained by political fragmentation, economic incentives, and geopolitical rivalry.
Armed actors have proliferated and diversified. States confront militias, paramilitaries, mercenary formations, and hybrid security forces, often while relying on similar actors themselves. Authority is diffused, accountability diluted, and violence outsourced.
Conflict has become economically rational. Smuggling, trafficking, illicit taxation, aid diversion, and control of trade routes sustain armed groups and political elites alike. Entire war economies have taken root, making peace politically difficult and economically threatening for those who profit from disorder.
External entanglement has intensified. Middle powers and global rivals increasingly treat African conflict zones as arenas of strategic competition. Access to resources, ports, markets, and military facilities frequently outweigh commitments to peace.
Civilians are no longer incidental victims, as exemplified by events in Sudan which are documented in Amani Africa’s report on prioritizing the protection of civilians. Displacement, starvation, and terror are increasingly deployed as strategies of control. Norms have eroded. Ceasefires rarely hold. Agreements no longer bind. Mediation is widely mistrusted.
Elections Without Peace: Democracy as a Risk Multiplier
As Africa approaches 2026, a dense calendar of elections looms across fragile and polarized contexts. Elections conducted without political settlement, security guarantees, institutional trust, and political inclusion do not endure. They redistribute conflict rather than resolve it.
Consistent with the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, the African Union must urgently revisit its election observation, validation, and certification practices. Recent controversial elections and rulings have eroded public trust in electoral politics, particularly in the context of upcoming elections in 2026.
The Collapse of Multilateral Authority
At precisely the moment Africa needs collective action, its multilateral institutions are at their weakest. Political capture, failure to articulate clear vision and mobilize consensus of member states, inconsistency, underfunding, and external bypassing have eroded credibility and enforcement capacity.
Peace initiatives are increasingly brokered outside African multilateral frameworks. They tend to be driven by transactional mindsets that prioritize short-term deals over norms and durable political settlements. This trend poses a mortal danger to Africa’s peace and security architecture, as the loss of leadership of the African Union (AU)on many files clearly attests.
Toward a Reform Agenda: Reclaiming Politics, Collectivity, and Pan-African Agency
This trajectory is not inevitable. But reversing it requires decisive collective action.
Africa must urgently undertake a serious, collective strategic reflection on its position in the emerging global order. The AU institutional reform offers an opportunity but only if it is done in a manner that breaks from the failed business as usual approach of the past years. The AU, together with regional economic communities, must craft and articulate a common Pan-African strategy to resist fragmentation and reclaim agency.
The primacy of politics must guide multilateral action. Conflict prevention and resolution need to be revitalized, anchored on robust diplomacy for peace. Peacemaking, mediation, and peacebuilding—not transactional dealmaking—must remain the core mandate of Africa’s multilateral institutions. Ceasefires are necessary but insufficient; they are steps toward political settlement, not substitutes for it.
Conflicts that are regional in nature require integrated regional strategies. Enforcement must matter. Decisions without consequences erode credibility.
War economies must be dismantled. Conflict financing networks, trafficking routes, and external sponsorship must be disrupted through coordinated regional and international action.
Peace initiatives must be principled and based on courageous leadership and impartial but solidly supported diplomatic strategy.
Civilians must be re-centered. Peace processes that exclude social forces, youth, women, and displaced populations lack legitimacy and durability.
Finally, elections must be subordinated to peace, not the reverse. No more elections without security guarantees, political inclusion, and consensus on the rules of the game.
2026: A Line in the Sand
Africa is approaching a decisive threshold. If current trends persist, 2026 may be remembered as the moment when permanent war became structurally entrenched and Africa’s collective voice fatally weakened.
The future remains salvageable—but only if serious reform based on recommitment to and robust defense of AU norms replaces ritual, collective strategy replaces fragmentation, and peace and Pan-Africanism are reclaimed as deliberate political choices rather than rhetorical aspirations bereft of resolve.
The content of this article does not represent the views of Amani Africa and reflect only the personal views of the authors who contribute to ‘Ideas Indaba’
A highlight from Amani Africa 2025 Impact profile: Promoting a coherent African policy approach on climate change
A highlight from Amani Africa 2025 Impact profile
Promoting a coherent African policy approach on climate change
Date | 14 January 2026
During 2025, in one of its most impactful engagements, Amani Africa’s work on climate change was critical to advancing a coherent African voice across different policy spaces. Informed by its recognition of the strategic significance of climate change policy-making globally for Africa, as a part of the world that least contributed to climate change but is most affected by the impacts of climate change, Amani Africa’s work focused both on overcoming fragmentation in the African Union’s engagement and charting a coherent African voice.
Amani Africa’s work in this respect involved the production of analysis, taking an active part in policy convenings, delivering presentations to AU policy organs and working closely with policy makers. Our analytical work was carried out through the specific editions of Amani Africa’s flagship publication, Insights on the Peace and Security Council (here and here) and more comprehensively in the presentation Amani Africa delivered to the Peace and Security Council of the AU (here).
There were key policy events in which we profiled our work and thinking towards advancing a coherent African voice in climate change policy-making through participation and presentations. The first was the UN Climate and Security Mechanism regional meeting held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 23 June 3035 at the UNECA.
Our work also featured in three high-level side events held during the Africa Climate Summit held on 8-10 September 2025 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
The key occasion for presenting a policy briefing to the AU policy organ was the session of the Peace and Security Council held on 17 September 2025, dedicated to climate change, peace and security.
Of particular significance was also our engagement and work with policymakers. This was critical to embed the key policy messages of our work in policy outcomes. Underscoring the need for not separating the peace and security implications of climate change from the climate change policy process with its focus on justice and development, the policy issues raised in our work including the principle of common but differentiated responsibility, the trade impacts of unilateral climate action such as the common border adjustment mechanism, climate finance and just energy transition found their way in the policy outcomes of the PSC’s 1301st session and the AU-EU summit declaration. Our approach to addressing the peace and security implications of climate change as part of and not in isolation from the wider climate change policy process, with its focus on development and justice, has proved useful to building common ground between states with divergent positions on the climate peace and security nexus.
Our technical engagement with policy makers on the negotiation on the AU-EU summit declaration contributed to both leaving out the reference to the selective language of ‘rules based international order’ in the AU draft. When it was brought back after the EU rewrote the AU draft, our engagement was critical to its removal and its replacement with the use of the inclusive formulation of ‘based on international law and the principles and purposes of the UN Charter.’
Emergency session on Israel’s recognition of Somaliland
Emergency session on Israel’s recognition of Somaliland
Date | 06 January 2026
Today (6 January), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council will hold a ministerial session on Israel’s recognition of Somaliland as an independent state. The session, not initially envisaged in the Provisional Program of Work of the PSC for January 2026, is convened following a request.
Following opening remarks by Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Chairperson of the PSC for January 2026, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, Chairperson of the AU Commission, is expected to make a statement. Abdisalam Abdi Ali, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Somalia, is also expected to deliver a statement as the concerned country. In addition, Abdoulkader Houssein Omar, Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Republic of Djibouti, is scheduled to make a statement in his capacity as Chair of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the concerned regional economic community/regional mechanism (REC/RM).
Since its proclamation of independence from Somalia in May 1991, Somaliland, the territory of the northern region of Somalia, has remained without any de jure recognition from any state in the world. This changed at the very end of 2025 with Israel becoming the first state to officially recognise the independence of Somaliland. On 26 December 2026, Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced that Israel and Somaliland had signed a joint declaration establishing full diplomatic relations, describing it as being ‘in the spirit of the Abraham Accords.’ Despite the willingness that Somaliland authorities expressed for joining the Abraham Accords, Israel’s recognition garnered no backing from any other country, even outside of the region.
Despite the enthusiastic reception in Somaliland of Israel’s official recognition as a historic development, Somalia, as the state with de jure authority over Somaliland, released a strong statement rejecting Israel’s decision, calling it an ‘attack on its sovereignty’ and an ‘unlawful action and asserting that the territory remains ‘an integral, inseparable and inalienable’ part of Somalia. Mogadishu was not alone in the rejection of Somaliland’s recognition. Countries in the region and beyond joined Somalia in their rejection of Somaliland’s recognition by Israel. Djibouti expressed its steadfast support for Somalia’s territorial integrity. Other countries, including Egypt, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, as well as the Arab League and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, also expressed strong opposition. Similarly, the European Union reaffirmed, through its spokesperson, ‘the importance of respecting the unity, the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Somalia.’ Meanwhile, the United States did not immediately follow Israel in recognising Somaliland; however, President Donald Trump reportedly stated, ‘Everything is under study… We will study it.’
For Africa and the AU, the issue of Somaliland is not completely new. Following its declaration of ‘republic’ in 2002 and invitation by Somaliland to the AU for undertaking a fact-finding mission, the AU dispatched such a fact-finding mission to Somaliland between 30 April and 4 May 2005, led by former AU Commission Deputy Chairperson, Patrick Mazimhaka. In December 2005, Somaliland submitted its application for membership in the AU. Somaliland’s President Dahir Rayale Kahin met on 16 May 2006 with the then AU Commission Chairperson Alpha Oumar Konare to discuss the matter.
Despite the legal issues that it raises, ordinarily it is not understandably approached as being exclusively a legal matter. Indeed, the legal dimension of Somaliland’s status has at best been approached in general terms through the lens of the AU’s and its predecessor Organisation of African Unity (OAU) principles of respect for the territorial integrity, unity and sovereignty of states, while it has neither been adjudicated in a proper judicial setting nor a legal opinion been given on it. The prevailing wisdom in the OAU/AU at the time and since then has been that this is a matter best considered as essentially being a strategic issue that needs to be handled, having regard to sensitivities around territorial integrity of states, stability and regional peace and security, hence without totally dismissing Somaliland’s quest. During tomorrow’s session, another legal issue, namely the legality of Israel’s decision, may attract attention. However, given that recognition of states under international law is a sovereign matter, much of the focus for member states could be on the strategic implications of Israel’s actions.
This recognition came at a time of major geopolitical rivalry and rising tension along the coast of the Red Sea and Gulf of Eden, involving various regional powers, including, among others, Turkey, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia. Geographically, Somaliland occupies a critical position on the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait at the southern end of the Red Sea. This chokepoint is a vital artery for global commerce and energy shipments – including oil and gas – moving between Asia and Europe via the Suez Canal. In recent years, the attacks by Yemeni Houthis on ships heading to Israel have significantly affected traffic. In exchange for its recognition, Israel is expected to gain a foothold across Yemen’s coast, potentially availing it access to bases or ports for maritime intelligence and security operations on the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. This may also enable Israel to check on the growing interest of Turkey in Somalia. There are also fears that Somaliland may be used for the resettlement of Palestinians from Gaza.
More generally, Israel’s recognition also broke a longstanding diplomatic understanding internationally that any recognition of Somaliland would follow the lead of Africa and the AU. Additionally, beyond traditional concerns of opening Pandora’s box, there are also concerns, as made apparent by the statement of Somalia, that it may have adverse peace and security implications. It also lacked any regional or international support.
Some of these issues emerged in the statements from the regional grouping IGAD and the AU Commission itself. The IGAD statement, which reaffirmed its commitment to the unity, territorial integrity and sovereignty of Somalia, held that ‘any unilateral recognition runs contrary to the Charter of the United Nations, the Constitutive Act and the Agreement establishing IGAD’ and expressed its commitment to ‘inclusive political processes and regional cooperation in support of lasting peace, stability and prosperity for Somalia and the wider IGAD region.’ In an approach that appears to completely shut any pathway for Somaliland’s recognition, the AU Commission Chairperson, in his statement, rejected ‘firmly’ ‘any initiative or action aimed at recognising Somaliland as an independent entity.’ He warned that such action runs ‘risks setting a dangerous precedent with far-reaching implications for peace and stability across the continent.’
On 29 December, the UN Security Council (UNSC) held an emergency session on Israel’s recognition of Somaliland. During the session, various members of the UNSC and others who, on request, intervened rejected Israel’s action and emphasised the need for respecting the territorial integrity, unity and sovereignty of Somalia. Similarly, the African 3plus members of the UNSC, including Somalia, echoed the statement of the AU Commission. Highlighting the need for addressing the determination of the final status of Somaliland through diplomatic means, in his briefing during the UNSC session, UN Assistant Secretary for the Middle East, Mohamed Khiari, called on ‘Somali stakeholders in peaceful and constructive dialogue, in particular recalling the 2023 Djibouti Communiqué on talks between the Federal Government of Somalia and Somaliland.’
It is generally expected that members of the PSC would echo support for the principle of territorial integrity, unity and sovereignty of states. They may also affirm the need for respecting the position of the AU and regional bodies such as IGAD. It may not also come as a surprise if reference is made to the 2005 AU fact-finding mission and the 2023 Djibouti Communiqué, to which the UN Assistant Secretary for the Middle East made reference during the UNSC session, to underscore the need for addressing the status of Somaliland through diplomatic means, with sensitivity and regard to stability, enhancement of peace and democratic system governance. Given the geopolitical context of the Horn of Africa and the dynamics in the AU, some may also caution that the situation is not instrumentalised by extra-regional actors to settle political scores and fuel division in the region.
At the time of going to press, it remained unclear what form the outcome of the session may take. It is, however, expected that the PSC, drawing on the statement of the AU Commission Chairperson, would reject Israel’s unilateral recognition of Somaliland. It may also welcome the statement of IGAD. The PSC, echoing the AU Commission Chairperson statement, is also expected to reaffirm the territorial integrity, unity and sovereignty of Somalia. It may also urge that all states respect the AU’s constitutive act and the longstanding principle of the territorial integrity of AU member states. The PSC may also state that no situation should be used as a theatre for advancing geopolitical interests of actors outside of the region, and instigate tension and division in Somalia and the region. It may call for constructive dialogue between Somalia and Somaliland, following the December 2023 Djibouti Communiqué.
Sudan At The Zero Point: Why Seventy Years Of Independence Demand New Political Thinking
Sudan At The Zero Point: Why Seventy Years Of Independence Demand New Political Thinking
Date | 02 January 2026
Abdulgadir (Abdul) Mohammed, Former Senior Political Advisor and Head of Office, Sudan Mediation, United Nations
Today marks 70 years since Sudan emerged from colonial rule in 1956 with immense hope: hope for dignity, justice, and a state that would serve its people rather than dominate them.
Seventy years later, Sudan is at war with itself. But it is essential to say this clearly, especially on such a symbolic date: this war does not reflect the character of the Sudanese people.
Anyone who has spent time among Sudanese communities knows this. Sudanese society is marked by generosity, civic solidarity, humor in hardship, and an instinctive care for others. Even during this devastating war, ordinary people have shared what little they have, sheltered strangers, organized neighborhood aid, and protected one another across ethnic, religious, and regional lines. The humanitarian work of the emergency response rooms speaks volumes about the character and spirit of the Sudanese people.
This civic spirit deeply impressed President Thabo Mbeki during his years leading the African Union mediation on Sudan. After travelling widely across the country and engaging communities far beyond negotiating halls, he once remarked: “I hope and pray that one day Sudanese will have a government that is as good as them.”
That hope still matters. It matters because Sudan’s tragedy is not a failure of its people. It is a failure of politics.
Why Zero Point matters for Sudan
I recently read a book called Zero Point by Slavoj Žižek. I did not read it looking for answers about Sudan, and I am not an academic. I am an African political activist and mediator. I read widely because reading sometimes helps me find language for realities that are difficult to name.
Žižek writes about moments when societies reach a point where the old order has already collapsed, yet everyone continues to behave as if it still exists. Governments are recognized, institutions function in name, negotiations continue, and official language remains confident—but none of this connects with lived reality anymore.
He calls this moment a “zero point.”
It is not the end of politics. It is more dangerous than that. It is the moment when the ground under politics gives way, but we keep using the same words, tools, and assumptions as if nothing fundamental has changed. The state exists, but no longer governs.
Sudan officially has a government led by the Sudanese Armed Forces. It is recognized internationally. Ministries exist. Flags fly.
But recognition is not the same as responsibility.
The state does not protect civilians at scale. It barely provides services. It does not organize social life beyond survival and coercion. It offers no shared national vision capable of commanding consent.
On the other side, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) control large parts of the country. Their leaders claim to be dismantling the unjust “1956 state,” a message that resonates with Sudanese at the peripheries who were excluded for decades. But what exists under RSF control is not reform or governance. It is rule by extreme uncertainty, displacement, and atrocity.
This is not a setback. It is disaster.
Much international engagement with Sudan treats the war as a setback: a failed transition, a power struggle between two generals, a crisis that can be managed with enough pressure and patience.
This is a profound misreading of the destructive nature of the war dynamic and its hostility to political settlement.
Defeat implies recovery. Disaster destroys the conditions of recovery.
In Sudan today, violence is not a breakdown of order—it is the order. Atrocity is not accidental—it is how control is exercised. Fear, hunger, and displacement are tools of power.
Polarization as an instrument of defeat
One of the most destructive features of Sudan’s war is polarization—not as a social by-product, but as a political strategy.
Polarization narrows political space until only existential camps remain. Compromise becomes betrayal. Politics becomes war by other means. Even if guns fall silent, politics cannot resume because trust and shared language have been destroyed.
What Zero Point teaches
The key lesson from Zero Point is this: when societies reach a zero point, repeating old formulas becomes part of the problem. Reformist language, procedural optimism, and technical fixes no longer illuminate reality; they obscure it.
At the zero point, the choice is not between good and bad options. It is between thinking honestly or surrendering to catastrophe.
Mamdani and the slow poison of collapse
This warning resonates deeply with African political thought, especially the work of Mahmood Mamdani and his recent book, Slow Poison.
Mamdani argues that many postcolonial crises are not sudden failures but the result of long-term, incremental damage—the slow hollowing out of political institutions, civic life, and popular sovereignty.
His critique of neoliberal governance is especially relevant. Neoliberalism weakens the state’s social foundations while strengthening its coercive arm. Over time, politics is emptied of meaning, leaving force to fill the vacuum.
Sudan’s collapse fits this pattern.
Beyond Islamism and neoliberalism
Sudan cannot be rebuilt within old ideological binaries. Islamism failed to build inclusive politics. Neoliberalism failed to build a socially rooted state.
New thinking must move beyond both. This does not negate negotiation or the urgency of stopping the war immediately. Ending the war is a moral imperative.
But without new thinking, a ceasefire risks freezing disaster in place.
Seventy years to nowhere—and a chance to begin again.
Seventy years after independence, Sudan stands at a painful crossroads. One could describe this history as seventy years to nowhere—a cycle of militarization, exclusion, and aborted democratic promise.
But Sudan’s people have not failed. They have resisted, organized, and cared for one another. The failure lies in political systems that never rose to their level.
The Sudanese people deserve a government as good as they are.
Politics is still possible—but only if we are willing to think differently and rebuild from the truth.
The content of this article does not represent the views of Amani Africa and reflect only the personal views of the authors who contribute to ‘Ideas Indaba’
Guinea-Bissau, not Benin, the real test of the efficacy of ECOWAS’s response to coups
Guinea-Bissau, not Benin, the real test of the efficacy of ECOWAS’s response to coups
Date | 31 December 2025
Solomon Ayele Dersso, PhD
Founding Director, Amani Africa
As in the previous years, West Africa remains on the lead when it comes to being ground zero for the new era of coups in Africa. During the closing months of 2025, the region experienced a coup orchestrated by an incumbent election losing president in Guinea-Bissau and another attempted coup in Benin.
It was in the early hours of 7 December that a group of soldiers initiated a coup in Cotonou. After seizing the national broadcaster, they announced the dissolution of state institutions, the suspension of the constitution and the creation of the Comité Militaire pour la Refondation, led by Lt-Col Pascal Tigri. Despite this announcement, the putschists did not succeed in either seizing Benin’s president or gaining the full support of the army. Acting on the request of Benin’s President Patrice Talon, a series of regional actions, under the auspices of the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS), culminated in forestalling the consummation of the coup. Nigeria played a lead role, with Nigeria’s President Bola Tinubu dispatching the country’s air force to strike positions held by coup makers. Within the framework of the ECOWAS Standby Force, Nigeria, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana and Sierra Leone also sent ground troops.
By the end of the day, these swift coercive measures, undertaken in close coordination with and logistical support from French forces, succeeded in foiling the coup attempt. The ECOWAS was hailed (here and here) for the role it played in foiling the attempted coup in Benin. Given the trends in recent years, the regional body’s response to the attempted coup against President Talon is rightly commended, potentially seen as marking a dawn for turning the tide against coups in the region.
Yet, given the timing of the coup in Guinea-Bissau and the attempted coup in Benin, the real test of whether the response of ECOWAS marks a turning point against coups came from Guinea-Bissau rather than Benin. What made the intervention in ECOWAS successful was a unique combination of factors, including the lack of full support from Benin’s army for the putschists, the economic and security interests of Nigeria that were at stake, as well as French logistical and intelligence support.
In Guinea-Bissau, despite the fact that the initial response of ECOWAS echoed its most successful and firm response to the post-electoral crisis in The Gambia in 2017, it was unable to follow through. Ten days before the coup attempt in Benin, after convening the national elections belatedly on 23 November and in a context meant to guarantee his re-election as President, Guinea-Bissau’s incumbent president, Umaro Sissoco Embalo, announced his own overthrow from power through a military coup. As the head of the ECOWAS election observation mission, former Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan told reporters that what happened in Guinea-Bissau was a ‘ceremonial coup’, suggesting that it was orchestrated by Embalo himself to prevent his electoral loss. Following Embalo’s announcement, on 26 November, a group of army officers announced their seizure of power and suspension of all political institutions. Declaring the establishment of the High Military Command for the Restoration of National Security and Public Order (HMC) as the governing body, it imposed an overnight curfew and halted the electoral process. Highlighting the close coordination of the coup between Embalo and the army, Embalo was allowed to fly out of Guinea-Bissau despite a declaration by the military of the closure of international borders and Embalo’s earlier announcement of being put under house arrest.
The Chairperson of ECOWAS, President Julius Maada Bio of Sierra Leone, convened an extraordinary summit on 27 November. The communiqué that the summit adopted condemned the ‘coup d’etat perpetrated on 26 November.’ Most importantly (and echoing ECOWAS’s earlier actions in Cote d’Ivoire (2010/11) and The Gambia (2016/17), the ECOWAS summit rejected ‘any arrangements that perpetuate an illegal abortion of the democratic process and the subversion of the will of the people of Guinea-Bissau.’ While deciding to suspend Guinea Bissau, ECOWAS demanded that the coup makers ‘respect the will of the people and allow the National Electoral Commission to proceed without delay with the declaration of the results of the elections of 23 November 2025.’ Cognisant of the imperative for swift and high-level engagement, it also mandated ‘the Chair of the (ECOWAS) Authority to lead a high-level Mediation Mission to Guinea Bissau to engage the leaders of the coup’.
Similarly, in an emergency session held on 28 November, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) decided to suspend Guinea-Bissau. Similar to ECOWAS, the PSC, beyond expressing its strong condemnation and total rejection of the coup, demanded that the military leaders ‘allow the National Electoral Commission to finalise the tabulation and proclamation of the results of the elections as well as accompany the electoral process to the end with the inauguration and assumption of the winner.’
Acting on the decision of the ECOWAS summit, President Bio of Sierra Leone led a delegation to Guinea-Bissau to push for ‘complete restoration of constitutional order.’ As part of the effort to safeguard the electoral process, Nigeria announced that it granted asylum and protection at its Embassy to Fernando Dias da Costa, the presumed winner of the 23 November presidential elections.
The ECOWAS and, by extension, the AU did not follow through on their earlier decisions. Despite the firm and appropriate initial response from both ECOWAS and the PSC, neither was able to follow through on their initial demand nor on the warning from ECOWAS that it reserved the right to use all options ‘including sanctions on all entities deemed culpable of disrupting the electoral and democratic process.’ Thus, when the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government met in mid-December, ECOWAS changed its approach from seeking the conclusion of the electoral process and safeguarding the will of the people of Guinea-Bissau to a short transition that will culminate in another election. Thus, despite reiterating its earlier decision and noting that the elections held on 23 November were free and fair, ECOWAS called for ‘institution of a short transition to be led by an inclusive government that reflects the political spectrum and society in Guinea Bissau, with a mandate to undertake constitutional, legal, and political reforms and the organization of credible, transparent and inclusive elections.’
What stands out in this decision is not simply that ECOWAS opted for abandoning its earlier demand for ‘respect for the will of the people’ of Guinea-Bissau, but also the regional body’s total silence about the complicity of the former president of Guinea-Bissau in the coup. This also signifies the persistent charge against ECOWAS and the AU that they tend to turn a blind eye to unconstitutional acts of incumbents.
Indeed, ECOWAS, drawing on its experience in securing the outcome of the December 2010 elections in Cote d’Ivoire, including through the use of sanctions, could have resorted to the option of adopting steps towards imposing sanctions, including by leveraging the West African Monetary Union (as it did in Cote d’Ivoire), as part of increasing the cost on the coup makers. Additionally, both ECOWAS and the AU could have initiated a process towards giving recognition of the outcome of the election results, as they did both in respect to Cote d’Ivoire and The Gambia in 2011 and 2017, respectively. Such steps would have slammed shut any route for the military leaders in Guinea-Bissau to entrench their illegal usurpation of power. Indeed, as a show of their seriousness about their zero tolerance for coups, ECOWAS and the AU, as El-Ghassim Wane proposed, could also have launched an investigation into the circumstances leading to the interruption of the electoral process and the attempt to frustrate the will of the people of Guinea-Bissau. The lack of such measures means that Embalo could continue to exploit the situation and the military junta could continue to defy ECOWAS in pursuit of its plans.
Despite the success in foiling the coup, the ECOWAS response in Benin is emblematic of the deeply flawed policy approach that has become characteristic of both the AU and regional bodies like ECOWAS: react to the symptom (coup) while remaining silent to the democratic regressions that underly the coup. Even more poignantly, the coup in Guinea-Bissau reveals that the turn of events in Cotonou does not in any way signify a new dawn in the approach of ECOWAS for turning the tide against coups in the region.
Provisional Programme of Work of the Peace and Security Council for January 2026
Provisional Programme of Work of the Peace and Security Council for January 2026
Date | January 2026
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) will assume the chairship of the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) for the month of January. The Provisional Programme of Work outlines six substantive sessions, of which five will focus on thematic issues, while one will address a country-specific situation. All sessions are scheduled to be held at the ambassadorial level. With the exception of the open session commemorating Africa Reconciliation Day and reflecting on lessons learned for countries affected by conflict, all meetings will be conducted as closed sessions.
On 12 January, the PSC is scheduled to consider and adopt the Provisional Programme of Work for February through official email correspondence. It is not clear if the recent practice whereby the incoming chairperson presents his/her vision of what is to be accomplished with the items proposed in the program of work is not followed systematically.
On 19 January, the PSC will convene its first substantive session to receive an update on the situation in South Sudan. The Council last considered the situation at its 1308th session on 28 October 2025, when it expressed grave concern over the political and security situation and the risk of relapse into violence. With much of the 2018 Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) systematically violated and intensifying conflicts, the PSC called for an all-inclusive, high-level political dialogue as the only viable path toward sustainable solutions. During the upcoming session, a key development likely to feature is the move to amend the R-ARCSS by delinking the general elections scheduled for December 2026 from the permanent constitution-making process, the national population census, and housing data. The Council of Ministers reportedly approved these amendments on 23 December, after which they are expected to undergo further institutional processes, including review by the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC) and ratification by the national legislature. While the government of President Salva Kiir has presented the amendments as a necessary step to facilitate long-delayed elections, opposition groups have rejected them as illegal, arguing that they were adopted without the consent of all parties to the Revitalised Agreement. The PSC is therefore expected to receive updates on these and related developments and their implications for the Agreement, as well as for peace and stability in South Sudan.
On 21 January, the Council will convene its bi-annual consideration of the half-year report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on elections in Africa. Building on the 1288th session held on 3 July 2025, during which the PSC reviewed elections conducted across the continent in the first half of 2025, the forthcoming session is expected to focus on elections held between July and December 2025. The report is also anticipated to provide an overview of elections scheduled for 2026, with particular attention to those planned for the first half of the year. Elections held in the second half of 2025 that are likely to feature in the Council’s deliberations include those in Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Malawi, Seychelles, Somalia, and Tanzania. Despite the attention and scrutiny that the elections in Cameroon and Tanzania attracted following reports of post-electoral violence accompanying Cameroon’s presidential election and Tanzania’s general elections, it is not anticipated that these elections will be subjected to critical scrutiny separate from other elections. The exception to this is the situation in Guinea-Bissau, where the largely credible election that had a clear winner was interrupted by a coup upon the military seizure of power by the ‘High Military Command for the Restoration of National Security and Public Order’. In addition to its treatment as part of the elections held in the second half of 2025, the PSC may also have a dedicated session to consider the conclusion of Guinea’s transition period, the general elections held on 28 December 2025, despite the lack of compliance with Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG).
On 23 January, the PSC will hold its third substantive session of the month to consider the ‘Report on the Activities of the Peace and Security Council and the State of Peace and Security in Africa’. Pursuant to Article 7 (q) of the PSC Protocol and in keeping with established institutional practice, the Council will, following its deliberations, transmit the report to the 39th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly, scheduled for mid-February 2026. The report is anticipated to present a consolidated account of the PSC’s undertakings during the reporting period, alongside an analytical appraisal of prevailing trends and developments shaping the continent’s peace and security environment.
On 28 January, the PSC will convene to discuss the revitalisation and consolidation of the Sanctions Sub-Committee. The session is expected to focus on clarifying the Sub-Committee’s terms of reference and mandate, as well as strengthening information-sharing and the exchange of experiences with experts from the United Nations Security Council. Notably, in 2025, the PSC did not convene any session to consider the activities of the Sub-Committee. Although the Sub-Committee was scheduled to meet on 24 June to provide updates on its work, there are no indications that this meeting took place. The forthcoming session is being held pursuant to a decision adopted by the PSC at its 1248th session, which requested the Sanctions Sub-Committee to urgently review the scope of its mandate to encompass violations of the AU Constitutive Act and the PSC Protocol beyond unconstitutional changes of government. In this context, the discussion is expected to revisit the AU’s sanctions framework, which has historically been applied primarily in cases of unconstitutional changes of government, and to assess the Union’s experience in investigating and sanctioning member states for breaches of other agreed norms. The session will also seek to draw lessons from United Nations best practices on investigations, the imposition of sanctions, and the monitoring and enforcement of compliance, with a view to adapting these processes to the AU context as relevant. Expanding the AU sanctions regime to address violations of other AU norms is therefore expected to constitute a central element of the deliberations.
On 29 January, the PSC will deliberate on the theme ‘Illegal exploitation of natural resources and proliferation of weapons in Africa as aggravating factors in conflicts: prospects for strengthening control mechanisms by the AU, Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) and Member States’ with a focus on the Sahel, the Lake Chad Basin, Sudan, and the Great Lakes region. This is not the first time the DRC has placed this issue on the Council’s agenda during its chairship. In November 2024, at its 1246th session, the PSC, during DRC’s chairship, discussed strengthening mechanisms to curb the illegal exploitation of natural resources by armed and terrorist groups. At that session, the Council requested the AU Counter-Terrorism Centre (AUCTC) to undertake a study on the issue and tasked the AU Commission with developing robust mechanisms to combat the illicit exploitation and trade of natural resources. The session also comes against the backdrop of growing concern over the proliferation of weapons, which continues to fuel terrorism, organised crime, and violent conflicts across regions—from the Sahel and coastal West Africa to the Great Lakes—as recently noted by the AU High Representative for Silencing the Guns. Factors such as porous borders, weak stockpile management, inadequate arms transfer controls, and the expansion of terrorism and organised crime have exacerbated the problem. The upcoming meeting will therefore provide an opportunity to assess progress on previous PSC decisions and to explore ways of strengthening continental, regional, and national control mechanisms to address the illicit exploitation of natural resources and the proliferation of weapons.
The Council’s final engagement of the month will take place on 31 January, when it will convene an open session marking the fourth commemoration of the African Day of Peace and Reconciliation, with a focus on lessons for countries affected by conflict. The session is expected to facilitate comparative reflection on national reconciliation trajectories and to distil practical insights on how the AU can more effectively advance peace and reconciliation across the continent. The African Day of Peace and Reconciliation is observed annually on 31 January and has been commemorated on that date in each of the previous three cycles, following its designation at the 16th Extraordinary Session of the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government held in May 2022 in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, during which João Manuel Gonçalves Lourenço was appointed as the AU Champion for Peace and Reconciliation in Africa.
In addition to the substantive sessions, the PSC’s Committee of Experts (CoE) is scheduled to convene virtually on two occasions during the month. From 14 to 16 January, the CoE will meet to consider the Report on the Activities of the Peace and Security Council and the State of Peace and Security in Africa. This will be followed by another virtual CoE meeting on 26 and 27 January, focusing on the revitalisation and consolidation of the PSC Sanctions Sub-Committee.
Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - November 2025
Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - November 2025
Date | November 2025
In November 2025, under the chairship of Cameroon, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) had a scheduled programme of work consisting of five substantive sessions, made up of three situation-specific sessions and two thematic sessions, as well as an informal consultation with countries in political transition. It also provided for the 17th Annual Retreat of the PSC on the Review of its Working Methods, the Abuja Lessons-Learned Forum and the 8th Annual Consultative Meeting with the United Nations (UN) Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). After the revision of the programme, the PSC held six substantive sessions, with only two dedicated to country-specific situations. All six sessions were convened at the ambassadorial level.
